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INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY
SERIES
1815
WATERLOO
-
HOUSSAYE
1815
WATERLOO
BY
HENRY HOUSSAYE
Of the French Academy
TRANSLATED BY
S. B. WILLIS
PUBLISHED BY
FRANKLIN HUDSON PUBLISHING CO.,
Kansas City, Mo.
Copyright, 1905, by
Franklin Hudson Publishing Co.,
Kansas City, Mo.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
BOOK ONE.
Entrance into Campaign.
Chapter I. - The Last Army of the Empire. PAGE
I. - The transition from a peace to a war footing. - Recall of
the men on leave of absence. - Mobilization of the National
Guard. - The conscription of 1815 9
II. - The armament and clothing. - Supplies. - The fortresses.
- The war budget 17
III. - First and second distributions of the troops into army-
corps. - Strength of the first army and the auxiliary
army on June 15, 1815 24
IV. - Removals and promotions : 26
V. - The command : The Marshals of France 30
VI.- The command : The Chief of Staff 35
VII. - The command : The Generals 38
VIII. - The spirit of the Army 43
Chapter II - The Plans of Campaign.
I. - Idea of an invasion of Belgium in the first days of April. 51
II. - The Allies' plan of campaign 53
III. - Napoleon's plan of campaign 55
IV. - Concentration of the French Army (June 8-14). - Arrival
of the Emperor at Beaumont. - Strength and positions
of the armies on June 14th 58
Chapter III. - FIRST COMBATS.
I - Passage of the Belgian frontier (June 15th). - The
desertion of General Bourmont 61
II. - Capture of Charleroi 64
III. - Interview between Napoleon and Ney. - Combat of Gilly
on the right wing 66
IV. - The operations of Ney. - Combat of Gosselies. - Combat of
Frasnes. - Quatre-Bras 70
3
4 Table of Contents.
BOOK TWO.
LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS.
Chapter I. - The Morning of June 16th. page
I. - The plans and orders of Napoleon (from five to eight
o'clock) 73
II. - The departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine) ... 75
III. - Concentration of the Prussian Army to the north of the
Ligny. - Inactivity of the English Army during the day
of June 15th. - The ball of the Duchess of Richmond
(night of June I5th-16th) 77
IV. - Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (June 16th, ten
o'clock). - Interview between Wellington and Blücher
at the mill of Bussy, near Ligny (one o'clock in the
afternoon) 81
Chapter II. - The Battle of Ligny.
I. - The field of battle. - Dispositions of Blücher and Napo-
leon 85
II. - From three o'clock until four : Attacks of Saint-Amand by
Vandamme and of Ligny by Gérard 89
III. - From four o'clock until half- past seven: Counter-attack
of Blücher. - Appearance of a supposed column of the
enemy upon the flank of the French Army. - Demon-
stration of Grouchy against the Prussian left. - Stub-
born fight in Saint-Amand and Ligny 92
IV. - From half-past seven o'clock until half-past nine: Final
assault. - Capture of Ligny. - Combats of the hills. -
Retreat of the Prussians 98
Chapter III. - The Battle of Quatre-Bras.
I. - Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of June 16th.
Reiterated orders of the Emperor 103
II. - Attack of Quatre-Bras by the corps of Reille (two o'clock
in the afternoon). - Return of Wellington to Quatre-
Bras and arrival of the first English reinforcements
(three o'clock). - Death of the Duke of Brunswick (half-
past four o'clock) 106
III. - False movement of Count d'Erlon
IV. - The charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'clock). - Of-
fensive movement of Wellington (seven o'clock). - The
French driven back into their first positions (from
eight to nine o'clock) 113
Chapter IV. - The Retreat of the Prussian Army.
I. - The first plans of Napoleon for the day of June 17th. . . . 118
II. - The orders of the Emperor to Grouchy (between eleven
and half-past eleven o'clock) 121
Table of Contents. 5
PAGE
III. - Retreat of the Prussian Army on Wavre 124
IV. - Movements of Pajol and Exelmans towards Namur and
Gembloux in pursuit of the Prussian columns 126
V. - March of the army of Grouchy - Bivouac at Gembloux. -
Letter of Grouchy to the Emperor (ten o'clock in the
evening) 128
Chapter V. - The Retreat of the English Army.
I. - Exchange of despatches between Blücher and Wellington
(morning of June 17th). Retreat of the English Army
(ten o'clock) 134
II. - Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still occupied by the
English cavalry (two o'clock) 136
III. - Vigorous pursuit of the English rear guard by Napoleon
in person. - Combat of Genappe. - Cannonade of Mont
Saint-Jean (seven o'clock) 139
IV. - The night bivouac. 141
V. - Uncertainties of Napoleon. - Letter from Blücher to
Wellington. - Orders of Napoleon (night of June 17th-18th) 143
BOOK THREE.
WATERLOO.
Chapter I. - Blücher and Grouchy.
I. - Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the
morning of June 15th - Departure from Wavre of
Field Marshal Blücher (eleven o'clock) 149
II. - Dispositions of Grouchy 151
III. - Discussion between Gérard and Grouchy at Walhain
(noon) 155
Chapter II. - The Battle of Waterloo. - Morning.
I. - Topography of the field of battle 158
II. - Positions of the Anglo-Dutch Army 160
III. - Luncheon of Napoleon at Caillou. - Letter to Grouchy. . . 163
IV - The last review (ten o'clock). - Order of battle of the
French Army. - Disposition of Napoleon for the attack
(eleven o'clock) 167
Chapter III. - The Battle of Waterloo. - From half-past eleven to
three o'clock.
I. - Attack of Hougoumont by Jérôme Bonaparte's division of
Reille's corps 173
II. - Appearance of Bülow's corps upon the heights of Chapelle
Saint-Lambert. - New despatch of Napoleon to Grouchy 175
III. - Attack of La Haye Sainte and of the plateau of Mont
Saint-Jean by the corps of Count d'Erlon 178
6 Table of Contents.
PAGE
IV. - Counter-attack of the English of Picton. - Charge of the
Horse Guards of Somerset. - Mishap of the cuirassiers
in the hollow road 180
V. - Charge of the dragoons of Ponsonby. - Rout of d'Erlon's
infantry. - Counter-charge of the lancers of Jacquinot
and the cuirassiers of Farine. - Burning of Hougoumout. 181
Chapter IV. - The Battle of Waterloo. - From three o'clock until seven.
I.- Second attack of La Haye Sainte - The order from Ney
to Milhaud 186
II. - First and second charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud and
of the light cavalry of the Guard. - Order from the
Emperor to the cuirassiers of Kellermann and to the
cavalry of Guyot 189
III. - Entrance into line of Bülow's corps. - Lobau's defence. -
Capture and recapture of Plancenoit ..... 192
IV. - third and fourth charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud,
supported by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and horse
grenadiers of the Guard 195
V. - General attack of the plateau by the infantry of Reille and
d'Erlon and by the débris of the cavalry. - Capture of
La Haye Sainte. - The English line shaken. - New
combats at Plancenoit 198
Chapter V. - The Battle of Waterloo. - From seven to nine o'clock.
I. - Dispositions for the final attack. - Strengthening of the
English line. - Approach of Ziethen's corps 202
II. - Assault of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean by the Middle
Guard 205
III. - "The Guard recoils!" - General advance of the English
Army - Irruption of the Prussians of Ziethen. - The
panic 209
IV. - The squares of Christiani, Roguet, and Cambronne 211
V. - Arrival of Pirch's corps to the support of Bülow. -
Butchery in Plancenoit. - The mêlée on the plateau of La
Belle Alliance. - The last squares of the Old Guard. ... 213
Chapter VI.- The Rout.
I. - Meeting of Wellington and Blücher in front of La Belle
Alliance (quarter-past nine). - The rout of the French 217
II. - Attempt at resistance in Genappe (eleven o'clock) 219
III. - Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of June 18th-19th) 221
IV. - Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras. - The Army passes
the Sambre at Charleroi (morning of June 19th; 223
V. - Retreat on Laon. - Departure of the Emperor for Paris
(June 20th) 226
Chapter VII. - The Combats of Wavre and the Retreat of Grouchy.
I. - March of Grouchy on Wavre. - Combat of La Baraque. -
Attack of Wavre (afternoon of June 18th) 231
Table of Contents. 7
PAGE
II. - The second despatch of Soult - New assaults against
Wavre and Bierges. - Passage of the Dyle at Limale
and night combat 235
III. - Renewal of the combat and defeat of Thielmann (morning
of June 19th). - News of the disaster (half-past ten in
the morning). - Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and
evening of June 19th) 238
IV. - Combats of La Falise and Boquet (morning of June 20th).
- Defense of Namur (from three to nine in the
evening). - Rallying at Givet of the army of Grouchy (June
21st) 242
Chapter VIII.-The Campaign of 1815.
I. - The operations of June 15th. - The battles of Ligny and
Quatre-Bras 246
II. - The error of Napoleon 252
III. - Marshal Grouchy 256
IV. - Waterloo 263
WATERLOO.
BOOK ONE.
Entrance into Campaign.
CHAPTER I.
The Last Army of the Empire.
I. - The transition from a peace to a war footing. - Recall of the men
on leave of absence. - Mobilization of the National Guard. -
The conscription of 1815.
II. - The armament and clothing. - Supplies. - The fortresses. - The
war budget.
III. - First and second distributions of the troops into army corps. -
Strength of the first army and the auxiliary army on June
15, 1815.
IV. - Removals and promotions.
V. - The command: The Marshals of France.
VI.- The command : The Chief of Staff.
VII. - The command : The Generals.
VIII.- The spirit of the Army.
I.
On his return from the isle of Elba the Emperor found no-
more than 200,000 men under the flags. If he had felt himself
to be all-powerful as formerly, he would have had recourse for
doubling the Army, to an extraordinary levy of the classes of
1806 to 1814, to the recall of the class of 1815, and to the
anticipated call of the class of 1816. But, having hardly resumed
the throne, he hesitated before so unpopular a measure as
the reestablishment of the conscription, which had been
9
-2-
10 WATERLOO.
abolished by Louis XVIII. He had then for sole resources the
return into the ranks of the soldiers on limited and unlimited
leave and the recall of numerous deserters carried on the muster-
rolls as "absent without permission." The men on six months'
furlough amounted to 32,800, the deserters to 85,000. Almost
all of the men on six months' furlough could be counted on to
rejoin their colours; already three or four thousand had arrived
at the depots, in conformity with the royal ordinance of March
9th. But among the 85,000 men "absent without permission"
it was necessary to admit that there would be a great number
who would not rejoin their regiments and also a great many
who would be entitled to receive definite discharges, either on
account of infirmities, or as supports of their families. Marshal
Davout, Minister of War, estimated that the recall of soldiers
of every category would give scarcely 59,000 men.
The decree calling out the reserves, which had been
prepared on March 28th, was not made public until April 9th.
This delay was attributable to reasons of a political nature.
The Emperor, who at that time was attempting by all possible
means to enter in negotiations with the powers for the
maintenance of peace, feared that the putting of the Army on a war
footing would belie his pacific protestations. Towards the
French population, who so ardently desired peace, he felt
constrained to show the same consideration. The West was
in agitation, the Midi was in arms; in the rest of France the
Royalists were labouring to destroy the popularity of the
Emperor by predicting war. This was not the moment to alarm,
to dissatisfy all the country by calling out the reserves. More-
over, Napoleon still preserved a ray of hope that there would
not be a rupture with Europe. This illusory hope diminishing
from hour to hour, he decided to publish the decree in the
Moniteur of April 9th. As he foresaw, this decree struck a
blow at public opinion. In a few days the rente fell eight
francs. Sadness and discouragement prevailed throughout
the land. The peasants, generally very happy at no longer
having to endure the vexations of the country nobility or to
fear the reestablishment of privileges and the replevin of the
property of the émigrés, felt their sentiments for the Emperor
growing weaker at the thought that his return was about to
bring, if not a second invasion, at least an interminable war.
By reason of the time necessary for the transmission and
the posting of Orders and legal delays, the mustering-in of the
The Last Army of the Empire. 11
men began only on April 25th. Public opinion was so opposed
to the idea of war that among the men recalled, though all of
them were old soldiers of Napoleon, a great many presented
themselves only in order to show cause why they should be
exempted or discharged from further service. It is true that,
though a great number of these men had deserted in 1814 in
order to avoid wearing the white cockade, a great number had
left their corps because they were weary of war. During the
last year they had resumed work in the fields and workshops,
and a great many of them had married; hence they were still
less disposed to take up arms again. In the departments in
which the Royalist spirit predominated, and in which those
who had been recalled to arms felt themselves supported by
the population, the meetings of the Board of Examiners were
tumultuous. The men cried: "We will not set out. Long
live the King!" Fearing an insurrection in the West, the
Emperor authorized many prefects of that region to apply the
decree with great circumspection, and even to suspend its
execution. In spite of everything, the levy gave 17,000 men
more than Davout, who was little inclined to illusions, had
presumed. In the first days of June 52,446 men had been
incorporated and 23,448 were en route to rejoin their regiments.
The voluntary enlistments, which had been so rare during
The Campaign of France, amounted to nearly 15,000 men. A
Royal ordinance of December 31, 1814, granted to each
enrolled volunteer a bounty of fifty francs. The Emperor
suppressed this bounty. "This method," said he, "is not in
accord with the sentiments manifested by the French in the
defence of their independence." In order to increase the
enlistments, the Emperor thought of causing to be read by officers
of the Guard calls to arms, accompanied by the beating of
drums, upon the public places, around the workshops, and in
the villages. But, Davout having represented to him that
"this would cause useless disorder," he abandoned this
expedient of the recruiting sergeants of the eighteenth century
Reduced to a few vessels in condition to take the sea,
without crews (two-thirds of the sailors had been sent home
on furlough), and without supplies, the fleets could only be
employed in some cruises in the Mediterranean. With the
available men in the ports and the naval reserves the Emperor
hoped to constitute fifty or sixty battalions of sailors. It was
only with great difficulty that twenty were formed, and by
12 WATERLOO.
the middle of June only one had been put en route; it formed
the garrison of Calais. The three regiments of the artillery
of the Marine, of a real effective of 5,284 men under the
Restoration, were raised to nearly 6,000 by the organization of a new
battalion. Six battalions remained in the ports, whose
defence they assured; two were detached to Paris, one went to
Lyons, and another fought in Brittany in the mobile column
of General Bigarré.
Of the three foreign regiments which existed under Louis
XVIII., the Emperor preserved the second (Isenberg) and
the third (Irish), presenting together 875 bayonets; the first
(La Tour d'Auvergne), which had remained faithful to the
Duke of Angoulême during the short campaign in the Midi,
was disbanded. The Emperor would have liked to have kept
the four Swiss regiments, but the opposition manifested by
the officers to taking the tricolour cockade necessitated the
disbanding of these troops. Napoleon busied himself with
organizing five new foreign regiments: one of Poles, quickly
raised to 800 men, thanks to the soldiers of the ex-legion of the
Vistula, who, although disbanded in 1814, had not yet returned
to Poland; one of Swiss, into which entered 502 men of the
four regiments suppressed on April 2nd; one of Italians, one of
Germans, and one of Dutch-Belgians. These three last were
to be formed with deserters from the armies of Frimont,
Blücher, and the Prince of Orange. At the beginning of June
the Dutch-Belgian regiment counted 378 bayonets. Finally
there were raised in the Gironde a battalion of negroes and a
few companies of Spanish refugees.
The country being threatened, the laws and decrees of
1791, 1792, 1805, and 1813, which had not been abrogated,
gave the Emperor the right to increase the Army by means of
mobilized National Guards. Some days after his return to the
Tuileries he occupied himself, with Davout and Carnot, in
reorganizing the National Guard. There were at that time in all
France nearly 200,000 National Guards, aged from twenty to
sixty years, and Carnot estimated that this number could be
raised to 2,500,000. A decree, rendered on April 10th,
prescribed that all citizens liable to service in the National Guard
should be inscribed upon the muster-rolls in order to be
formed into battalions. The Emperor did not think of
organizing such a multitude, but he counted on taking there from
a great number of mobilized battalions, composed solely of
The Last Army of the Empire. 13
men from twenty to forty years old. He remembered that at
Fere-Champenoise in 1814 the National Guards had fought like
old soldiers. By new decrees the Emperor ordered the
mobilization of 326 battalions of 720 men each, which were to be
directed immediately upon the frontier places and the
entrenched camps. This was putting again in force the decree
of the Legislative Assembly of July 11, 1792, with this
attenuation, that in the war battalions the providing of substitutes
was fixed at the small sum of 120 francs.
In a score of departments, notably in Aisne, Ain,
Ardeche, Ardennes, Aube, Céte-d'0r, Isere, Jura, Marne, Meurthe,
Meuse, Mont-Blanc, Haut-Rhin, Bas-Rhin, Rhone, Haute-
Saone, Saone-et-Loire, Seine-et-Marne, Seine-et-Oise, Vosges,
and Yonne, the levy was effected very easily, the battalions
soon received their full complement of men, and the mobilized
National Guards quitted family and fireside with cries of
"Long live the Emperor!" and with the enthusiasm of 1791.
Those of the Guards who were able to do so purchased their
own arms and uniforms. But the same patriotism and the
same good-will did not animate the whole of France. In half
of the country, in spite of the Guards and mobile columns,
hardly one-fourth of the fixed contingents could be raised.
By the end of May Orne had furnished 107 Guards out of 2,160
demanded, Pas-de-Calais 437 out of 7,440, and Gers 98 out of
1,440. At Amiens this proclamation was circulated: "Who
has recalled Bonaparte? The Army. Well, let it defend him.
His enemies are our friends. We will not arm to defend a
man whom hell has vomited forth." In Vendee and Brittany,
where an insurrection was feared, the National Guards were
not called out; but when civil war began, some thousands of
citizens took up arms spontaneously and seconded the troops
against the Royalist bands without, however, leaving their
department.
Out of the 234,720 National Guards called into service by
the decrees from April 10th to May 15th, nearly 150,000 were
by June 15th assembled in the fortresses or on the march for
them. A third of the officers for the battalions were named
from the officers on half-pay and for the other two-thirds from
the civil element. The Emperor had not wished to leave the
selection of the officers to election. He named them from civil
lists, prepared in each department by a committee composed
of a prefect, a councillor-general, two generals, and a superior
14 WATERLOO.
officer. Almost all of the National Guards not only appeared:
resigned to do their duty, but determined to do it willingly.
They drilled their best, yielded docilely to discipline, and
entered the cities with branches of lilac in the muzzles of their
guns, singing the "Marseillaise," and terminating each couplet
with cries of "Long live the Nation! Long live the Emperor!"
If there sometimes arose complaints, it was from those who
were yet neither armed nor clothed and who demanded guns,
overcoats, and shoes. Mortier, Jourdan, Leclerc des Essarts,
Rouyer, Lanusse, Berckheim, and all the general officers who
commanded mobilized National Guards or passed them in
review, praised the good spirit and fine attitude of these
improvised soldiers. Gérard wrote Vandamme, June 5th: "The
ten battalions of National Guards of the reserve of Nancy are
superb. In three weeks there will be no difference between
them and the troops of the Line."
If the war lasted any length of time, the men from twenty
to forty years of age, forming the first ban of the National
Guard, could be counted on to give at least 150,000 more men,
for a great number of refractory men from the departments of
the Centre and Midi would end by submitting to the law; thanks
to the pacification of Vendee, which was near and certain, the
decrees relating to the mobilization of the National Guards
could be applied in the departments of the West; and, finally,
there would be an opportunity to decree new levies in the
patriotic departments of the East. For the second ban of the
militia, its organization was not pressed, save at Paris and
Lyons. When the lack of time and arms prevented the forming
of the mobilized battalions, it was not the hour to increase the
sedentary battalions, which, by reason of the pacific services
which they were to render, were already sufficiently numerous.
In the mass of citizens aged from forty to sixty years there
were, however, a great many men who could be used
advantageously in the defence of the fortresses. They were the old
officers, subalterns, and soldiers retired after a minimum service
of twenty-four years. Since the month of April many retired
officers had requested permission to re-enter the Army; but
there were so many officers on half pay that all of them could
not be utilized. With the retired officers and soldiers Davout
thought of forming battalions of veterans for the fortresses.
"They will set an example for the National Guards," wrote he
to the Emperor, "and will inspire them with the military
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 15
spirit." Napoleon did not fail to adopt this proposition.
On May 18th he rendered a decree inviting all retired soldiers
to resume service temporarily, in order to be organized into
battalions and batteries for the fortresses. The retired soldiers,
who numbered 94,000, but of whom hardly half appeared eligible
for service, hastened to present themselves at the mustering-
places. With the most robust there were formed fifty-six
battalions and twenty-five companies of artillery, of a total
strength of nearly 25,000 men.
At Paris the sedentary National Guard was raised to
6,518 men. The workmen of the faubourgs had demanded
spontaneously to coöperate in the defence of the city, and
from these workmen twenty-four battalions of Federate
Sharpshooters were formed. These 18,000 sharpshooters,
commanded by officers on half-pay, were destined to occupy the
advance posts and the works of the first line. At Lyons there
were by June 12th 4,000 sedentary National Guards, and
Mouton-Duvernet was busy forming fifteen battalions of
Federate Sharpshooters. In Aisne and Ardennes and in all the
departments of the East the levies en masse could be counted on
in case the country was invaded. Composed of foresters,
gendarmes, custom-house officers, sedentary National Guards, and
in general of all the able-bodied citizens, the levies en masse
were to assemble at the sound of the tocsin upon the order of
the military authorities in order to occupy the mountains
and defiles.
With the 150,000 mobilized National Guards, the 25,000
retired soldiers, the 26,000 Federates of Paris, Lyons, Toulouse,
and Nancy, the urban and rural National Guards, the free corps
and the levies en masse, it seemed that the fortresses, the large
cities, the defiles, and the bridge-heads would be sufficiently
provided with defenders. But in spite of voluntary
enlistments and of the return of two-thirds of the men on furlough,
the active army was still too weak. After much hesitation,
the Emperor decided to call out the class of 1815. The
conscription had been abolished by Article XIL of the Royal
Charter; and this article having been interpreted as having a
retroactive effect for the conscripts of 1815, though a sénatus-
consulte of October 9, 1813, had called them under the flags,
it was to be feared that the recall of these conscripts would be
regarded as an abuse of power. Davout himself, ordinarily
so resolute, represented to the Emperor that it would not be
16 WATERLOO.
prudent to pronounce the unpleasant word "conscription.
"It would be better," said he, "to change the name of the thing,
and declare that all young men having entered into their
twentieth year since the 1st of January last will make a part
of the National Guard and will be directed upon the depots of
the Army, with the promise of being discharged after the end
of the war." The Council of State, to which the projected
decree relating to the conscription of 1815 was submitted in
the meeting of May 23d, refused to give its adherence to the
measure, "the levying of men being within the jurisdiction of
the legislative power."
To await the meeting of the Chambers! But would the
enemy await until they met before entering France? Now,
the conscription of 1815 would furnish 120,000 soldiers, of
whom 20,000 had fought during the last campaign. The
Emperor removed the scruples of the Council of State by proposing
to assimilate the conscription of 1815 with the soldiers on
leave of absence. To recall them a decree would be no longer
necessary; a simple administrative measure would suffice.
The Council of State enunciated a favourable opinion, and in
the first days of June Davout was able to issue instructions
for the levy of the class of 1815. The country had then
decided that, since war was inevitable, it was necessary to make
the best of it. The departure of the conscripts was effected
without the resistance and rebellions which had been occasioned
in so many of the departments by the recall of the soldiers on
furlough and in a less degree by the mobilization of the National
Guards. On June 11th - that is to say, one week after the
decree had been made public - 46,419 conscripts had assembled,
ready to set out, in the chefs-lieux of the departments. In
Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Franche-Comté, Burgundy, and
even in many provinces of the Centre, an extreme good-
will was reported. The Prefect of Seine-et-Oise wrote: "The
conscripts of 1815 have assembled in three days with an
astounding facility." The Prefect of Mont-Blanc remarked that his
department had furnished more combatants than at any time
of the Revolution. Aisne, which from April 1st to June 12th
had given 18,200 volunteers, recalled soldiers, conscripts,
mobilized National Guards, irregular sharpshooters, and retired
soldiers - among whom were to be seen some old men of seventy-
three years - merited these words from Napoleon "In this
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 17
department (Aisne) there will be found as many men as there
will be guns with which to arm them."
II.
A great many guns, munitions, provisions, horses,
uniforms, and shoes were necessary, and there were very few.
Almost all of the material had to be improvised. If the
artillery possessed 13,947 pieces of ordnance, it was in need of
horses, harness, and 600,000 projectiles. In the infantry and
cavalry regiments, both with greatly reduced effectives, the
armament was complete; but to arm the recalled soldiers, the
enlisted volunteers, the naval reserves, the mobilized National
Guards, the Federate Sharpshooters, and the conscripts of 1815,
who, according to the expectation of everyone, would amount
towards the middle of September to more than 500,000 men,
there were in the arsenals and magazines but 195,000 muskets,
of which 74,000 were in need of repairs.
"The safety of the country," wrote Napoleon, "depends
upon the quantity of guns with which we shall be able to arm
ourselves." The imperial factories, to which all the gunsmiths,
exempted from the different conscriptions since the year VIII.
(1799), were recalled by decree, received an order for 235,000
muskets and musketoons and 15,000 pairs of pistols. The
bayonets were made in the cutleries of Langres and Moulins.
Ten thousand fowling-pieces and 4,000 blunderbusses were
distributed among the peasants of Alsace, Lorraine,
Champagne, and Burgundy. For repairing the unserviceable guns,
one had recourse to private industry. Workshops were
established in the principal cities, in which were employed all the
gunsmiths, locksmiths, cabinet-makers, and braziers; in Paris
there were six of these shops, which employed 2,000 workmen.
The Government also attempted to purchase some guns in
England, and a few thousand were brought from Belgium and the
Rhenish provinces, concealed in coal barges. Others were
brought in by the peasants, a reward of 12 francs being offered
for each gun restored; and others still were requisitioned from
the merchants and ship-owners, who had been notified by
means of placards to furnish a list of all the arms in their
possession.
In spite of the activity displayed and all the means
employed, the men arrived at the dépôts faster than the arms
18 WATERLOO.
entered into the arsenals. The factories and shops could
furnish but 20,000 new and almost the same number of
repaired guns per month. In the first days of June hardly half
of the mobilized National Guards had received muskets. As
for the short swords for the infantry, the making of which had
been suspended, for it was first necessary to make bayonets,
it was decided that, even in the Line, only the companies of
grenadiers should be provided with them. Cuirasses were
lacking. "Cause the men to rejoin anyhow," wrote Napoleon;
"cuirasses are not indispensable for making war." Every-
where the making of cartridges was pressed in such fashion as
to raise the supply to 100 cartridges per man; 50 in the
cartridge-box and 50 in the caissons of the park. At Vincennes
12,000,000 were manufactured in two months. On June
1st the reserve supply of the Army of the North amounted
to 5,500,000 cartridges, and the soldiers of all the regiments
in the first line had, with a few exceptions, their complement
of 50 cartridges.
Not only the Government of the Restoration had done
nothing to restore the magazines of clothing emptied by the
gigantic armaments of 1812 and 1813, but it had not even
provided for the maintenance of the troops who had remained
under the flags. From May, 1814, to February, 1815, the War
Department had allotted to the service of clothing but 4,000,000
of francs, of which sum 1,000,000 alone had been paid. The
uniforms were in rags. In more than twenty regiments the
men were in need of shoes; and in the crack corps, such as
the Royal Chasseurs, some of the men had neither boots nor
shirts. In the 14th Light the men had worn for two years, in
winter as well as in summer, linen trousers. To the 27th of
the Line there were due 30,000 francs for the clothing of the
prisoners repatriated prior to January 1, 1815. These men
made The Campaign in police caps. The Emperor was forced
to raise to 30,000,000 the credits for the service of clothing,
and the Administration of War estimated that it would be
necessary to increase them to 51,000,000 in the course of the
year. Some shops established in Paris furnished 1,250 coats
per day. Work was pursued actively in the dépôts, to which
the manufacturers were invited to advance supplies, the cities
guaranteeing the payment. As blue cloth was not to be had
in sufficient quantities, some overcoats were made from cloth
of different colours.
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 19
On March 20th the cavalry possessed only 27,864 horses,
the artillery and auxiliary services 7,765. Of these 35,629
horses, 5,000 had been, as a measure of economy, loaned to the
farmers; these horses were ordered to be returned in haste to
the corps. The departments were struck with a requisition
of 8,000 horses against reimbursement, whilst at the central
depot of remounting at Versailles the horses presented
voluntarily by the breeders and farmers were purchased. The
horses of the military household of the King and of the Royal
Volunteers, were distributed in the Guard. The depots of each
corps were authorized to make direct purchases. Finally
the Emperor had the excellent idea of taking half of the horses
of the gendarmerie. Each gendarme received an indemnity
of 600 francs; he was to remount himself under fifteen days,
which was easy for him to do by reason of his situation in the
country. Thanks to this expedient, 4,250 vigorous and trained
horses were immediately distributed between the cuirassiers
and dragoons. The requisition in the departments gave more
horses than had been expected; but at the great dépôt of
Versailles the remounting proceeded very slowly. From the
past services of General Preval, it seems that he should have
been selected to resume the command of this depot, where he
had performed such prodigies in 1814. Rightly or wrongly,
he was suspected of being a Royalist. The Emperor sent or
rather exiled him to the dépôt of Beauvais, and appointed to
Versailles General Bourcier. The latter was a formalist, a
slave of regulations, stopping at trifles. He refused the horses
over eight years old and those that were lacking a half-inch of
the height required by the regulations. In the midst of war,
during the single month of March, Preval had collected more
than 7,000 horses; in two months of peace Bourcier had been
able to find but 2,579! In spite of this disappointment, there
was on the day when the Army took the field a fine body of
horses. The cavalry counted 40,000 with the armies and in
the dépôts; the artillery, including the train and equipages,
16,500.
Threatened by the whole of Europe, Napoleon knew that
he would be unable to prevent the invasion on all points of
the territory. Perhaps he would be reduced, as in the
preceding year, to commence operations only on this side of the
Oise, the Aisne, and the Marne. Even upon the most favourable
hypothesis, his next campaign must be at the same time
20 WATERLOO.
offensive and defensive. The putting in a state of defence of
the fortresses was therefore no less necessary nor less urgent
than the reorganization of the Army. On March 27th the
Emperor gave orders for this work, which was not undertaken
until April 15th. It had been necessary to await the reports
on the state of the fortresses, the instructions of the Committee
of Engineers, the opening of credits, and the establishment
of workshops. At Metz, 7,000 workmen were employed; at
Rocroi, 500; at Toul, 700; at Eandrecies, 400; at Dunkirk,
1,000; at Huningue, 500; at Grenoble, 400; at Cherbourg,
500; at Bayonne, 400; at Bordeaux, 200; at Perpignan, 150;
and upon the entrenched camp of Maubeuge, 1,000. On the
15th the defiles of the Vosges and the passages of Argonne
were provided with redoubts, abatis, and blinds; everything
was prepared to inundate the departments of the North; and
in more than eighty towns the works were either completely
terminated or in a way to be promptly finished. Besides, in
almost all of the fortresses, there existed no breaches in the
ramparts. It had been only necessary to raise the talus of
the counterscarp, prepare the platforms for the barbettes,
repair the embrasures, the banquettes, the glacis, and to
establish accessory and a few outworks.
Lyons and Paris needed works of far greater importance.
At Lyons 4,000 workmen were engaged. The old wall of
Fourvieres, as well as that which extended from the Rhone to the
Saéne, was restored; some bridge-heads were erected at La
Guillotiere and Brotteaux and some redoubts at Pierre-Seise,
Saint-Jean, and Croix-Rousse. Fearful, doubtless, of
alienating from him the Parisians by showing them the peril with
which they were threatened, Napoleon, urgent as appeared
to him the necessity of fortifying Paris, gave his first orders
in this regard only on May 1st. This was much time lost, all
the more as the Emperor desired a vast system of fortifications
with continuous lines, horn- and crown-works, redoubts and
forts crossing their fire. Generals Haxo and Rogniat laid out
these fortifications. It was only towards the middle of May
that the works began to be actively pressed. Fifteen hundred,
2,000, and then 4,000 workmen were employed upon these
works, without counting numerous detachments of volunteers
from the Guard, the Line, the National Guard, and the
Federates. When Napoleon set out for the army, the
entrenchments and the works on the right bank, which had been
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 21
undertaken first, as being destined to cover the most probable
points of attack, were partly finished, but those on the left
bank were hardly begun.
The works upon the fortifications, the arming and
provisioning of the fortresses, were actively pushed. The arsenals
of Metz, Douai, Lille, Grenoble, and Toulouse, furnished
cannon and powder for the fortified towns in which the material
of artillery was insufficient. Foundries were established for
the casting of projectiles. The Marine sent from Toulon to
Lyons by way of Aries and the Rhone 100 twenty-four-, twelve-,
and six-pounders, and from Brest and Cherbourg to Paris 300
pieces of ordnance by way of Havre and the Seine. The
armament of Paris comprised, moreover, 300 field pieces, 100 of
which were distributed into movable batteries. "We must
place guns wherever we can," wrote the Emperor, "for one
fights with cannon-shots like one fights with blows of the fist."
In order to gain time, Davout at first charged the
commanders of army corps to occupy themselves, in conjunction
with the prefects and ordonnateurs, with the victualling of the
fortresses. But it was to be feared that by this system, which
moreover gave rather good results, the requisitions would be
neglected. There existed an agreement concluded between
the Government of Louis XVIII and the contractor, Doumerc.
This agreement was maintained. But Doumerc, a brother of
the cavalry general, was only the proxy of Ouvrard, who failed
to fulfil his obligations. There were complaints everywhere;
it became necessary to encroach upon the reserve supplies in
order to nourish the men and horses. Ouvrard was accused
of using in speculations upon the Bourse the money advanced
by the Treasury. Davout authorized the prefects to purchase
what was necessary, regardless of the price, for the account of
the contractor. The general application of this measure would
have ruined Ouvrard. He proposed through Doumerc a new
contract, which was entered into on May 24th with Davout
and Daru; according to the terms of this contract the
victualling of the fortresses was to be completed within thirty days
by means of an anticipated payment of 4,000,000 francs.
By the middle of June the places of the first and second lines
were, with a few exceptions, provisioned for four months on
an average, and the convoys in the rear of the Army of the
North carried a supply of provisions for eight days.
22 WATERLOO.
In order to push a successful conclusion this immense
armament, more time and money would have been necessary.
The royal budget of war of 1815, which was to be presented
to the Chambers during the April session, amounted to 298,000,-
000 francs, of which 25,000,000 were for the military
household, the Swiss regiments, and the pensions of the émigrés and
Vendeans. The Emperor was quick to see that, in spite of the
saving to be realized under these heads, the military budget
must be increased by 100,000,000. Still, the estimate was
modest. If the war had lasted any length of time, the expenses
would have greatly exceeded these expectations. Napoleon
was not in favour of loans, because, according to his saying,
"he did not wish to spend income in advance," and also
because he did not believe in credit. In 1815 he did not desire
to increase the imposts, for fear of rendering himself unpopular.
Far from seeking resources in new taxes, he suppressed the
tax on drinks, the home tax, and, in communes of less than
4,000 inhabitants, the tax on liquids. This reform, which
history has passed over in silence, in the midst of such great
events, had nevertheless some influence upon public opinion.
The Bourbons, who had solemnly promised the suppression of
the droits reunis, had taken great care to change nothing, and
Napoleon, who had promised nothing, abolished those imposts
which were regarded as the most vexatious and the most
intolerable. Among the peasants, the small stock-holders, and
in the already influential class of grog-sellers and wine-brokers,
this reduction rallied more men to the imperial cause than
were driven away by the Additional Act, especially attacked
by the wits of the salons and the political professors.
The Emperor found an unhoped-for resource in a coin
reserve of 50,000,000, which existed in the Treasury on March
10th. The Minister of Finance, Baron Louis, had employed
a part of this fund in stock-jobbing: he had not felt at liberty
to carry the remainder to Ghent. The imperial Government
profited by the time at which the revolution had taken place.
On March 20th the tax-payers had as yet paid very little of
the imposts which had become due. There was, in fact, a
continual flow of money into the chests of the receivers during the
months of April and May, for generally these contributions
were paid without difficulty. Nevertheless, the ordinary
receipts and the available money being insufficient to meet all
the expenses, Gaudin, upon an order from the Emperor,
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 23
negotiated a loan of 3,600,000 francs from the Sinking Fund,
and deposited as collateral checks to the same amount,
redeemable out of the national funds. This transaction,
managed with the cooperation of Ouvrard, produced, clear of all
discount, 40,000,000 in cash.
The expenses of arming, equipping, and clothing the
mobilized National Guards, expenses estimated at 24,000,000, did
not figure in the budget of war. They were charged to the
departments, which were to provide for them out of the tax on
substitutes, which had been fixed at 120 francs, and by the
setting aside of one-tenth of the communal revenues and the
proceeds arising from the sale of one-fourth of the forest
reserves. There was allotted, moreover, to the expenses of the
National Guards the entire sum arising from the patriotic gifts,
and a reserve fund of 6,000,000 to be taken from the Sinking
Fund.
Thanks to these resources and to these expedients, France
was put on a war footing. But in how many fortresses was
the work interrupted for the lack of money! How many
soldiers carried equipments that were unfit for service! And
how many National Guards, already brigaded, awaited, useless
and dissatisfied, for their arms to be given them! In May
they had received their pay only after great delay and many
difficulties. On June 12th there were for the entire Army of the
North but one thousand pairs of shoes in reserve; the gratuity
promised the soldiers on taking the field had not been paid
them, and, at the time when the pay amounted to 5,000,000
per month, the military chests contained only 670,000 francs.
The extraordinary resources (coin reserve left by Baron
Louis and the product arising from the alienation of 3,600,000
francs of the Government funds) were exhausted, and the
regular receipts began to fall off. Though the Emperor and his
councils were opposed to exceptional measures, it became
necessary to resign themselves to them, for the expenses
foreseen by Davout for the month of July alone amounted to
72,000,000. In the budget presented to the Chambers on June
19th there figured a national loan of 150,000,000, guaranteed
by the forests of the State. All the tax-payers were to
subscribe an amount equal to the sum of their realty and personal
taxes. It was a forced loan.
24 WATERLOO.
III.
The Emperor did not even await the commencement of
the mobilization in order to organize the army corps. Thanks
to the concentration of the troops under Paris ordered by Louis
XVIII, to the numerous regiments which had rejoined the
Battalion of the Isle of Elba since Grenoble, and finally to the
strong garrisons of the frontier towns of the North and East,
Napoleon, immediately after his return to the Tuileries, found
that he had in a manner under his hand a great part of the
available forces of the Army. In order to be ready for every
emergency, he hastened, on March 26th, to order the formation
of eight army corps, called corps of observation. The 1st
Corps was to assemble at Lille; the 2nd at Valenciennes; the 3rd
at Mézieres; the 4th at Thionville; the 5th at Strasbourg; the
6th at Chambray; the 7th at the foot of the Pyrénées; and the
8th, or reserve corps, at Paris. Temporarily, the regiments
entering into the composition of these army corps would be of
two battalions. The skeletons of the 3rd battalions and the
depots would be concentrated in the military government of
Paris and in the towns of the interior until the calling out of
the reserves would permit of the forming of the 3rd, 4th, and
5th battalions, which would go immediately to rejoin the Army.
The mobilized National Guards would replace the troops of
the Line in the fortresses.
The light cavalry was distributed at the ratio of one
division for each army corps. With the surplus of this cavalry
and the dragoons, cuirassiers, and carabiniers, there were formed
eight divisions of reserve cavalry, to each of which was attached
a battery of horse artillery.
On March 20th the Imperial Guard comprised only the
two regiments of grenadiers and the two regiments of chasseurs
of the Old Guard and four regiments of cavalry. The Emperor
augmented the effectives of the cavalry regiments, created a
third and fourth regiment of grenadiers, a third and fourth
regiment of chasseurs (Middle Guard), eight regiments of
voltigeurs and eight of tirailleurs (Young Guard), and a second
regiment of horse chasseurs. He re-established the two
regiments of horse and foot artillery of the Old Guard, as well as
the regiment of the train, the squadron of picked gendarmes,
the battalion of marines, and the company of sappers. The
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 25
Young Guard was organized with the enrolled volunteers
and the recalled soldiers having formerly belonged to this
corps, and in which each man received a sou as extra
pay. The men of the Elba battalion were incorporated with
the Old Guard. For the Middle Guard, the artillery and
cavalry, it was necessary to recruit them from the gendarmerie
and the Line. The gendarmerie gave 500 men. Each regiment
of the Line was to furnish thirty of its best men, large and
strongly constituted; a minimum service of four years in the
infantry and of eight years in the cavalry was required.
When, at the end of May, the recalled soldiers, the
mobilized National Guards, and the volunteers had increased the
army, the Emperor made a new distribution of his forces.
The 1st Corps (under Drouet d'Erlon), the 2nd Corps (under
Reille), the 3rd Corps (under Vandamme), the Army of the
Moselle, called thenceforth the 4th Corps (under Gérard), and
the 8th Corps (become the 6th, under Lobau), the cavalry
reserve (under Grouchy), and the Imperial Guard, formed the
Army of the North, 124,139 men strong, and commanded by
the Emperor in person. The 5th Corps became the Army of
the Rhine (23,097 men, of whom 3,000 were mobilized National
Guards, under Rapp); and the 6th Corps became the Army of
the Alps (23,617 men, of whom 13,000 were mobilized National
Guards, under Suchet). The 7th Corps was divided into two
fractions - one fraction took the name of Corps of the Western
Pyrénées (6,280 men, of whom 3,000 were mobilized National
Guards, under Clausel); the other, that of Corps of the Eastern
Pyrénées (7,633 men, of whom 3,300 were mobilized National
Guards, under Decaen). The Emperor created finally three
new army corps; the Army of the West (nearly 10,000 men,
under Lamarque), whose duty it was to repress the Vendean
insurrection; the Corps of the Var (5,544 men, under Brune),
and the Corps of Jura (8,420 men, of whom 5,500 were
mobilized National Guards, under Lecourbe), both destined to
second the army of Suchet in the defence of the Alps.
Four divisions of picked National Guards, of a total
strength of 17,466 men, camped under Avesnes, Sainte-
Mesihould, Colmar, and Nancy; 90,000 mobilized National
Guards and 25,000 retired soldiers were assembled in the
fortresses and in the dépôts; 11,233 cannoneers of the Line and
6,000 cannoneers of the Marine assured in the fortified towns,
in conjunction with 2,071 veteran and 6,000 sedentary
-3-
26 WATERLOO.
cannoneers, the service of the artillery; 13,934 soldiers of all arms
were en route by detachments to join the active armies; finally,
59,559 available and non-available men were in the depots of
the Line and 5,559 in the depots of the Guard. There were, in
addition to these, 4,700 men of the war battalions detached to
the island of Elba and in the colonies; 8,162 men in the
hospitals; 10,000 marine and 5,129 veteran fusiliers; 14,521 foot
and horse gendarmes; finally, 12,000 custom-house officers
organized militarily and 6,000 partisans. Thus the Emperor had
raised the active army from 200,000 men to 284,000, and he
had formed an auxiliary army of 222,000 men.
One month later these two armies would have been
augmented, first, by 19,000 recalled soldiers, who had received
their orders of route prior to June 10th, but had not yet reached
the dépôts; second, by some thousands of recalled soldiers
who, on June 15th, had not arrived in the chefs-lieux of the
departments; third, by 46,500 conscripts of 1815 who, at this
same date, were assembled in the chefs-lieux of the departments;
fourth, by 15,000 mobilized National Guards, put en route by the
middle of June for the points of concentration. Finally, from
July 15th to September 25th, there would have been the 74,000
men forming the complement of the contingent of 1815 and
the 84,000 men forming the complement of the levy of the
mobilized National Guards. It would have been possible to
mobilize even 60,000 or 70,000 more National Guards, in
applying to the departments of the West, for which they had
been deferred, the decrees calling the National Guards into
active service, and in ordering a new levy in all the extent of
France. When Napoleon said that by October 1st the Army
would have numbered 800,000 men, he was not so far from the
truth.
IV.
In execution of the decrees of Lyons, the officers who,
having emigrated or quitted the service at the time of the
Revolution, had been introduced into the Army since April 1, 1814,
were struck from the muster-rolls. But, as many of these
officers were provided with employment in the military
household and in the staffs, this wholesale removal produced but
few vacancies in the Line. The officers in line of promotion
sufficed to complete the lists. The officers on half-pay were
placed in the battalions, squadrons, and batteries of new
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 27
Formations in the Young Guard, and in the Federate
Sharpshooters. In the midst of May 2,500 officers of this category,
to whom, moreover, the Emperor had given their entire pay
pending employment, were still available; they were directed
upon the frontier places to command the mobilized National
Guards.
Certain of the devotion of the officers who lived in
immediate contact with the troops, Napoleon had legitimate
reasons for mistrusting many colonels and generals. Among
the general officers, there were in 1814 some weakness and
treason; in 1815, some hesitation and resistance. Numerous
changes imposed themselves in the high military personnel.
But it was rather the interest of the Army than personal
rancour or sympathy which dictated to the Emperor his
exclusions and selections. Pitiless for the officers who had shown
themselves during The Campaign of France incapable, as
Augereau and Oudinot, or criminal, as Marmont and Souham,
Napoleon knew how to forget the conduct of those who from
the 1st to the 20th of March had attempted to change his
triumphal return into a miserable failure. Colonel Cunéo
d'Ornano, who had imprisoned twenty-five grenadiers in the
citadel of Antibes, was promoted general; General Miollis, who
had led the garrison of Marseilles in pursuit of the little
imperial column, was invested with the command of the place of
Metz; Colonel Roussile, the tenacious defender of the gate of
Grenoble, remained at the head of the 5th of the Line; Colonel
Dubalen, of the 64th, who had publicly given his resignation to
Ney upon the place of arms of Lons-le-Saunier, was recalled to
his regiment; General Marchand might have also returned
into favour, but he refused, he said, "to figure upon the list of
traitors." A Republican under the Empire and converted
under Louis XVIII. to constitutional monarchy, Foy had put
himself, on March 24th, at the head of the Bonapartist
movement at Xantes, only after having done everything to arrest it.
He was none the less provided with a fine division in the Army
of the North. Many officers of the 10th of the Line, promoted
by the Duke of Angoulême during The Campaign in the Midi,
were confirmed in their new grade. Harispe and Heudelet,
though seriously compromised by their manifestations in favour
of the Bourbons, had, nevertheless, a command. The
Emperor employed Rapp, Belliard, Ruty, Haxo, Kellermann the
younger, and Gourgaud, just as if they had not served in
28 WATERLOO.
the army assembled at Villejuif under the orders of the Duke
of Berry. "Would you have dared to fire on me?" said
Napoleon to Rapp. "Doubtless, sire; it was my duty." And
Napoleon gave him the Army of the Rhine.
The Emperor, however, removed or retired a hundred
officers of every rank: Dupont, whose favour under Louis
XVIII had not effaced the dishonour of Baylen; Dessolles, who
had so well seconded Talleyrand in April, 1814; Beurnonville,
Donnadieu, and Bourdessoule, who had emigrated to Belgium;
Maison, also an émigré, and who, solicited by the Imperial
Government to return to France, replied that he would return
there only at the head of 500,000 bayonets; Curto, whose
furious words against Napoleon had provoked a mutiny in the
garrison of Thionville; Generals d'Aultanne, Monnier, Ernouf,
Loverdo, Briche, and the colonels of the 10th of the Line and
of the 14th Chasseurs, who had fought in the Midi under the
Duke of Angoulême eight days after the imperial Government
had been recognized by two-thirds of France. Without
remorse for his complicity with Marmont in the defection of
Essonnes, Souham had hoped to preserve his command of
Périgeux; removed, he presented himself at the Tuileries at a
public audience in order to attempt to move the Emperor.
"What do you still wish from me?" said Napoleon, turning his
back on him. "You see that I no longer know you!"
At the request of Davout and the corps commanders, many
colonels, majors, captains, and lieutenants were, on account of
their persistent hostility, struck from the lists. The disgrace
of Colonels Moncey, Oudinot, and Zoppfell appears less
explicable. Moncey had only sought to maintain the 3rd Hussars in
obedience to the King, and that only up to the 13th of March;
now Napoleon had shown himself indulgent to many analogous
acts. Oudinot could be reproached only for bearing the name
of his father, and Zoppfell for being a protégé of the Duke of
Feltre. Denounced as a Royalist, Bugeaud was put on half-
pay by Davout in the course of April, but Suchet, Grouchy,
Gérard, and Bertrand hastened to speak in favour of "the best
colonel of the Army." Replaced at the head of the 14th of the
Line, Bugeaud received, as a compensation for his momentary
disgrace, the rank of commander in the Legion of Honour.
General de Bourmont was also unemployed for some time.
From Lons le-Saunier he had hastened to Paris to join Louis
XVIII. The Emperor ordered his arrest at the request of Ney;
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE.
29
but the latter was the first one to solicit Napoleon to give a
command to this general. Gérard, who had had Bourmont
under his orders during The Campaigns of 1812 and 1814,
demanded him as a general of division in his army corps. After
having hesitated for a long time, the Emperor finally yielded.
It was necessary for him to impose his will upon Davout, who
yielded only to a formal order. "Gérard answers for Bourmont
with his head," said the Emperor. "Gérard is wrong," replied
the Prince of Eckmühl; "I answer for no one. I only answer
for myself."
Lenient, as we see, towards those who had wished to
combat him, the Emperor did not lavish recompenses upon those
who had first compromised themselves for him. If he
promoted La Bédoyère, already proposed during The Campaign of
France, and Mallet, commander of the Battalion of the Island
of Elba, to be generals of brigade, if he promoted Simmer, who
had brought him two regiments at Lyons, to be general of
division, and if he named Brayer peer of France, Dessaix,
Girard, Allix, Ameil, Mouton-Duvernet, Gilly, Piré, Protean, and
Chartran received no favours of any kind; they were employed
in the armies only according to the strict rights of their rank.
Now, Dessaix had accepted the command of Lyons seven days
before the Emperor's return to the Tuileries, Girard had
commanded from Avallon the imperial advance guard, Allix had
proclaimed the Empire at Nevers, Ameil had been arrested at
Auxerre as an emissary of Napoleon, Chartran was to pay with
his life for his devotion to the imperial cause, and Mouton-
Duvernet, Gilly, Piré, and Protean had ardently and
efficaciously seconded Grouchy in The Campaign of the Midi against
the Duke of Angoulême. General Porret de Morvan, who, for
having led to Sens the foot chasseurs of the Old Guard,
flattered himself that he would be selected to replace Curial as
colonel of this corps, saw Curial disgraced, but the command
of the chasseurs was given to Morand. Prince Jérôme,
imperial highness though he was, was only invested with the
command of a division of infantry. Merlin, who had forced the
Governor of Vincennes to capitulate, received the three stars,
but Sebastiani, who had hastened the defection of the army of
the Duke of Berry, was charged with a mission which he justly
regarded as unworthy of his merit and services - namely, the
organization of the National Guards in the 16th Military
Division. Exelmans, who had been first to enter the Tuileries
on March 20th, was given a corps of cavalry, but Kellermann,
30 WATERLOO.
who had been employed in the Army of Villejuif, was also given
the command of one. Lallemand the elder, one of the
principal chiefs of the conspiracy of the North, was made lieutenant-
general; but Lefebvre-Desnoëttes and Lallemand the younger
were simply replaced at the head of the horse chasseurs and of
the artillery of the Old Guard. After the fiasco of Compiegne,
Colonel Marin had gone at full speed to rejoin Napoleon at
Auxerre; he doubtless hoped to obtain the command of the
horse artillery of the Guard, of which he had been major. It
was Colonel Duchand, of the artillery of the Line, who was
selected.
V.
Of the twenty marshals of France, three - Berthier,
Marmont, and Victor - had accompanied or rejoined Louis XVIII.
in Belgium; the Emperor ordered their names to be struck
from the list of marshals. Perignon, who had foolishly
compromised himself with Vitrolles at Toulouse, and Augereau,
whose recent recantation could not redeem his pitiful conduct
at the head of the Army of Lyons in 1814, were the object of
the same measure. Napoleon also desired to remove both
Gouvion Saint-Cyr and old Kellermann; the first for having
disregarded his orders after March 20th and for having caused
the troops of the 22d Military Division to resume the white
cockade; and the second for having voted the Act of Deposition
on April 1, 1814. Madame Gouvion Saint-Cyr wrote a letter
to Davout which appeased the Emperor; the Marshal escaped
with a forced sojourn in this chateau of Reverseaux. Napoleon
also failed to carry out his first decision in regard to the Duke
of Valmy. Sérurier, who had also, as senator, voted the Act
of Deposition, was maintained in his functions as Governor
of the Invalides. The Emperor contented himself with not
naming him to the Chamber of Peers, and the lesson was
well merited.
Oudinot, like Gouvion Saint-Cyr, had refused, after
March 20th, to obey the orders of Napoleon. He had not
permitted the Empire to be proclaimed at Metz until the garrison
and the revolted populace had forced him to do so. Relieved
of his command, he used every effort to obtain his pardon.
He addressed a letter to the Emperor, and supplicated Davout,
Suchet, and Jacqueminot to intercede for him. "Go at once to
the Emperor," he wrote to Suchet, "and tell him what you think
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 31
of me; tell him that you did not forward your letter and that of
Ney to me until the evening of the 27th. You will also tell
him that never has Oudinot forgotten what he owes to
Napoleon; and that if Oudinot has been guilty of any wrong, he
will no sooner know it than he will expiate and repair it. I am
in need of your intercession for my wife and children, who all
share the misfortune which prostrates me." The Emperor
revoked the order exiling him to Lorraine and consented to
receive him at the Tuileries, but he left him without employment.
Doubtless Napoleon would not have harboured any ill-will
against the Marshal for his conduct at Metz; but he could not
forget that the Duke of Reggio had, the preceding year, caused
himself to be beaten at Bar-sur-Aube, on account of his faulty
dispositions on the eve of the battle and by his fatal indecision
during the combat.
Though Macdonald had shown himself to be a very zealous
Royalist, and though he had done his utmost at Lyons and
Villejuif to organize resistance, the Emperor was disposed to
give him a command. But the Marshal, who had returned to
Paris after having accompanied Louis XVIII as far as the
frontier, was firmly resolved not to serve under the new
Government. It was in vain that General Maurice Mathieu, his
old chief of staff in the Army of the Grisons, supplicated him to
come to the Tuileries, where the Emperor awaited him; it was
in vain that Davout himself forced his door in order to
determine him to accept a command; he remained inflexible.
Being tired of war, the sole favour that he would deign to ask
of the Emperor was permission to be allowed to live like
a good bourgeois on his property of Courcelle, near Gien.
Napoleon granted his request.
After having published a violent order of the day against
Napoleon, Moncey had left Paris on March 20th. He wrote
two days later to the Emperor that he intended to retire to
the country. Napoleon had already replaced him as
Inspector-General of Gendarmerie by Rovigo. But should he
not have remembered what Moncey had done in 1814 at the
head of the Parisian National Guard and restored this
command to him? He contented himself with naming him a
member of the Chamber of Peers, the same as Lefebvre, who
had had no command during The Campaign of France and who
had remained without employment under Louis XVIII. In
justice to Lefebvre, we should state that he was sixty-seven
32 WATERLOO.
years old, and the Emperor rightly wished to have young men
in command of his army corps.
Massena had seconded but feebly the Duke of Angoulême
during the short campaign upon the banks of the Rhône, and
immediately after the capitulation of La Pallud he had hastened
to proclaim the Empire. On April 14th he addressed to
Napoleon a report justifying his conduct, which closed as follows:
"I can not conceal from Your Majesty how desirous I am of
seeing you again in order to assure you of my boundless
devotion." The Emperor wrote to the Prince of Essling a letter
of congratulations, summoned him to Paris, and received him
there with great marks of friendship; but, in spite of his half-
promise, he preferred not to restore to him the government of
the 9th Military Division. In order to contain the Royalists
of Marseilles, it was necessary to have a man who had not
commanded there in the name of Louis XVIII The Emperor
offered to Massena, whose infirmities rendered him incapable
of serving in the active armies, the government of the 4th and
5th Military Divisions, comprising the Moselle, the Meurthe,
and the Vosges. The Marshal refused this post, and remained
in Paris, where he showed himself very assiduous in attending
the sittings of the Chamber of Peers.
Although Mortier, Governor of Lille, Suchet, Governor of
Strasbourg, and Jourdan, Governor of Rouen, had remained
faithful to the King during three or four days after March
20th, they had not compromised themselves like Oudinot and
Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The Emperor could not feel towards them
any resentment. He did not wish, however, to maintain them,
in the posts which they held from Louis XVIII. This was with
him a principle. Charged at first with the inspection of the
places of the Northeast, Mortier was selected to command the
cavalry of the Guard and finally put at the head of the Young
Guard. Suchet was invested with the command of the Army
of the Alps; and Jourdan received the command of Besançon,
a fortified town of the first line, where Davout judged it
necessary that there should be a marshal of France.
In disgrace since 1807 for having, it is said, closed too
complacently his eyes upon the peculations of Rourrienne in the
Hanseatic town, Brune had demanded vainly, at the
beginning of The Campaign of France, permission to resume service.
During the Restoration he had also remained without
employment. After the return of the Emperor, Brune again offered his
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE.
33
sword. The administrative qualities, of which he had given
proof in Belgium, the Gironde, Vendee, and Tuscany, designated
him for the government of one of the provinces in which the
troubles still existed. Sent to Marseilles as governor of the 9th
Military Division, he was at the same time charged with the
organization and the command of the army corps of the Var.
Marshal Ney, having arrived with his troops at Paris on
March 23rd, was entrusted on the same day with a mission in
the departments of the north and east. The patent object of
this mission was to inspect the fortresses; the secret object,
to judge of the state of minds, to furnish information regarding
the officers and functionaries, and to propose, if necessary,
some removals and substitutions. Ney performed this mission
with zeal, but he had the bad taste to manifest against the
Bourbons sentiments of an unheard-of violence. In the
meetings of the officers he exhaled insults against the King and
Princes. "It is a rotten family," said he. These words were
not of a nature to pacify public opinion, which was generally
hostile to him. Among the Bonapartists, and even in the
entourage of the Emperor, his conduct at Lons-le-Saunier was
criticised. This malicious play upon words was repeated all
over Paris: "Il fallait être né (Ney) pour ça!" - ("One must
be born for this!") - and his sudden change of sides did not
free him from suspicion. "If Ney is employed in the field,"
wrote an anonymous person to the Emperor, "he should be
given a staff upon which one can depend." There were no
lack of men to recall to Napoleon the never-to-be-forgotten
scene of Fontainebleau, and perhaps one had reported to him
the words of Ney at the time of his recent passage through
Dijon: "I had congratulated myself on having forced the
Emperor to abdicate, and now I must serve him!" In addition
to all this, the Marshal, on returning from his tour of inspection,
about April 15th, had been so utterly lacking in tact as to
attempt to excuse himself to the Emperor for his words
concerning the iron cage. "This speech is true," he said, "but
it was because I had already made up my mind, and I did not
think I could say anything better to conceal my projects."
Napoleon remained silent, but in his eyes the Marshal saw a
flash of lightning.
Desperate, full of confusion and remorse, accusing every
one and himself, Ney retired to his property of Coudreaux.
For six weeks nothing was heard from him. It was said that
34 WATERLOO.
he was in disgrace; it was even reported that he had been
arrested. He returned to Paris for the ceremony of the Champ
de Mai. Named peer of France on June 2nd, he went to the
Elysée four days later to obtain the written order for the
payment of a sum of 37,000 francs due him for back pay and the
expenses of his tour. "Here you are," said Napoleon to him;
"I thought you had emigrated." "Would that I had done
so sooner!" bitterly replied the Marshal. On June 11th he
again returned to the Tuileries, but there was no question in
these two interviews of a command for him in the Army of
the North. Ney doubtless, who knew that Napoleon called
him la bête noire, dared not solicit one. But on June 11th, at
the moment of quitting Paris, the Emperor became doubtful
as to the wisdom of his course. Could he condemn to a
degrading repose the hero of so many battles? Could he, in the
hour of peril, deprive both France and himself of such a soldier?
He wrote to the Minister of War: "Summon Marshal Ney;
tell him that, if he wishes to be in the first battles, he must be
by the 14th at Avesnes, where will be my headquarters."
Napoleon, no doubt, believed that he was acting in the interest of
the Army or, what was identical, in his own interest. He acted
also through commiseration. The tone of his note indicates it.
It is not an order; it is only a notice, which leaves the Marshal
free to do as he pleases. Let Ney come if he desires. But
Ney could not but desire to be present in the first battles,
should it be only in the hope of being killed. He set out from
Paris on June 12th and reached Avesnes on the 13th, where he
dined with the Emperor, but he received the command of the
1st and 2nd Army Corps only on the afternoon of the 15th -
that is to say, after the operations had begun.
Since he had "passé roi," according to the expression in
vogue in the Army, Murat figured no longer upon the list of
marshals. Three weeks before Napoleon took the field,
Joachim, who had fallen from the throne, had sought refuge in the
environs of Toulon. Not even his soldier's sabre remained to
him. He besought the Emperor to restore it to him. "I
desire," he wrote, "to shed for you the last drop of my blood."
Napoleon refused his offer. He could not see his way clear to
give a command in the French Army to a Frenchman who had
fought against it one year before. Besides, he was angry with
his brother-in-law for having commenced too soon, in spite of
his instructions, the war against the Austrians; he was
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 35
especially angry with him for having allowed himself to be defeated.
Later, in his reveries at St. Helena, Napoleon regretted his
decision in regard to this great cavalry leader. "At Waterloo,"
he said, "Murat would have perhaps gained us the victory.
What was necessary? To overthrow three or four English
squares. Murat was precisely the man to do this." "Would
Murat, who possessed the double gift of inspiring in his horse-
men a furious élan and of terrifying the enemy, have succeeded
in riding down the English? It is possible.
The memory of Grouchy is henceforth so intimately
associated with the cursed remembrance of Waterloo that the fine
services and brilliant actions of this valorous captain have
been forgotten. If he had not the magnetic élan of Murat,
he knew like him how to manoeuvre masses of cavalry. Second
in command of the expedition to Ireland in the year V. (1796),
Governor of Madrid in 1808, colonel-general of the chasseurs
and chevau-légers in 1809, and chief of the Sacred Squadron
during the retreat from Russia, he had contributed to the
victories of Hohenlinden, Eylau, Friedland, Wagram, and the
Moskowa. After Vauchamps it is said the Emperor had
thought of naming him marshal of France. In disgrace under
Louis XVIII., Grouchy was sent to Lyons on March 31st to
combat the Duke of Angoulême. Promoted marshal after
this short and easy campaign, he was put at the head of the
Army of the Alps, then recalled to Paris on May 8th. The
Emperor intended to give him the four cavalry corps of the
Army of the North. It was as commander-in-chief of the
cavalry that Grouchy entered Belgium on June 15th; for his
misfortune, he was on the next day to be charged with a still
more important command.
VI.
The selection of a major-general seriously preoccupied
Napoleon. By whom could he replace Berthier? The Prince
of Wagram was neither a great captain, an organizer, nor a
man of superior intellect; but he possessed extensive technical
knowledge, and he had raised to the hundredth power the
qualities of a good clerk. Indefatigable, conscientious, diligent,
quick to grasp the most complicated orders, skilful in
translating them in all their details with wonderful accuracy,
precision, and clearness, and, finally, punctual in transmitting
36 WATERLOO.
them at the right moment, he had been for Napoleon a perfect
instrument. With him as chief of staff, the Emperor was
tranquil; the orders were always drawn up in such a manner
that those who received them had no doubt or hesitation as to
the manner in which they were to be executed. And these
orders always reached their destination, even should Berthier
be forced to cause each order to be carried, when he deemed it
prudent, by eight officers, taking as many different routes.
It was said that Berthier had grown feeble in mind and body.
In 1814, however, his correspondence bears witness that his
pen had lost nothing of its activity and luminous precision.
The Emperor, who remembered the services of the Prince of
Wagram during the last campaign, regretted him and despaired
not of seeing him return to France. "That brute of a
Berthier!" said he to Rapp, "he will return. I will pardon him
everything, but on condition that he will don his uniform of a
Life Guardsman and appear before me."
Berthier, in fact, attempted to return to France, where he
had left the Princess of Wagram with his son and his two
daughters. Having remained a short time at Ghent, he went
to the Chateau of Bamberg, a property of his uncle by
marriage, the King of Bavaria. At the beginning of May he set
out to gain by-way of Bale the French frontier; he was unable
to pass beyond Stockach, where he found the headquarters of
the Prince of Hohenzollern. The Allies, no doubt, preferred
to keep Berthier a half-prisoner in Bavaria than to know that
he was in Napoleon's staff. He returned very sadly to
Bamberg. In the afternoon of June 1st, as a regiment of Russian
dragoons on the march for France was defiling in front of the
chateau, Berthier was seen to quit suddenly the window on
the first floor, from which he was watching the soldiers, to
appear shortly afterwards at a window on the third floor and to
fall upon the pavement. He was picked up dead, with his
skull fractured.
For three weeks the Emperor had decided to take for
major-general Marshal Soult, who, as it seems, had offered
himself for this position.
Suspected by the friends of the King, hated by the
Bonapartists as well as by the Liberals, and execrated by the entire
body of officers, Soult had retired to Villeneuve-l'Etang. This
retreat being near Paris, he came to the Tuileries on March
26th. It is hardly probable that this visit was made in order
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 37
to remind the Emperor that he had spoken of him as a madman
and adventurer in his last order of the day. At the end of
this interview, of which nothing has become public, Soult
exchanged many letters with Davout, who manifested some
friendliness towards him. But, in spite of Davout's steps in
his behalf, the Emperor was some time in reaching a decision.
"I desire," wrote Soult, on April 11th, to the Minister of War,
"that your excellency will have the kindness to reply to my
letter written to you a few days since, in order that I may be
in position to conform to the decision of His Majesty in my
regard." Some days later Soult, who had sent his oath in
writing, was invited to come to renew it solemnly before the
Emperor. Thenceforth the Duke of Dalmatia could regard
himself as being restored to favour. On May 9th he was named
major-general.
Soult was as superior to Berthier as a man of mind and
action is to a good clerk. But he had never discharged the
duties of a chief of staff in an army corps; he had had no
experience in this office, and was lacking in the qualities of
application and exactness, which are so essential to the proper
discharge of its duties. Bailly de Monthyon, who, regarded as
Berthier's right arm, had been chief of the General Staff from
1812 to 1814, and who, in 1813, during the absence of the
major-general, had twice discharged the duties of this office;
Drouot, aide-major-general of the Imperial Guard; Belliard,
Murat's chief of staff from 1805 to 1808 and aide-major-general
during The Campaigns of Saxony and France; Reille and
Drouet d'Erlon, both old chiefs of staff of Lannes; Bertrand,
for so long an aide-de-camp of the Emperor, and so
accustomed as grand marshal to receiving and transmitting his
orders; Gérard, ex-chief of staff of Bernadotte; Ruty, chief of
staff in 1813 of the artillery of the Grand Army; and so many
other generals of division, would have been perhaps more
capable of replacing the Prince of Wagram. But for
hierarchical reasons, or etiquette, the Emperor desired to have
a marshal of France for major-general. Now, none of the
marshals, save Davout and Suchet, appeared more capable of
discharging the duties of this office than Soult. At the moment
when France was in the midst of a military organization, on
the eve of a war which threatened to embrace in its theatre of
operations La Vendee, the northern frontier, the Alps, and
the Pyrénées, and at a time when a political crisis might arise,
38 WATERLOO.
it was of the utmost necessity that Davout should be left in the
ministry of war and in the command of Paris. But there was
Marshal Suchet, ex-chief of staff of Joubert and Massena. It
seems that, at least from the standpoint of moral effect, the
Emperor would have been well inspired in preferring him to Soult,
for Suchet could have awakened no suspicion nor provoked any
mistrust. Soult would have replaced, without disadvantage,
the Duke of Albuhera in the command of the Army of the Alps,
and this post, being less in evidence, would have attracted
less attention upon him. Thus would have been avoided that
great scandal, that the first man in the Army, after the
Emperor and the Minister of War, should be, of all the general
officers, he who had rendered himself most odious to the Army
under the royal Government.
Soult having addressed an order to Vandamme before his
nomination had been rendered official, the haughty general
wrote to Davout the following ironical letter: "I have
received a letter from the Duke of Dalmatia, in which he
announces himself as major-general. I think it best to forward
it to your excellency before answering it. As the Duke of
Ragusa could give me the same notice, I shall regard it as null
and void until I am informed of this nomination by your
excellency or by an imperial decree."
VII.
Before occupying himself with the marshals the Emperor
had selected for the principal commands the generals who were
desirous of obtaining the marshal's baton, and whom he had
already promoted in his mind. He expected to find among
these men "having their road to make," as he said, more
ardour and devotion than among his old comrades loaded down
with glory and honours. He gave the 1st Army Corps to Drouet
d'Erlon, a general of division since 1805, a combatant of Jena
and Friedland, and one of the best lieutenants of Massena and
Soult in the Spanish wars. Reille, a veteran of the Italian
campaigns, a general of division since 1807, commanding a
division of the Guard at Wagram, and entrusted at the end of
1812 with the chief command of the Army of Portugal, had
the 2nd Corps. Gérard, colonel at Austerlitz, brigadier-general
at Jena, general of division at the Moskowa, one of the heroes,
with Ney, of the retreat from Russia, and the sole officer of his
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE.
39
rank who had commanded an army corps during the
campaign of France, received the 4th Corps. The 5th Corps (later
Army of the Rhine) was entrusted to Rapp, the man of twenty-
two wounds, the heroic defender of Dantzig, a general of
division since 1807, and an aide-de-camp of Napoleon for twelve
years. Mouton, Count de Lobau, one of the most skilful
officers of the Army in the art of manoeuvring troops and a
general division since 1807, had the command of the 6th Corps,
in formation at Paris. Charles Lebrun, a son of the Duke of
Plaissance, and a valiant cavalry general, was placed
temporarily at the head of the 3rd Corps. The Emperor intended
to replace him, at the proper time, "with a more skilful
general." About the middle of April he gave this army corps to
Vandamme. Napoleon did not love this rude soldier, bad bed-
fellow that he was; but the superior military qualities of
Vandamme and his seniority of rank (he had been named general of
division in 1799, when only twenty-two years old), designated
him among all others for a command. He exercised it, at
least so long as left to himself, with an incomparable
conscientiousness, firmness, and zeal - careful of all the details
pertaining to the organization, the clothing, and the
instruction of the troops; prompt in proceeding against those who
wished to persuade the soldiers to desert and the alarmists;
ardent in inflaming the minds of the soldiers, the mobilized
National Guards, and the inhabitants of Ardennes and the
Meuse. Vandamme merited this praise from Davout: "You
have communicated all your fire to the country where you
command."
Sent to Bordeaux to cause the imperial Government to be
recognized in that city, Clausel, who had particularly
distinguished himself in Italy and Spain, remained in that city
as governor of the 11th Military Division. He received, more-
over, the command of the Corps of the Western Pyrénées.
General Decaen, a veteran of The Campaigns of the Rhine and
the Vendée, and for six years Governor of the isles of France
and Bourbon, had sincerely wished to preserve Bordeaux for
the King; but, the Duchess of Angoulême, he had been
compelled to yield to the force of events. He returned to
Paris, from whence he set out for Toulouse at the end of May.
The Emperor had confided to him the command of the 8th
and 10th Military Divisions and the Corps of the Eastern
Pyrénées. Decaen would have preferred a corps or a division
40 WATERLOO.
in the Army of the North to this post, at the same time political
and military. On account of his conduct at Bordeaux, he was
about to find himself at Toulouse under the alternative of
awakening the suspicions of the Emperor, if he showed little
zeal, or of rendering himself doubly odious to the Royalists,
if he acted with the rigorous firmness demanded by the
circumstances. Decaen took this last course, as he should have
done, and caused himself to be execrated throughout all
Languedoc.
Struck from the list of officers in 1804 for having
manifested openly his indignation at the trial of his comrade
Moreau, Lecourbe had been restored to his rank by Louis
XVIII. At Lons-le-Saunier he had attempted to prevent the
defection of Marshal Ney, and, upon the report of the latter,
Napoleon had ordered his arrest. But he came to the Tuileries
to protest his devotion. Happy to attach to his cause this
tried officer, who passed for a Republican and whose name
had remained dear to the veterans of the armies of the Sambre-
et-Meuse, of the Rhine, and of Helvetia, the Emperor gave
him the command of the Corps of the Jura.
Lamarque had, on March 20th, installed himself in the
command of Paris. Replaced two days later by General
Hullin, who had occupied this post from 1807 to 1814, he
received the command of a division in Reille's corps; then he
was sent to La Vendée as general-in-chief of the Army of the
West. He had formerly combated the bands of Abruzzes
and the guerrillas of the sierras of Aragon. His experience in
partisan warfare caused him to be selected to command against
the Vendeans.
General Durosnel, ex-aide-de-camp of the Emperor, was
second in command of the Parisian National Guard, Napoleon
being nominally commander-in-chief. Durosnel had greatly
distinguished himself in the cavalry; but, whilst Moncey,
Ornano, Hullin, d'Heriot, and Lespinasse had found them-
selves in Paris during The Campaign of 1814, he, having been
made prisoner at Dresden, had not returned to France until
after peace had been declared. Thus, being ignorant of what
the National Guard had done, and especially of what it might
have done, he found himself badly prepared for commanding
it. With a little zeal and energy he might have made up for
his lack of experience; but he permitted himself to be
circumvented by his staff, which numbered a great many secret
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 41
Royalists and deluded Liberals. Far from breathing the spirit
of patriotism and abnegation in all the National Guard, he was
not long in contracting the sentiments of egotistic prudence
which guided the élite of this militia. Charged with the
revision of its personnel, he carried out this work in a half-
hearted manner, as if he only wished to appear to give
satisfaction to the Emperor. It was, indeed, necessary for him to
strike from the lists some officers at the same time too
compromised and too well known, like Decazes and Rémusat; but
he maintained upon the lists such men as Major Billing, an
intimate friend of Comte, editor of the Censeur, and Colonel
Aclocque, who prohibited the band from playing "Let us watch
over the safety of the Empire," under pretence that it was
"an incendiary air." Some very warm partisans of the
Emperor were removed, notably Major Beck, the only one of the
superior officers of the 6th Legion who had fought at the Buttes-
Chaumont in 1814; Captain Albert, who had made the trip to
the isle of Elba; and Captain Ollivier, who had equipped at
his own expense half of his company.
Moreover, Durosnel set everything at work to prevent the
creation of the Federate Sharpshooters, then to delay their
organization. "To arm such men," he said, "would create
uneasiness and dissatisfaction in the National Guard." Now,
commanded exclusively by officers on half-pay, and having for
commander General Darricau, who had gained all his grades
at the siege of Toulon, in Egypt, in the Grand Army, and in
Spain, and who, contrary to Durosnel, had faith and ardour,
the Federate Sharpshooters would have contributed
efficaciously towards the defence of Paris. As Carnot and Davout
said, the creation of these battalions of workmen could impress
unfavourably only the hostile and pusillanimous spirits.
The promotions in the Army were made by the Emperor
motu propria, or upon the proposal of Davout; sometimes even
the Minister of War promoted the officers to the posts without
referring the nominations to the Emperor. Davout was no
more infallible than Napoleon. There were some awkward
selections - nay, some pitiful ones. Berckheim and Millet,
who had never served but in the cavalry; and Molitor, a
general of division since 1802, who, on account of his great military
qualities, should have been employed in the active armies,
were called to command some National Guards; whilst
Marcognet, a poor officer, and Donzelot, who had lost the habit
-4-
42 WATERLOO.
of war during the seven years that he was Governor of Corfu,
were both given a division in the 1st Corps of the Army of the
North. A few days after having been relieved of his command,
the colonel of the 14th Chasseurs, one of the most faithful
officers of the Duke of Angoulême during The Campaign of
the Midi, was proposed for a regiment of mobilized National
Guards. Another colonel, whose cowardice under fire had led
to his retirement, was also proposed for a regiment of the Line.
Finally, General Moreau, the pusillanimous commander of
Soissons in 1814, who had avoided a capital condemnation
only thanks to the fall of Napoleon, was selected to command
a brigade in active service. The Emperor was justified in
saying: "It seems to me that, among the general officers,
there are a great many young men more skilful than those
proposed to me."
Overtasked and absorbed by the gravest cares, the
Emperor often ratified the nominations of Davout without
examining them. He then visited his displeasure upon this
minister, who, as it appears, was disliked at the Tuileries on account
of his stiffness and severity in the service. So there was no
lack of individuals in the imperial entourage to incriminate all
his acts that were susceptible of criticism. In order to have
one guarantee more for the military personnel, the Emperor
charged his aide-de-camp Flahault with revising the
nominations proposed by the Minister of War. "Collect," he wrote to
Flahault, "all the information possible upon the generals and
officers, for, if I make some bad selections, it is you whom I
shall hold responsible." Very brave and an excellent staff
officer, Flahault had shown himself as brilliant a cavalier at
Friedland and the Moskowa as skilful diplomat at Neumark
and Lusigny. None the less, his truly extraordinary
advancement was attributed to favour. In fact, though he had never
commanded more than a squadron, he had been named, at
twenty-eight years of age (in 1813), general of division. So
young a lieutenant-general should have, perhaps, declined this
mission - very delicate with a man like Davout. At all events,
without displacing less zeal, he might have discharged it in a
more discreet manner. Each day he installed himself for
many hours in the War Office, overturning the documents,
causing reports to be made directly to him, erasing of his own
authority some names upon the lists, and even giving some
orders directly opposed to those of Davout. The selections
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 43
were no better, for, in spite of his devotion and intelligence,
the Emperor's aide-de-camp could judge no better than Davout.
The Prince of Eckmühl was deeply wounded by this
inquisition, from which he was quickly delivered. He had an
explanation with the Emperor, telling him that, if it were not an act
of cowardice to abandon his post under such circumstances,
he would not remain one hour in the ministry.
Among the officers provided with commands, there were
some men incapable, worn out before their time, or of doubtful
devotion; but the high personnel of the last Imperial Army
formed, nevertheless, an admirable whole. We may even say
that, unless in revolutions or in wars analogous to those which
succeeded each other from 1789 to 1814, never will the French
Army possess such chiefs. Independently of their innate
military qualities, they possessed this advantage - experience, and
this virtue - youth. All had made war for more than twenty
years, and none were fifty years old. Napoleon was forty-six;
Davout, forty-five; Soult, forty-six; Ney, forty-six; Grouchy,
forty-nine; Drouet d'Erlon, forty-nine; Lobau, forty-five;
Lamarque, forty-five; Kellermann, forty-five; Reille, forty-four;
Vandamme, forty-four; Rapp, forty-three; Clausel, forty-
three; Suchet, forty-three; Pajol, forty-three; Gérard, forty-
two; Drouot, forty-one; and Exelmans, forty-one- this for the
commanders of the army and cavalry corps. Among the
generals of division, many - Allix, Piré, Flahault, Berckheim,
and Teste - were less than forty. The youngest of the generals
of brigade was La Bédoyère; he was twenty-nine.
VIII.
Among these men who had so often led the French to
victory, their faith in success, unfortunately, did not equal
their physical vigour and military talents. They were too well
informed regarding the formidable armaments of Europe and
the feeble resources of France, both in soldiers and materiel,
not to see that, unless favoured by Fortune, which, however,
was always possible in war, the Emperor would be unable to
to fight long with his small army against the masses of the
coalition. On June 10th, in passing through La Fère, General
Ruty, commander-in-chief of the artillery, said to Colonel
Pion des Loches: "Bonaparte is irretrievably lost. The
King will soon return. What will become of us? Miserable
44 WATERLOO.
army that would not fire a shot three months since!" In a
reunion of officers, on the eve of the passage of the Sambre,
another general uttered words so discouraging that, in
contempt of all discipline, Major de Négrier severely criticised them:
"It is not for you," he cried, "to make such reflections. The
wine is drawn, and you should drink it, and not attempt to
demoralize us." Confidence was lacking, even in the general
officers who had been led by their sentiments or by the force of
circumstances to declare themselves first for Napoleon, and
who, compromised as they were, should have had so great a
interest in strengthening the morale of their comrades. But
they were all the more uneasy, as they felt their heads would
be one of the prizes of this lost game.
Variance reigned in the staffs. The generals who, without
being very fervent Royalists, would have demanded nothing
better, however, than to finish tranquilly their career under
the Bourbons, were vexed with the accomplices of March 20th
for having thrown the country into an adventure and provoked
a frightful war. These last suspected the others, and
denounced them as officers without energy, lukewarm patriots,
and timid Royalists. Finally, more ardent than ever were
the competition, rivalry, and jealousy for commands. As
sparing of recompenses as the Emperor had been in regard to
his true partisans, the other generals feared none the less that,
after the first battle, there would be advancement only for
the former. And, on the other hand, those who had rallied to
the Emperor from the first hour were astonished to see still in
the Imperial Army men like Soult, Durutte, Bruny, Bourmont,
and Dumonceau. General Piré protested against the
insufficiency of the indemnity for taking the field. "It is the lack of
attention to private interests," said he, "that often leads to
the loss of the general cause." General Maurice Mathieu
asked to be retired in order not to become the subordinate
of Clausel, his junior in rank. Duhesme, who had at first
been attached to the 3rd Corps, was given a command in the
Young Guard. "He can not," wrote Davout, "be placed under
the orders of Vandamme." General Bonnet accused General
Ornano of having spoken disparagingly of him to the Emperor,
challenged him, and lodged a ball in his chest. Vandamme,
who had a corps of 18,000 men, complained to the Minister of
War that some generals younger than he were given more
important commands. Gressot wrote to Soult that the generals
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 45
of the Army of the Rhine were unanimous in regretting being
under the orders of Rapp, "a man of complete nullity." If it
had not been on the very day of taking the field, more than one
general would have refused to serve under the Prince of the
Moskowa, and Vandamme, and even Gérard, passed with
displeasure under the command of Grouchy. An officer of the
Emperor's staff wrote to Davout: "All regard themselves as
crusaders, engaged in the same venture, but without any
obligation towards one another."
As to the comradeship and solidarity existing among the
generals of 1815, we have these fine words of Cambronne
before the Council of War: "I refused the rank of lieutenant-
general because there were so many jealous persons. You saw
the effects of this at Waterloo; we had a renowned captain.
Well, even he was unable to put everything in order. One
would have said that my nomination was an injustice; that I
was too young. I would have been placed in an embarrassing
position, and I was unwilling to run the risk of compromising
the safety of the Army."
Contrary to the staffs, the soldiers and almost all of the
regimental officers were full of ardour and confidence. Whilst
the generals saw things as they were in reality, the soldiers
recommenced the dream of glory which the invasion had
interrupted, but which they could not believe ended. Had not the
Emperor, whose return had been predicted for a year by the
barrack refrains and the marching songs, returned to his own?
In the eyes of the soldiers Napoleon was invincible. If he had
been conquered in 1812, it had been by the snow; in 1814, it
was by treason. This faith, so suitable for strengthening the
morale of the Army, and which the Emperor, moreover, had
always attempted to inspire, had, unfortunately, for counter-
part the suspicion of everything that was not Napoleon. One
may be conquered only by treason, but the soldiers suspected
treason everywhere. "Do not employ the marshals during
The Campaign," one wrote to the Emperor. The quarters of
the corps commanders, the Tuileries, and the War Department
were flooded with complaints and denunciations of the officers
who, during the other reign, had manifested sentiments in
favour of the Bourbons and the Orleanists, or who were only
members of noble families.
At the advance posts of the Army of the Rhine a sentinel
fired upon an individual who was seeking to reach the German
46 WATERLOO.
bank by swimming. The report spread among the troops that
a note had been found upon the dead body announcing that
there was a plot to blow up the powder magazine at
Strasbourg. The commandant of Conde, Colonel Taubin, excused
himself for certain delays in the provisioning of the fortress
by saying that "his orders were not obeyed"; and driven mad
by the harsh reply of the assistant chief of staff of the 1st Corps,
that "an officer who could not command obedience was
unworthy to command," he blew out his brains. The garrison
believed that he had killed himself to avoid being sent before
a council of war as an accomplice of a conspiracy. The minds
of the soldiers being thus troubled by the fear of treason, we
can imagine what an emotion was caused in the 1st Army Corps
by the distribution of false cartridges. The fact was, indeed,
very grave, for the ordnance department of Lille had delivered
not wooden cartridges, used in drilling, but ball cartridges,
containing bran in place of powder. Drouet d'Erlon had the
colonel in charge of the ordnance department shadowed.
"For a long time," said he, in a report to Davout, "I have had
some suspicions regarding his opinions." Davout ordered an
investigation, which, like all investigations, ended in nothing.
It was impossible to ascertain how, why, or since when these
strange cartridges came to be placed in the magazine.
The bonds of discipline, which even in the armies of
Austerlitz and Wagram were not near so strong as one imagines,
became still further relaxed from the effects of this almost
universal suspicion, as well as from the events that had occurred
during the past year. Soldiers are not quick to obey chiefs
whom they believe capable of ragusades (this was the word in
vogue), and to respect generals and colonels who, after having
caused them to march against their Emperor three months
before, henceforth manifested the most ardent Bonapartism.
Only the officers who, during the period extending from March
5th to the 20th, had by their words or acts encouraged or
provoked the men to desert to the Emperor, preserved their
authority. And not always was this the case. Six officers of
the 1st Cuirassiers, having been advanced a grade by the
Emperor for having won over their regiment, were installed in
their new grades, according to the regulations, before the
assembled regiment. The cuirassiers received them with
murmurs and hisses. "We have done as much as you," they cried,
"and we have received neither advancement nor other
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 47
recompense." In more than one regiment it was hoped that all the
officers would be replaced by the subalterns; in more than
one address from the regiments to the Emperor the soldiers
demanded the removal of their colonel. "We demand," wrote
the dragoons of the 12th Regiment, "the removal of our colonel,
whose ardour for Your Majesty is not abreast with our
sentiments." "We are persuaded," wrote the officers, subalterns,
and soldiers of the 75th of the Line, "that the intention of Your
Majesty is not to maintain a traitor at the head of a French
regiment."
There was still another reason for this spirit of indiscipline.
Deceived by appearances, as were almost every one at that
time, the soldiers imagined that they alone had brought about
the revolution which had brought back the Emperor to the
Tuileries; consequently they believed that no one but them
had a right to cry, "Long live the Emperor!" Had not
Davout declared that the abandonment of their regiments by
the soldiers during the late events should be considered only
as a proof of devotion for the Emperor? and had not the sage
Drouot himself decided to reinstate in the cadres of the Old
Guard the subalterns cashiered in 1814 for having deserted
"from grief at the departure of His Majesty?" What an
example for an army!
On March 20th the dragoons of the Guard arrived from
Tours; they learned upon the quays that the Emperor was
holding a review. A year had passed since they had last seen
their idol. They hurried their officers along with them, filed
through the gate of the Louvre, and debouched at a rapid trot,
all covered with mud, and horses reeking with sweat, upon
the Place du Carrousel, vociferating, "Long live the
Emperor!" Some days later, at an inspection with open ranks,
some dragoons gave the signal. Suddenly the first rank
wheeled about, and the two ranks raised their sabres and
crossed them above the head of the Emperor. He laughingly
bowed his head, and finished the inspection under a vault of
steel. Fanaticism for Napoleon may excuse this lack of
discipline and these caprices contrary to the regulations. But
there were graver faults.
The troops of Grouchy, on the march from Pont-Saint-
Esprit to Marseilles, after the capitulation of La Pallud, were
guilty of the greatest excesses at Orgon, under pretence that
the preceding year, when the exiled Napoleon had passed
48 WATERLOO.
through this town, the inhabitants had wished to hang him.
At Aire (Pas-de-Calais) the 105th of the Line, en route for the
frontier, commenced to demolish a new house whose facade
was decorated with fleurs de lys. In order to calm the soldiers,
the commandant of the place was compelled to imprison the
unfortunate owner. At Aix some cannoneers, offended at
seeing some young Royalists walking about with enormous
white roses pinned to the lapels of their coats, dispersed them
with sabre-blows. At Saint-Germain the sharpshooters of
the Young Guard mutinied and refused to enter their barracks
because there was no tricolour flag over the entrance. In the
theatres the soldiers maltreated the spectators who did not
applaud the "Marseillaise." In the cafes they beat the men
who refused to cry, "Long live the Emperor!" Having
entered Belgium, they pillaged as hard as they could. "The
Army," wrote General Radet, commander of the gendarmerie,
to Soult on June 17th, "is infected with the spirit of marauding
and pillage. The Guard, itself sets an example. Some
magazines of flour have been pillaged and horses at picket stolen.
All night the homes of the Belgians, who have given every-
thing willingly and have cared for our wounded, have been
sacked. The soldiers do not recognize the authority of the
gendarmerie. I herewith tender my resignation as provost-
general of the Army."
Some of the regiments refused the sea-biscuits. Friant
complained that the grenadiers of the Guard carried women
with them. A voltigeur of the 96th deserted in arms to visit
his parents. He returned at the end of eight days, and his
colonel only inflicted upon him a slight disciplinary
punishment. Two hundred and ninety-two soldiers of the 39th and
59th of the Line declared that they would desert if they were
not placed in the Guard. Some men of the train, who had
followed the Emperor from Grenoble, had themselves
incorporated with the 1st Hussars, and some hussars belonging to
this regiment caused themselves to be placed in the Guard.
General Barrois, commanding a division of the Young Guard
in formation, received this singular request: "Monsieur le
Comte, we are 1,374 men of the 1st and 2nd of the Line and of
the 1st Light who have always served with honour. We believe
that it is our duty to inform you that we do not wish to remain
longer in our regiments, although we have nothing to complain
of. But, having served in the Guard, we wish to continue to
THE LAST ARMY OF THE EMPIRE. 49
do so. It would be imprudent to attempt to hinder us, as the
course which we have taken is irrevocable. You can prevent
the fault which we are about to commit by obtaining our
reinstatement in the Guard. But we do not wish to wait longer
than four days. Our colonels are informed of our intentions."
There existed a state of rivalry between the different
regiments, which provoked brawls and duels. The Emperor was
forced to order the suppression, in the five regiments of
cavalry bearing the No. 1, of the white shoulder-knots, of which
the other regiments were jealous. The soldiers belonging to
the Battalion of the Isle of Elba having been lodged in the
Hotel des Cent-Suisses, Place du Carrousel, some enthusiastic
persons substituted for the inscription above the main
entrance that of "Quartier des Braves." The other braves of the
Army, though they were all Bonapartists, looked upon this as
an insult. The grognards were joked by their comrades of
the Line and even of the Old Guard. Many sabre-blows were
exchanged. It became necessary to efface the inscription.
But if the Army was enervated by indiscipline, it was
animated by impatience to fight, resolution to conquer, idolatry
for the Emperor, and hatred of the foreigner. A spy wrote
from Paris to Wellington about the middle of May: "To give
a just idea of the enthusiasm of the Army, I need only to draw
a parallel between the epochs of '92 and the present year.
Still the balance will be in favour of Buonaparte, for to-day it
is no longer enthusiasm; it is frenzy. The cause of the soldiers,
who have nothing to hope for after the fall of their chief, is
inseparable from his. So I can not conceal from your
excellency that, whatever the Bourbonists may say, the fight will
be bloody and bitterly contested." "The troops," relates
General Hulot, "were exalted to the highest degree; their
ardour was a species of fanaticism." "The moment chosen for
taking the field," writes General Foy, on June 15th, in his
daily notes, "is well timed. The troops experience not
patriotism, not enthusiasm, but a veritable rage for the Emperor
and against his enemies." It was in all sincerity that a deserter
and traitor, the Adjutant-Commandant Gordon, sent this
information to Clarke: "The King, on his return, should
disband the Army and create a new one. The soldiers are furious;
their spirit is dreadful."
"The spirit of the soldiers is dreadful" - that is to say,
all the soldiers demanded to be passed in review by the
50 WATERLOO.
Emperor. They received the new eagles with enthusiastic
acclamations and threatening oaths. They replied to the cries
of "Long live the Army!" by cries of "Long live the Emperor!"
They put for prizes small tricolour flags in the muzzles of their
muskets. They swore, with sabres crossed above the flames
of punch, to conquer or die. They said, showing the bust of
the Emperor: "He will be with us!" They raised at their
expense a monument at the Gulf of Juan. They ordered
medals struck commemorative of the Emperor's return. They
abandoned one, two, and even five days' pay for the expenses
of the war. They quitted their garrisons and traversed towns
and villages crying, "Long live the Emperor!" and singing
"Le Père la Violette!" They tore the white flags in rags,
which they put to the vilest uses. They arrested those who
attempted to entice the soldiers to desert and beat them with
the butts of their muskets. They tore the deserters from the
hands of the gendarmes and degraded them without further
trial. They wished to double the marches in order to be in
the first battles. They declared they had no need of cartridges,
since they would attack the enemy with the bayonet. They
said "they cared not what became of them, provided the
Emperor thrashed the Allies."
Sensitive, insolent, undisciplined; suspicious of its chiefs,
troubled by the fear of treason, and thus accessible, perhaps, to
panic, but inured to and loving war; a thirst for vengeance;
capable of heroic efforts and furious transports, and more
haughty, more exalted, and more ardent in fight than any
other Republican or Imperial Army - such was the Army of
1815. Never had Napoleon had under his hand an instrument
of war so redoubtable nor so fragile.
CHAPTER II.
The Plans of Campaign.
I - Idea of an invasion of Belgium in the first days of April.
II. - The Allies' plan of campaign.
III. - Napoleon's plan of campaign.
IV. - Concentration of the French Army (June 8-14). - Arrival of the
Emperor at Beaumont. - Strength and positions of the armies
on June 14th.
I.
On March 25, 1815, when, at Vienna, the sovereigns were
busy hatching a seventh coalition against France, they had
to resist a sudden attack of Napoleon in Belgium, no more
than 80,000 soldiers - 30,000 Prussians, 14,000 Saxons, 23,000
Anglo-Hanoverians, and nearly 10,000 Dutch-Belgians.
Furthermore, the Saxons were disposed to mutiny, and defections
among the Dutch-Belgians were to be feared. The greater
part of the latter had served under Napoleon; and in Brussels,
in all the Walloon country, and particularly in the provinces
of Namur and Liege, which were subjected to the harsh
occupation of the Prussians, there was a French party.
Stationed from Treves and Coblentz as far as Courtray
and Antwerp, over an extent of seventy leagues, the allied
troops had, on March 15th, commenced some movements of
concentration; but Napoleon would have none the less been
able to cross the Belgian frontier with 50,000 men on April 1st,
and three days later to enter Brussels without striking a blow.
Wellington was at Vienna and Blücher at Berlin. The French
would have met with no resistance, as the Prince of Orange
and General Kliest, who commanded the Prussian Army in the
Rhenish provinces, had decided to effect their concentration,
in case of an attack, at Tirlemont (eleven leagues to the east
of Brussels).
Would this easy success have sufficed, as the Emperor
imagined, to raise Belgium? At all events, without imposing
upon experienced soldiers, the occupation of Brussels would
have produced a great effect in France and in foreign
countries. The Prussian generals, the Prince of Orange, and even
51
52 WATERLOO.
Wellington, feared this sudden attack. "It is necessary to
cover Brussels" wrote Muffling to the King of the Low
Countries, "in order that this city may not become the focus of a
revolution." "It would be of the utmost importance for
Bonaparte," wrote Wellington to Gneissenau, "to cause us to
retrograde behind Brussels, to drive away the King of France,
and to overturn the order of things which has been established
by the King of the Low Countries. It would have a terrible
effect upon public opinion." But this audacious blow, of
which Napoleon had conceived the idea, and the execution of
which he judged easy and certain, was abandoned by him as
soon as conceived. He understood too well that a victory
gained over only one-tenth of the forces of the coalition would
be regarded by the Allies as a simple advance-guard affair,
and that this victory, even should it result in the uprising of
Belgium, would not end the war. In passing the Sambre on
April 1st he would have then compromised the future for an
ephemeral success, for the ex-Royal Army, while being able
to furnish immediately 50,000 excellent troops, was not in
condition to undertake a campaign of some duration. Men,
arms, horses, supplies - all were lacking. Now the Emperor
could not at the same time direct the operations in Belgium
and reorganize the Army. Moreover, in order to form an army
of 50,000 men, it would have been necessary to take all the
available men in the garrisons of the northern departments,
whose population was so hostile to the Empire, and to employ
the reserve of Paris, destined in case of necessity to act in the
West, where the Vendean chiefs were very active, and in the
Midi, where Bordeaux, Toulouse, and Marseilles still recognized
the authority of the Duke of Angoulême, who was preparing
to march on Lyons.
If the military state of France prevented the captain from
taking the field too quickly, the political situation prohibited
the sovereign. Eight days after having re-ascended the throne,
Napoleon could not abandon the government to fight unless
circumstances imperiously demanded it. It was more urgent
to reorganize the administration, to fill the treasury, and to
pacify the country. For gaining the hearts of the French, all
of whom so ardently desired peace, what an admirable
expedient would have been the invasion of Belgium! Would
not the effect produced by the capture of Brussels have been
counter-balanced by the fright occasioned by seeing Napoleon,
The Plans of Campaign. 53
hardly returned to France, putting on his seven-league boots
to hasten to new conquests? The Emperor had still another
reason - and it was better than the others - not to commence
war before having exhausted all means of accommodation;
like his people, though doubtless not for so long a time, he
desired the maintenance of peace.
For more than one long month the Emperor persisted in
believing peace possible. "If we have war . . . .," he
wrote again on April 30th to Davout, from whom he had
nothing to conceal. Nevertheless, whatever might be the
tenacity of his illusions, he none the less prepared to defend
himself. He had called out the reserves, mobilized the
National Guards, and given orders for the reorganization of the
materiel. But it was only about the middle of May, when he
had almost lost all hope of avoiding war, that he decided upon
his plan of campaign.
II.
The Allies had been at work upon their plan since the
beginning of April. There were many plans proposed.
Knesebeck seriously proposed to deceive Napoleon by delivering to
him a false plan. He said: "We will lead the-enemy to
believe that we intend operating by way of Bâle; that he has
nothing to fear from the English Army, which will be occupied
with the siege of Dunkirk, or from the Prussian Army which
will remain on the defensive. We will thus attract Buonaparte
between the Marne and the Upper Rhine against the Austrian,
Bavarian, and Russian armies, whilst the English and Prussians
advance without opposition towards Paris."
Schwarzenberg renewed the art of war by gravely
declaring that the Allies should "neither divide themselves too
much, for fear of weakening themselves, nor march in such
large masses, for fear of not being able to subsist." He
concluded by saying that it was necessary to march on Paris in
three strong columns, "and to leave the details of the
operations to the knowledge and experience of the commanders."
The plan of Gneissenau - a crushing and redoubtable plan
- was based upon the enormous numerical superiority of the
Allies. Gneissenau said: "Four great armies, of which the
fourth - the Russian Army - will form the reserve, will enter
France simultaneously and march straight on Paris.
Regardless of what may happen to one of the three armies of the first
54 WATERLOO.
line - whether it is beaten or not- the two others will continue
to advance, making some detachments upon their rear to
observe the fortresses. The Russian or reserve army will be
destined to repair the checks which may be suffered by one of
the armies of the first line. For this, it will advance directly
to the aid of the army that may be in retreat, or will manoeuvre
on the flank of the enemy. Supposing that Napoleon defeats
one of the armies of the first line, the other two, continuing
to advance, will gain ground and thus draw nearer Paris,
whilst the army of reserve will assist the defeated army.
If, in place of pursuing the beaten army, Napoleon directs
himself on the flank of another army of the first line, the
reserve will unite with the latter, so that the battle will turn to
the disadvantage of the enemy. Meanwhile, the third army
will continue to advance, and the one which will have been
defeated will rally and then resume the offensive."
Wellington's idea was to begin hostilities without awaiting
the arrival of the Russian Army, and even before the three
armies had finished their concentration, He wrote on April
10th: "It is sufficient to direct between the Sambre and the
Meuse 60,000 Anglo-Dutch, 60,000 Prussians, and 140,000
Austro-Bavarians, in order to find ourselves in France with
forces superior to those of the enemy, and to be able to
manoeuvre in the direction of Paris." Greatly preoccupied with
the interests of Louis XVIII., Wellington judged that each new
day of the truce affirmed the power of Napoleon; and,
believing in the importance of a Royalist uprising in the Midi,
he deemed it necessary to second it by prompt action on the
northern frontier.
At Vienna the allied generals were not so eager to begin.
They wished to make this war without risks. They desired,
in each battle, to be at least three to one, and "to conquer
according to the rules of mechanics and the laws of gravitation."
In the council of war held on April 19th, and which was
presided over by the Czar, it was decided that, in order to give
the different armies time to effect their concentration, the
campaign should open only on June 1st. This was one month
lost according to Wellington and Blücher; one month gained,
according to Knesebeck and Schwarzenberg. The latter
intended even to gain another month by the discussion of the
strategical plan. It fact, June 10th, at the time when Blücher,
who had had, however, the diversion of a revolt of the Saxons,
The Plans of Campaign. 55
"had become enraged" at remaining inactive, and had said to
his soldiers that he was impatient to go to seek his pipe, which
he had forgotten in Paris, Schwarzenberg caused to be adopted
by the sovereigns a definite plan, the execution of which was
to begin only between June 27th and July 1st.
According to these new dispositions, six armies would
cross simultaneously the frontiers of France: the Army of
the Low Countries (93,000 English, Hanoverians, Brunswickers,
and Dutch-Belgians, under Wellington), between Maubeuge
and Beaumont; the Prussian Army (117,000 men, under
Blücher), between Philippeville and Givet; the Russian Army
(150,000 men, under Barclay de Tolly), by Saar-Louis and
Saarbruck; the Army of the Upper Rhine (210,000 Austrians,
Bavarians, Würtemburgers, and Hessians, under
Schwarzenberg; the right wing by Sarreguemines and the main body by
Bâle. These four, great armies would march concentrically
on Paris - the English by Péronne, the Prussians by Laon, the
Russians by Nancy, and the Austrians by Langres.
On the extreme left the Army of Upper Italy (38,000
Austrians and 12,000 Piedmontese, under Frimont) and the
Austrian Army of Naples (25,000 men, under Bianchi) would
pass the Alps and direct themselves, the first on Lyons, the
second on Provence, where the English squadron of the
Mediterranean would second its operations.
III.
By secret reports from Vienna and Brussels and by the
foreign journals - the press was already indiscreet - Napoleon
was able to form a general idea of the forces and plans of the
enemy. Two plans of campaign presented themselves to
his mind.
The first plan consisted in massing under Paris the 1st,
2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Corps, the Guard, the reserve cavalry, and
the Army of the Rhine (5th Corps); in concentrating under
Lyons the Army of the Alps and the Corps of the Jura; and in
permitting the Allies to engage themselves in the net-work of
fortresses, well provisioned and defended by nearly 150,000
mobilized National Guards, retired soldiers, cannoneers of the
Line, veterans, custom-house officers, gendarmes, and urban
National Guards. The allied armies, which were not to pass
the frontiers until July 1st, would be unable to arrive within the
56 WATERLOO.
radius of Lyons until the 15th or 18th and within that of Paris
until the 25th. By this time (July 25th) the entrenchments
of Paris would be completed; the garrison would number
30,000 regular troops, 18,000 Federate Sharpshooters, and
36,000 National Guards. The army concentrated under Paris
would have 200,000 soldiers; and there would remain nearly
80,000 men in the dépôts and 158,000 recruits.
As, of the 645,000 Allies who would enter France, 75,000
would manoeuvre in the Lyoness and Provence, and as, on
account of the multiplicity of his lines of operations, the enemy
would be forced to leave in the rear 150,000 men to protect his
communications and besiege or mask the fortresses, the four
great armies would have, on arriving between the Oise and the
Seine, but 420,000 combatants. To these 420,000 men
Napoleon would oppose 200,000 soldiers of the active army and
the entrenched camp of Paris. He would recommence the
campaign of 1814, but with 200,000 soldiers, instead of 90,000,
and with Paris fortified, defended by 80,000 men, and having
as Governor the skilful captain of Auerstaedt and Eckmühl,
the fierce defender of Hambourg, Davout.
The second plan - bolder, more conformable to the genius
of Napoleon, to the temperament of the French, and even to
the principles of great war, but terribly more hazardous - was
to attack the enemy before his forces were united. By June
15th the Emperor would be able to concentrate upon the
northern frontier an army of 125,000 men. He would enter
Belgium, beat there one after the other the English and
Prussians; then, after having received reinforcements from the
depots, he would make his junction with the 23,000 men under
the command of Rapp, and direct himself against the Austro-
Russians.
Doubtless, if the Emperor had had to look only at the
military side of the question, he would have adopted the first
plan, the success of which appeared certain. But he had no
longer his liberty of action of 1805, nor even of 1812. He
must, though Commander-in-chief, reckon with public opinion.
What an impression would have been produced in the country
by the abandonment without defence of nearly one-third of
the territory, and precisely those departments the most
patriotic and the most devoted to the imperial cause! Would it
not cause everywhere discouragement and disaffection, excite
even to hostility the ill-will of the Chamber, extend in the West
The Plans of Campaign. 57
and rekindle in the Midi the fires of insurrection. The
Emperor felt that, in order to raise the courage of the people and
impose upon the malcontent and factious, it would be
necessary, at the beginning of hostilities, for him to gain a brilliant
victory. Moreover, abandoning himself to his customary
illusions, he imagined this victory would be decisive enough
to break up the coalition. The Belgians, he thought, would
range themselves under the French flag, and the destruction
of Wellington's army would lead to the fall of the Tory cabinet,
which would be succeeded by one in favour of peace. If it
should turn out otherwise, the Army, victorious over the
English and Prussians in Belgium, would conquer also in France
the Russians and Austrians. At the worst - admitting a
check on the Belgian frontier - the Emperor would be able to
withdraw under Paris, and operate according to the defensive
plan. The Emperor, however, did not conceal from himself
the fact that, after a defeat in Belgium, the chances in favour
of the success of his first plan, to which it would be necessary
to return, would be greatly diminished. He would have lost a
great many men, weakened the morale of the Army and
country, provoked the Allies to advance by fifteen days their
entrance into France, and, necessarily, on account of not being
able to do everything at the same time, neglected somewhat
the organization of the defence.
The Emperor meditated for a long time upon these plans.
When he had determined in favour of the offensive, he was still
undecided for some days upon the point where he would strike
his first blows. For the success of his plan, which was to
defeat one after the other the two armies occupying Belgium, it
was necessary to attack Wellington or Blücher before they
had effected their junction. In taking his line of operations
on Brussels by Ath, and debouching from Lille or Condé
against Wellington's right, Napoleon would drive back the
English Army on the Prussians, and would find himself, two
days later, before the two united armies. If, on the contrary,
he advanced against Blücher's left by Givet and the valley of
the Meuse, he would likewise hasten the junction of the two
armies by pushing the Prussians upon the English. By one of
his finest strategical conceptions, the Emperor resolved to
advance boldly against the very centre of the enemy's
cantonments, upon the supposed point of concentration of the Anglo-
Prussians. As the route from Charleroi to Brussels formed
-5-
58 WATERLOO.
the line of contact of the two armies, it was upon this route
that Napoleon intended to burst, by Beaumont and
Philippeville, with the rapidity of a thunderbolt.
IV.
The orders of concentration were given in the first days of
June. The 1st Corps advanced from Valenciennes to Avesnes;
the 2nd, from Avesnes to Maubeuge; the 3rd, from Rocroi to
Chimay; the 4th, from Thionville to Rocroi; the 6th, from
Soissons to Avesnes; and the Imperial Guard, from Paris by
Soissons to Avesnes. The communications with Belgium and
the Rhenish provinces were intercepted; in the seaports an
embargo was placed on all vessels, even on the fishing barks;
and, in order to give no warning to the advance posts of the
enemy, some free corps and divisions of National Guards
replaced upon the northern and eastern frontiers the troops
directed upon the points of concentration. When Napoleon,
who had quitted Paris in the night, arrived at Laon at noon on
June 11th, all the troops had effected their concentration.
Grouchy alone, whose headquarters were precisely at Laon,
had not yet caused his four cavalry corps to budge.
Summoned to the quarters of the Emperor, he said that he had
received no orders. In fact, it was not until the next day, June
12th, that the Major-General thought of sending him from
Avesnes the instructions of Napoleon! But immediately after
having seen the Emperor, Grouchy had sent the order to the
four cavalry corps to repair to the frontier by forced marches;
himself, without losing an hour, had departed for Avesnes.
The concentration was not delayed, since all the reserve
cavalry arrived beyond Avesnes on the night of the 13th; but
many regiments had been forced to make twenty leagues
without unbridling - a bad start for horses at the opening of a
campaign If only this vexatious incident had called the
attention of Napoleon to the negligence of his major-general!
On June 13th the Emperor slept at Avesnes; and on the
evening of the 14th he advanced his headquarters to Beaumont,
in the centre of his Army. In spite of the unfavourable weather,
all the troops bivouacked this night in order to remain well
concentrated. At dawn there was read to them in front of
their bivouacs the following order of the day of the Emperor :
"Soldiers, to-day is the anniversary of Marengo and
The Plans of Campaign. 59
Friedland, which twice settled the destiny of Europe. Then, as
after Austerlitz and Wagram, we were too generous. To-day,
however, leagued against us, the princes whom we have left
upon their thrones aim at the independence and the most
sacred rights of France. They have begun the most unjust of
aggressions. Let us then march to encounter them. Are we
not still the same men?"
The Army occupied the following positions: The 1st
Corps (20,731 men, under Drouet d'Erlon), forming the
extreme left, between the routes of Avesnes, at Maubeuge and
Solre-sur-Sambre; the 2nd Corps (25,179 men under Reille),
between Solre-sur-Sambre and Leers; the 3rd Corps (18,105
men under Vandamme); and the 6th Corps (10,821 men, under
Lobau), between Beaumont and the frontier; the 4th corps
(15,404 men, under Gérard), between Philippeville and
Florenne; the reserve cavalry (13,144 men, under Grouchy), at
Valcourt, Bossus, and Gayolle; the Imperial Guard (20,755
men), in front and rear of Beaumont. This army had 370
pieces of artillery. The ground occupied by the bivouacs did
not exceed eight leagues in width by ten kilometres in length.
In ten days 124,000 men, separated by distances ranging
from twelve to seventy leagues, had united on the frontier,
within close cannon range of the enemy's advance posts,
without the Allies having taken a single defensive measure.
Never had a march of concentration been better conceived,
nor, save a few delays, which were quickly repaired, more
successfully executed.
While the French Army thus formed a formidable mass,
the Anglo-Prussians were still disseminated over a front of
more than thirty-five leagues and a medium depth of twelve.
On June 14th Blücher's headquarters were at Namur. The
I. Corps (30,800 men, under Ziethen), which formed the right
of the Prussian Army, occupied Thuin, Fontaine-Leveque,
Marchienne, Charleroi, Moustiers, Fleurus, Sombreffe, and
Gembloux; the II. Corps (31,000 men, under Pirch I.),
Namur, Héron, and Hannut; the III. Corps (23,900 men, under
Thielmann), Ciney, Dinant, and Huy; the IV. Corps (30,300
men, under Bülow), Liege and Tongres.
The cantonments of the English Army under Wellington,
who had established his headquarters in Brussels, extended
from the Lys and the Escault to the little river Haine. The
2nd Corps (27,321 men, under Lord Hill), occupied Leuze, Ath,
60 WATERLOO.
Audenarde, Ghent, and Alost; the 1st Corps (30,246 men, under
the Prince of Orange), Mons, Roeulx, Frasnes, Seneffe, Nivelles,
Genappe, Soignies, Enghein, and Braine-le-Comte; the cavalry-
corps (9,913 men, under Lord Uxbridge), cantoned along the
Dender, between Ninove and Grammont; and the reserve
(25,597 men, under the immediate command of Wellington),
in Brussels and environs.
In the positions which they occupied three days were
required for each of the two armies to concentrate on the line
of contact and double this time to concentrate on the English
right or Prussian left wing. This outrageous extension of the
cantonments, so dangerous in front of an adversary like
Napoleon, and so favourable to the success of the bold plan that
he had conceived, has been criticised by almost all military
writers. Wellington has attempted to justify these
dispositions by alleging the difficulty experienced in subsisting the
troops and the necessity of guarding every point. As a matter
of fact, it was because, while admitting the hypothesis of an
attack by Napoleon, and though they had even come to some
understanding regarding the method of guarding against such
an eventuality, the Allies believed it highly improbable. On
June 15th, at the hour when the Emperor had already his foot
upon the Belgian soil, Wellington tranquilly stated, in a long
letter to the Czar, how he intended to assume the offensive at
the end of the month. Some days previous Blücher had written
to his wife: "We shall soon enter France. We might remain
here a year, for Bonaparte will not attack us."
CHAPTER III.
FIRST COMBATS.
I. - Passage of the Belgian frontier (June 15th). - The desertion of
General Bourmont.
II. - Capture of Charleroi.
III. - Interview between Napoleon and Ney. - Combat of Gilly on the
right wing.
IV. - The operations of Ney. - Combat of Gosselies. - Combat of Frasnes.
- Quatre-Bras.
On June 15th, at 3:30 p.m., the French advance guards
passed the frontier at Leers, Cour-sur-Heure, and Thy.
According to the order of march despatched from the imperial
headquarters on the evening of the day before, the Army
marched on Charleroi in three principal columns: the left
column (corps of Reille and d'Erlon), by Thuin and Marchienne;
the central column (corps of Vandamme and Lobau, Imperial
Guard, and Grouchy's cavalry reserve), by Ham-sur-Heure,
Jamioulx, and Marcinelle; and the right column (Gérard's
corps), by Florenne and Gerpinnes.
The Emperor had combined everything from a strategical
point of view to facilitate the rapid passage of these masses
and to spare the men the enervating fatigue of trampling upon
the same spot; and he had prepared everything from a tactical
point of view to permit of the prompt deployment and mutual
aid of the different columns, in case the enemy should offer
serious resistance. Thirty minutes were to elapse between
the breaking camp of the different army corps. The troops
nearest the frontier were to put themselves in motion at three
o'clock in the morning, while those the most distant were not
to move until eight. Twelve regiments of cavalry reconnoitred
the march. The remainder of the mounted troops were
ordered to march on the left of the infantry. The sappers of
each army corps were to be united and to march in each corps
behind the first regiment of light infantry. Three companies
of pontoniers, with fifteen pontoons and the same number of
boats, were selected to follow immediately the corps of
61
62 WATERLOO.
Vandamme; the ambulances were to follow the imperial head-
quarters. There was an order to burn every carriage that
should slip into the columns, and, until a new order, the
baggage and reserve parks were not to approach nearer than three
leagues to the Army. The generals in command of the advance
guards were expected to regulate their march so as to remain
always abreast of one another; they were to reconnoitre in
every direction; interrogate the inhabitants upon the positions
of the enemy; seize the letters in the post-offices; communicate
to one another any information which they might have; and
to address frequent reports to the Emperor, who would be in
person with the advance of the central column. All the Army
was to have passed the Sambre before noon.
This order of march is justly regarded as a model. Never
in the auspicious hours of Austerlitz and Friedland had
Napoleon dictated a disposition of march more elaborate or
better conceived; never had his genius been more lucid; never
had he shown better his application to detail, his broad views
upon the ensemble, his perspicuity, and his mastery of the
art of war.
Unfortunately, the orders were not executed punctually.
Drouet d'Erlon took it upon himself to postpone his movement
until half-past four o'clock, instead of striking his camp at
three, as had been prescribed. Vandamme, who was to have
set out at three o'clock, awaited still at five the instructions
from the imperial headquarters. During the night the officer
who bore the order of march fell from his horse, broke his leg,
and remained inert and isolated in the midst of the fields.
Vandamme was informed of the march of the Army only by the
arrival of Lobau's corps in the rear of his bivouacs. Finally,
the troops of Gérard, who were also to set out at three o'clock,
were not massed at the point of concentration, abreast of
Florenne, until seven o'clock.
The soldiers of the 4th Corps were in great agitation.
They had just learned that General Bourmont, commanding
the leading division, had passed over to the enemy. This
desertion confirmed very inopportunely the fears of treason and
the suspicions against the chiefs by which the minds of the
soldiers had been troubled for three months. Murmurs and
imprecations arose from the ranks. One of Bourmont's brigade
commanders, General Hulot, "judging the moment critical,"
harangued the two regiments under his orders; he swore to
FIRST COMBATS. 63
them solemnly, sword in hand, "to combat with them the
enemies of France until his last breath." Gérard, in turn, deemed
it necessary to pass along the front of the troops and address a
few words to them; they replied by acclamations. Gérard
himself was greatly troubled by the desertion of his protégé
Bourmont, the particulars of which were given to him by Hulot.
A little after five o'clock in the morning Bourmont had
mounted his horse at Florenne with all his staff - Colonel
Clouet, Major Villoutreys, Captains d'Andigné, de Trélan, and
Sourda - and an escort of five chasseurs. After having passed
the French advance posts, he gave to a corporal of chasseurs a
letter for Gérard, which he had written at Florenne; and
having thus dismissed the escort, he rode rapidly with his
officers in the direction of the frontier. He said in his letter
to Gérard: ". . . I do not wish to contribute towards
establishing in France a bloody despotism which would ruin
my country. . . I would have resigned and returned to
my home if I had thought that I would have been permitted
to do so. This not appearing probable, I have been forced to
assure my liberty by other means. . . . No one shall see
me in the ranks of the enemy. He shall obtain from me no
information capable of injuring the French Army, composed of
men whom I love and for whom I shall never cease to bear
a lively attachment."
Two hours after having written this protestation that he
was not a deserter and traitor, Bourmont revealed to Colonel
von Schutter, commanding the Prussian advance posts along
the Sambre, that the French would attack Charleroi in the
afternoon. A little later he said to Colonel Reiche, Ziethen's
aide-de-camp, that the French Army numbered 120,000 men.
Finally, when, about three o'clock, he met Blücher near
Sombreffe, he would have, no doubt, hastened to answer all the
questions asked him. But the old soldier, disgusted at seeing
a man wearing the uniform of a general of division deserting on
the morning of a battle, hardly deigned to speak to him. An
officer of the Prussian staff having remarked to the field marshal
that he should show himself less brusque towards Bourmont,
since the latter wore a white cockade, Blücher, without caring
whether he was understood by the renegade, who might
understand German, said in a loud tone: "What matters the
cockade? A traitor will always be a traitor."
64 WATERLOO.
II.
The enemy had no need of information from the Count
de Bourmont. On June 9th Ziethen and General Dörnberg,
who commanded the light cavalry brigade detached in front
of Mons, were informed of great movements of troops towards
the frontier. On the 12th General Dörnberg had forwarded
to Wellington, who had transmitted it to Blücher, the
information that 100,000 French were concentrating between Avesnes
and Philippeville. On the 13th this same Dörnberg, who had
numerous spies along the frontier, wrote direct to Blücher that
an attack appeared imminent. On the 14th Pirch II
announced from Marchienne that the French would attack the
next day. In the evening the Prussian advance posts were
thoroughly informed of the proximity of the Imperial Army.
It was in vain that the precaution had been taken to build the
camp-fires in the hollows of the ground. The light from these
innumerable braziers were reflected upon the heavens, which
were illumined by a great white light.
While believing that Napoleon would not take the
offensive, Wellington and Blücher, however, in an interview
held at Tirlemont on May 3rd, had concerted together in
anticipation of this eventuality. Did they decide on this day, as
a number of historians state, upon a concentration on the line
of Sombreffe-Quatre-Bras? It is doubtful, for they were
ignorant whether the French Army would debouch by
Philippeville, Maubeuge, Conde, or Lille. It is far more probable that
the two Commanders-in-chief had agreed only upon a junction
in front of Brussels without fixing the precise point -
circumstances would dictate this point. Two days after the
conference of Tirlemont, Blücher, always zealous for the cause of
the Allies, had prescribed to his troops, in order to bring them
nearer to the English Army, a general movement on his right.
The I. Corps concentrated at Fleurus and the II. at Namur;
the III. Corps marched from Treves on Arlon, then on Dinant
and Huy; the IV. came from Coblentz to Malmedy and a little
later to Liege. Blücher moved his headquarters from Liege
to Namur. Ziethen, commanding the I. Army Corps, the
nearest one to the English cantonments, received the order to
remain in close touch with Wellington's army. Blücher wrote
to Ziethen on May 5th: "In case of an attack, you will await
FIRST COMBATS. 65
at Fleurus the development of the enemy's manoeuvres, and
you will inform the Duke of Wellington as well as myself of
all that takes place as early as possible." If not Wellington,
who, upon Blücher's promise at Tirelemont to cover the left
flank of the English Army, had echeloned his forces in such a
manner as to protect especially the routes of Ath, Mons, and
Nivelles, at least Blücher was prepared to meet an attack
from the side of Charleroi. Before noon on June 14th the Field
Marshal, informed by the reports of Pirch II. and Dörnberg,
began to prepare for the concentration of his entire army
at Fleurus.
The advance posts of Pirch II., who covered the front of
Ziethen's corps, expected, on the night of the 14th, to be
attacked at break of day. They received the French skirmishers
with musket-shots; then, in danger of being outflanked, they
retired foot by foot, from position to position, as far as the
Sambre. In these different engagements, at Thuin, Ham, in
the wood of Montigny, and at the farm of La Tombe, the
Prussians lost nearly 500 men killed, wounded and prisoners.
Continuing to push the enemy in front of them, the French
heads of column arrived between nine and ten o'clock on the
bank of the Sambre: Bachelu's division of Reille's corps
before Marchienne, and Pajol's cavalry in front of Charleroi.
The bridges were barricaded and defended by infantry and
cannon. The attack of Marchienne - in preparing which a
great deal of time was lost - consumed two hours. It was
only a little while before noon that the 2nd Light captured the
bridge at the point of the bayonet. Reille at once ordered the
2nd Corps to debouch, but, the bridge being narrow, the four
divisions and the cavalry did not finish their movement until
the middle of the afternoon. The 1st Corps, which followed
that of Reille, did not begin to cross the Sambre until 4:30 p.m.
Pajol was also detained quite a while before the bridge of
Charleroi. Between nine and ten o'clock the 1st Hussars
attempted a hurrah, which failed under the sustained fire of
sharpshooters concealed in the houses and behind the barricade.
It required infantry to force the barricade. Pajol resigned
himself to await the arrival of Vandamme's corps, which he
supposed was following him at a short distance. As we know,
this army corps had struck camp four hours late. About eleven
o'clock Pajol saw arriving not Vandamme, but the Emperor
in person with the sappers of the Guard and the Young Guard
66 WATERLOO.
of Duhesme. Informed of Vandamme's delay, Napoleon had
ordered Duhesme's division to quit its place in the central
column and to advance at a rapid pace towards Charleroi by a
cross-road. Sappers and marines hurled themselves on the
bridge, swept the barricade, and opened the way for Pajol's
squadrons. The Prussians having retired, the horsemen,
climbing at a rapid trot the steep and winding street which
traverses Charleroi from north to south, pursued them along
the route of Charleroi.
Not far from Charleroi the road branches off in two
directions - the one to the left leads to Brussels, while the other
goes to Fleurus. Pajol despatched the 1st Hussars along the
Brussels route, and with the main body of his cavalry he
advanced along the Fleurus route, by which the Prussians, who
had been dislodged from Charleroi, were retreating.
III.
It was a little past noon. The Emperor, acclaimed by
the inhabitants, traversed Charleroi. He halted at the foot
of the crumbling glacis at some hundred yards on this side of
the spot where the routes of Fleurus and Brussels branch, near
a little tavern called Belle-Vue, from which all the valley of
the Sambre may be seen. He dismounted from his horse,
ordered a chair to be brought from Belle-Vue, and seated himself
on the side of the road. The troops defiled. On perceiving
him, cavalry and infantry uttered cheers which drowned the
roll of drums and the blare of trumpets. The enthusiasm
bordered on frenzy; some of the soldiers issued from the ranks
"in order to embrace the horse of their Emperor." According
to an eye-witness. Napoleon soon sank into a deep slumber,
from which the noise of the acclamations was insufficient to
awaken him. This fact will not appear improbable if we
recall to mind that in Paris, in the months of April and May,
1815, the Emperor was often afflicted with these sudden fits of
drowsiness, and if we remember that on this day at noon he
had already remained seven or eight hours on horseback.
Gourgaud, who had accompanied the 1st Hussars along
the route of Brussels, returned about two o'clock to announce
that the Prussians showed themselves in force at Gosselies.
The Emperor sent him immediately to Marchienne, with the
order for Reille to March on Gosselies. Anxious, however, for
FIRST COMBATS. 67
his left until the execution of this movement, he ordered one
of Duhesme's regiments of the Young Guard and a battery of
horse artillery to take position on the Brussels route at two
kilometres from Charleroi. Soon after he ordered Lefebvre-
Desnoëttes to push forward to the support of the 1st Hussars
with the light cavalry of the Guard (lancers and chasseurs);
and he dictated to Soult a letter for d'Erlon, enjoining the
latter to march on Gosselies in order to second Reille. This
letter had just been despatched - it was a little after three
o'clock - when Marshal Ney arrived.
Having arrived by post at Avesnes on June 14th without
his horses and with a single aide-de-camp, Ney had found the
next day nothing but a peasant's cart to carry him to
Beaumont. There, on the morning of the 15th, he had purchased
two horses from Marshal Mortier, ill from an attack of sciatica,
and had ridden rapidly towards Charleroi, skirting the columns
on the march. The soldiers recognized him; they appeared
glad to see him again. "Everything is all right now!" they
cried; "here is Red-head."
The Emperor, who also wished that "everything should
be all right," said to the Marshal: "Good-day, Ney. I am
glad to see you. You will take command of the 1st and 2nd
Army Corps. I give you also the light cavalry of the Guard,
but you must not use it. To-morrow you will be joined by the
cuirassiers of Kellermann. Go, push the enemy on the
Brussels route, and take position at Quatre-Bras."
On the ground, and in presence of the enemy, the fine
strategical plan conceived in Paris by the Emperor takes form
and develops itself. He intended only, on this first day, to
advance on the presumed point of junction of the two allied
armies, so as to forestall them on this point. Now, since his
adversaries leave him the time, he will extend his field of action
and render it impossible for them to unite. The main body
of the English coming from Brussels and that of the
Prussians from Namur, the two armies must necessarily effect their
junction by the highway leading from Namur to Nivelles,
which passes through Sombreffe and crosses at Quatre-Bras the
route from Charleroi to Brussels. The Emperor wishes then
to push his left wing to Quatre-Bras and his right wing to
Sombreffe. He will establish himself at Fleurus, the summit of the
triangle formed by these three points, ready to burst the next
day with his reserve upon that one of the hostile armies which
68 WATERLOO.
will approach first. If both of them retreat, he will gain
Brussels without firing a cannon.
Grouchy arrived as the Emperor finished giving his
instructions to Marshal Ney, who set out immediately to put
them in execution. Grouchy had arrived an hour previous,
with Exelmans' dragoons, at the bridge of Charleroi, over which
the Young Guard was still defiling; impatient to rejoin his 1st
Corps of cavalry, which he supposed was engaged with the
enemy, he had outstripped the column, and had pushed on to
Gilly at a gallop. After having reconnoitred this position, he
had returned to obtain the Emperor's orders. The latter,
wishing to see for himself, immediately mounted his horse.
It was then after three o'clock. The dragoons of Exelmans
had finished debouching behind the Guard, and the advance of
Vandamme's corps had entered Charleroi.
General Pirch II. had established his division in the rear of
Gilly, its front covered by the boggy stream of Grand-Rieux.
Four battalions and a battery were stationed upon the
acclivities of the wooded heights which command the valley from
the Abbey of Soleillemont to Chitelineau; three other
battalions were in reserve near Lambusart; and a regiment of
dragoons observed the Sambre from Chatelet to Farciennes.
Deceived by the extension of this line of battle - extension
precisely intended to impose upon the French - Grouchy
valued the forces of the enemy at 20,000 men. The Emperor
judged at first glance that there were no more than 10,000.
He settled with Grouchy, who had been verbally invested
with the command of the right wing, the dispositions for
attack. One of Vandamme's divisions, seconded by Pajol's
cavalry, would attack the enemy in front, whilst Grouchy,
with Exelmans' dragoons, would ford the stream near the mill
of Delhatte and take them in flank. Then the Prussians were
to be pursued as far as Sombreffe, where the French would
take position.
After giving these orders, the Emperor returned to
Charleroi in order to hasten the march of Vandamme's corps. It
would have been better had he remained at Gilly. In his
absence, Vandamme and Grouchy consumed two hours in
combining their attack. About 5:30 p.m. the Emperor, surprised
at not hearing the cannon, returned upon the ground and
ordered Vandamme to plunge headlong against the enemy.
FIRST COMBATS. 69
After a short cannonade, which silenced Pirch's guns,
three columns, of two battalions each, rushed forward with
fixed bayonets. The Prussians posted in the first line did not
await the shock. In accordance with Ziethen's order, Pirch
put them immediately in retreat. Irritated at seeing these
battalions retiring without loss, the Emperor ordered one of
his aides-de-camp, General Letort, "to charge and crush the
Prussian infantry" with the squadrons on duty or serving
about his person.
Letort does not take time to unite the four squadrons.
He starts with the dragoons alone; the others will follow when
they are ready! He crosses the stream to the north of the
route, where it is not so deeply embanked; recrosses the route
of Sart-Allet in front of Vandamme's columns, and bursts upon
the retreating Prussians. Of the four battalions of the enemy
two succeed in gaining the wood of Soleillemont; the other
two, formed in squares, are overthrown and sabred; the few
survivors flee into the woods, the skirts of which are occupied
by the first regiment of western Prussia. In pursuing them
Letort is struck by a ball in the belly and falls, mortally
wounded, from his horse. The soldiers adored this gentle and
intrepid chief, and they avenged his death by massacring every
Prussian who came within reach of their long swords.
During this combat the dragoons of Exelmans, with the
brigades of Burthe and Vincent leading, debouched above
Chatelineau, overthrew the dragoon regiment of Colonel Moisky,
chased a battalion from the wood of Pironchamp, and threw
it back on Lambusart. All the troops of Pirch had rallied
there, and the enemy showed a disposition to defend himself.
Attacked simultaneously by the dragoons of Exelmans and
the light cavalry of Pajol, who had outstripped the columns
of Vandamme, he withdrew beyond Fleurus. Grouchy had
conducted in person the attack on the right. Although the
day was declining, he wished to take possession of Fleurus,
occupied only by two battalions, and to push the Prussians
as far as Sombreffe, in accordance with the orders of the
Emperor. But Vandamme, who had already commenced to
establish his bivouacs between Winage and the wood of
Soleillemont, refused positively to go further, saying that his troops
were too fatigued, and that, moreover, "he had no orders to
receive from the commander of the cavalry." Grouchy, not
being able to attack Fleurus without infantry, halted at the
70 WATERLOO.
distance of two cannon-shots from this village. The corps of
Exelmans and Pajol bivouacked in the first line, covering the
infantry of Vandamme, between Lambusart and Campinaire.
IV.
The left wing also did not advance as far as Napoleon
would have wished. The 1st Hussars, sent from Charleroi
along the route of Brussels, had encountered, about half-past
one o'clock, beyond Jumet, the cavalry of Lützow and the
skirmishers of the 29th Regiment, which covered the
concentration at Gosselies of the division of Steinmetz. Both parties
observed each other for some time, then the two cavalries
engaged. The uhlans drove back briskly the hussars, when they
were charged and repulsed in turn by the lancers of Piré, who
formed the advance of Reille's corps. Reille hastened the
march of his infantry, arrived about three o'clock within
cannon-range of Gosselies, and opened fire against this village.
At the moment when the columns of attack began their
movement Marshal Ney arrived with the light cavalry of the Guard,
which he had overtaken en route. Gosselies, defended by the
29th Prussian Regiment, was occupied after a slight combat.
However, the affair was not ended. The larger portion of
the division of Steinmetz was still on the march to the west
of Gosselies; by the occupation of this village the direct
route to Heppignies and Fleurus was intercepted. Without
hesitating, Steinmetz pushed several battalions against the
French, who had started to debouch from Gosselies, thrust
them, back, and, under the protection of a strong detachment
holding the houses on the northern side of the town, he
continued his retreat on Heppignies.
The route of Brussels was open, and there were yet four
hours of daylight. But Marshal Ney no doubt thought that,
in spite of the formal order of the Emperor to push the enemy,
he was already too far advanced with respect to the right wing
of the Army. Instead of continuing his march with all his
troops, he established the divisions of Girard, Foy, and Jérôme
around Gosselies, directed on Mellet the division of Bachelu
and the light cavalry of Piré, and only detached towards
Quatre-Bras the lancers and chasseurs of the Guard.
Arrived, about half-past five o'clock, in sight of Frasnes,
the lancers of the Guard were received with cannon-shots.
FIRST COMBATS. 71
The village was occupied by a battalion of Nassau troops and
a horse battery, commanded by Major Normann. This
officer, left without instructions, but hearing the cannonade at
Gosselies, had at once prepared to defend bravely his post.
Lefebvre-Desnoëttes immediately demanded some infantry.
A battalion of the 2nd Light, forming the advance of Bachelu's
division, and which had arrived abreast of Mellet, continued
its route towards Frasnes in accelerating its pace. The
skirmishers opened fire on the Nassau troops. Pending the
arrival of this reinforcement, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had directed
a part of the lancers to the right of Frasnes, so as to turn the
enemy. The Squadron of the Isle of Elba (Poles), commanded
by General Edouard de Colbert in person, pushed as far as
Quatre-Bras, which was unoccupied. But Colbert found
himself there without support, and very far from the main body
of his division; he returned near Frasnes. Meanwhile the
battalion of Major Normann had withdrawn along the route,
always keeping the French within close cannon-range. It took
position upon the skirts of the wood of Bossu, at two
kilometres in front of Quatre-Bras, where at this moment Prince
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar arrived with four battalions of Nassau
troops. Informed fortuitously at Genappe of the passage of
the Sambre by the French, this young Prince had, on his own
authority, put his troops on the march to occupy that important
strategical point.
On hearing the cannonade, Marshal Ney rejoined his
advance guard. He reconnoitred the position. Although the
Nassau troops numbered only 4,500 with six guns, they were
sufficient to defend Quatre-Bras against the 1,700 lancers and
chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, supported by a single
battalion. Ney contented himself with ordering a few rather
feeble charges against the Nassau infantry, in position in
front of Quatre-Bras, and directing to the east of this point,
on the side of Sart Dame Aveline, a reconnaissance, which
did not even approach within musket-range of the enemy's
outposts. Then, a little before eight o'clock, he rejoined at
Frasnes, where it had established itself, the division of Lefebvre-
Desnoëttes, and returned to Gosselies to pass the night.
Colonel Heymès, Ney's aide-de-camp during this
campaign, has said, in explanation of the Marshal's conduct, "that
there was not one chance in ten" of taking possession of Quatre-
Bras. As a matter of fact, when Ney arrived within sight of
72 WATERLOO.
Quatre-Bras, not at ten in the evening, as Heymès pretends,
but at seven at the latest, as we have just seen, he could hardly
think of carrying this position with two regiments of cavalry
and one battalion of infantry; but if at five in the afternoon,
being then at Gosselies, he had put on the march along the
Brussels route only one-fourth of the troops that had been
entrusted to him by the Emperor - that is, two divisions of
cavalry, two of infantry, and four batteries - before nine o'clock
he would have exterminated in Quatre-Bras with these 14,000
men the 4,500 infantry of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar,
the greater part of whom had but ten cartridges. In halting
Reille's corps around Gosselies, Ney, for the first time in his
life, had yielded to prudence. He had renounced occupying
Quatre-Bras, if not by a cavalry post, in case this point should
not be defended. He had judged that it would be
compromising his army corps to place it en flèche, at four leagues from
the right wing, in a position where it might be attacked by all
of Wellington's forces. Some strategists have declared that
Ney acted according to the true principles of the art of war.
This may be possible. But if Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar
had understood these principles, he would not have obeyed the
inspiration to march on Quatre-Bras with four battalions, at
the risk of being crushed there by the entire French Army.
BOOK TWO.
LIGNY AND QUATRE-BRAS.
CHAPTER I.
The Morning of June 16th.
I. - The plans and orders of Napoleon (from five to eight o'clock).
II. - The departure of Napoleon for Fleurus (half-past nine).
III. - Concentration of the Prussian Army to the north of the Ligny. -
Inactivity of the English Army during the day of June 15th. -
The ball of the Duchess of Richmond (night of June 15th-16th).
IV. - Arrival of Wellington at Quatre-Bras (June 16th, ten o'clock). -
Interview between Wellington and Blücher at the mill of
Bussy, near Ligny (one o'clock in the afternoon).
I.
The occupation of Quatre-Bras and Sombreffe on the
evening of June 15th imposed itself only as a complement of
the fine strategical operation conceived by Napoleon. The
fact that Grouchy and Ney had not seized these two points
was only an unfortunate incident. The essential object of the
movement of the French Army, which was to advance on the
first day upon the line of contact of the English and Prussians,
was not the less attained. Almost without striking a blow,
and in spite of delays in the march of many columns, the
Emperor had passed the Sambre, made seven leagues upon the
enemy's territory, and established his army in the very midst
of the cantonments of the Allies. He had 124,000 men
bivouacked within a triangle of three leagues.
The enemy appeared to be in disorder. During the entire
day not an English uniform had been seen. At no point
had the Prussians appeared in force; they had feebly
disputed the passage of the Sambre, and their half-hearted though
skilful and valiant defence of Gilly and Gosselies seemed
73
74 WATERLOO.
rather to have been intended to protect a retreat than to cover a
concentration.
When the Emperor, who had returned at night to
Charleroi, had taken cognizance of the reports of Grouchy and Ney,
he imagined that the Allies, disconcerted by his unforeseen
aggression, were falling back on their bases of operations - the
Prussians towards Lyle and Maëstricht, the Anglo-Belgians
towards Ostend and Antwerp. The direction pursued by the
Prussian advance posts in their retreat from Thuin to
Marchienne, from Fontaine-Lévêque and Marchienne to Gosselies,
and from Charleroi and Gosselies to Fleurus, was of a nature
to confirm this supposition. If the Prussians had been
manoeuvring to unite at once with the English, they would have
retired towards the north; as it were, they had retreated
towards the northeast, uncovering the route of Brussels. The
resolution which Napoleon, judging from appearances,
attributed to Blücher and Wellington, assured him the victory.
The farther the allied armies departed from each other the
more easy it would be to beat them. It was one thing to
attack the English when the Prussians were within one march
of them, and another thing if Wellington and Blücher were
separated by fifteen or twenty leagues.
The Emperor determines upon his plan on the morning
of June 16th, probably at six o'clock, perhaps earlier. With
Grouchy and the right wing he will advance on Sombreffe and
Gembloux. If a Prussian corps is still found in one or the
other of these positions, he will attack it. The ground thus
reconnoitred or swept on the east, he will recall the reserve,
temporarily posted at Fleurus, and will rejoin with it Ney and
the right wing at Quatre-Bras. Thence he will move on
Brussels by a night march. He reckons that the head of column
will arrive in Brussels on June 17th at seven in the morning.
The orders for this double movement were despatched
by the Major-General between seven and eight o'clock in the
morning; the order for Kellermann to direct himself on
Gosselies, in order to be at the disposal of Marshal Ney; the order
for Drouot to put the Guard on the march for Fleurus; the
order for Lobau to push the 6th Corps half-way from Charleroi
to Fleurus; and the order for Vandamme and Gérard to march
on Sombreffe with the 3rd and 4th Corps, and to follow
henceforth the instructions of Marshal Grouchy, commander of the
right wing. Soult wrote to Ney to take position at Quatre-
The Morning of June 16th. 75
Bras with six divisions of infantry and the cuirassiers of
Kellermann, and to push his other two divisions of infantry - one
to Genappe (five kilometres beyond Quatre-Bras), with the
cavalry of Piré, and the other to Marbais, with the cavalry of
Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, in order to support eventually the right
wing. Ney, finally, was to push some reconnaissances as far
as possible along the routes of Nivelles and Brussels. As to
Grouchy, he received the order to establish himself at
Sombreffe, and to send from there an advance guard to Gembloux
and some reconnaissances in every direction.
II.
At the imperial headquarters these orders were being
expedited when the Emperor received a note from Grouchy,
stating that strong columns of the enemy, who appeared to
be debouching by the route of Namur, were directing
themselves towards Brye and Saint-Amand. While believing that
the Prussians were in retreat, Napoleon had admitted the
hypothesis of an encounter with them at Sombreffe, but he
had been far from thinking that they would come to take
position on the outskirts of Fleurus. This movement indicated
that, far from withdrawing his troops and separating himself
from the English Army, as the direction followed by his
advance posts in their retreat the day before had caused him
to think, Blücher was manoeuvring with the view of a battle
for the same day in conjunction with Wellington. Instead of
a rear guard or an isolated corps to be dislodged from Sombreffe
or Gembloux, Napoleon would have to fight, north of Fleurus,
the entire Prussian Army, and, as Blücher and Wellington
would no doubt act in concert, the English would be met with
in force on the route of Brussels.
This completely overturned the plan conceived by
Napoleon. He could not defeat during the day the army of
Blücher on the right, overthrow in the evening the army of
Wellington on the left, and march in the night on Brussels.
Napoleon, however, was not disconcerted. With him
suppositions changed swiftly into certainties. When he had
supposed a thing, this thing must be such as he had supposed it.
Fortune had so often declared in favour of his previsions!
On the morning of June 16th he believed that Blücher was
retreating and the route of Brussels open; then Blücher was
76 WATERLOO.
retreating and the route of Brussels was open. The movements
reported by Grouchy could be only some demonstrations
intended to be misleading. He would give a good account of
these few Prussian regiments - merely a screen destined to
mask- the retreat of their main army. It seemed, moreover,
that this was the opinion of Grouchy himself, for in the letter
in which he reported the appearance of columns of the enemy
in the direction of Saint-Amand he announced that he was
uniting his troops in order to march on Sombreffe, in accordance
with the orders of the previous day. If since five o'clock in
the morning Grouchy had presumed that Blücher's entire army
was concentrating to the west of Sombreffe, he would not have
prepared for a movement on this village, at the risk of suffering
a disastrous flank attack.
The Emperor then made no change in his orders. Far
from changing anything in them, he wrote about eight o'clock
to Ney and Grouchy in order to reiterate them and to hasten
their execution. Knowing that his aides-de-camp were better
mounted than the officers of the Major-General, he entrusted
one of these letters to Flahault, the other to La Bédoyère; in
this way he hoped that his two lieutenants would receive his
iterative instructions before those even which had just been
sent by Soult. In these duplicates the Emperor explained
himself more fully upon a few details pertaining to the
execution of his orders, and he revealed, what Soult had failed to
do, that the object of the double movement on Sombreffe and
Quatre-Bras was a night march on Brussels.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning, as Napoleon
was on the point of setting out for Fleurus, an officer of lancers
arrived from the left wing; he said "the enemy presented
some masses on the side of Quatre-Bras." Fearing that the
presence of these pretended masses might, as the day before,
cause Ney to hesitate to march forward, the Emperor deemed
it necessary to reassure him and to renew once more his orders.
He at once had the Major-General to write to him as follows :
"Blücher being yesterday at Namur, it is not probable that
he has any troops at Quatre-Bras. Hence you will have an
affair only with what comes from Brussels. Unite the corps
of Counts Reille and d'Erlon and that of the Count de Valmy;
with these forces you should be able to beat and destroy any
force that may present itself." However, in order to be
prepared for every emergency, the Emperor ordered Lobau
The Morning of June 16th. 77
to remain temporarily at Charleroi, so that he could march,
if necessary, with the 6th Corps to the assistance of Ney.
In accordance with his orders, Adjutant-Commandant Janin,
Lobau's assistant chief of staff, was sent to Frasnes in order
to judge of the state of affairs.
The Emperor arrived at Fleurus a little before eleven
o'clock. He there found Grouchy - not without some
astonishment, for he supposed him already on the march for
Sombreffe. The Marshal had no difficulty in making him
understand that in the presence of the hostile masses, which were
taking position to the north of Fleurus, he had been forced to
limit himself to the occupation of that village, evacuated at
daylight by the Prussians. Napoleon traversed the line of
advance posts. In the midst of the plain of Fleurus there
rises a mill in the shape of a tower, which dominates all the
plain. The Emperor ordered some sappers to prepare, by
means of a breach in the roof, a sort of loggia, in which he
mounted in order to observe the positions of the enemy.
III.
Blücher, who had hastened from Namur at the first alarm,
had arrived at Sombreffe at four o'clock in the afternoon of
June 15th. He flattered himself that he would have, at an
early hour on the 16th, his four army corps behind the stream
of Ligny, a position which had been recommended to him two
months before by Major von Gröben, and upon which he had
then resolved to deliver battle if the French passed the Sambre
at Charleroi. He was full of ardour and believed himself
invincible. "With my 120,000 Prussians," he had written to
his wife, "I would charge myself with the capture of Tripoli,
Tunis, and Algiers, could we but cross the sea." But on
account of the excessive extension of his cantonments the Marshal
was to meet with great disappointments. On the 16th, at
eleven o'clock in the morning, he had in line only Ziethen's
corps, which had been reduced to 28,000 men by the losses of
the day before. The corps of Pirch I. (31,000 men) arrived
at Sombreffe only at noon, followed at some distance by the
corps of Thielmann (24,000 men). As for the IV. Corps, there
had been received at headquarters during the night a letter
from Bülow, announcing that it would not be assembled at
Hannut (forty-two kilometres from Sombreffe) till the middle
78 WATERLOO.
of the day. Thus Blücher was about to find himself short of
30,000 bayonets. However, he was determined to accept
battle, counting on the more or less prompt, more or less active
cooperation of the Anglo-Dutch Army. Had not the two
Commanders-in-chief agreed on May 3rd, at Tirelemont, to
support mutually each other, if Napoleon took the offensive?
And had not Wellington just said (evening of June 13th) to
Blücher's envoy. Colonel Pfüell, "My army will be
concentrated at Nivelles or Quatre-Bras, according to circumstances,
twenty-two hours after the first cannon-shot"?
There was a little diplomacy in the promises of Wellington.
Blücher's retreat on Liege would have left the English Army
alone before Napoleon, and it would have been forced to
choose between the alternative of accepting battle with a great
inferiority of forces and that of falling back on its base of
operations, and thus uncover Brussels. It was then necessary
that Blücher should remain in position, and for this Wellington
deemed it essential to promise his support. He hoped,
moreover, to be able to give him this support - but, like a true
Englishman, at his own time and pleasure, and without
running the risk of compromising the safety of his army, even
though it would be for the good of the common cause. Now,
was not the offensive movement of the French towards
Charleroi a simple demonstration, intended to attract on this side
the Anglo-Prussian masses? Was not the Emperor at this
very moment advancing on Brussels with the main body of
his army, either by Maubeuge, Mons, and Hal, or by Lille,
Tournay, and Ath? Wellington feared that such was the
case, and fearing to be drawn into a false manoeuvre, he was
unwilling to move a man or cannon before being absolutely
certain of the precise point upon which Napoleon would
direct his principal attack.
It was in vain that on June 12th, 13th, and 14th numerous
reports of the concentration of the French Army upon the
frontier had arrived at his headquarters in Brussels; it was in
vain that at eight o'clock on the morning of June 15th
Wellington had learned by a letter from Ziethen that the Prussian
advance posts had been attacked at dawn. On this very
day he had yet given no order. Muffling, the Prussian
commissioner at the English headquarters, having received a
personal letter from Ziethen confirming the first reports,
hastened to communicate its contents to the Duke. "If
The Morning of June 16th. 79
everything is as Ziethen believes," said Wellington to him, "I shall
concentrate on my left wing, so as to act in concert with the
Prussian Army; but if a part of the enemy's forces march on
Mons, I shall be obliged to concentrate on my centre. I must
then await, before coming to a decision, some news from my
advance-posts at Mons. However, as the destination of my
troops remains uncertain, and as their departure is certain, I
shall issue orders in order that they may be ready to march."
According to these orders, despatched only on June 15th,
between six and seven o'clock in the evening, the troops were
simply to assemble by divisions at Ninove, Ath, Grammont,
Brussels, Braine-le-Comte, and Nivelles, and to be ready to
march next day at dawn. Thus, at the time when the French
left wing had passed Gosselies and the right wing had arrived
within sight of Fleurus, Wellington, in place of directing his
troops upon the threatened point, contented himself with
uniting them in isolated divisions within a parallelogram of ten
leagues by nine. In truth, he must have been deluded and
paralysed by the vision of Napoleon attacking in person
upon all points at the same time.
At noon Blücher had written to Muffling in order to
announce to him the withdrawal of Pirch's division upon the left
bank of the Sambre, and that he was about to concentrate his
army at Sombreffe, where he intended to accept battle. "I
expect," he added, "prompt news of the concentration of
Wellington's forces." This letter, which arrived about seven
o'clock in the evening, and which was immediately shown to
Wellington, influenced him no more than had the letters of
Ziethen. "The dispositions of the Field Marshal are very
good," said he, "but I can not decide upon anything before
knowing what is passing on the side of Mons." He was,
finally, to acquire the certainty that everything was tranquil
there. A letter from General Dörnberg, which he received
between nine and ten o'clock, informed him in this regard. He
then determined, not, as his apologists pretend, on a
movement with all his army on Quatre-Bras, but on a partial
concentration towards Nivelles.
After having given these orders, which, by reason of the
advanced hour and the extent of the cantonments, could not
be put in execution before dawn, Wellington said to Muffling :
"My troops are about to put themselves on the march. But
here the partisans of Napoleon begin to raise their heads. We
80 WATERLOO.
must reassure our friends. Let us go to the ball of the Duchess
of Richmond, and we will mount on horseback at five in the
morning."
In Brussels, where, however, there had been festivals every
evening, this ball, announced for some time, was discussed
almost as much as the early entrance into campaign. It was
known that the Duchess of Richmond had made great
preparations; that she had turned into a sumptuous hall a vast
shed contiguous to her villa; that a military band would
furnish the music; and that there had been invited to the
soirée the élite of the English Staff and of the cosmopolite
society of Brussels, Russian and German diplomats, English
peers, and French émigrés. Applications, prayers, and
intrigues were multiplied in order to obtain invitations. The
Duchess of Richmond received the guests assisted by her eldest
daughter, later Lady Ross, at that time seventeen years old.
There were hardly more than two hundred guests - the Prince
of Orange, Prince Frederick of the Low Countries, the Duke of
Brunswick, the Prince of Nassau, Lord Wellington, the
Burgomaster of Brussels, Princes Auguste and Pierre d'Arenberg, the
Duke and Duchess de Beaufort and their daughter, the Duke
and Duchess d'Ursel, the Count and Countess de Mercy-
Argentau; Count de La Tour-Dupin, French minister to The
Hague, and the Countess de La Tour-Dupin; the Marquis and
Marchioness d'Assche, Count de La Rochefoucauld, the
dowager Countess d'Oultremont and the Misses d'Oultremont,
Lady Fitz-Roy Somerset, Count du Cayla (without his wife).
Sir Charles Stewart, Lord and Lady Seymour and their
daughter; Count Pozzo di Borgo and Baron de Vincent,
ambassadors of Russia and Austria to His Majesty the King of
France at Ghent; General Alva, Spanish commissioner,
attached to Wellington's staff; General Muffling; Lord Uxbridge,
Commander-in-chief of the British cavalry; Lord Saltoun,
colonel of the Foot Guards; Lord Somerset, commanding the
brigade of Horse Guards; Lord Hill, commanding the 2d
English Corps; Generals Clinton, Ponsonby, Picton, Vivian, Byng,
Pack, Cooke, Kempt, Maitland, and a great number of colonels,
majors, and young captains, lieutenants, and ensigns. When
Wellington, about midnight, entered the home of the Duchess
of Richmond, the ball was at its height. Full of life and gaiety,
the beautiful young women and handsome officers were
The Morning of June 16th. 81
intoxicated with the noise and movement. But, as in the funereal
dances of the old frescoes, Death led the round.
The passage of the Sambre by the French Army was still
unknown. Wellington informed the Duke of Brunswick that
Bonaparte had entered Belgium, and that in all probability
there would be a battle during the day. Brunswick, by a sort
of presentiment, felt the chilliness of death. He turned pale
and arose with a bound, by this sudden movement letting
the Little Prince de Ligne, whom he had upon his knees, fall
to the floor. Wellington took to one side all the general officers
and gave them verbally the orders of march which had just
been sent to them in writing. They were not long in quitting
the ball. Informed about one o'clock, in the middle of the
festivities, by a despatch from Constant Rebecque, that the
French had shown themselves at Quatre-Bras, the Prince of
Orange set out for Genappe. By degrees the rumour spread
that the Army was about to move. But the young officers
could not tear themselves from this night of pleasure, "upon
which," said Lord Byron, "was soon to rise so bloody a dawn."
It was only when they heard the trumpets and bugles sounding
the assembly that they ran, in silk stockings and buckle shoes,
to rejoin their companies. The Duchess of Richmond, deeply
moved, would have wished to arrest the ball, but the young
ladies and the few young men who did not belong to the Army
continued to dance until daylight.
Wellington did not leave until three o'clock, after having
supped. The Duchess awakened her youngest daughter, a
true baby Reynolds, who came with her rosy little hands to
buckle on the sword of the Commander-in-chief.
IV.
Muffling says that during the ball Wellington was very
gay. There certainly was no reason for this gaiety! During
the entire day he had persisted in leaving his troops dispersed
in their cantonments at four, eight, ten, and fifteen leagues
from one another; and the orders of the evening, by which he
flattered himself to repair victoriously his great error, were
pitiful. His last dispositions tended to nothing less than to
uncover the route leading from Charleroi to Brussels in order
to protect that of Mons, which was not threatened. If the
orders of Wellington had been executed, a gap four leagues
82 WATERLOO.
wide would have been opened between Nivelles and the Lower
Dyle; a gap through which Ney would have been able to
advance half-way to Brussels without firing a shot, or, better
still, as Gneissenau has said, "to turn back on the rear of the
Prussian Army and cause its utter destruction."
Fortunately for the Allies, many of Wellington's
subordinates had taken it on themselves to act without awaiting
his orders, and others had intelligently disobeyed those which,
after so much time lost, he had decided to give. On the day
before, Major Normann had defended Frasnes, the Prince of
Saxe-Weimar had advanced from Genappe to Quatre-Bras
with his brigade, and General Chasse had concentrated his
division at Foy. A little later Constant Rebecque, the Prince
of Orange's chief of staff, directed, in the absence of the Prince,
General Collaert to assemble his cavalry behind the Haine, and
General Perponcher to prepare to march on Quatre-Bras.
Finally, at eleven o'clock in the evening, this same Rebecque,
not being able to avoid transmitting to the generals of division
Wellington's order to concentrate all the Netherland troops
at Nivelles - or, in other words, to uncover the route of
Brussels - gave them verbal instructions which left them free not
to conform to this order. "It is impossible to know at
Brussels," he said, "the exact state of affairs." Perponcher did
not hesitate. In place of maintaining at Nivelles the Bylandt
brigade and of recalling that of Saxe-Weimar, as directed by
Wellington, he marched with Bylandt on Quatre-Bras to
support Prince Bernard.
Ah, if Napoleon had had as chief of staff a simple Constant
Rebecque and as lieutenants some Perponchers and Bernards
of Saxe-Weimar! And what a fine occasion, on the other
hand, for professors of strategy like Charras to denounce the
fatal indecision, the torpor of mind, and the moral weakness
of the Emperor if, on the eve of a battle, Napoleon had
remained ten hours without concentrating his troops, had then
prescribed a movement in a direction opposite to that of the
enemy, and had, finally, passed the night in parading himself
at a ball!
But in war, as in play, nothing can prevail against Fortune.
When Wellington, who had left Brussels at six in the morning,
arrived about ten at Quatre-Bras, he found there the division
of Perponcher, when he should have found the advance guard
The Morning of June 16th. 83
of Marshal Ney. His Grace, appearing to forget the fact that
one had acted contrary to his orders, deigned to congratulate
General Perponcher and also the Prince of Orange - who had
had nothing to do with it - upon the position taken. Then,
after having advanced close enough to Frasnes to observe well
the French advance posts, he despatched the order to the
division of Picton and the corps of Brunswick, which had been
halted at Waterloo, to resume their march, and wrote to Blücher
that Quatre-Bras was occupied by a division of the Prince of
Orange and that the English Army was directing itself on that
point. The letter closed as follows: "I do not see a very
large force of the enemy in front of us, and I await some news
from your excellency before deciding upon my course."
Wellington was not long in changing his mind. Believing,
rightly or wrongly, that it would be many hours before he was
attacked at Quatre-Bras, he decided that in place of awaiting
some news, which he would be unable to verify, it would be
better to go to see things for himself and to concert verbally
with Blücher. About one o'clock he joined the Field Marshal
upon the heights of Brye. They ascended upon the roof of
the mill of Bussy, situated in front of that village; from there
they were able to view all the ground, much better than from
the mill of Fleurus, where Napoleon had established his
observatory. They saw the French columns debouching; and
with their glasses they recognized the Emperor, surrounded
by his staff. It seemed evident that they would soon have to
combat the entire Imperial Army, the detachment which
occupied Frasnes being but a negligible fraction.
"What do you desire me to do?" brusquely said
Wellington in French. (He was ignorant of the German language.)
Gneissenau proposed that the Duke should direct without
delay all his troops in the rear of Brye to act as a reserve
for the Prussian Army. This plan, based upon a false
appreciation of the distribution of Napoleon's forces, was combated
by Muffling. He said in substance that the English should
manoeuvre so as to outflank the French left. "You are right, "
cried Wellington. "I will overthrow what I have in front of
me at Frasnes, and I will march on Gosselies." Gneissenau
objected that this movement would be eccentric and of doubtful
result, whilst the concentration at Brye would procure a certain
and decisive success. The discussion being prolonged. Well
84 WATERLOO.
Wellington said, in order to end it: "Well, I will come if I am
not attacked myself." With these words, which could not be
construed into a formal engagement, the Duke departed for
Quatre-Bras, whilst Blücher took his last tactical dispositions.
CHAPTER II.
Battle of Ligny.
I. - The field of battle. - Dispositions of Blücher and Napoleon.
II. - From three o'clock until four: Attacks of Saint-Amand by
Vandamme and of Ligny by Gérard.
III. - From four o'clock until half-past seven: Counter-attack of
Blücher. - Appearance of a supposed column of the enemy
upon the flank of the French Army. - Demonstration of Grouchy
against the Prussian left. - Stubborn fight in Saint-Amand
and Ligny.
IV. - From half-past seven o'clock until half-past nine : Final assault.
- Capture of Ligny. - Combats on the hill. - Retreat of the
Prussians.
I.
In front of the hill of Fleurus there rises at a gentle incline,
beyond an undulating plain, a line of low heights, upon which
are situated on the west the village of Brye, on the east that
of Tongrinne, and in the centre and somewhat remote the
market-town of Sombreffe. These positions in themselves
are easily accessible; but at their feet the stream of Ligny,
four or five yards wide, deeply embanked and lined with
willows, alders, and brambles, pursues its tortuous way through
the lowlands. This stream and the rough ground by which
one descends to it form a deep trench, which is flanked on the
right by the villages of Wagnelée and Saint-Amand and the
hamlets of la Haye and Petit Saint-Amand; on the left by
the hamlets of Potriaux and Tongrinelle and the villages of
Tongrinne, Boignée, and Balâtre. In the centre there is the
village of Ligny, with its two large farms, its old chateau, and
its church, situated in the midst of a cemetery, surrounded by
breast-high walls. The front of the position was thus
constituted by a continuous fosse and ten bastions, some in front
of this fosse, as Petit Saint-Amand, La Haye, Grand Saint-
Amand, Tongrinelle, Boignée, and Balâtre, and others in the
rear, as Potriaux and Tongrinne. The ninth and most
important, Ligny, is traversed in its entire length by the stream
of that name.
85
86 WATERLOO.
From the mill of Fleurus, where Napoleon had established
his observatory, the Prussian positions appeared less strong
than they were in reality. The Emperor was unable to form
an exact idea of the lay of the land in the valley. The bottoms,
which were cut up with gullies, and through which flows the
Ligny, escaped his sight. He seemed to have before him a
vast plain covered with grain, shelving slightly downwards in
the centre, then rising gently to meet the extreme horizon - a
true landscape of Beauce. He ordered brought to him the
surveyor of the village, a certain Simon, who informed him
as best he could.
At noon the four divisions of Ziethen with the cavalry of
Röder were the only forces in line; the corps of Pirch I. and
that of Thielmann had just commenced to mass themselves
behind Sombreffe and Tongrinne. The Emperor correctly
estimated the force in front of him at one army corps.
However, he was not deceived as to the intention of Blücher. "The
old fox does not take to the open," said he. He conjectured
that the Field Marshal had taken up a waiting position, in
which he hoped to impose long enough upon the French to
give to his other army corps and, according to all probability,
the army of Wellington, the time to rejoin. As a matter of
fact, if Blücher had had the intention of defending with his
sole forces his lines of communication, he would have taken
position perpendicular to the route of Fleurus. The extension
of his right towards Wagnelée revealed the project of a
reunion with the English Army on the march from Brussels.
Resolved to attack immediately, the Emperor was very
much disconcerted to learn that the corps of Gérard was not
even in sight. He awaited its arrival. Doubtless he then
believed that only a single corps of the enemy was opposed to
him, and he had at hand the corps of Vandamme, the 1st and
the 2nd Corps of cavalry, and, in the second line behind Fleurus,
the Imperial Guard. But he apprehended, not without reason,
that, in the midst of the action, the mass of the Prussian Army,
which in all probability was on the march towards Sombreffe,
would put in its appearance.
Soon after noon Gérard, who had outstripped his army
corps, arrived upon the line of advance posts with a small
escort. In seeking the Emperor, he approached within carbine
range of a post of the enemy's cavalry. The Prussians charged.
Gérard, thrown from his horse, was in great danger of being
Battle of Ligny. 87
captured; he was saved by one of his aides-de-camp. Having
rejoined the Emperor at the mill, he thought it necessary to
say a few words concerning the desertion of Bourmont, who
had obtained a command only upon his pressing solicitations.
Napoleon interrupted him by saying : "I have often told you,
General, that the blue are always blue and the white always
white."
It was not until one o'clock that Gérard's column
debouched. The order of movement had been sent before eight
o'clock; and the distance from Chatelet to Fleurus is but ten
kilometres. But in consequence of the non-execution, in the
afternoon of the day before, of the Emperor's instructions
prescribing the establishment of the 4th Corps upon the left
bank of the Sambre, Gérard had been forced in the morning
to pass this river over a single bridge with the larger portion,
of his troops. Hence this long delay in the march of the
4th Corps.
It seems that the Emperor had at first thought of attacking
by Wagnelée and Saint-Amand in order to throw back the
Prussians on Sombreffe. But the exposed position of their
right wing suggested the idea of enveloping them in place of
driving them back. For this he modified his anterior orders
to Ney. According to the instructions sent in the morning,
the Marshal was to establish himself at and beyond Quatre-
Bras, pending the order to march on Brussels. At two o'clock
he ordered Soult to write to Ney: "The Emperor desires me
to inform you that the enemy has united an army corps between
Sombreffe and Brye, and that at half-past two Marshal Grouchy
with the 3rd and 4th Corps will attack him. His Majesty's
intention is that you will attack also what is before you, and
after having pressed them vigorously, you will turn back in
order to coöperate with us in enveloping the corps of which I
have just spoken."
The corps of Vandamme, that of Gérard, and the cavalry
of Grouchy were deployed in front of Fleurus, perpendicular
to the highway. The Emperor ordered a change of front with
the right in advance- By this manoeuvre Vandamme
approached Saint-Amand; Gérard advanced within nearly 1,000
yards of Ligny, parallel with the highway; and Grouchy drew
up his troops in the form of a square in front of Boignée. The
Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, left until two o'clock
behind Fleurus, ranged themselves in the second line.
88 WATERLOO.
From the mill of Bussy, where he was still at two o'clock
with Wellington, Blücher had seen this movement taking shape.
He hastened to complete his order of battle. The corps of
Ziethen, of which only a few battalions had until then occupied
the front of defence, took position as follows: four battalions of
the division of Steinmetz at La Haye and Le Hameau (or
Petit Saint-Amand), the other six in support; three battalions
of the division of Jagow in Saint-Amand, the other seven under
the mill of Bussy; the division of Henckel in Ligny, with two
battalions somewhat in the rear; the division of Pirch II. was
drawn up in echelons between Brye and the mill of Bussy.
Röder's cavalry massed itself in a hollow of the ground on the
north of the road leading from Ligny to Sombreffe, with the
exception of the 1st Silesian Hussars, which was detached with
a light battery on the extreme right upon the old Roman road
to reconnoitre the flank of the army. The artillery was
established between the villages, upon the lower slopes of the hills.
Saint-Amand, La Haye, and Ligny had been hastily fortified;
but none of the bridges spanning the Ligny had been cut, as
Blücher wished to preserve these debouches in case he should
pass to the offensive.
Behind this first line the corps of Pirch I. (divisions of
Tippelskirch, Krafft, Brause, and Langen, and the cavalry of
Jurgass) was in reserve to the north of Brye, along the route
of Nivelles. The corps of Thielmann, which formed the
Prussian left, had the divisions of Luck and Kempher at Potriaux,
Tongrinne, Tongrinelle, and Balâtre, and the divisions of
Borcke and Stülpnagel with the cavalry of Hobe in reserve at
Sombreffe and behind Tongrinne.
This vast deployment had not escaped the vigilant eye of
Napoleon. Until past two o'clock - so long as his own
manoeuvres had not forced Blücher to unmask all his forces - the
Emperor had believed that he would have to deal with but
30,000 men. The extension of the enemy's front, and the
masses which he saw in motion, revealed to him the presence
of an army! The battle would no doubt be murderous, but
he was about to finish with Blücher in a single day. He held
him in the hollow of his hand! For in a few hours Ney, taking
in reverse the position of Brye, would sound with cannon-shot
the death-knell of the Prussian Army." It may be that in
three hours the fate of the war will be decided," said the
Emperor to Gérard. "If Ney executes his orders, not one
Battle of Ligny. 89
cannon of this army will escape!" At a quarter-past three a
second order - more urgent, more imperative than the
preceding - was sent to Ney: "I wrote you one hour ago," said
Soult, "that the Emperor intended to attack the enemy in the
position which he has taken between the villages of Saint-
Amand and Brye. His Majesty desires me to say to you that
you must manoeuvre immediately so as to envelop the right
wing of the enemy and to fall with might and main upon his
rear. The Prussian Army is lost, if you act vigorously. The
fate of France is in your hands. So do not hesitate a moment
in making the movement which the Emperor orders, and direct
yourself upon the heights of Saint- Amand and Brye."
At the moment when Soult despatched this order Napoleon
received a letter from Lobau, informing him that, according
to the report of Colonel Janin, Ney had before him at Quatre-
Bras nearly 20,000 enemies. The Emperor reflected that these
20,000 men might make a defence sufficiently tenacious to
prevent the Prince of the Moskowa from effecting in time the
movement against the Prussian Army. His fine tactical
combination was in danger of miscarrying. He did not flatter
himself, as he has been wrongfully accused, with gaining two
battles in one day. The important thing for him was not to
gain a half-victory over Blücher and a half-victory over
Wellington; it was to contain the English and to exterminate the
Prussians. The Emperor thought that Ney with the single
corps of Reille would suffice to contain the English, and that
the single corps of d'Erlon would be sufficient to turn the right
of Blücher. He decided to entrust to this general the
execution of the movement previously assigned to Ney and from
which he expected such decisive results. There was not an
instant to be lost. He sent directly to Count d'Erlon the order
to advance with his army corps in the rear of the Prussian
right wing. Colonel Forbin-Janson, charged with
transmitting to him this order, was also to communicate it to Ney.
At the same time the Emperor, desiring to have all his
forces well in hand, wrote Lobau, who had been detained
temporarily at Charleroi, to march on Fleurus.
II.
Battle was joined. About three o'clock three cannon-
shots, fired at equal intervals by a battery of the Guard, had
given the signal for the assault.
-7-
90 WATERLOO.
Without deigning to prepare the way with his artillery,
Vandamme launched against Saint-Amand the division of
Lefol. With the band of the 23rd Regiment playing the air
"La Victoire en chantant," the division advanced, formed in
three columns, each column preceded by a swarm of
skirmishers. Before the enemy's front the ground, entirely bare of
trees or hedges, formed a sea of ripening grain, already four
or five feet high. The march through it was slow and
laborious, and if the corn almost concealed the skirmishers, the
columns were perfectly visible. The batteries opened a heavy
fire on them, and as many as eight men were cut down by one
ball. The Prussians were sheltered in the houses and behind
the embankments and quickset hedges which surrounded the
orchards. At fifty yards from the village the soldiers of Lefol
leaped over the enclosures. The point-blank discharges did
not arrest their élan; and in less than fifteen minutes of furious
combat the enemy was driven from the orchards, the houses,
the cemetery, and the church. But the Prussians of Jagow
rallied upon the left bank of the stream, and soon, supported
by four battalions of Steinmetz, they prepared for a counter-
attack. The division battery of Steinmetz turned its fire
against Saint-Amand, starting many fires, and the 24th
Prussian regiment passed the stream at La Haye in order to take
the French in flank.; Vandamme deployed the division of
Berthezéne on the left of Lefol; and, in accordance with the
anterior instructions of the Emperor, he ordered the division
of Girard, in position to the north of Wangenies, to attack
Le Hameau and La Haye.
Whilst Lefol was engaged in the attack of Saint-Amand,
Pécheux's division of Gérard's corps attacked Ligny in three
columns under the fire of the Prussian batteries. The left and
centre columns carried the hedges and enclosures on the out-
skirts of the village, but, decimated by the heavy and rapid
fire of musketry which came from the old chateau and the first
houses, they fell back. The 30th of the Line, composing the
column on the right, pushed farther. It entered the hollow
road, crowned by the farm of La Tour, a building with walls
like a fortress, and from which the bullets rained in a perfect
hail; it penetrated even as far as the church square. There
the regiment, completely surrounded by the enemy concealed
in the houses, in the cemetery, and behind the willows along
the stream, found itself in the centre of a quadrilateral of fire
Battle of Ligny. 91
In an instant the entire head of the column was swept away;
twenty officers and nearly five hundred men fell dead or
wounded. The survivors retired in disorder and went to rally
in their first positions.
Two new attacks succeeded no better. Some batteries of
twelve-pounders reinforced the artillery of Gérard, which
until then had only replied to that of the enemy. They opened
fire on Ligny. The balls demolished the houses and ricocheted
in the streets; the roofs of the cottages caught fire and fell in,
starting a conflagration upon ten different points. For the
fourth time the division of Pecheux, seconded by a brigade
of Vichery's division, marched against the Prussians. In an
ardent combat, a succession of assaults against each house, the
French obtained possession of most of the upper village.
Ligny is composed of two streets running parallel with
the Ligny and separated by this stream - the rue d'En-Bas on
the north and the rue d'En-Haut on the south. Between the
two streets are a few scattered cottages, the church square, and
a vast communal meadow, which shelves downwards like a
glacis to the Ligny. Dislodged from the farm of La Tour and
the rue d'En-Haut, the Prussians resumed their positions in
the cemetery, in the church, and in the houses surrounding
the square. The soldiers of Pecheux advanced valiantly under
a murderous cross-fire; some broke into the houses, while
others escaladed the wall of the cemetery. At this moment a
large force of the enemy, which had rallied behind the church,
charged the French, who had become disorganized by these
numerous assaults. Upon this little square, too narrow for
the number of combatants, French and Prussians engaged in a
terrible and murderous hand-to-hand struggle, in which, after
having discharged their muskets, they used their bayonets,
the butt-ends of their muskets, and even their fists. The
carnage was abominable. "The men massacred one another,"
says a Prussian officer, "as if they had been animated with a
personal hatred. It seemed as if each man saw in his opponent
a mortal enemy, and that he rejoiced at finding the
opportunity to wreak his vengeance. No one thought of fleeing
or of asking quarter."
The Prussians finally fell back. They abandoned the
houses, the church, the cemetery, and retired in disorder over
the two bridges of the Ligny. The French pursued them with
the bayonet. More than one Prussian was hurled into the
92 WATERLOO.
boggy bed of the stream. Upon the left bank, however, the
enemy, reinforced by the two remaining battalions of Henckel's
division, re-formed and renewed the fight. Some of the
Prussians opened fire from the hedges and clumps of willows which
lined the bank of the stream, whilst others fired, over the heads
of their comrades, from the houses of the rue d'En-Bas and
from loopholes made in the walls of the large farm on the left
bank. In spite of this terrible fire in tiers, some soldiers of the
30th and 96th Regiments crossed the bridges and drove back
the Prussian sharpshooters against the houses. But Jagow
brought four battalions to the support of Henckel. The
Prussians threw back the assailants upon the right bank; they even
attempted to recross the two bridges. It was the turn of the
French to defend the stream. French and Prussians fired at
each other from one bank to the other - a distance of four
yards - through the smoke. The weather was tempestuous,
and the suffocating heat was still further increased by the
musketry and fires started by the shells. Amidst the noises
of the combat were heard the horrible cries of the wounded
who were being roasted alive under the burning ruins.
Grouchy, on his side, had commenced his attack against
the Prussian left. His cavalry had driven from Boignée the
enemy's posts, and Hulot's division of Gérard's corps, which
had passed under his immediate command, threatened
Tongrinelle and skirmished before Potriaux with the Prussians
of Luck.
Upon all points new batteries entered into action, and the
fusillade increased in violence. From la Haye to Tongrinelle,
the battle raged upon both banks of the Ligny, from which
arose, as from an infernal river, a curtain of fire and smoke.
III.
About four o'clock the action had extended still further
west. Girard had launched his division against Le Hameau
and La Haye. The assault was so prompt, so resolute, so
ardent, that the Prussians were terrified and gave ground
almost without firing a shot. Blücher, solid in his centre,
intact on his left, saw his right outflanked. He wished to
disengage it by a vigorous counter-attack. It was necessary for
him at any price to give himself air on this side, for it was
from here that he intended to debouch later with the English,
Battle of Ligny. 93
whose cooperation he still expected. The Field Marshal
unhesitatingly drew upon his reserve. The division of Pirch II.,
the only one of Ziethen's corps which had not been under fire,
would march from Brye against La Haye and Saint-Amand,
whilst the cavalry of Jurgass, of the corps of Pirch I., and the
division of Tippelskirch, of the same corps - in all, forty-seven
squadrons and nine battalions - would advance on Wagnelée,
from whence they would burst on the flank of the French.
Formed in columns of battalions, the infantry of Pirch II.
attacked with the bayonet the soldiers of Girard, who had
already debouched from La Haye in order to turn Saint-Amand,
where the Prussians of Steinmetz had returned in force and
occupied many points. The division of Girard fell back under
the attack of the fresh troops, retired into La Haye, and, after
a stubborn fight, abandoned half of this hamlet. But with a
chief like Girard it was only for a short time. He re-formed
in the streets, swept by balls and bullets, his decimated
battalions, and hurled them again against the enemy. He led
them in person, sword in hand. He fell mortally wounded,
but he saw his soldiers throw back for the second time the
Prussians out of La Haye upon the left bank of the stream.
The flank movement attempted by Jagow and
Tippelskirch was less successful than the counter-attack of Pirch II.
Habert's division and Demon's cavalry, which Vandamme
had until then held in reserve, were deployed in front of
Wagnelée with two battalions as skirmishers in the corn. The
head of Tippelskirch's column, which advanced, in order of
march and without reconnoitring, was surprised by the heavy
and well-directed fire which issued from the corn. It fell back
in disorder, spreading confusion among the battalions which
it preceded, and in which there were a great many recruits.
Without hesitating, Habert ordered a bayonet charge against
these disunited troops and drove them back into Wagnelée.
Stupidly dispersed and intimidated by the evolutions of
General Domon's horse chasseurs, Jurgass' cavalry took scarcely
any part in the action.
During these combats Blücher had descended from the
mill of Bussy in order to direct in person the execution of the
manoeuvre from which he promised himself such immense
results. He arrived within close cannon-range of La Haye, just
at the moment when the division of Pirch II. was driven from
this village by the mortal effort of the intrepid Girard.
94 WATERLOO.
Without giving the men time to recover their breath, Blücher
ordered Pirch II. to lead them back into the fire and to
reoccupy la Haye, regardless of the cost. Reanimated by the
presence of old Vorwärtz, the soldiers cheered, crossed the
stream, and penetrated, into La Haye with fixed bayonets.
Girard's division, reduced from 5,000 to 2,500 men, its chief
mortally wounded and its two brigadiers hors de combat - it
was Colonel Matis, of the 82nd of the Line, who had taken the
command - resisted desperately. Forced to yield to numbers,
it retired from house to house, from orchard to orchard, and
from hedge to hedge, as far as Le Hameau, where it massed
itself and awaited the assault. The enemy was about to leave
it some respite, for the French had thrust back Tippelskirch
into Wagnelée, they held firm in Saint-Amand and they
occupied half of Ligny. Blücher was compelled to relieve
before Saint-Amand, the division of Steinmetz, which had lost
half of its effective, to send a reinforcement to Henckel in
Ligny, to give Tippelskirch time to rally in Wagnelée, and, in
view of the new manoeuvre which he meditated, to send to
the south of Brye the corps of Pirch I.
The Emperor also makes his preparations for the great
movement which he has had in view since the beginning of
the battle. It is half-past five; he had written to Ney at two
o'clock; at six he will hear the cannon of the Marshal
thundering in the rear of the Prussian Army; then he will launch
his reserves, still intact, against the centre of the enemy, will
overthrow it, cut off its retreat towards Sombreffe, and push
it under the steel and fire of Vandamme and Ney. Of the
60,000 Prussians of Ziethen and Pirch, not one will escape.
The Imperial Guard, horse and foot, and the cuirassiers
of Milhaud had already commenced to form for the attack,
when there arrived an aide-de-camp from Vandamme with
the intelligence that a hostile column of 30,000 men was
reported at the distance of a league upon the left, and appeared
to be directing itself on Fleurus with the purpose of
turning the army. Vandamme added that the troops of Girard,
having discovered this supposed hostile column, had
abandoned La Haye, and that he himself would be forced to
evacuate Saint-Amand and to retreat unless the reserve arrived in
time to arrest this column.
Napoleon was amazed at this intelligence. He at first
had an idea, as Vandamme also had had for a moment, that
Battle of LIGNY. 95
the column was the French division which, in accordance with
his orders of eight o'clock in the morning, should have been
sent by Ney to Marbais. But a division has not 20,000 or
30,000 men, and troops who show themselves to the south
of Villers-Perwin cannot debouch from Marbais. Was it then
Ney who arrived with all his forces, according to the new
instructions sent at two o'clock and renewed at three? Or
was it d'Erlon who arrived with the 1st Corps, in conformity
with the despatch of half-past three? But d'Erlon, like Ney,
had orders to turn back by the heights of Saint-Amand on
the rear of the enemy and not to come to Fleurus. To march
on Fleurus was to cause the plan of the Emperor to miscarry.
Neither Marshal Ney nor Count d'Erlon could be guilty of
such an error! Then it must be either an English corps, which
had turned Ney's right, or a Prussian corps, which had
operated by the old Roman road a vast turning movement.
The Emperor hastened to send one of his aides-de-camp to
ascertain the strength and intentions of the hostile column.
Meanwhile he suspended the movement of the Guard against
Ligny and caused it to resume its first position in front of the
mill of Fleurus with its regiments deployed. Duhesme's
division of the Young Guard and the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Foot
Chasseurs of the Old Guard, detached from the reserve, advanced
at an increased pace to the support of Vandamme.
These reinforcements did not arrive any too soon. Hardly
recovered from a panic caused by the approach of the hostile
column - panic which General Lefol had been able to arrest
only by turning his guns against the fugitives - the corps of
Vandamme was about to suffer the combined attack of the
greater part of the Prussian right wing. A little before six
o'clock the reserve batteries of the enemy entered into
action and prepared the way for the assault. Tippelskirch
debouched from Wagnelée upon Le Hameau, his right supported
by the numerous squadrons of Jurgass. The skirmishers of
the 1st Pomeranian Regiment opened so brisk and sustained a
fire that in a few minutes they had emptied their cartridge-
boxes; the hussars who flanked them brought them their own
cartridges. The division of Pirch II., seconded by the fresh
troops of the division of Brause and a part of the division
of Krafft, assailed Saint-Amand on three sides. The French
withdrew. The débris of Girard's division abandoned Le
Hameau; Lefol and Berthezéne yielded all the northern part
96 WATERLOO.
of Saint-Amand; and Habert recoiled as far as his first
position on the left of this village. From the mill of Bussy, where
he had returned, Blücher witnessed the success of his troops.
He already believed himself master of the road of Fleurus
and soon free to go to attack in flank the French reserve, a
manoeuvre which he had had in view for a long time.
But the Young Guard of Duhesme advances at the
charging step. It passes the division of Habert and attacks with
superb ardour the Prussians of Tippelskirch. The latter, roughly
handled, retire, partly into Wagnelée and partly into Le
Hameau. Held in check by the chasseurs of Domon and the
lancers of Alphonse de Colbert, whom the Emperor had just
sent from the right to the left of the battle-field, the cavalry
of Jurgass can only protect the retreat of Tippelskirch without
attempting anything against the Young Guard. The
indefatigable division of Girard, whose four intrepid regiments, the
11th and 12th Light and the 4th and 82nd of the Line, well
deserve to be named, bursts again upon Le Hameau, from whence
it drives the Prussians for the third time. Lefol and
Berthezene force Pirch II. out of Saint-Amand. The French are
once more masters of all the ground as far as the first houses
of La Haye. "What soldiers!" writes a Royalist émigré
present in the battle. "They were no longer the feeble débris
of Arcis-sur-Aube. They were, according to the point of view,
a legion of heroes or demons."
On the right wing the cavalry of Grouchy occupied
Tongrinelle, and the infantry of Hulot vigorously attacked
Potriaux. In the furnace of Ligny the battalions of heroes
melted like gold in the crucible. Gérard had thrown himself
into this village with his last reserve, the second brigade of
Vichery. Blücher had relieved there the division of Henckel
by the larger part of the division of Krafft. Both sides fought
with the same rage - Prussians and French passing and
repassing in turn the stream - for the possession of the church,
the cemetery, the farm d'En-Bas, and the castle of the Counts
de Looz, in which, in spite of the flames which surrounded
them, two companies of Silesian sharpshooters intrepidly held
out. Many soldiers fell from exhaustion. Krafft no longer
hoped to maintain his position much longer. He informed
Gneissenau that he and Jagow were on the point of being
surrounded in Ligny. "Hold out for a half-hour longer," replied
Gneissenau. "The English Army is approaching." Illusion
Battle of Ligny. 97
or lie! for Blücher was soon to or had already received a
despatch from Muffling, informing him that Wellington, fighting
with an entire army corps, would not even be able to send
him a single squadron.
Nothing discouraged the intrepid soul of Blücher. If
Muffling's letter contained "disagreeable news," according to
the moderate expression of Grolemann, it at least informed him
that Napoleon had not all his army with him, as he had thought,
and gave him the assurance that he would not be attacked
in reverse, since Wellington would contain the French corps
detached upon the route of Brussels. He received
simultaneously a report from Pirch II. and one from Thielmann
announcing that the attack of the French seemed to slacken
towards La Haye and Potriaux. After having begun its
advance, the Old Guard had returned to its first position. This
counter-march, which had been seen from the mill of Bussy,
seemed to indicate some hesitancy on the part of Napoleon.
It was the moment to act, if one did not wish to permit the
victory to escape. Blücher still possessed confidence. He
clung to the idea of gaining the battle all alone by throwing
back the French left upon its centre. For this it would suffice
that his lieutenants hold Ligny. He would charge himself
with the rest. He ordered his last reserves to advance, save
two battalions, which he posted in Brye and near the mill.
He sent to Ligny to reinforce Jagow and Krafft a part of the
division of Langen, and also summoned Thielmann to send
there the division of Stülpnagel. Then, taking with him the
last battalions of Langen and the débris of the division of
Steinmetz, which had retired into the second line about five
o'clock in the evening, the ardent old man - he was seventy-
three years old - led them towards Saint-Amand.
On his way he rallies all the men whom he meets returning
from the fight, there a company, here a section, farther on a
group of fugitives. With these seven or eight battalions he
rejoins the exhausted divisions of Brause, Pirch II., and
Tippelskirch, and orders a new attack. "My men have burned
all their cartridges and emptied the cartridge-boxes of the
dead," said Pirch to him; "they have no longer a tingle shot
to fire." "Have at them with the bayonet!" cries Blücher.
And brandishing his sabre, spurring forward his magnificent
white horse, a gift of the Prince Regent of England, he leads
on his electrified soldiers. Supreme effort of brave men at
98 WATERLOO.
the end of their strength! They retake Le Hameau, but their
wave breaks against the steel dike of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Chasseurs of the Guard, deployed by regiments on the left of Saint-
Amand.
The Prussians had returned in confusion into La Haye.
Blücher at least hoped to sleep on his positions. He thought
the battle ended, for night had come. It was not night. At
half-past seven, during the June solstice, the sun still shines on
the horizon. It was a tempest. Great black clouds swept up
from the edge of the horizon and accumulated overhead,
covering with a dark pall the entire field of battle. The rain began
to fall in large drops. It thundered violently, peal on peal;
but the rumbling of the thunder was soon drowned by the
noise of the frightful cannonade which burst forth suddenly
towards Ligny.
IV.
About half-past six o'clock the aide-de-camp sent to
ascertain the strength of the hostile column which had debouched
from the wood of Villers-Perwin on the flank of Vandamme had
reported to the Emperor that this pretended English column
was the corps of d'Erlon. Napoleon should have surmised
as much. A false manoeuvre, a confusion of orders, an
eccentric march, are things not so rare in war that he could not
admit of their possibility. Greatly disconcerted by the
threatening march of this column, he had not thought of the corps
of d'Erlon, which, however, he himself had just called upon
the battle-field. If his habitual presence of mind had not
failed him, the abortive movement would have yet been feasible.
It would have sufficed to send by the aide-de-camp charged
with reconnoitring the column the pressing order to d'Erlon
to manoeuvre so as to turn the Prussian right. Napoleon had
not thought of this. And when the aide-de-camp returned,
he rightly judged that the movement could no longer be made
in opportune time. In order to operate this enveloping march,
two hours would have been required. Besides, the Emperor
had probably been informed by the aide-de-camp that the 1st
Corps was disappearing. Had Ney, in peril, recalled it, or had
d'Erlon, having discovered that he had taken a wrong
direction, moved to the west of Wagnelée to manoeuvre in the rear
of the Prussian lines, in accordance with the order borne by
Forbin-Janson?
Battle of Ligny. 99
The Emperor quickly made up his mind. If, in
consequence of orders badly understood or poorly executed, it
appeared that he could no longer count on the cooperation of a
part of his left wing, at least he was freed from the uneasiness
occasioned by the presence of the supposed hostile column on
his flank. He was free once more to act. He could no longer
gain the decisive victory of which he had dreamed since the
afternoon, but he could yet win the battle and throw back
Blücher far from Wellington. He issued his orders for the
final assault.
The reserve batteries open fire against the hills which
dominate Ligny; the Old Guard deploys in columns of
divisions; the squadrons of the Emperor's escort, the 2nd cavalry
division of the Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud, form for
the attack; whilst the corps of Lobau debouches from Fleurus.
The cannonade ceases, the charge beats, and all this mass
moves under the warm rain with cries of "Long live the
Emperor! " The first column of the Guard (2nd, 3rd, and 4th
Grenadiers) penetrates to the west of Ligny; the second (1st
Chasseurs and 1st Grenadiers) attacks the village on the east. Led
by Gérard, the soldiers of Pecheux and Vichery cross the stream
of Ligny, and finally wrest from the Prussians the farm
d'En Bas and all the houses on the left bank. The débris of the
divisions of Jagow and Krafft and the battalions of Langen
endeavour to re-form upon the first acclivities, above the ravine.
But Pecheux rushes from the midst of Ligny, followed by
Vichery and the first column of the Guard; from the right of
the village debouch the 1st Grenadiers and the 1st Chasseurs,
followed by the cuirassiers of Milhaud; from the left, with the
Emperor, advance the squadrons of his escort and the heavy
cavalry of the Guard. The Prussians yield on all points. In
order to describe the rapidity and the impression of this
irresistible attack, Soult wrote to Davout: "It was like the
transformation scene at the theatre."
Blücher arrived from La Haye at full speed. The rain
had ceased and the wind had dispersed the clouds. By the last
rays of the sun, which reappeared for an instant above the
hills of Brye, he saw his troops in full retreat, and, in the wide
breach made in his front of battle, the bear-skin caps of the
Old Guard, the horse grenadiers, tall as towers, the dragoons
100 WATERLOO.
manoeuvring to charge, and, in a scintillation, the 3,000
cuirassiers of Milhaud.
Old Blücher, according to the words of Major von
Grolemann, "never regarded himself as defeated so long as he could
continue the combat." To check the French, he counted on
the cavalry of Röder, in reserve between Brye and Sombreffe;
on the débris of the division of Henckel, which, at six o'clock,
had been relieved in Ligny; and on the divisions of Stülpnagel
and Borcke, which Thielmann had detached from his corps.
But, on account of orders badly interpreted, Henckel was
already near Sombreffe, and Stülpnagel still far from Ligny.
As for the troops of Borcke, Thielmann could not deprive
himself of this last reserve; he was pressed too vigorously on
his front by Grouchy - the division of Hulot had carried
Potriaux and threatened Sombreffe, and the dragoons of
Exelmans (brigade of Burthe) had overthrown the cavalry of
Lottum, captured its guns, and were advancing towards the
route of Namur. The thirty-two squadrons of Röder alone
remained available. Blücher hastened to them and ordered
the charge. Lützow, the celebrated partisan chief of the War
of 1813, fell with the 6th Uhlans upon a square which he
believed was composed of mobilized National Guards, on account
of the dissimilarity of their uniforms. It proved to be the 4th
Grenadiers of the Guard. The uhlans were received by a file-
fire at close range, which stretched upon the ground eighty-
three men. Lützow, overturned with his horse, was made
prisoner. A charge of the 1st Dragoons and of the 2nd Landwehr
of Courmache, another of the uhlans of Brandenburg and the
Dragoons of the Queen, and a fourth of all the squadrons
together, succeeded no better. Some were repulsed by the Old
Guard, which had relieved in the first line the divisions of
Gérard, and the others were roughly handled by the dragoons
of the Guard and the cuirassiers of Milhaud. Until nightfall
Prussian and French squadrons gyrated and clashed together
upon the acclivities of the hills, in front of the squares of the
Guard, which advanced slowly but surely towards the mill
of Bussy.
Struck by a ball, the horse of Blücher sank under his rider.
The aide-de-camp Nostiz, who charged by the side of the Field
Marshal, saw him fall and dismounted to assist him. They
found themselves in the midst of the cuirassiers of the 9th
Battle of Ligny. 101
Regiment, who had just overthrown the Prussians, and who,
in the darkness, passed without perceiving these two officers.
A few minutes later the cuirassiers, being driven back, in
turn repassed near them - almost over them - still without
seeing them. Nostiz hailed the Prussian dragoons. Blücher
was disengaged, all bruised, and in a half-swoon, from
beneath his horse, placed upon the horse of a subaltern, and
led far from the field of battle in the midst of the torrent of
fugitives. They were innumerable. On the next day 8,000
of them were stopped at Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle.
The Prussian centre was overthrown and broken. Save
a few battalions, which withdrew in good order and resisted
intrepidly the cuirassiers of Delort, who unfortunately were
not supported by the second division of Milhaud's corps,
all the infantry fled in confusion. Thanks to the desperate
charges of Röder's cavalry, which delayed the march of the
French, Krafft, Langen, and Jagow saved a part of their
artillery, and were able to rally the débris of their divisions
between Sombreffe and the Roman road. But if Blücher's centre
had been pierced, he still held his positions on the wings.
Ziethen and Thielmann had begun to retreat only when they had
learned of the abandonment of Ligny. The Prussians massed
around La Haye gained slowly the last summits of the hills,
arresting by offensive returns the infantry of Vandamme
when it pressed them too closely; their rear guard maintained
itself in Brye until dawn. Thielmann withdrew his corps in
the rear of Sombreffe, which he continued to occupy during
the night by a strong detachment. At half -past nine there
was still skirmishing along the line of Brye-Sombreffe.
The Emperor returned about eleven o'clock to Fleurus,
whither the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Chasseurs of the Guard were
recalled from Saint-Amand. Save these regiments and the
reserve batteries, all the Army bivouacked upon the left bank of
the stream - the corps of Lobau, which had taken no part in
the action, in the first line, near the mill of Bussy; the corps of
Vandamme in front of La Haye; the corps of Gérard, the Old
Guard and the cavalry of the Guard, before Ligny; the
cuirassiers of Milhaud to the right of this village; the division of
Hulot and the cavalry of Grouchy between Tongrinne,
Potriaux, and Sombreffe. In front of Brye and Sombreffe the
French outposts were within close musket-range of those of
102 WATERLOO.
the Prussians. The French felt themselves so near the enemy
that, although they were in the second line, the grenadiers of
the Guard bivouacked without fire, in battalion squares.
During the night the wounded were cared for, but the
ambulances, too few in number and badly organized, were not
sufficient for the task; 12,000 Prussians and 8,500 French lay
dead or wounded on the plain and in the villages, which had
been transformed into charnel-houses.
CHAPTER III.
The Battle of Quarte-Bras.
I. - Inaction of Marshal Ney during the morning of June 16th. -
Reiterated orders of the Emperor.
II. - Attack of Quatre-Bras by the corps of Reille (two o'clock in the
afternoon) . - Return of Wellington to Quatre-Bras and arrival
of the first English reinforcements (three o'clock) . - Death of
the Duke of Brunswick (half-past four o'clock).
III. - False movement of Count d'Erlon.
IV. - The charge of Kellermann's cuirassiers (six o'clock). - Offensive
movement of Wellington (seven o'clock). - The French driven
back into their first positions (from eight to nine o'clock).
I.
In the course of this day the Emperor had sent nine
despatches to Marshal Ney. But, as he said at St. Helena, "Ney
was no longer the same man." The most ardent of the
Emperor's lieutenants, he who in so many battles - notably at
Jena and Craonne - had attacked the enemy before the
appointed hour, had become circumspect and temporizing,
even to inertia.
On the day before, assailed by strategical scruples, the
Marshal had directed towards Quatre-Bras only a detachment,
which was too weak to carry that position. On the morning
of June 16th he did nothing to make up for the time lost.
Admitting that he was right in awaiting new instructions from
the Emperor before attacking, he should at least have prepared
everything to act on the receipt of the first order. His troops
were echeloned from Frasnes to Thuin, over a line of seven
leagues. At daybreak he ought to have massed at Frasnes
the divisions of Bachelu, Jérôme Bonaparte, and Foy, and all
the cavalry, and summoned to Gosselies the corps of d'Erlon.
This movement could have been completed before nine o'clock
in the morning, save the division of Allix, which would have
rejoined only two hours later. Thus by nine o'clock Ney would
have found himself in position to attack Quatre-Bras, at the
first, order, with 19,000 bayonets, 3,500 sabres, 64 guns, and a
reserve of 20,500 men. But the Marshal took no preparatory
103
104 WATERLOO.
measures. He left his divisions dispersed, his soldiers in
bivouac, and awaited, inert, the orders of the Emperor.
About half-past six o'clock the Marshal received a first
letter from Soult. It was not, indeed, an order of march, but
it was a warning that his troops would soon have to put
themselves in motion. Soult announced to him the early arrival
at Gosselies of Kellermann's cuirassiers, and asked him if the
1st Corps had operated its movement in that direction. It
was then still a question of Ney pushing straight ahead along
the route of Brussels. If the Emperor had wished to recall
the Marshal on his left, apparently he would not have sent him
a reinforcement of eight regiments of heavy cavalry. Ney,
however, did not issue from his apathy. He contented himself
with addressing to Soult the information demanded. Then,
about seven o'clock, he set out for Frasnes without even
directing Reille to cause his troops to take up arms. He
confined himself to saying to him : " If there arrives an order from
the Emperor during my absence, you will execute it at once
and communicate it to Count d'Erlon."
At Frasnes Ney remained inactive and careless, as at
Gosselies. He did not think to examine closely the positions of
the enemy, and to push towards Quatre-Bras an offensive
reconnaissance, which would have caused his adversary to
unmask his forces. We might even say that he neglected to
interrogate his generals and the commanders of his advance
posts, or that he did not listen to what they reported to him.
Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, or Colbert, certainly informed him that
the Netherlanders appeared to have received reinforcements;
that since morning they had extended and advanced their
front; and that at six o'clock their skirmishers had driven back
the French advance posts upon the edge of the wood of La
Hutte. After this skirmish, it is true, the combat had
degenerated into a desultory firing, but the ensemble of the enemy's
dispositions led to the presumption that his intention was to
make a stand at Quatre-Bras. Ney believed nothing of the
kind. They were only vain demonstrations, intended to
impose upon the French and prepare for a retreat. At most, "we
will have an affair with that handful of Germans who were
sabred yesterday."
The Marshal was so convinced of this that about
eleven o'clock, when Flahault delivered to him the letter of the
Emperor which directed him to take position at and in front
The Battle or Quatre-Bras. 105
of Quatre-Bras, he dictated without hesitating the following
order: "The 2nd Corps will put itself on the march at once to
take the following positions : The 5th Division in the rear of
Genappe upon the heights; the 9th Division in the second line,
to the right and left of Bauterlez; and the 6th and 7th
Divisions at Quatre-Bras itself. The three first divisions of Count
d'Erlon will take position at Frasnes. The right division will
establish itself at Marbais with the 2nd Division of cavalry.
The 1st Division of cavalry will cover our march and
reconnoitre in the direction of Brussels and on our flanks. The two
divisions of the Count de Valmy will establish themselves at
Frasnes and Liberchies. The cavalry division of the Guard
will remain in its present position at Frasnes." This was not
a disposition for battle; it was a simple order of march. The
mind of Ney is clearly revealed therein. He counted on
occupying Quatre-Bras without striking a blow; at the worst,
after a very short resistance. His instructions were merely
a transcription of the Emperor's orders. Like Napoleon, he
imagined that the route of Brussels was free. But he was
on the spot!
To make matters worse, Ney, who had served the Emperor
badly, was served in like manner by Reille. He enjoined this
general to execute immediately any orders which he might
receive from the Emperor. Now, when Flahault passed through
Gosselies at ten o'clock and communicated to Reille the
instructions of which he was the bearer, the latter, troubled by a
report from General Girard, deemed it advisable to await a
positive order from Ney before putting his troops on the march.
"General Flahault," he wrote to the Marshal, "has
communicated to me the orders which he has for you. I would have
commenced my movement on Frasnes as soon as my divisions
would have been under arms, but, according to a despatch from
General Girard, which reports two bodies of the enemy, of six
battalions each, coming by the route of Namur, and whose
advance guard is at Saint-Amand, I shall hold my troops in
readiness to march pending your orders. As, no doubt, they
will reach me in a short time, there will be only a short delay."
This "short delay" was one of two hours. Reille did not
move his troops until the receipt of Ney's order - that is to say,
about noon. His head of column hardly reached Frasnes
before half-past one o'clock. In vain, during this interval of
time, Ney had received another letter from the Major-General
-8-
106 WATERLOO.
reiterating the first instructions. With a single battalion and
the chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, he was constrained to
await the infantry of Reille before beginning the attack.
Besides, he thought that he had plenty of time to establish
himself at Quatre-Bras, for he still laboured under the impression
that the enemy, being few in number, would offer no great
resistance.
The Prince of Orange, it is true, had at hand only the
division of Perponcher - 7, 800 men and 14 guns. But, impressed
with the strategical importance of Quatre-Bras, he was
determined to hold this position at any cost until the arrival
of the English.
The position was favourable to the defence. The hamlet
of Quatre-Bras, consisting of a group of three large farms and
of two houses, situated at the crossing of the roads leading
from Charleroi to Brussels and from Namur to Nivelles,
commands on all sides the multiple undulations of the ground.
On the east, the route of Namur, raised above the level of the
ground, forms a natural entrenchment, in front of which arises,
like a redoubt, the farm of Piraumont. On the southwest
access to Quatre-Bras is protected by the farm of Pierrepont
and the coppice of Bossu, which extends for the space of 2,000
yards, on the left of the route of Charleroi. Finally, in a sort
of valley, at the distance of half a league to the south of the
hamlet, the large farm of Gemioncourt, constructed near the
route, constitutes another advance work.
Although a division numbering less than 8,000 men was
insufficient to line this front of more than three kilometres and
occupy solidly all its positions, Perponcher, in order to impose
on the French and delay as long as possible the attack of
Quatre-Bras, feared not to scatter his force. Two battalions
with three guns remained in reserve at Quatre-Bras and along
the route of Namur; the others were distributed as follows:
on the left, one battalion with five guns in front of
Gemioncourt and another occupying this farm; on the right, four
battalions and the horse battery upon the eastern skirt of
the wood of Bossu and in front of Pierrepont.
II.
About half-past one o'clock Reille, who marched with the
advance guard of Bachelu's division, rejoined Ney. "There is
only a very small force in the wood of Bossu," said the
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 107
Marshal. "It is necessary to carry this position at once." Reille,
on this day, was not in a very enterprising humour; he replied:
"This may be a Spanish battle, in which the English will show
themselves only when it is time. It would be prudent, before
attacking, to wait until all our troops are massed here." Ney,
impatient, replied : "Nonsense! Two companies of voltigeurs
will suffice for this work!" Nevertheless, Reille's remarks
had caused him to reflect; he delayed the attack until the
arrival of Bachelu's second brigade and of Foy's division.
At two o'clock these troops, debouching from Frasnes,
formed in columns of battalions - Bachelu on the right of the
route and Foy upon and to the left of it; the chasseurs of Piré
flanked the right of Bachelu's division, and the lancers
remained in the rear of the interval between the two divisions.
In the second line were the cavalry of the Guard in column
upon the highway, and the first brigade of Kellermann's
cuirassiers deployed on the left. The division of Jérôme
Bonaparte was still on the march between Gosselies and Frasnes,
and the three other brigades of Kellermann had taken position
at Liberchies, in accordance with Ney's orders.
The Marshal. did not wish to delay longer his attack; but,
troubled by the words of Reille, he judged that the troops
whom he had in hand would not be sufficient to attack the
position in front. He resolved to direct his efforts against the
left of the enemy. (He hoped that the defenders of Pierrepont
would fall back as soon as they saw themselves outflanked, but
Prince Bernard, having a line of retreat on Hautain-le-Val,
had no fears of being cut off from Quatre-Bras.) After a short
cannonade, the Marshal launched in the direction of Piraumont
the division of Bachelu, the cavalry of Piré, and the brigade of
Jamin of Foy's division. The second brigade of Foy (General
Gauthier) remained temporarily in reserve. The division of
Bachelu and the cavalry of Piré advanced between the wood
of La Hutte and the highway towards Piraumont. The
Netherlanders posted in the second line were not in sufficient force
to meet this attack. Bachelu drove back without difficulty
the 27th Chasseurs as far as Piraumont. Arrived abreast of
the farm of Lairalle, Jamin's brigade, led by Foy, took the lead
on the left, drove back the 2d Battalion of Nassau, and
dislodged from Gemioncourt the 5th Battalion of militia, whose
débris re-formed on the west of the route, and fell back towards
the wood of Bossu. Ney then ordered them to be charged by
108 WATERLOO.
the lancers of Piré, who overthrew them. The Prince of Orange,
closely pressed, owed his safety only to the swiftness of his
horse; one of his aides-de-camp was wounded and captured.
Save on the right, where the four battalions of Prince Bernard
of Saxe-Weimar had not yet been molested, the French were
masters of the advanced positions of the enemy.
It was nearly three o'clock. Wellington, who had
returned from the mill of Bussy, judged the situation critical,
almost desperate. In a very short time he would be forced in
Quatre-Bras by Foy, already on the march to attack this
hamlet on the south, and by Bachelu, who would soon be in
position to attack it on the east. But just at this moment
reinforcements arrived - the brigade of Van Merlen (Dutch
hussars and Belgian dragoons), by the route of Nivelles; and
the division of Picton (eight English and four Hanoverian
battalions), by the route of Brussels. Wellington was
especially uneasy for the right of his line - almost disgarnished and
threatened by Bachelu, in possession of the farm of
Piraumont and its dependencies. The division of Picton, by a
prompt movement "towards the left, in line of battle,"
advanced upon the route of Namur; the brigades of Kempt
and Pack in the first line, kneeling in the wheat; the
Hanoverian brigade, in the second line, sheltered behind the talus
of the highway.
During the deployment of the English the Prince of Orange
launched in succession his hussars and dragoons against the
column of Foy, whose sharpshooters had approached Quatre-
Bras. Before reaching this infantry the enemy's squadrons
were broken by the lancers of Piré and driven back at a quick
pace beyond the cross-roads. Wellington was jostled and
drawn in the rout as far as the Brussels highway. In turning
back by a wheel to the right towards Gemioncourt, the lancers
of Piré overthrew a battalion of militia and captured eight
cannon.
The action had opened also to the south of the wood of
Bossu. At three o'clock the division of Prince Jérôme had
debouched from Frasnes, and Ney had at once directed it
against the farm of Pierrepont, whilst the brigade of Gauthier
rejoined General Foy. Dislodged from Pierrepont, the enemy
withdrew into the wood, whither the skirmishers penetrated
behind them. They advanced there very slowly; besides
this wood being well defended, the undergrowth was so thick
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 109
that in certain spots it became necessary to cut a passage
with the sabre.
At this stage of the combat, a little before four o'clock,
the Marshal received Soult's letter, written at two, ordering
him to push the enemy vigorously and to turn back upon the
Prussian corps in position at Brye, so as to envelop it.
Enlightened henceforth as to the projects of the Emperor and
the importance of the occupation of Quatre-Bras, Ney ordered
a general advance. Bachelu moved from Piraumont towards
the enemy's left; Foy marched from the lowlands of
Gemioncourt towards Quatre-Bras, with one column on the highway
and the other to the right of it; Jérôme threw the brigade of
Soye into the wood of Bossu and advanced with the brigade
of Bauduin between the highway and the wood, to meet the
corps of Brunswick - a new reinforcement which had reached
Wellington. Under this combined and vigorous attack the
Allies gave ground on their right and centre. The brigade of
Soye rendered itself master of most of the wood of Bossu and
threw back its defenders on Hautain-le-Val, with the exception
of one battalion, which maintained itself in the northern
corner, near Quatre-Bras. Foy's division and Bauduin's brigade,
which marched on its left, drove back the black battalions of
Brunswick. A charge of Brunswick cavalry, led by the Duke
of Brunswick in person, broke itself on the bayonets of the 1st
Light. Frederick William was struck by a ball in the belly;
transported into a house of Quatre-Bras, he died there during
the evening. His father, the author of the manifesto of 1792,
had been mortally wounded at Auerstaedt. They were both
ardent enemies of France.
On the right the column of Bachelu had traversed the
little valley which separates the heights of Gemioncourt from
those which crown the route of Namur; it had just scaled this
slope when it received, almost at point-blank range, the fire
of Picton's first line, concealed in the wheat. The column
halted, wavered. Picton, seeing the hesitation of the French,
caused them to be charged with the bayonet by the brigade of
Kempt, which drove them back rapidly, near Piraumont.
There, however, riddled with grape from the batteries of
Bachelu and scourged by the musketry of the 108th of the Line,
which had been left in reserve, the English were arrested in
turn and forced to regain their first positions. In their retreat
they were subjected to the charges of the 1st and the 6th
110 WATERLOO.
Chasseurs (Piré's division.) The skirmishers were sabred, but
the battalions, rapidly formed in squares, remained unbroken.
The square of the 28th, attacked on two rides, seemed on the
point of breaking, when Picton, in order to reanimate his
soldiers, cried: "Twenty-eighth, remember Egypt!"
The 42nd (Highlanders) and 44th Regiments, which formed
the right of Pack, were less fortunate. The lancers of Piré,
galloping in pursuit of the Brunswickers, discovered the
Redcoats in line of battle at the angle of the two routes; they
rushed straight on them and broke without, however, over-
throwing them. A furious melee of bayonets against lances
took place; the flag of the 44th was taken and retaken.
Colonel de Galbois with the 6th Lancers pierced as far as the route
of Namur, where he cut to pieces a Hanoverian battalion.
III.
To second his attack, Ney counted on the 20,000 men of
Count d'Erlon, who were soon expected to debouch from
Frasnes. But - by a concatenation of fatalities, or, rather, by
the logical consequences of delays in the preparatory
dispositions, of orders badly understood and executed, and of
inopportune counter-orders - this corps was about to fail him, as it
had failed Napoleon.
In the morning d'Erlon had concentrated his five divisions
at Jumet (a half -league in the rear of Gosselies), where he was
in person since the evening of the day before with the divisions
of Durutte and Donzelot. Reille's corps, upon which he was
to close up, not having budged from Gosselies, he awaited
instructions. A little before eleven o'clock he received notice
from Reille to prepare to follow the movement of the 2nd Corps.
Reille also informed him that he himself would remain in his
position until a new order. D'Erlon could only do as much.
About a quarter-past twelve the order from Ney to advance
to Frasnes was transmitted to him, either directly or through
the intermediary of Reille; but, before putting himself on the
march, he was compelled to await the movement of the entire 2nd
Corps, which preceded his. Jérôme's division having scarcely
quitted its bivouacs, to the south of the wood of Lambuc,
before one o'clock, the advance guard of the 1st Corps did not
reach Gosselies till between half-past one and two o'clock.
There d'Erlon halted his troops until the return of a strong
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 111
reconnaissance which he had sent from Jumet towards Chapelle-
Herlaymont, where the presence of an Anglo-Belgian corps,
threatening his left, had been falsely reported to him by some
peasants. In spite of Ney's order of eleven o'clock, written
according to the instructions of the Emperor of eight o'clock,
he neglected sending to Marbais one of his divisions. He
intended, probably, to detach this division towards this village
as soon as he attained Frasnes. He did not resume his march
until three o'clock.
Between four and a quarter-past four o'clock half of the
column had passed the Roman road, when d'Erlon was
overtaken by Colonel de Forbin-Janson, of the Imperial Staff.
Forbin-Janson had left Fleurus a quarter of an hour after the
officer charged with Soult's message; but, by cutting across
the country by way of Mellet, he had gained nearly an hour
upon the latter. He bore an order from the Emperor ordering
Count d'Erlon to direct the 1st Corps upon the heights of Saint-
Amand, in order to burst on Ligny.
Anxious to second the views of the Emperor, General
d'Erlon at once ordered his column to turn to the right.
Unfortunately, he had read wrong this order, scrawled in pencil,
which Forbin-Janson, an officer who owed his position solely
to favour, and without any knowledge of the combinations
of war, was unable to explain to him. The order stated,
"sur la hauteur de Saint-Amand" ("upon the height of Saint-
Amand"); d'Erlon had read or understood, "à la hauteur de
Saint-Amand" ("abreast of Saint-Amand"). Consequently,
instead of taking the direction of Brye and Ligny, in order to
attack the Prussians in reverse, he directed himself on Saint-
Amand and Fleurus, so as to prolong the Emperor's left. This
movement was precisely contrary to the instructions of
Napoleon; so we can, in a measure, explain why the Emperor,
on being informed of the advance of a column and its
threatening position on his left flank, had not thought of d'Erlon,
whom he was far from expecting on this point, and why he,
as well as Vandamme, had taken this column for a Prussian
or English corps.
In confiding an order of such importance to a staff officer
as inexperienced as was Count Forbin-Janson, Napoleon acted
contrary to his usual method in such instances. Until 1814,
when he had raised in the Ninèvre a partisan corps, which took
part in only a few slight skirmishes, Forbin-Janson had seen
112 WATERLOO.
no service. In 1815 the Emperor introduced him into the
Army with the rank of colonel and attached him to his staff.
He had no knowledge whatever of the duties of an aide-de-
camp. Not only was he unable to explain to d'Erlon the
prescribed movement, but when he had transmitted to him the
order, either that he had badly understood or had forgotten
the subsidiary recommendation of the Emperor, or for some
other cause, instead of going to communicate this order to
Marshal Ney, he rejoined at a rapid pace the Imperial Staff.
Count Forbin-Janson, at least, deserves credit for having lost
no time in going and returning.
The Prince of the Moskowa learned of d'Erlon's movement
only from General Delcambre, chief of staff of the 1st Corps.
Whilst on the march along the Roman road with his troops,
d'Erlon, filled with misgivings, had sent this officer to inform
the Marshal of his march towards the other battle-field. Ney
flew into a great passion. His rage was still further increased
a few minutes later when the officer arrived bearing Soult's
order, dated a quarter-past three o'clock: "You must
manoeuvre immediately so as to envelop the right of the enemy
and to fall with might and main upon his rear. This army
(the Prussian) is lost if you act vigorously. The fate of France
is in your hands. So do not lose an instant in making the
movement ordered by the Emperor, and direct yourself upon
the heights of Saint-Amand and Brye." Seeing the masses of
the enemy increasing - the advance of Alten's division had
just debouched from Quatre-Bras - Ney understood more fully
that it would be necessary to oppose to them all his forces.
Besides, at the very moment when the Emperor's letter
suggested to him the fine manoeuvre by which the Prussian
Army could be exterminated, he recognized the impossibility
of executing it. Ney was exposed to the fire of a battery;
the balls struck the ground and ricocheted around him. He
was heard to exclaim: "Would that these English cannon-
balls would strike me dead!"
Exasperated and blinded by rage, Ney did not stop to
reflect that the 1st Corps would no longer be able to arrive in
useful time at Frasnes, and that in recalling it there he crossed
the plans of Napoleon and acted in direct contravention with
his will. He sent back General Delcambre with the imperative
order for d'Erlon to bring back his troops to the right wing.
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 113
IV.
And yet these words of Napoleon's letter, "The fate of
France is in your hands," troubled and fascinated the Marshal.
This movement, which he had directed d'Erlon to interrupt,
he had not entirely abandoned the idea of executing himself.
Perhaps by a desperate effort he might yet, in spite of the
disproportion of forces, throw back the English beyond Quatre-
Bras, and once master of this point, operate against the
Prussian Army, with the aid of d'Erlon, the manoeuvre awaited by
Napoleon. All the troops had been engaged, with the
exception of the cuirassiers of Kellermann and the cavalry of the
Guard. He summoned Kellermann. "My dear general," said
he to him in an excited tone, "it is a question of the safety
of France. An extraordinary effort is necessary. Take your
cavalry and throw yourself in the midst of the English. Crush
them, ride them down!"
The intrepid Kellermann had never discussed an order
to charge. However, he thought it his duty to say to Ney
that the Anglo-Dutch were thought to number more than
20,000 men, and that he had with him but one brigade of
cuirassiers, his three other brigades having remained in the rear,
in accordance with the order of the Marshal.
"What does that matter!" cried Ney. "Charge with what
you have! Ride them down! I will cause you to be supported
by all the cavalry here present. ... Go! "
Kellermann could do nothing else but obey. He rejoined
Guiton's brigade (8th and 11th Cuirassiers), formed it in
columns of squadrons, each squadron separated by a distance
double that of its front, and led it at a rapid trot as far as the
summit of the hill which rises between Gemioncourt and Quatre-
Bras. There he gave the command, repeated at once from
front to rear of the column: "Prepare to charge! . . .
Gallop! . . . Forward! . . . Charge!" "I hastened,"
says he in his report to Ney, "in order not to give to my men
the time to recognize the full extent of the danger."
The trumpets sound the charge. In an irradiation of steel
and a rain of pebbles thrown up by the feet of the horses the
cuirassiers descend the slope like an avalanche. At each stride
the pace increases. The ground trembles and a cloud of dust
arises. The men in the first rank, bending forward over the
necks of their horses, hold their blades straight before them;
114 WATERLOO.
the others brandish their glittering swords. Kellermann,
sword in hand, charges twenty steps in front of the leading
squadron.
In the valley the four battalions of Colin Halkett's fresh
brigade are drawn up in line or formed in squares. Motionless,
resolute, and calm, the English, reserving their fire, await the
cuirassiers. The 69th Regiment, posted in the first line,
between the wood of Bossu and the highway, delivers its fire at
thirty yards. The cuirassiers pass through the balls and smoke
like a flash of lightning through the clouds. They attack the
69th, overthrow and crush it and, take its flag. They then
charge the square of the 30th and overthrow the 33rd. Then,
without giving their horses time to blow, they scale the
opposite slope, sabre in passing the cannoneers of a battery, break
a square of Brunswick, and penetrate as far as Quatre-Bras.
The first and, second lines of the enemy were pierced, and a
bloody breach was opened. Unfortunately, the cuirassiers
were not supported. Offended by Ney, who seemed to doubt
his resolution, Kellermann had delivered his charge too soon.
His mind still unbalanced by his rage against d'Erlon, the
Marshal had badly coordinated this supreme effort, had
delayed to issue orders, and had forgotten the cavalry of the
Guard in reserve near Frasnes. The columns of infantry and
the lancers and chasseurs of Piré had just begun to move,
whilst the two regiments of cuirassiers, reduced to 500 men,
disunited by the very impetuosity of the charge, and their
horses blown, found themselves alone in the midst of
Wellington's army. They were at the apex of a triangle of fire,
fusilladed from the wood of Bossu by the Dutch, from the
embankment of the route of Namur by the English, from the
houses of Quatre-Bras by the sharpshooters of Brunswick, and
cannonaded from the route of Brussels by the batteries of
Major Kulmann. Count de Valmy fell under his dead horse.
This was the signal for flight. It was in vain that he arose
and attempted to re-form his squadrons; the cuirassiers no
longer listened to his commands. They wheeled about, buried
their spurs in the flanks of their horses, and, in small groups,
in disorder, but still with threatening point, re-traversed under
a hail of balls the two lines of the enemy, bearing off as a trophy
the flag of the 69th English.
These horsemen, panic-stricken and retreating at
headlong speed, jostled and drew with them in their flight many
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 115
battalions of Foy's division and the brigade of Bauduin.
Bachelu, who had just begun his advance from Piraumont,
saw at a distance the rout and also arrested his movement.
Alone, the cavalry of Piré continued its charge against the
enemy. At a rapid gallop it hurled itself upon the battalions
of Kempt. The English squares, opposing their bayonets and
flanking fire to this cavalry, rendered unavailing its multiplied
charges.
At this moment Commandant Baudus, who had been sent by
the Emperor, joined Marshal Ney, who, having had two horses
killed under him, was standing on foot "at the most exposed
point." Baudus transmitted to him the words of Napoleon:
" It is absolutely necessary that the order given to Count d'Erlon
should be executed, regardless of the situation in which Marshal
Ney may find himself. I attach no great importance to what
is passing to-day where he is. The important affair is here,
where I am, because I wish to finish with the Prussian Army.
As for the Prince of the Moskowa, he must, if he can do no
better, confine himself to holding in check the English Army."
Ney, wild with rage, his face purple with passion, brandished
his sword like a madman. He hardly listened to the words of
Baudus, and cried that he had just sent to d'Erlon the order
to return to Frasnes. Baudus vainly attempted to get him
to rescind this order. The Marshal quitted him abruptly to
throw himself in the midst of his routed infantry. He quickly
rallied it and led it against the brigade of Pack, which was
advancing offensively.
From six until seven o'clock Wellington had received new
reinforcements - namely, the artillery of Brunswick, the
brigades of English Guards of Maitland and Byng, and the
Nassauers of Kruse. It was his turn to attack - to attack safely,
as he loved to do. Maitland and Byng entered the wood of
Bossu; Halkett and Pack, supported by the corps of Brunswick
and Nassau, marched on the right and left of the highway in the
direction of Gemioncourt; and the English and Hanoverians
of Kielmansegge converged on Piraumont. The French yielded
the conquered ground only foot by foot and under reiterated
attacks. More than an hour was necessary to drive Jérôme
from the wood of Bossu. Foy, driven from position to
position as far as Gemioncourt, held out for a long time around
this farm. Bachelu abandoned Piraumont only after a fierce
fight. Past eight o'clock a battalion of Maitland having
116 WATERLOO.
debouched from the southwest corner of the wood in order to
retake Pierrepont, the division battery of Foy stopped it
short by its fire; then the indefatigable lancers of Piré charged
it, threw it in disorder, and pursued it as far as Gemioncourt;
it escaped by re-entering the wood. At the same time the
cuirassiers overthrew the 7th Belgian Battalion to the northwest
of Pierrepont. Everywhere the piles of dead and wounded -
4,300 French and 4,700 Anglo-Netherlanders - testified to the
fury of the fight.
At nine o'clock, when the battle was lost, or rather had
terminated without result, for both armies had resumed the
positions which they had occupied in the morning, the 1st
Corps debouched from Frasnes.
Having been rejoined about six o'clock, at the distance of
a long cannon-shot from Saint-Amand, by General Delcambre,
d'Erlon had hesitated between the first instructions of the
Emperor and the imperative order of Ney. In spite of the advice
of Generals de Salle and Garbe, and to the intense indignation
of the soldiers, who saw the Prussians and burned to attack
them, he had finally determined upon a counter-march. "I
judged," said he, "that to recall me in spite of the will of
Napoleon the Marshal was in extreme peril." But d'Erlon did
not stop to think that, being within three kilometres of Fleurus
and at three leagues from Quatre-Bras, he would be able to
aid the Emperor very efficaciously, whilst he would be unable
to arrive in time to support Ney. As a matter of fact, when
he reached Frasnes, when it was quite dark, with his troops,
"indignant and humiliated at having done nothing on this
day," the Marshal no longer had need of them.
Count d'Erlon brought back but three divisions. The idea
having occurred to him at the beginning of the counter-march
that it was necessary to fill the gap existing between the right
and left wings, he had left Durutte in sight of Wagnelée with
the 4th Division of infantry and the cavalry of Jacquinot.
Durutte not having been able to obtain any definite instructions
from d'Erlon, save the recommendation to "act with extreme
prudence," advanced slowly between Villers-Perwin and
Wagnelée. To the northwest of this last point Jacquinot had a
slight engagement about eight o'clock with the cavalry of
General Marwitz, which covered the right of Blücher. A little
later Durutte turned back on Wagnelée, which he occupied
after having dislodged a feeble rear guard. These feints against
The Battle of Quatre-Bras. 117
the flank of the Prussians were not made in time nor were they
pushed far enough to annoy in any way whatsoever the
retreat of the vanquished army. At Wagnelée, however,
Durutte had plainly seen the Prussians retiring from Le Hameau
and la Haye on the heights of Brye. Impassive, he had
permitted them to defile within range of his guns. He was
paralysed by the instructions of d'Erlon, who had recommended
him to act with extreme prudence. One of Durutte's
brigadiers, General Brue, exasperated by this forced inaction,
exclaimed: "It is something unheard of for one to witness with
grounded arms the retreat of a beaten army, when everything
indicates that it would only be necessary to attack in order
to destroy it." "It is very fortunate," replied Durutte, "that
you are not responsible." "Would to God that were!"
answered Brue. "We would already be' fighting."
CHAPTER IV.
The Retreat of the Prussian Army.
I. - The first plans of Napoleon for the day of June 17th.
II. - The orders of the Emperor to Grouchy (between eleven and half-
past eleven o'clock).
III. - Retreat of the Prussian Army on Wavre.
IV. - Movements of Pajol and Exelmans towards Namur and Gembloux
in pursuit of the Prussian columns.
V. - March of the army of Grouchy. - Bivouac at Gembloux. - Letter
of Grouchy to the Emperor (ten o'clock in the evening).
I.
On the evening of the battle of Ligny the Emperor had
not deemed it prudent to pursue the enemy farther than the
line of Brye-Sombreffe. The Prussian Army, whose right and
left wings had retired in rather good order, and which
continued to occupy these two villages with detachment, still
seemed capable of offering a serious resistance. It was also
to be feared that a reserve corps debouching by the route of
Namur would arrive upon the scene. Finally Napoleon was
without news of his left wing. During the entire day the
Prince of the Moskowa had not written him a single despatch.
The Emperor had learned in an indirect way that there had
been a battle at Quatre-Bras. But had Marshal Ney been
victorious? The presumptions were rather that he had been
held in check, if not repulsed, since the orders prescribing a
movement in the rear of the Prussian Army had not been
executed. There were many reasons for not risking the chances
of a night pursuit.
The Emperor then contented himself with directing
Grouchy, who, in accordance with his instructions, had come
about eleven o'clock to Fleurus for orders, to cause the enemy
to be followed at early dawn by the cavalry corps of Pajol
and Exelmans.
About seven o'clock on the morning of June 17th Flahault
returned from Frasnes and informed the Emperor, who was
lunching, of the battle of Quatre-Bras. Almost at the same
time there was received at headquarters a despatch from Pajol,
118
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 119
dated Balâtre, at four o'clock in the morning, stating that he
was pursuing the enemy, who was in full retreat towards Liege
and Namur. Pajol added that he had already made many
prisoners.
Thus, between seven and eight o'clock at the latest, the
Emperor was informed regarding the movements of the
Prussians as well as the English. The first were retreating towards
Liege and Namur; the second still held their positions at
Quatre-Bras. But was this information sufficiently complete
and exact? Was it the main body of the Prussian Army, or an
isolated corps, that was retreating towards Namur?' Was it a
rear guard that occupied Quatre-Bras, or was it the entire army
of Wellington? Napoleon did not judge that he was well enough
informed to come to a decision. Grouchy had come for orders;
he told him to remain in order to accompany him upon the
battle-field of Ligny, whither he was preparing to go to visit
his troops. At the same time he caused Soult to write to Ney
as follows: ". . . The Emperor is going to the mill of
Brye, by which passes the main highway leading from Namur
to Quatre-Bras. It is then hardly possible that the English
Army will do anything in front of you, for if it attempted to
do anything, the Emperor would march against it by the route
of Quatre-Bras, whilst you would attack it in front, and this
army (English) would be instantly destroyed. So inform His
Majesty of what is passing in front of you. . . . His
Majesty's intention is that you will take position at Quatre-Bras;
but if this is impossible, you will inform him at once of every-
thing in detail, and the Emperor will go there, as I have told
you. If, on the contrary, there is only a rear guard there, you
will attack it and take up position there. To-day is needed to
terminate this operation and to supply ammunition, rally the
stragglers, and call in the detachments."
From this we see that the plans of the Emperor for the
day of the 17th were confined to the occupation of. Quatre-
Bras by Ney and the revictualling of the Army. Doubtless, if
Wellington should remain in his exposed position at Quatre-
Bras, he would profit by this fortunate chance to march against
the English and exterminate them; but he doubted very much
if his cautious adversary would commit such a fault. Ney
would dislodge without difficulty from Quatre-Bras the rear
guard, which still remained in that position, and the French
Army would remain inactive in its bivouacs during the
entire day.
120 WATERLOO.
There were better ways in which to employ the day after
a victory. So Napoleon did not long persist in the idea of
giving so much rest to his troops and such a respite to the
enemy. This was his intention at 8 o'clock, as is shown by
the letter of Soult to Marshal Ney; but at half-past eight,
before entering his carriage, he meditated other projects. He
sent to Lobau the order to send to the assistance of Pajol on
the route of Namur the infantry division of Teste with its
battery, and he caused to be directed on Quatre-Bras a cavalry
reconnaissance, to ascertain if the English still occupied in
force that position. He then quitted the Château of Fleurus,
thoroughly determined to return there no more. Already, in
the imperial entourage, it was said that the Prussians were to
be followed towards Namur and the English towards Brussels.
The Emperor, in fact, had conceived this double manoeuvre,
but he had not as yet determined upon its mode of execution.
He wished to obtain further information; he went to await it
upon the battle-field of the day before, in the midst of his
soldiers, to whom he knew that he could never show himself
too often.
A little before nine o'clock the Emperor entered his
carriage; but, unable to bear the severe jolting of his heavy berlin
over the furrows, he left it, "fatigued as he was," says Grouchy,
and mounted his horse. He traversed Ligny, Saint-Amand,
and the outskirts of La Haye. A great number of wounded
Prussians were still lying upon the ground pell-mell with the
dead. The Emperor spoke to them, ordered brandy and
money to be distributed to them, and gave the most positive
orders for them to be picked up at once and shown the same
attention as the French. A Prussian officer of rank lay, horribly
mutilated, on the very spot where he had fallen the day before.
The Emperor called a peasant who was standing at some steps
from him and said to him in a serious tone : "Do you believe
in hell?" The Belgian, terribly frightened, answered in the
affirmative. "Well, if you do not wish to go to hell, take care
of this wounded man whom I entrust to you; otherwise, God
will cause you to burn; He desires us to be charitable." "This
recommendation," concludes an eye-witness of this scene, "was
not useless, for the Belgians showed as much eagerness in
caring for our wounded as they manifested aversion in
succouring the Prussians, who had rendered themselves obnoxious."'
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 121
Arrived on a line with the mill of Bussy, the Emperor
passed along the front of the troops drawn up before their
bivouacs. He halted to congratulate the chiefs of the corps,
the officers, and soldiers. At sight of him these last broke
forth in resounding cheers that were heard at a distance of
more than three kilometres by General von Gröben, in
observation before Tilly. This tour finished, the Emperor
dismounted from his horse and conversed for quite a while with
Grouchy and many generals on the state of opinion in Paris,
the Legislative Corps, Fouche, and the Jacobins. Some of his
auditors admired the freedom of mind which he preserved in
such critical circumstances; others were a little uneasy at
seeing him lose time in talking politics and bewildering his
mind with subjects foreign to those which it seemed should
occupy him exclusively. Grouchy, however, dared not sound
the Emperor upon the operations planned for the day.
Already, on his departure from Fleurus, he had demanded some
orders of him, and Napoleon had sharply replied : "I will give
them to you when the time comes."
II.
The Emperor was not so absorbed with the plots of the
Liberals of the Chamber that he forgot the enemy. He had
received new information. It was at first a letter from Ney,
stating that the English, in position in front of Quatre-Bras,
held the wood of Bossu, Gemioncourt, Piraumont, and showed
eight regiments of infantry and two thousand horse. The
Emperor could not doubt that these masses were the first
line of Wellington, present with his army, and not a rear
guard. Soon after, between ten and eleven o'clock, the officer
commanding the reconnaissance sent towards Quatre-Bras
reported that the English still occupied that point, their left
covered by the cavalry with which he had had an engagement.
There also arrived some information regarding the retreat of
the Prussians. A despatch from Pajol stated that he had
captured, in front of Mazy, upon the route of Namur, eight guns and
numerous wagons; and a message from Exelmans made known
that he was marching with "his two divisions of dragoons and
his horse batteries on Gembloux, "where the enemy had
massed his forces."
It was nearly eleven o'clock. The Emperor finally took
his last dispositions. He ordered Lobau to send the 6th Corps
-9-
122 WATERLOO.
to Marbais, in order to second the attack of Marshal Ney
upon Quatre-Bras by out-flanking the English left. Drouot
received an order to follow this movement with all the Guard.
The Emperor then said to Marshal Grouchy: "While I am
marching against the English you will put yourself in pursuit
of the Prussians. You will have under your orders the corps
of Vandamme and Gérard, the division of Teste, and the cavalry
corps of Pajol, Exelmans, and Milhaud."
From the very first Grouchy felt the responsibility rather
than the honour of this mission. In the course of his long career
he had never exercised a great command. It was as a general
of cavalry that he had accomplished his fine feats of arms and
won his renown. He had the coup d'œil of the battle-field, the
lucid and prompt vision of weak points, the conception of
sudden and decisive movements; but he was the man of a
single hour, a single manoeuvre, a single effort; he was a
tactician, but a tactician momentary, local and special, and not
made for the conduct and the responsibilities of strategical
operations. To make matters worse, he was conscious of his
inferiority as commander of an army acting independently.
This sentiment was soon to paralyse him. Besides, he knew
or suspected that Gérard and Vandamme especially, with
whose intractable character he was acquainted, were displeased
at being put under his orders. What authority could he have
over some lieutenants who lacked confidence in him? But, as
a marshal of France, Grouchy could not, nor even did he wish,
through respect for himself, to decline the mission from which
he augured already nothing but difficulty and danger. A
refusal was at the bottom of his mind; he dared not formulate it.
If, as he pretends, he observed to the Emperor that it
would be very difficult to discover in what direction the
Prussians had gone and to baffle their designs, since they had begun
their retreat in the night or at break of day. Napoleon could
not have failed to reply to him something like the following:
"Pajol has been in pursuit of the enemy since three o'clock;
he has taken from him, on the Namur route, since five o'clock,
men, baggage, and guns. Exelmans, who has followed a
Prussian corps now massed at Gembloux, has certainly, by this
time, regained contact with the enemy. Then, if Blücher's
heads of columns have eight or ten hours the start of you, your
cavalry is in close pursuit of his rear guard." It is even
possible that the Emperor may have added, as Grouchy affirms:
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 123
"All the probabilities lead me to believe that it is upon the
Meuse that Blücher is effecting his retreat. So you will direct
yourself on that side." The reports from Pajol and Exelmans
seemed, in fact, to confirm the assumption that, in
accordance with the principles of strategy, the Prussians were
withdrawing upon their base of operations.
Grouchy having departed in order to issue his orders, the
Emperor decided that it would be better to have more cavalry
with the principal fraction of the army. He determined to
retake from his lieutenant Demon's division of Vandamme's
corps and Milhaud's corps of cuirassiers. In the absence of
the Major-General, still at Fleurus, he dictated to Bertrand an
order for Grouchy, enjoining the latter to direct without delay
on Marbais these three divisions of cavalry.
A few minutes after (probably between 11:30 and 11:45
A. M.) the Emperor thought it best to develop and explain
more fully in writing the verbal instructions which he had
just given to Marshal Grouchy. Soult had not yet arrived.
Bertrand again took the pen and wrote under the Emperor's
dictation :
"Go to Gembloux with the cavalry corps of Pajol and
Exelmans, the light cavalry of the 4th Corps, the division
of Teste, and the 3rd and 4th Corps of infantry. You will
reconnoitre in the direction of Namur and Maëstricht, and you
will pursue the enemy. Explore his march and inform me of
his movements, in order that I may be able to penetrate what
he intends doing."
"I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre-Bras, where
the English still were this morning. Our communications
then will be direct by the paved route of Namur. If the enemy
has evacuated Namur, you will write to the general
commanding the 2d Military Division at Charlemont to cause that
town to be occupied by some battalions of the National Guard."
"It is important to discover what Blücher and Wellington
are intending to do; whether they propose to unite their armies
in order to cover Brussels and Liege, in trying the fate of
another battle. In all cases keep constantly your two corps
of infantry united in a league of ground, having many avenues
of retreat. Post intermediate detachments of cavalry, so as
to be able to communicate with headquarters."
According to this letter, Marshal Grouchy was, first, to
concentrate all his forces at' Gembloux, an intermediate point
124 Waterloo
between Namur, Liege, and Wavre; second, to explore all the
country in the direction of Namur and Maëstricht, directions
which it was probable, but not certain, that the enemy was
following in his retreat; third, to put himself on the traces of the
Prussians and penetrate their designs in pursuing them; and
fourth, to know whether Blücher's object was to unite with the
English. Doubtless the Emperor did not trace for his
lieutenant, as he might have done, the conduct to be followed under
all circumstances; but he could not doubt that Grouchy, who
by his very position upon the flank of the Army, was
manifestly destined to cover it against an offensive return of the
enemy, would manoeuvre so as to interpose himself between
the Army and the Prussians.
Napoleon had provided for Blücher. There remained
Wellington. He ordered Soult, who had just rejoined the
Imperial Staff, to write to Ney that he must attack the English
at once and that he (Napoleon) would second him. It was
noon. By this time the heads of columns had no doubt reached
Marbais. The Emperor mounted his horse and took the road
to Quatre-Bras, whither the soldiers of Lobau, all the Guard,
the divisions of Domon and Subervie, and the cuirassiers of
Milhaud were on the march, eager for the fray.
III.
Napoleon, Soult, Grouchy, and all the staff thought the
Prussians were retreating towards the Meuse; it was in the
direction of the Dyle that they were falling back. On the day
before, at night, whilst their troops were rallying between the
route of Namur and the Roman road, Ziethen, Pirch I., and
other generals, no longer receiving any orders, hastened to
Brye, where they expected to find Blücher. At this moment
the dragoons, who had picked up Blücher from the battle-field,
bore him all bruised from his fall and in a half-swoon into a
cottage of Mellery. His staff was without news of him; it was
ignorant if he were a prisoner or free, dead or living.
Consternation reigned supreme; every eye was fixed with
expectancy on Gneissenau, to whom, in Blücher's absence, belonged
the command by reason of his seniority of rank. What course
would he take? Would he abandon his lines of communication
with Namur to try once more to unite with the English by a
parallel march, or, in order to fall back on his base of operations.
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 125
would he leave Wellington alone against the French Army
and overturn the plan of campaign decided upon for two
months? Gneissenau sat his horse in the middle of the road
which joins to the north of Brye the route of Namur; by the
light of the moon he consulted with difficulty his map. After
a short examination, he cried: "Retreat on Tilly and Wavre."
Some days later Wellington wrote emphatically to the
King of the Low Countries: "It was the decisive moment of
the century." Likewise the German military historians have
exalted the retreat on Wavre as the equal of the finest
strategical conceptions. We think this is putting it a little
extravagantly, to say the least. This determination marks in
Gneissenau firmness in reverses and an understanding of the
necessities of war; but when he ordered this movement, he certainly
did not foresee the immense consequences that were to result
from it. At that time he had no intention of rejoining the
English Army in order to cover Brussels. If he thought that
at Wavre the Prussians would again find themselves in the
same sphere of operations with the English, he had no assurance
that such would be the case, as it was dependent upon the line
of retreat that would be chosen by Wellington and upon other
eventualities. At all events, he did not count on resuming
the offensive thirty-six hours after his defeat. It was especially
as a temporary position, as a point of concentration, that he
indicated Wavre, whose defence was rendered easy on account
of the River Dyle. The movement was not as audacious as
the Germans have pretended. If Gneissenau abandoned his
lines of communication with Namur and Liege, it was to open
new ones, by way of Tirlemont and Louvain, with
Maëstricht, Cologne, Wesel, Munster, and Aix-la-Chapelle. On the
morning of June 17th couriers had been sent to these places
to collect munitions, and the order had been sent to Liege to
direct the siege park on Maëstricht. Gneissenau had then not
"broken the bridges behind him," as General von Ollech says,
or rather, he had broken them, but with the certainty of
establishing others the next day.
The corps of Ziethen and Pirch I. bivouacked between
Tilly, Mellery, and Gentinnes; three battalions of Jagow
remained at Brye as an outpost under the command of Quarter-
master-General Grolemann. Notice of the retreat on Wavre
was sent to Thielmann, who had withdrawn his troops to the
north of Sombreffe, though continuing to occupy this position
126 WATERLOO.
by a strong detachment, and to Bülow, who, knowing already
that the battle was lost, had halted his army corps upon the
Roman road with his advance guard at Baudeset. On arriving
at Mellery, Gneissenau had there found Blücher. He was
stretched upon some straw in a remote cottage, taking from
time to time a few swallows of milk.
At dawn on the 17th all the army decamped. The corps
of Ziethen and Pirch, which had just rallied the three battalions
of the outpost at Brye, marched on Wavre by way of Gentinnes,
Villeroux, and Mont Saint-Guibert; Colonel Sohr was left
temporarily behind Tilly with two regiments of cavalry. Having
arrived before Wavre between eleven o'clock and noon, Ziethen
passed with his troops upon the left bank of the Dyle and
established them in Bierges and environs. Pirch halted his corps
upon the right bank; it bivouacked between Aisemont and
Saint-Anne.
From Sombreffe, Thielmann had at first advanced to
Gembloux; judging his troops to be very much fatigued, he
took position a little beyond this village and, very imprudently,
remained motionless from seven in the morning until two in
the afternoon. He finally resumed his march, passed through
Corbaix, crossed only at eight o'clock the bridge of Wavre, and
camped at La Bavette (a half-league to the north of Wavre).
The cavalry of Lottum and the division of Borcke, which
formed the rear guard of this corps, did not even arrive in
sight of Wavre until long past midnight; they were forced to
bivouac upon the right bank of the Dyle.
Bülow, whose troops were in column upon the Roman
road, had orders to establish himself at Dion-le-Mont (a league
to the southwest of Wavre). He marched so slowly that at
ten in the evening his movement was unfinished.
IV.
The retreat of the Prussian outpost established at Brye,
and consequently those of the corps of Pirch and Ziethen,
escaped absolutely the notice of the French videttes in
position in front of the mill of Bussy. During the entire morning
the cavalry posts made no movement, not a reconnaissance,
not a patrol. On the French right, towards Tongrinne, the
hussars of Pajol showed more vigilance. At half-past two in
the morning they warned their general that the enemy was
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 127
abandoning his positions. Pajol at once ordered to mount
the two regiments which he had under his immediate
command, and launched himself in pursuit of the Prussians along
the route of Namur. Unfortunately, this was a false direction.
He believed himself to be on the traces of Thielmann's corps,
when it was only a few stragglers, a convoy, and a stray battery
that he was following. Beyond Mazy, about five or six o'clock
in the morning, he overtook this column, sabred a squadron of
the 7th Uhlans which had joined it, and captured the guns and
wagons. He pushed no farther than Les Isnes on the route
of Namur, no longer seeing anything in front of him. Very
uncertain as to what he ought to do, he sent reconnaissances
in different directions, and halted in person at the point where
the road of Saint-Denis crosses the main highway. At twelve
o'clock, informed by false reports that the enemy was not
retreating on Namur, but on Saint-Denis and Liege - or, in other
words, on Louvain - he directed himself on that side. Thanks
to the arrival of the 1st Hussars, which had rejoined about nine
o'clock, and the division of Teste, which had just been sent
him by the Emperor, his forces then amounted to three
regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and two batteries.
Berton's brigade of dragoons of Exelmans' corps had put
itself in motion soon after the rear guard of Thielmann had
evacuated Sombreffe. But instead of entering this village
and taking the route of Gembloux, Berton followed Pajol
along the route of Namur. However, he did not cross the
stream of Omeau, as some peasants had informed him that
the Prussian Army was retreating by way of Gembloux and
that there were still a great many troops in that village.
Berton hastened to transmit this information to General
Exelmans, and awaited further instructions. He ought to have
also communicated it to Pajol, who was fifteen hundred yards
in front of him. The order to advance on Gembloux soon
reached Berton. He resumed his march, and arrived in front
of the village at nine o'clock. Some Prussian videttes were
posted on the left bank of the Omeau; and beyond Gembloux
masses of the enemy were discovered taking their rest.
Exelmans soon rejoined Berton, bringing with him his
three other brigades of cavalry. He rather judiciously
estimated at 20,000 men the Prussians bivouacked behind
Gembloux. Exelmans had 3,000 dragoons and two horse batteries;
and Pajol was six kilometres to the right with 1,400 hussars.
128 WATERLOO.
3,000 infantry, and two batteries. Exelmans did not think to
inform him that the Prussians occupied Gembloux -
information which would have saved his comrade an eccentric march
of twenty kilometres (going and returning) in the direction of
Leuze. He made no demonstration to compel the Prussians
to unmask their designs. He did not fire a cannon-shot at
these masses, not even a musket-shot at the videttes. He
limited himself to observing the enemy - very heedlessly, as we
shall see farther on. Finally, with a negligence truly
unpardonable, he neglected to inform at once Grouchy or the
Emperor that he was in touch with one of Blücher's corps.
In spite of these faults, affairs were not seriously
compromised. At noon, at the moment when the Emperor
reiterated in writing to Grouchy the order to pursue the
Prussians, their army was divided. The corps of Ziethen and Pirch
were concentrated at Wavre, the corps of Bülow on the march
from Baudeset had not yet passed Walhain, and the corps of
Thielmann had halted near Gembloux, within cannon-range
of Exelmans. The negligence of the French videttes, the
carelessness of the officers commanding the outposts, the time
lost in the morning, and the false indications of the Prussian
line of retreat, all could have yet been repaired if Exelmans
had been vigilant and active and if Grouchy had thoroughly
understood his mission.
V.
On quitting the Emperor, about half-past eleven o'clock,
near the mill of Bussy, Grouchy sent by Colonel de
Blocqueville the order to General Vandamme, at Saint-Amand, to
advance quickly with the 3rd Corps to Point du Jour, at the
intersection of the roads of Namur and Gembloux. At the same
time he despatched to Exelmans, towards Gembloux, another
aide-de-camp, Captain Bella, to obtain information. He then
went to Ligny, wishing to give in person his instructions to
Gérard. On his way there he met Marshal Soult, who was on
his way to rejoin the Imperial Staff. He had with Soult a short
interview, which bore only upon the divisions of cavalry which,
according to the first order of Bertrand, which he had just
received, he was to detach from his army and direct on Marbais.
When he had departed, Soult said to one of his aides-de-camp :
"It is a fault to divert so large a force from the army which
is marching against the English. In the state in which their
Retreat of the Prussian Army 129
defeat has put the Prussians, a feeble corps of infantry, with the
cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans, would suffice to follow and
observe them." Soult, who, moreover, was deceived as to the
disorder of the Prussian Army, blamed the too great strength
of the detachment placed under the orders of Grouchy, but he
did not criticise the direction given to the pursuit of the enemy.
At Ligny, Grouchy found Gérard in a bad humour. He
was, it appears, greatly vexed at not receiving the Marshal's
baton after the battle, and doubtless, somewhat dissatisfied at
seeing himself detached under the orders of Grouchy. In
conformity with the second despatch of Bertrand, which had
reached him, the Marshal ordered Gérard to follow the 3rd Corps
to Gembloux. It does not appear, whatever Grouchy may say,
that the irritation of Gérard had led the latter to defer with a
bad intention the movement prescribed. Before he could put
his troops on the march, he was forced to wait until the entire
corps of Vandamme had finished defiling. Now, the defile of
an army corps of three divisions of infantry, with artillery,
engineers, and train, lasted at least an hour at this time, when
the distance between the divers elements of the column was
less, however, than it is to-day. If there was any delay in the
departure of the 4th Corps, the fault must be attributed to
Grouchy himself. As the 3rd and 4th Corps were to follow the
same route, and as the corps of Vandamme was at Saint-
Amand, 2,000 yards, as the crow flies, to the left of Ligny,
where the corps of Gérard was stationed, it was Gérard, and not
Vandamme, that Grouchy should have first put on the march.
In this way more than an hour would have been gained. It
has been said that Grouchy wished to spare the self-love
of Vandamme, whose ill-nature he feared. A fine reason!
Grouchy must have, indeed, felt himself invested with but
little authority! On the day before and the one previous to
that, on the left wing, the 2nd Corps had formed the head of
column instead of the 1st Corps; and in the Guard it was
customary to march with the left in advance, without the
grenadiers feeling humiliated.
The corps of Vandamme marched with incredible
slowness. From Saint-Amand to Point du Jour, by way of Ligny
and Sombreffe, it is nearly four miles. Now the advance of the
3rd Corps, which had decamped from Saint-Amand before noon,
did not reach Point de Jour until three o'clock. It had then
marched at the rate of two kilometres per hour.
130 WATERLOO.
Grouchy arrived at Point du Jour almost at the same time
as the advance of Vandamme. What he had done since
quitting Gérard at Ligny, scarcely a league distant from Point du
Jour, can not be explained. At all events, he had not thought
to send a few squadrons on a reconnaissance in the direction of
Gentinnes. Yet the Emperor had said to him : "It is for you
to discover the direction taken by the enemy."
The aide-de-camp Bella, on returning from his mission
to Exelmans, rejoined Grouchy either at Point du Jour or
Sombreffe. Exelmans had given him at Gembloux, between
one and two o'clock, a letter for the Marshal, stating that he was
in touch with the enemy's army, massed upon the left bank of
the Orneau, and that he would follow the Prussians as soon as
they would put themselves on the march. It was necessary to
hasten to profit by this important information. Grouchy,
who was an excellent handler of cavalry, ought to have hastened
at full speed to Gembloux, to see with his own eyes what was
going on and to direct in person the movements of the four
brigades of dragoons. He contented himself with proceeding
there at a snail's pace with the entire corps of Vandamme,
which was followed by that of Gérard. The troops continued
to march very slowly. It is seven kilometres from Point du
Jour to Gembloux. Vandamme did not arrive there till seven
o'clock, and Gérard at nine. Notwithstanding the dilatory
march of these corps, they would have been able to reach
Gembloux two hours earlier and simultaneously if Grouchy had
ordered them to move on this village in two columns. Gérard
would have taken the road to Point du Jour and Vandamme
would have gained the Roman, road above Sombreffe.
The corps of Thielmann had been gone for some time, and
Exelmans, whose videttes were separated from those of the
enemy only by the stream of the Orneau, had permitted the
Prussians to march away on his left without discovering their
retreat in time. Thielmann had struck camp to the north of
Gembloux at eight o'clock; Exelmans did not enter the village
with the dragoons until three. The Prussians were still close
by, and he might have yet discovered their traces lost by his
fault. But he knew not how to repair his very culpable lack
of vigilance. Instead of pushing some parties in every
direction and of following with the main body of his cavalry the one
which would have again found the traces of the enemy, he went
simply to take position at Sauvenierre, a short league to the
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 131
north of Gembloux, satisfied with having captured near there
a park of four hundred beeves.
During this afternoon Grouchy had shown Little activity.
He put off until the next day the pursuit of the Prussians.
The corps of Vandamme had made only thirteen kilometres
and that of Gérard hardly ten. Now, although there were still
nearly two hours of daylight, Grouchy halted his troops. He
ordered the infantry of Vandamme to bivouac around
Gembloux and that of Gérard in the rear of that village. The
Marshal has alleged as an excuse the bad condition of the roads
and the rain, which fell in torrents. But on the side of Wavre
and Dion-le-Mont the roads were no better, and the Prussians
marched under the beating rain.
Exelmans, however, had determined about six o'clock to
send the brigade of Bonnemains on a reconnaissance to Sart-á-
Walhain and the 15th Dragoons to Perwez. Bonnemains went
beyond Sart-a-Walhain, and threw out some detachments
towards Nil Saint-Vincent and Tourinnes. This last village was
still occupied by a Prussian rear guard. After having
observed for nearly an hour this infantry, which made no
movement, the dragoons fell back and established themselves in
bivouac at Emage. There, about ten o'clock, a peasant
informed Bonnemains that the enemy had evacuated Tourinnes,
and was marching in the direction of Wavre. Bonnemains
reported this information. On returning from Perwez, the
colonel of the 15th Dragoons also reported that the Prussian
troops were retreating on Wavre.
These reports did not reach Grouchy until late at night.
But since six o'clock he knew by a letter from Pajol that the
hostile column, which at first seemed to be directing itself on
Namur, had marched towards Louvain; and between seven
and eight o'clock he had himself gathered at Gembloux
important information. If these reports did not all agree - if,
according to some, the Prussians were marching by Perwez on
Liege and Maëstricht - according to the greater part, they were
directing themselves on Wavre, in order to unite with
Wellington towards Brussels.
From the despatch of Pajol, together with the information
given by the inhabitants of Gembloux, it was evident that,
in the first place, the enemy was not retreating on Namur, as
had been believed in the morning; in the second place, that he
was marching either on Louvain, Maëstricht, or Liege, or on
132 WATERLOO.
Wavre, but far more probably on this last point, with the
design of uniting with the English Army.
Under these circumstances, it was necessary, by all means,
to proceed towards Wavre, for if the Prussians were falling
back towards Liege, Maëstricht, or Louvain, they would put
themselves outside of the sphere of operations for at least
two days; whilst, if they rallied at Wavre with the view of a
junction with Wellington's army, there was imminent danger
for the Emperor. Then Grouchy ought to and could have,
since eight o'clock in the evening, sent the cavalry of Exelmans
to Walhain and Sart-á-Walhain, the corps of Vandamme to
Ernage, and that of Gérard to Saint-Géry. Not only by this
movement would he have established his army on the same
evening at a league nearer Wavre, but by immediately causing
the 4th Corps to double upon the 3rd in order to send it to
Saint-Géry, he would have given himself the faculty of
marching the next day, without loss of time, in two parallel columns.
Besides, at Saint-Géry the 4th Corps would have found itself
well placed to gain rapidly Mont Saint-Guibert and the bridges
of Mousty and Ottignies, if Grouchy at sunrise had believed
it necessary to move on Wavre by the left bank of the Dyle.
Grouchy did not understand that Wavre was his
immediate objective, and that he ought to sacrifice the doubtful
hope of overtaking the Prussians, if they were retreating
towards Liege, to the necessity of covering the flank of the
Imperial Army, if they manoeuvred to unite with the English.
At ten in the evening he wrote to the Emperor : ". . . It
appears, according to all the reports, that, having arrived at
Sauvenierre, the Prussians have divided themselves into two
columns; one has taken the route to Wavre, and the other
appears to be directing itself on Perwez. One may perhaps
infer from this that a portion are going to join Wellington, and
that the centre, which is Blücher's army, is retiring on Liege,
while another column with artillery is making its retreat on
Namur. General Exelmans has orders to push this evening
six squadrons on Sart-á-Walhain and three squadrons on
Perwez. According to their reports, if the main body of the
Prussians is retiring on Wavre, I shall pursue them in that
direction, in order that they may not be able to reach Brussels,
and to separate them from Wellington. If, on the contrary,
my information proves that the principal Prussian force has
Retreat of the Prussian Army. 133
marched on Perwez, I shall direct myself by way of that town
in pursuit of the enemy."
Although Grouchy says in this letter that he was preparing,
according to the news of the night, to march either on Wavre
or towards Liege, he took no measure in view of the first of
these movements. His orders for the next day - orders to
Exelmans and Vandamme to march on Sart-a-Walhain; order
to Pajol to direct himself from Mazy on Grand Leez; order to
Gérard to follow the 3rd Corps to Sart-a-Walhain and to send
his cavalry to Grand Leez, "the enemy retiring on Perwez" -
testify that, forgetting Wellington and neglecting Wavre, it
was in the direction of Liege that he persisted in seeking the
enemy
CHAPTER V.
The Retreat of the English Army.
I. - Exchange of despatches between Blücher and Wellington (morning
of June 17th). - Retreat of the English Army (ten o'clock).
II. - Arrival of Napoleon at Quatre-Bras, still occupied by the English
cavalry (two o'clock).
III. - Vigorous pursuit of the English rear guard by Napoleon in person
- Combat of Genappe. - Cannonade of Mont Saint-Jean (seven
o'clock).
IV. - The night bivouac.
V. - Uncertainties of Napoleon. - Letter from Blücher to Wellington.
- Orders of Napoleon (night of June 17th-18th).
I.
On the side of Quatre-Bras, French and English remained
motionless in their positions during the morning of June 17th.
Ney did not learn the result of the battle of Ligny till after
nine o'clock. As for Wellington, he had remained all night
without hearing from his allies. The last message which he
had received from Blücher, on the day before, stated that the
Field Marshal had resumed the offensive and "that all was
well." A little later Gneissenau had, indeed, despatched an
officer to inform him of the retreat; but this officer, severely
wounded en route by French sharpshooters, had not been able
to carry out his mission. Wellington thought that the battle,
which had been indecisive, would be renewed the next day
all along the line. Therefore he ordered his troops to bivouac
at Quatre-Bras and summoned there reinforcements. The
cavalry of Lord Uxbridge arrived in the evening and during
the night; and on the morning of the 17th the brigade of
Ompteda, the divisions of Clinton and Colville, and the reserve
artillery put themselves on the march to rejoin. Wellington,
who had gone to Genappe to sleep, returned early in the
morning to Quatre-Bras. Anxious to hear from Blücher, for it
had been reported at Genappe that the Prussians had met with
defeat, he sent towards his left his aide-camp. Colonel Gordon,
with a detachment of the 10th Hussars. Gordon, avoiding
the French videttes at Marbais, pushed as far as Tilly, where
134
Retreat of the English Army. 135
he had the good fortune to find still General Ziethen with the
rear guard of the 1st Corps. He learned from the General that
the Prussian Army was retreating on Wavre. On returning to
Quatre-Bras at half-past seven o'clock, he transmitted this
information to Wellington, who, in order to deceive his
impatience, was walking with long strides along the road of
Charleroi in front of Quatre-Bras.
Affairs assumed a different aspect. Wellington could no
longer remain at Quatre-Bras, exposed to a combined attack
from Ney in front and from Napoleon on his left. At first,
somewhat troubled, he thought of retreating at once. "Old
Blücher," said he, "has received a good mauling, and
has fallen back eighteen miles in the rear. As he has fallen
back, we must fall back also. I suppose they will say in
England that we have been thrashed "Muffling
observed to him that the situation did not appear so serious.
"The Prussian Army," said he, "having marched on Wavre,
you can easily put yourself again in the same sphere of
operations with it. You can fall back on some point on a line with
Wavre; there you will obtain news of the Field Marshal,
information regarding the state of his troops, and you will be
able to come to a decision as to what is best to be done under
the circumstances."
Wellington determined to go to occupy the plateau of
Mont Saint-Jean, a strong defensive position, which he had
reconnoitred the preceding year at the time of his passage
through Brussels. But should he decamp at once, or should
he wait until his troops had breakfasted, at the risk of having
a warm rear-guard affair? There was from time to time some
firing at the advance posts, but the troops of Ney made no
movement. "I know the French," said Muffling. "They will
not attack before having made their soup." Wellington
decided that the retreat should commence only at ten o'clock.
He sent to Lord Hill the order to fall back to Waterloo with
the divisions on the march for Quatre-Bras. Then, after
having read his paper, which had just been brought him from
Brussels, he enveloped himself in his cloak and stretched
himself upon the ground to sleep. On awakening, about nine
o'clock, he threw a glance at the French positions. Seeing that
Ney made no preparations for an attack, he said: "Are the
French retiring? It is not at all improbable."
136 WATERLOO.
At this moment a Prussian officer, Lieutenant Massow,
arrived from Mellery. He had been sent by Gneissenau to
inform Wellington of the proposed concentration of all the
Prussian Army at Wavre, and to ask him what he intended
to do. The Duke replied in presence of Muffling: "I am
going to establish myself at Mont Saint-Jean. I shall await
Napoleon there in order to deliver battle to him, if I have the
assurance of being supported, even by a single Prussian corps.
But if this support can not be rendered me, I shall be forced to
sacrifice Brussels and take up a position behind the Escault."
Massow left immediately to return to the Prussian
headquarters.
The English began their movement. The divisions of
Cook and Picton, the Dutch-Belgians of Perponcher, the
division of Alten, and finally the corps of Brunswick, marched
successively by the route of Brussels. The numerous
squadrons of Lord Uxbridge were deployed in the second line, so as
to mask and then to cover this retreat. At one o'clock this
corps of cavalry alone remained in position. Ney giving Lord
Uxbridge plenty of leisure, the latter seated himself with his
aide-de-camp upon the edge of the road. Uxbridge having
remarked that the French would soon attack, the aide-de-camp
replied, laughing: "They are eating." A short time after
this Uxbridge was informed that large masses of troops were to
be seen on the march towards the left. The imperial advance
guard was approaching by the route of Namur.
II.
From the mill of Bussy, near Ligny, the Emperor, with
the light cavalry of Domon and the cuirassiers of Milhaud,
had repaired to Marbais, whither he had previously directed
the corps of Lobau, the cavalry division of Subervie, and the
Guard. Having arrived there a little before one, he halted a
short time, awaiting news from Ney, or the noise of cannon.
Impatient, he determined to march in person on Quatre-Bras.
At nearly a league from this point the scouts of the 7th
Hussars, who reconnoitred the Army, fell back before the English
videttes. The Emperor arrayed his troops in line of battle,
with the artillery in the centre, the infantry in the second line,
the cuirassiers on the right, and the light cavalry of Domon,
Subervie, and Jacquinot on the left. At the same time he
Retreat of the English Army. 137
detached towards Frasnes, in order to communicate with Ney,
the 7th Hussars, who, mistaking for the English the red lancers
of the Guard, posted on the extreme right of the Marshal's
position, opened fire upon them.
The scouts had made prisoner an English vivandiere. On
being brought before the Emperor, she told him that the
only troops at Quatre-Bras were the cavalry of Lord
Uxbridge, charged with the duty of covering the retreat of
the English Army. As for the French who had fought the day
before, she knew nothing of them; she believed that they had
passed the Sambre. Greatly vexed that Wellington should
escape from his clutches, the Emperor wished at least to give
a good account of the fine English cavalry. The cuirassiers,
the chasseurs, the lancers, and the horse-batteries moved
forward at a rapid trot. The Emperor, in his impatient haste,
outstripped them with the squadrons of his escort.
Lord Uxbridge, at first notice of the approach of the
French, had hastened to the route of Namur. He there found
Wellington. The French were still a great way off, and only
the reflection of the sun upon burnished steel could be seen.
"They are bayonets," said Wellington. But, having taken
General Vivian's field-glass, he recognized the cuirassiers.
After having exchanged a few words with Lord Uxbridge, he
decided to retreat. He charged Uxbridge with the command
of the rear guard and departed. Whilst the brigades of
English dragoons followed by the route of Brussels, the hussars of
Vivian and Grant deployed perpendicular to the route of
Namur, with the horse batteries in position along their front.
It was a little more than two o'clock. Great black clouds,
driven by a furious wind, accumulated overhead. The tempest
coming from the northwest, Quatre-Bras was already shrouded
in darkness, whilst on the side of Marbais the weather
remained clear. Lord Uxbridge was on horseback near the light
battery of Captain Mercer, whose guns enfiladed the route of
Namur. Suddenly there was seen, issuing from a fold of the
ground, a horseman, followed by a small escort. His face,
body, and horse, lighted up in reverse, appeared black as night
- a statue of bronze, standing out from a luminous background,
through which pierced the rays of the sun. From the
silhouette Lord Uxbridge recognized Napoleon. "Fire!" cried
he, "and aim well." The cannon roared. The Emperor
ordered a horse battery of the Guard to advance. The English
-10-
138 WATERLOO.
judging the danger too great in continuing this duel of artillery,
limbered up their pieces. The horsemen of Jacquinot and
Subervie rushed forward. English hussars and cannoneers
fled in confusion in the midst of blinding flashes and under
the torrential rain which had commenced to fall. "It seemed,"
said Mercer, "that the first cannon-shots had rent asunder
the clouds."
Marshal Ney had given no sign of life. The Emperor sent
some orders direct to the commanders of the army corps in
position in front of Frasnes. D'Erlon appeared finally with
the advance guard of his infantry. To the reproaches that
were addressed to him by the Emperor for having arrested the
day before his movement against the Prussian right, he replied
that, being under the direct command of Marshal Ney, he had
been forced to obey the orders of his immediate chief. The
Emperor judged that time was too valuable to be lost In
discussion; he ordered Count d'Erlon, with the 1st Corps, to
follow the cavalry immediately along the route of Brussels.
Soon after this Ney arrived. In. his letter of eight o'clock
Napoleon had already expressed his dissatisfaction that he
had, on the day before, manoeuvred so unskilfully. He did
not return again to this subject; but he manifested very
plainly his surprise at the non-execution of the orders that
he had sent him the same morning, touching the occupation of
Quatre-Bras. Ney excused himself by saying that he still
believed that he had in front of him the entire army of
Wellington. At least the Marshal ought to have assured himself
if such were the case by a vigorous offensive reconnaissance.
Now, he had not even pushed a single squadron beyond his
lines. He had shown himself as negligent, as careless, and as
apathetic as on the morning of the 16th and evening of the 17th.
Marshal Ney, in truth, had remained all night, through
the carelessness of the Major-General, in ignorance of the
Victory of Ligny. He would have been able to take the
offensive only after having received the order of eight o'clock.
Furthermore, this order was conditional. Had Ney even,
attacked then, it is probable that the English would have none
the less effected their retreat without disorder, thanks to their
numerous cavalry. They would have only put themselves in
motion an hour earlier, and Ney would have occupied Quatre-
Bras at noon - a sterile result. However, there would have
been a chance that Wellington, vigorously assailed, would
Retreat of the English Army. 139
have determined to fight upon his positions. But Marshal
Ney had done nothing to provoke this combat. The Emperor
blamed him for this. Furthermore, he no doubt reproached
himself for not having sent, at seven in the morning, from.
Ligny to Quatre-Bras, the Guard and Lobau's corps. He had
thus permitted to escape the opportunity of exterminating the
English Army. Wellington, most of whose troops were in
position, his line of retreat on Genappe compromised, and
attacked in front by Ney, would have been forced to accept a
battle, virtually lost in advance.
While speaking to Ney at Quatre-Bras, the Emperor had a
vision of this lost victory. He wished to re-seize it. He
imagined that, by hastening his march, he might yet overtake
Wellington and compel him to fight. He ordered Reille, then
Lobau, and finally the Guard, to follow rapidly the 1st Corps
and the light cavalry along the route of Brussels; they would
be flanked on the right by the chasseurs of Domon and the
cuirassiers. Himself, with the squadrons of his escort, and a
horse battery of the Guard, gained at a gallop the head of the
column, in order to render the pursuit more impetuous.
III.
"This pursuit," says Captain Mercer, "was conducted
with the speed of a fox-chase." The English rear guard fled
in the greatest disorder - hussars and cannoneers galloped pell-
mell, going like mad, blinded by the lightning-flashes and
lashed by the rain, which fell in such torrents that it was
impossible to distinguish the colour of the uniforms. Lord
Uxbridge performed the duties of a cornet of horse. He hastened
along the column, crying to his men: "Faster! Faster, for
God's sake! Gallop, or you will all be captured." The lancers
of Alphonse de Colbert clung sometimes so closely to the
English hussars that, amidst the noise of the horses and the thunder,
their peals of laughter and insults reached the fugitives.
Some of the English passed the Dyle over the bridge of
Genappe, others over a bridge above this village, and a few at a
ford. To the north of Genapppe there rises at a gentle incline
a range of hills. In order to delay a little the impetuosity of
the pursuit, Lord Uxbridge established half-way up the ascent,
in two lines, the greater part of his cavalry and two batteries.
When the 1st Lancers debouched from the village, in pursuit
140 WATERLOO.
of Vivian's brigade, it was saluted by a volley of grape, then
charged by turns by the 7th English Hussars and the 1st
Regiment of Life Guards. The lancers broke without difficulty
the hussars; but they were driven back into Genappe by the
Guards, who penetrated into the village with them. Uxbridge
led this charge in person. In the narrow and winding street
which formed at that time almost all of the village there took
place a body-to-body combat, in which the lancers lost all the
advantage of their long weapons. In the midst of Genappe,
the 2nd Lancers, debouching in companies of fours from a
transversal street, fell upon the Guards and threw them back
far beyond the first houses. On the route of Brussels, the
English were again charged by the hussars of Marbot, who had
turned the village by the right. Thrown into disorder, they
regained the heights under the protection of their artillery.
At this moment the Emperor issued from Genappe with
the squadrons of his escort and a horse battery. Mounted upon
"Desirée," a very swift white mare, he had galloped from
Quatre-Bras to rejoin the advance guard. His grey surtout,
made of very thin material - a sort of duster - was penetrated
by the rain. The water streamed over his boots. The clasps
of his hat were broken by the violence of the rain and the
corners had fallen down in front and behind - he found himself
coifed like Basil in the "Barber of Seville." He superintended
in person the placing of the guns in battery, crying to the
gunners in accents of rage and hatred : "Fire! They are
English!"
In the street of Genappe, Colonel Sourd, of the 2nd Lancers,
was surrounded by many Life Guards, and had his right arm
hacked so as to render its amputation necessary. Larrey
amputated it at once. During the operation Sourd dictated the
following letter to the Emperor, who had just promoted him
to be a general. "The greatest favour that you can
render me is to leave me colonel of my regiment of lancers,
which I hope to conduct again to victory. I refuse the rank
of general. Let the great Napoleon pardon me! The rank of
colonel is everything to me." Then, before the bandage had
hardly been placed upon his bloody, stump, he remounted his
horse and galloped along the column to rejoin his dear
regiment. The armies of the Republic and Empire had many men
of this stamp.
Retreat of the English Army. 141
Past Genappe, the march became extremely; low. The
English did not show less haste, nor the French less ardour; but
under the continuous action of this great rain the ground
became more and more difficult. Along the road, reserved for
the artillery and infantry, the water ran like a mill-race; in the
ploughed lands, the horses sank up to their knees.
Towards half-past six Napoleon attained with the head of
column the heights of La Belle Alliance. The infantry of
Brunswick, in the greatest disorder, and the rear guard of the
English cavalry traversed the valley which separates these
heights from the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean. The hussars of
Marbot followed them. They began to skirmish, when from
the edge of the plateau an enemy's battery opened fire upon
the main body of the cavalry, which had halted near La Belle
Alliance. The rain had ceased, but the atmosphere was still
saturated with water. Through this curtain of fog the
Emperor indistinctly perceived masses of cavalry and infantry.
Was it all of Wellington's army ready to deliver battle, or only
a strong rear guard, which had taken position to protect the
retreat? The Emperor wished to ascertain the truth. By his
orders, four light batteries opened fire, whilst the cuirassiers
of Milhaud deployed as if to charge. The enemy's cannon
thundered loudly; the English unmasked themselves. All
their army was there.
IV.
Night approached, and most of the infantry were still far
in the rear. The Emperor ordered the fire to cease. During
the cannonade he had remained near La Belle Alliance, exposed
to the cannon-balls which Captain Mercer, who had recognized
him, directed upon the staff. Napoleon pointed out to the
troops the positions for their bivouacs. The corps of d'Erlon
(save the division of Durutte, which did not rejoin until next
morning), established itself between Plancenoit and the farm
of Montplaisir, its front and right flank covered by the cavalry
of Jacquinot. The cuirassiers of Milhaud, the light cavalry of
Domon and Subervie, and the cavalry of the Guard bivouacked
in the second line, abreast of Rossomme. The corps of Reille
and Lobau and the cuirassiers of Kellermann halted in Genappe
and environs. After having traversed this village at dark, the
Foot Guard left the main highway, which was encumbered with
the artillery and baggage train, and attempted to gain the
142 WATERLOO.
imperial quarters. Only two or three regiments arrived near
there, at the village of Glabais, between eleven and twelve
o'clock at night. The others having lost their way, the men
disbanded and wandered in search of the farms and isolated
country houses. They did not rejoin their colours until the
next morning.
It was indeed a villainous night of bivouac! The troops
arrived in the darkness, broken with fatigue, streaming with
water, and "each man dragging two or three pounds of mud
with his shoes." A great many of the soldiers marched bare-
footed, having lost their shoes in the heavy ploughed lands.
They were compelled to stretch themselves out in the midst of
the rye, which was more than three feet high and drenched
with water. "It was like entering a bath." The men could
not think of erecting shelters; the wood cut in the copses of
Vardre, Chantelet, and Caillou served to make fires, which
were lighted with great difficulty, were continually going out,
and produced more smoke than heat. The rain ceased only
at rare intervals. In order to receive less water and regain a
little warmth, ten or twelve of the soldiers would group
themselves together and sleep standing, closely pressed one against
the other. The most stoical, or the most fatigued, extended
themselves in the mud. There are times in war when one
would sleep upon bayonets. After having picketed their
horses, a number of horsemen mounted again in the saddle and,
enveloped in their long mantles, slept bent over their horses'
necks. Of the four days' bread carried in the haversacks, all
was consumed. The men suffered greatly from hunger. In
most of the regiments the distributions were made only at
midnight and even in the morning. We can imagine the
dissatisfaction of the troops, as well as the frenzied marauding
of which the Belgian peasants were the victims.
The Guard, which during a part of the night had wandered
through the fields and along the country roads, was especially
furious. Never had the grumblers grumbled so much. With
the murmurs and oaths were mingled imprecations against
the generals; the men accused them of having purposely led
them astray in these unknown roads. And, remembering 1814,
these old soldiers said: "This smells of treason." But in the
Guard, as well as in the Line, there was neither demoralization,
nor even discouragement; the men preserved in their hearts
the hope of vengeance and faith in victory. In spite of and
Retreat of the English Army. 143
before everything, it was the English, the Red-coats, the "God-
dams," whom they blamed for this night under the rain,
without; bread and without fire. And they promised themselves to
make them pay dear for it the next day.
The English were not much better off upon the plateau
of Mont Saint-Jean. Nevertheless, the infantry, having
commenced its retreat at ten o'clock, had reached its positions
before night. The leading divisions had even arrived before
the storm. The soldiers established themselves upon ground
still dry, made for themselves comfortable beds of straw by
bending down the rye, and kindled fires; finally, the service of
food being well assured, they tranquilly prepared their supper.
Alone, the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which had bivouacked
after night, suffered severely from the inclemency of the
weather.
The Emperor returned to spend the night at the pretty
little farm of Caillou, situated on the edge of the road, at 2,700
yards from la Belle Alliance. The farmer Boucqueau and
his family had fled in order to escape the pranks of the
Brunswickers, who, in their retreat, had fired some shots through the
windows, burst in the door, and finally pillaged the house.
The Emperor ordered a great fire to be kindled; and, pending
the arrival of his baggage, he dried himself as best he could in
front of the chimney.
About nine o'clock General Milhaud informed him verbally
that, in his march from Marbais to Quatre-Bras, his right
flankers had discovered a column of Prussian cavalry which,
from Tilly, had withdrawn in the direction of Wavre. It is
possible that the Emperor immediately wrote to Grouchy,
from whom he had as yet received no message, to inform him
of the direction of this column and to enjoin him to advance
on Wavre so as to draw near the Imperial Army. But if the
order was sent, it never reached its destination. The officer
who bore it did not overtake the Marshal, either because he
had been captured or killed en route by the Prussian scouts,
or for some other cause.
Besides, it does not appear that the Emperor was alarmed
by Milhaud's report. Since noon he had manoeuvred with the
idea that Blücher's army was retreating on Namur or
Maëstricht, or was falling back to the north, in order to unite with
144 WATERLOO.
the English Army in front of Brussels. The march of a
Prussian column on Wavre only confirmed one of his previsions.
Furthermore, this column might be only a stray corps, cut off
from its line of retreat. But at the worst, if all the Prussian
corps should seek to concentrate at Wavre, Grouchy would
overtake them in time to combat them. If they marched
immediately towards Brussels by the route from Wavre to that
city, they would not be immediately dangerous. As to
supposing that Blücher, thirty-six hours after a defeat and having
33,000 French on his traces, would risk a flank march, from
Wavre to Plancenoit or Ohain, in order to resume the offensive,
such a hypothesis never entered the mind of the Emperor.
On the evening of June 17th Napoleon was less preoccupied
with the movements of the Prussians than with the plans of
the English. He feared that Wellington had only made a
simple halt at Mont Saint-Jean, and that he would flip away
during the night to go to take up a position in front of Brussels,
where he would be joined by the Prussians. If such was the
object of the enemy, the Emperor regarded the game as greatly
compromised, for though he was certain of exterminating the
English at Mont Saint-Jean, he regarded it as very hazardous
to debouch from the Forest of Soignes before the two united
armies. However, all this was only a matter of conjecture
with the Emperor, for he still doubted if the main body of the
Prussians was falling back towards Brussels or Liege. And
among the crowd of contradictory thoughts that struggled
with one another in his brain, there survived the hope that
even should Blücher manoeuvre to approach Wellington, the
Prussian Army, defeated, cut in twain, and demoralized by the
battle of Ligny, would be in no condition to enter again into
line before many days.
The uncertainties of the Emperor touching the plans of
Wellington were, indeed, justifiable, for, even far into the
night, the Duke himself did not know what course he would
take. This depended on Blücher. As he had said in the
morning to the orderly officer of Gneissenau, Lieutenant Massow, he
would accept battle at Mont Saint-Jean, if he had the assurance
of being supported by at least one of the four Prussian corps;
otherwise, he would continue his retreat.
Now, since eleven o'clock Wellington had remained
without news from the Prussian headquarters. Blücher had,
indeed, been informed by Massow, on the latter's return, of the
Retreat of the English Army. 145
eventual plan of the English general, and he burned to co-
operate therein . But before formally pledging himself to second
Wellington the next day, Blücher was forced to wait until his
army was concentrated and revictualled. Things did not
proceed with the rapidity that he would have wished. In the
afternoon of June 17th the I. and II. Corps alone were massed
at Wavre; and, besides, they were lacking in munitions and
food. The great park had been directed by way of Gembloux
on Wavre; but would it avoid the French cavalry? For the
III. and IV. Corps, they might be followed so closely by the
French that it would be necessary to halt and deliver battle.
About five o'clock, as the noise of the cannonade of
Genappe diminished in violence, the great park arrived. Three
hours later the III. Corps passed through Wavre on the way to
La Bavette. Finally, at eleven o'clock, a report from Bülow
announced that he was at Dion-le-Mont with the head of the
IV. Corps. Blücher received at the same moment a despatch
from Muffling confirming the information that Wellington
had taken eventually at Mont Saint-Jean some positions for
battle. Gneissenau still hesitated. "If the English are
defeated," he objected, not without reason, "we run the risk of
being completely destroyed." Blücher finally succeeded in
convincing his all-powerful chief of staff. "Gneissenau has
yielded!" said he, with a triumphant air, to Colonel Hardinge,
the English military attaché. "We are going to rejoin the
Duke." He wrote to Wellington: "The corps of Bülow will
put itself on the march to-morrow at dawn in your direction.
It will be followed immediately by the corps of Pirch. The I.
and III. Corps also. will hold themselves in readiness to advance
towards you. The exhaustion of the troops, a part of whom
have not yet arrived, will not permit me to begin my movement
earlier."
This letter reached Wellington about two in the morning
at his headquarters at Waterloo, a village situated a league in
the rear of the first English lines. Assured, henceforth, of the
cooperation of the Prussians, Wellington determined to accept
battle. Fortune declared once more in his favour; but he had
none the less remained too long in expectation. The want of
news from Blücher should have caused him to think that the
Prussians would be unable to second his army, and, though he
wished to fight only with their support, he had yet made, at
one in the morning, no preparations for retreat.
146 WATERLOO.
At the very moment when Wellington reached his
conclusions Napoleon penetrated them. The Emperor had
retired rather late at Caillou. Before retiring he had dictated an
order of battle, based upon the hypothesis of a great battle, for
the next day. He had also caused to be read to him the
journals which had arrived from Paris, and had dictated many
letters, "necessitated," says Davout, "by the ennui and
embarrassment occasioned by the intrigues of the Chamber of
Representatives." Awakened after a short nap, the Emperor
arose about one in the morning in order to make the entire
round of his advance posts. He was accompanied only by
General Bertrand. The rain had set in again; it fell in
torrents. When Napoleon had attained the crests of La Belle
Alliance, the English bivouacs appeared before him at the
distance of a short cannon-shot. Silence reigned in the camps
of the enemy, and the Allied Army seemed buried in sleep.
On the horizon, the Forest of Soignes, upon which were
reflected, through a veil of rain and smoke, the innumerable fires
lighted by the soldiers, looked like an immense conflagration.
The Emperor judged that the English would stand on their
positions. If they had been intending to retreat during the
night or even at sunrise, as he had feared, there would have
been already some preparatory movements in their camp.
The Emperor returned to Caillou as the day dawned.
He there found the letter that Grouchy had written from
Gembloux, on the day before, at ten in the evening. The courier
had arrived at Caillou about two o'clock. This despatch stated
that the Prussians seemed to be falling back in two columns -
one in the direction of Liege and the other towards Wavre -
and that, if the march of the Prussian columns on Wavre was
confirmed by the reports of the night, Grouchy "would follow
them in order to separate them from Wellington." Confiding
in the promise of his lieutenant, the Emperor did not deem it
necessary to send him, just then, new instructions. It is not
for us to say if he acted wisely.
Soon after some spies - then some officers sent on
reconnaissances, and Belgian deserters, came by their reports to
confirm the previsions of the Emperor. The English did not
budge. The battle would take place at Mont Saint-Jean.
The Emperor felt sure of victory. The wan sun that
appeared through the clouds "would witness the destruction of
the English Army." Napoleon, however, was troubled by his
Retreat of the English Army. 147
inability to attack as early as he would have liked, and as was
necessary. On the evening of the day before, in the doubtful
hope that Wellington would await him at Mont Saint-Jean, he
had indicated the positions to be occupied by the different
army corps, so as to be able to begin the action at an early
hour. Unfortunately, the rain had soaked the ground to such
an extent that, in the opinion of the artillery generals, it would
be impossible to manoeuvre the guns. It is true the rain had
ceased; but many hours would be required to dry and harden
the ground. About five o'clock the Emperor, judging, no
doubt, that it would no longer be necessary to occupy so early
the position of battle, and that it would be better to give the
troops time to rally, clean their arms, and prepare their soup,
determined to wait until nine o'clock to begin the attack.
He dictated to Soult this order, which modified that of the
day before: "The Emperor orders that the Army be ready to
attack at nine in the morning. The corps commanders will
rally their troops, cause them to clean their arms, and permit
the soldiers to prepare their soup. They will also cause the
soldiers to eat in order that at nine o'clock sharp each corps
may be ready and in line of battle, with its artillery and
ambulances, in the position of battle which the Emperor has
indicated in his order of yesterday evening."
BOOK THREE.
WATERLOO.
CHAPTER I.
Blücher and . Grouchy.
I. - Dispositions and movements of the Prussian Army on the morning
of June 18th. - Departure from Wavre of Field Marshal Blücher
(eleven o'clock).
II. - Dispositions of Grouchy.
III. - Discussion between Gérard and Grouchy at Walhain (noon).
I.
In accordance with his promise, Blücher had made ready
to second vigorously his allies. Some orders despatched
during the night enjoined Bülow to march at dawn on Chapelle
Saint-Lambert, distant from Mont Saint-Jean some seven
kilometres, as the crow flies, and Pirch to follow the movement
of Bülow's corps. At Chapelle Saint-Lambert these generals
were to act according to circumstances. If the action did not
appear to be seriously engaged, they were to remain in that
position and to conceal their presence; in the contrary case,
they were to attack the right flank of the French Army. As
for the corps of Ziethen and Thielmann, they were to remain
until a new order in their cantonments on the left bank of the
Dyle. Blücher intended to lead them also to the support of
the English; but before doing this it was necessary that he
await the morning reports. He could not completely
disgarnish the line of the Dyle without having positive information
regarding the march and strength of the French corps which
had been reported at Gembloux.
Well conceived as was this disposition, it had one initial
fault. As Bülow's corps had not been engaged at Ligny,
149
150 WATERLOO.
Blücher wished to engage it first. He sacrificed to this
preoccupation, which, moreover, was legitimate, rapidity of
movement. The corps of Ziethen and Thielmann were bivouacked
at Bierges and la Bavette (eight and nine kilometres,
respectively, from Chapelle Saint-Lambert); the corps of Pirch and
Bülow were at Aisemont and Dion-le-Mont (ten and fourteen
kilometres from Chapelle Saint-Lambert.) Manifestly, the
troops nearest the field of battle should have been sent there
first, whilst those farthest away should have come to occupy
temporarily the line of the Dyle. At all events, the Prussian
staff ought to have foreseen that Pirch's corps must remain
motionless under arms during the defile of Bülow's corps.
It was then Pirch who ought to have made the head of column.
If one had acted in this manner, half of the Prussian Army
would have found itself concentrated at Chapelle Saint-Lambert
long before noon.
As it was, things were very different. The division of
Losthin, Bülow's advance guard, did not arrive in front of
Wavre till seven in the morning. It lost a great deal of time
in crossing the bridge and climbing the main street of the village,
which was narrow and very steep. When it had debouched, a
violent conflagration, entirely fortuitous, broke out in this
street and barred its access. The bulk of Bülow's corps was
forced to await until the fire was extinguished. The march of
the 4th Corps thus suffered a delay of more than two hours;
the rear guard division did not reach until near three o'clock
the environs of Chapelle Saint-Lambert. The II. Corps (Pirch)
had taken up arms at five o'clock. But, as it was necessary
to permit the IV. Corps to defile, the troops remained
motionless in front of their bivouacs at Aisemont till past noon. At
two o'clock half of Pirch's corps was still upon this side (right
bank) of the Dyle.
Between seven and eight o'clock in the morning Count
Groben, on returning from the advance posts, had reported
that the French, in position at Gembloux, had yet made no
movement, and that he estimated their strength at 15,000 men.
"I can not affirm," he had added, "whether the French are
not more numerous, but even should they number 30,000
men, a single one of our army corps will suffice to guard the
line of the Dyle. "It is at Mont Saint-Jean that the fate of the
campaign is to be decided. It is necessary to send there every
man possible." This was, indeed, the opinion of Blücher,
Blücher and Grouchy. 151
but Gneissenau and Grolemann still hesitated to disgarnish
the line of the Dyle. "This question," said Grolemann, with
the' formal assent of Gneissenau, "will be resolved at noon; if,
from now until then, the enemy does not appear before Wavre
in too great strength, the I. Corps will follow the II. and IV.,
and perhaps the III. will march also." Meanwhile Blücher
wrote to Muffling: "I pray you to say in my name to the
Duke of Wellington that, sick as I am, I shall put myself at
the head of my troops to fall upon the right wing of the enemy
as soon as Napoleon will have engaged battle. If the day
passes without an attack from the French, I am of the opinion
that we should both attack them to-morrow."
Before forwarding this letter which Blücher had dictated
to him, the aide-de-camp Nostitz communicated its contents
to Gneissenau. On the day before and the morning of the battle
of Ligny the latter had somewhat mistrusted the promises of
Wellington, whom he regarded as "a great knave." The day
of June 16th, during which the Duke had sent to Brye neither
a man nor a cannon, had confirmed and increased the prejudices
of Gneissenau. He feared that the English would fall back
without combat on Brussels. In this event the Prussian Army
would be exposed to a disaster, taken en flagrant delit of march,
and attacked in front by Napoleon and in flank or reverse by
the corps of Grouchy. Gneissenau caused this postscript to be
added to Blücher's letter: "General Gneissenau is in perfect
accord with the Field Marshal; but he prays your excellency
to penetrate the secret thoughts of the Duke of Wellington
and to learn if he is fully determined to light in his present
position, or if it is only a mere demonstration, which might
greatly endanger our army."
Time passed; the ardent Blücher wished to be present
at the opening of the battle. Leaving Gneissenau free to
control the movements of the other army corps, he quitted
Wavre at eleven o'clock to rejoin Bülow towards Chapelle
Saint-Lambert. "In spite of all that which I suffered from
my fall," said he later, "I would have had myself tied on my
horse rather than to have missed the battle."
II.
If Grouchy, on the evening of June 17th, was still doubtful
as to the concentration of the Prussian Army at Wavre, the
information that reached him during the night ought to have
152 WATERLOO.
dissipated this doubt. Between eleven and twelve o'clock at
night he received a report from General Bonnemains and
another from the colonel of the 15th Dragoons, both announcing
the march of the Prussians on Wavre. Towards three in the
morning there was transmitted to him from Walhain, or Sart-
a-Walhain, notice that there had been seen passing on the day
before three army corps which were directing themselves on
Wavre, and that, according to the words of the officers and
soldiers, these troops were going to concentrate near Brussels
in order to deliver battle.
All this information, which confirmed that of the
preceding evening, only half convinced Grouchy. He no longer
doubted that the enemy was directing himself on Wavre; but,
taking to the letter, without reflecting, the words of the
Prussians, he imagined that their army had made there not a
strategical concentration, but a simple halt, and that it would march
from there towards Brussels by the main highway. He knew
that the Emperor had foreseen a battle with the English in
front of the Forest of Soignes, and he never stopped to think
that instead of gaining Brussels, the Prussians might, from
Wavre, join directly their allies by a short lateral march. He
did not see that, in order to prevent this junction, it was not
necessary to follow the Prussians by way of Walhain and
Corbaix, but to make a flank pursuit by way of Saint-Géry
and Mousty. There was every advantage and no danger in
passing the Dyle at the nearest point and in manoeuvring by
the left bank of this little river. If the Prussians remained at
Wavre, which is situated on the left bank of the Dyle, that
position could be attacked more easily from the left bank than
by the right. If they directed themselves towards Brussels,
the French could follow them after having reached Wavre.
If they marched directly to join the English, the appearance
of 33,000 French on their flank would arrest, or at least retard,
their movement. Finally, if they, had already effected their
junction with the English and threatened to crush the Imperial
Army under their united masses, the French would be, at
least, upon the left bank of the Dyle, and near enough to the
Emperor to be able to assist him in the midst of the battle.
Grouchy had no idea of all this. He made no change in
his orders of the day before. He even permitted, although he
had at that time decided to march on Wavre, the corps of Pajol
and the cavalry of Vallin to operate the eccentric movement
Blücher and Grouchy. 153
on Grand Leez which he had ordered. He wrote to the
Emperor that, as all the information confirmed the march of the
Prussians by way of Wavre on Brussels, "in order to
concentrate there or to deliver battle after having united with
Wellington," he was starting for Wavre.
Grouchy had under his hand 33,000 soldiers and 116 guns.
In attaching himself servilely to the traces of the Prussian
rear guard, instead of manoeuvring, on the morning of June
18th, by the left bank of the Dyle, he committed a gross
strategical error. In leaving, under circumstances so pressing and
so grave, his troops in bivouac a part of the morning, he was
guilty of an irremediable fault. On June 18th day dawns at
half-past two; at three it is light enough to march. Now,
Grouchy had directed Vandamme and Gérard to put
themselves on the march at six and eight o'clock, respectively.
Unfortunate man!.
In consequence of the delay in the distribution of food,
the troops did not even set out at the hour prescribed. The
dragoons of Exelmans, who had passed the night at Sauvenierre
and were to form the advance, did not mount until six o'clock.
The corps of Vandamme did not put itself en route from
Gembloux until between seven and eight, and the corps of Gérard
did not quit its bivouacs on the right bank of the Orneau until
the same hour. Another cause of the delay was that all these
troops followed the same route. By marching in two columns
- one by Sauvenierre and Walhain, and the other by Ernage
and Nil Pierreux - the two army corps would have been massed
at the same time at Corbaix.
Grouchy, it appears, did not leave Gembloux before eight
or nine o'clock. He proceeded slowly and rejoined the advance
of the 3rd Corps a little on this side of Walhain. Having
reached about ten o'clock the outskirts of this village, he
allowed the columns of infantry to file by, and entered the house
of the notary Hollert, in order to write to the Emperor. It
appears that his aide-de-camp, Pontbellanger, who had been
sent upon a reconnaissance upon the banks of the Dyle,
towards Mousty, had reported to him that no hostile troops had
been discovered in that region; and an inhabitant of Walhain,
who claimed to have formerly served in the French Army in the
capacity of an officer, had given him new and important
information. He assured the Marshal that the main body of the
Prussians, who had passed through Wavre, was camped in the
-11-
154 WATERLOO.
plain of La Chyse, near the road leading from Namur to
Louvain (three leagues, as the crow flies, to the northeast
of Wavre) .
This false information, which the old officer "declared
was positive," was most satisfactory to Grouchy. Not only
was the army of Blücher not seeking to effect its junction with
Wellington by a flank march, but, instead of advancing directly
on Brussels, it had commenced by making a long detour in
order to concentrate first in the direction of Louvain. Thus
the enemy had put himself for the time being outside of the
sphere of operations. Grouchy could congratulate himself
upon having manoeuvred so skilfully. If he had not overtaken
the Prussians, he was on their traces and had driven them away
from the English, which was the principal object of his
movement. By evening all his troops would be massed at Wavre,
in position between the two hostile armies; and on the next
day he would be free either to go to combat the Prussians in
the plain of La Chyse, or to attack them in their flank march
if they directed themselves towards Brussels, or to advance
towards this city in order to unite with Napoleon's forces. The
Marshal hastened to write to Napoleon, in order to transmit to
him this new information. He closed this letter saying:
"... This evening I expect to be concentrated at Wavre,
and thus find myself between Wellington, whom I presume to
be in retreat before Your Majesty, and the Prussian Army. I
have need of ulterior instructions in order that I may know
what Your Majesty wishes me to do. The country between
Wavre and the plain of La Chyse is very difficult, intersected
with ravines, and partly marshy. I can easily reach Brussels
before the Prussian force, which has halted at La Chyse.
Vouchsafe, Sire, to send me your orders; I can
receive them before beginning my movement to-morrow."
"To-morrow!" It was indeed a question of to-morrow!
Grouchy gave this letter to Major La Fresnaye, a former
page of Napoleon, who set out at once. As to the Marshal,
free henceforth from anxiety, and thinking that he had an
entire day before him in which to reach a determination, he
seated himself tranquilly at dinner.
Blücher and Grouchy. 155
III.
Grouchy was eating some strawberries (to eat
strawberries is not, moreover, a hanging matter, even on a morning of
battle), when Gérard, who had outstripped by two or three
kilometres the vanguard of the 4th Corps, entered the room
where he was dining. Soon after Colonel Simon Loriere,
Gérard's chief of staff, was introduced. While walking in the
garden of the notary Hollért, he had heard the cannon
growling in the distance; he hastened to inform his chiefs of this
fact. It was a little more than half-past eleven. Grouchy
and Gérard descended into the garden. General Baltus,
commanding the artillery of the 4th Corps, General Valaze,
commanding the engineers, and Inspector of Reviews Denniee
were there with numerous officers of the staff - all very
attentive to the noise of the cannonade. Many of them were
kneeling, with ear to the ground, in order to ascertain the
direction of the sound.
Gérard listened for some minutes, and said: "I think that
we should march to the sound of the cannon."
Grouchy objected that it was probably only a rear-guard
affair. But the fire increased in violence. "The earth
trembled," relates Simon Loriere. It could no longer be doubted
that two armies were fighting. Towards the west clouds of
smoke arose above the horizon.
"The battle is at Mont Saint-Jean," said a peasant whom
Valaze had taken as a guide. "We could reach there in four
or five hours' march."
The notary Hollert, summoned by Gérard, confirmed the
words of the guide "It is in front of the Forest of Soignes,"
said he. "The distance from here there is nearly three and a
half leagues."
"We should march to the sound of the cannon," repeated.
Gérard.
"We should march to the sound of the cannon," said in
turn General Valaze.
Grouchy has admitted that he was "vexed" at hearing
his subordinates publicly giving him advice. This is one reason
why he did not heed it. There was another - the fear of
responsibility. Rather than to follow the dangerous advice of
his generals, would it not be better to follow blindly the
156 WATERLOO.
instructions of the Emperor, which would cover him, whatever
might happen? He said: "The Emperor told me yesterday
that his intention was to attack the English Army, if
Wellington accepted battle. So I am not at all surprised at the
engagement which is taking place at this moment. If the
Emperor wanted me to take part in it, he would not have sent
me away from him at the very time when he was advancing
against the English. Besides, on account of the condition of
the roads, drenched by the rain of yesterday and of this
morning, I would not be able to arrive in useful time upon the
battle-field."
General Baltus coincided with the views of Grouchy.
He said : "The roads are in very bad condition and the artillery
would be unable to pass over them."
"With my three companies of sappers," replied General
Valaze, "I pledge myself to remove every difficulty."
"I would arrive with the ammunition-chests!" cried
Gérard
Valaze, having again consulted his guide, who affirmed
that the march would be an easy thing, resumed : "The sappers
can open many passages."
Gérard became more and more animated. "Monsieur le
Maréchal," said he, "it is your duty to march to the sound of
the cannon."
Offended at Gérard for permitting himself to read him a
lesson, and that in a loud voice in the presence of a score of
officers. Grouchy replied in a severe tone, so as to close the
discussion: "My duty is to execute the orders of the Emperor,
which direct me to follow the Prussians; to follow your advice
would be an infringement of his instructions."
At this moment there arrived an aide-de-camp of
Exelmans, Commandant d'Estourmel; he announced that a strong
Prussian rear guard was in position in front of Wavre. This
officer was also directed to say that, according to every
indication, the enemy's army had passed the bridge of Wavre during
the night and morning in order to draw near the English Army,
and consequently General Exelmans thought of advancing by
way of Ottignies upon the left bank of the Dyle. This new
information and the advice expressed by Exelmans were so
many reasons in support of Gérard's counsel. But for Grouchy,
still persuaded that the Prussians had gained Wavre in view
of a retreat towards La Chyse, the presence of their rear guard
Blücher and Grouchy 157
in that town confirmed this supposition. He congratulated
himself on having resisted Gérard, since the orders of the
Emperor were to follow the Prussian Army, and since he
was finally on the point of overtaking this unsiezable army.
Having said to d'Estourmel that he would give his orders to
Exelmans in person, the Marshal called for his horse.
As Grouchy was preparing to mount, Gérard risked a last
attempt : "If you do not wish to advance towards the Forest
of Soignes with all the troops, at least permit me to make this
movement with my army corps and the cavalry of General
Vallin. I am confident that I can reach the battle-field in
time to be of assistance to the Emperor."
"No," replied Grouchy; "it would be committing an
unpardonable military fault to divide my troops and cause them
to operate upon both banks of the Dyle. I would expose both
of these bodies, which would be unable to support each other,
to the danger of being crushed by forces two or three times
more numerous."
He set his horse at a gallop. Those officers of his staff who
had witnessed the discussion from a distance and who heard
the cannon believed that he was about to manoeuvre in order
to draw near the Imperial Army.
CHAPTER 11.
The Battle of Waterloo.
Morning.
I. - Topography of the field of battle.
II. - Positions of the Anglo-Dutch Army.
III. - Luncheon of Napoleon at Caillou. - Letter to Grouchy.
IV. - The last review (ten o'clock). - Order of battle of the French
Army. - Disposition of Napoleon for the attack (eleven o'clock).
The plateau of La Belle Alliance and Mont Saint-Jean,
each of an average altitude of 396 feet, extend almost parallel
with each other in an easterly and westerly direction. They
are separated by two twin valleys, which are crossed
perpendicularly, from south to north, by the great highway from
Charleroi to Brussels. These two valleys are narrow and of
slight depth; from the inn of La Belle Alliance to the crests
of Mont Saint-Jean the distance is 1,300 yards, as the crow
flies, and the depth of the lowest valley is about 330 feet.
East of the great highway there is the valley of Smohain, which,
very rough, gradually contracts itself, becomes a ravine, and
finishes by confounding itself with the bed of the stream of
Ohain; on the west there is the valley of Braine 1'Alleud, which
also presents multiple undulations, and through which passes
diagonally the route of Nivelles. This route runs in an S.S.W.
and N.N.E. direction. After having reached the plateau of
Mont Saint-Jean, it joins, at the hamlet of the same name, thus
forming an acute angle, the main highway, which traverses, at
nearly a league beyond this point, the village of Waterloo,
built in a hollow in the Forest of Soignes, and continues
towards Brussels through the forest.
As seen from La Belle Alliance, the great highway of
Brussels, which ascends and descends in a straight line, appears
very steep. This, however, is an illusion of the perspective.
In reality the slope has not so great an inclination. A horseman
can climb the hill at a sustained gallop without urging or
blowing his horse. But on the right and left of the highway
158
The Battle of Waterloo. 159
the very uneven ground falls abruptly in many spots. It is
an infinite succession of hills and valleys, swales and
hummocks, furrows and ridges. Nevertheless, in looking from
the heights, the double valley presents the appearance of a
plain extending without marked depressions between two hills
of slight elevation. It is necessary to pass through the fields
in order to see these incessant and undulating movements of
the ground, similar to the waves of the sea.
The road from Ohain to Braine l'Alleud, which skirts the
crest of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and there intersects at
right angles the route of Brussels, covers with a line of
natural obstacles almost all of the English position. East of the
great highway, this road is even with the ground; but a double
row of quickset hedges, tall and stiff, renders it impassable to
cavalry. On the west side, on account of a sudden rise of the
ground, the road of Ohain extends between two banks from
five to seven feet high; it thus forms, for the space of 400 yards,
a redoubtable shelter-trench; then it rises again to the surface
and continues its course without presenting other obstacles
than a few scattered hedges. In the rear of the crest which
forms the screen the ground slopes downward towards the
north, rendering the position very favourable to the defence.
The troops of the second line and the reserves are concealed
from the enemy and partly protected from his fire.
Spread over a radius of 3,500 yards, half-way up the hill
and in the valleys, the Chateau of Hougoumont, with its
chapel, its vast commons, its park enclosed with walls, its
orchard surrounded by hedges, and the coppices which defends
its southern approach; the farm of La Haye Sainte, a massive
stone building, flanked by an orchard bordered by hedges and
a terraced garden; a mound surmounting the excavation of a
sand-pit and protected by a hedge; finally, the hamlet of
Smohain - form so many bastions, galleries, and redoubts in
front of the position.
The horizon is limited on the north by the green masses
of the Forest of Soignes, against which, the steeples of Mont
Saint-Jean and Braine l'Alleud stand out in bold relief. On
the northeast extend the woods of Ohain and Paris, and
farther on the wood of Chapelle Saint-Lambert. On the east the
woods of Vardre and Hubermont line the tops of the hills
which crown the ravine of Lasne, which has its source near the
village of Plancenoit. All the rest of the ground is open.
160 WATERLOO.
The summits of the plateaux, the hillsides, and the valleys, were
everywhere covered with tall rye which had begun to ripen.
In short, a vast rampart (the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean),
rising above the valleys of Smohain and Braine l'Alleud; two
rows of hedges, then a double wall like a parapet (the road of
Ohain), from whence all points of approach are commanded
by a plunging fire; six advanced works (Hougoumont, La Haye
Sainte, the sand-pit, Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain);
some debouches suitable for counter-attacks; and in the rear
of the parapet a sloping ground, hidden from view of the enemy,
crossed by two great highways, favouring the rapid movements
of supports and of artillery reserves - such was the position
chosen by Wellington.
II.
The English had bivouacked in some disorder over all the
extent of the plateau. Awakened at dawn, they began to
kindle the fires, to prepare their breakfast, and to clean their
arms and uniforms. Instead of drawing the charges from the
guns, the greater number of the soldiers discharged them in
the air. There was a continual fusillade, giving the illusion of
a combat. The outposts of Napoleon were either lacking in
vigilance or well inured to war, for no French relation mentions
the false alarm caused by this fusillade. About six o'clock,
to the discordant summons of trumpets, pibrochs, and drums,
sounding and beating on all tides at the same time, the troops
assembled. The inspection over, battalions, squadrons, and
batteries, guided by staff officers, marched to occupy their
positions of combat.
The English brigades of Maitland and Byng (Guards) and
Colin Halkett, the Hanoverian brigade of Kielmansegge, and
the Anglo-German brigade of Ompteda, established
themselves in the first line along the road of Ohain - the right
(Byng), near the route of Nivelles; and the left (Ompteda),
resting on the route of Brussels. East of this route, and also
along the road of Ohain, were stationed the English brigades
of Kempt and Pack (Picton's division), the Dutch-Belgian
brigade of Bylandt, and the Hanoverian brigade of Best.
These nine brigades formed the centre or, more correctly
speaking, almost the entire front of the Allied Army; for, in
Wellington's order of battle, there was, properly speaking, no
centre. There were a right and left centre, separated by the
The Battle of Waterloo. 161
route of Brussels, and the two wings. The right wing,
composed of the English brigades of Adam and Mitchell, of the
Hanoverian brigade of William Halkett, and the Anglo-
German brigade of Duplat, was en potence between the route
of Nivelles and Merbe Braine; on the extreme right the Dutch-
Belgian division of Chasse occupied the ground in front of
Braine l'Alleud. The left consisted only of the Nassauer
brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar and the Hanoverian
brigade of Wincke; these troops were stationed above
Papelotte. La Haye, and Smohain, with detachments in these
positions. On the extreme left the English cavalry brigades of
Vandeleur and Vivian flanked the army in the direction of
Ohain.
The reserve formed upon the plateau in two lines, the
second line near the farm of Mont Saint-Jean. It comprised,
behind the right centre, the Nassauer brigade of Kruse, the
entire corps of Brunswick (infantry and cavalry), the Anglo-
German cavalry brigades of Grant, Dörnberg, and Arenschild,
the Horse Guard brigade of Somerset, the brigades of Trip and
Van Merlen (Dutch-Belgian carabiniers and hussars); and
behind the left centre, the English brigade of Lambert, the
English brigade of dragoons of Ponsonby, and the Dutch-Belgian
brigade of dragoons of Ghigny.
The artillery was disposed as follows: four batteries
along the front of the right centre; the same number at the
centre of the line of battle, at the intersection of the route of
Brussels and the road of Ohain; four along the front of the left
centre; two on the right wing; two on the extreme left with
Chasse; two foot and seven horse batteries in the second line,
behind the right centre; and three batteries in reserve, near
the farm of Mont Saint-Jean.
Against the impetuous onslaught of the French columns
Wellington had employed in Spain and Portugal a very peculiar
kind of tactics. He placed his first line of infantry in the rear
of the crests, so as to conceal it from the view and from the
blows of the enemy during the preparatory period of the
assault and even during the assault itself. It was only when
the assailants, disunited by the ascension under the fire of
the chains of sharpshooters and of the batteries established
upon the crests, that the English battalions, which until then
had not suffered, unmasked themselves, delivered a point
blank discharge, and charged with the bayonet. The ground
162 WATERLOO.
of Mont Saint-Jean favoured this kind of tactics. "Form in
the usual manner," said Wellington to the general officers.
Thus, with the exception of the Belgian brigade of Bylandt
and a chain of sharpshooters which were posted on the slopes
- so to speak, in the advance line - all the infantry took
position at 20, 100, and 200 yards behind the road of Ohain.
These troops were completely masked, some by the banks and
quickset hedges of the road, and others by reason of the
interior declivity of the plateau. This declivity also favoured
the reserves by preventing them from being seen from the
opposite height. The batteries were established along the front,
in front of and behind the road of Ohain, according to the
nature of the ground and the extent of the field of fire.
Embrasures had been opened for the guns in the banks and hedges.
The farms and the unevenness of the ground, forming
advanced works, had been put in a state of defence. A barricade
had been erected across the route of Brussels on a line with
la Haye Sainte; and an abatis closed the route of Nivelle;
Hougoumont was occupied by seven companies of the 1st and
2nd (Coldstreams) and 3rd Regiments of English Guards, a
company of Hanoverians, and a battalion of Nassauers; La Haie-
Sainte, by five companies of the German Legion; the sand-pit
and its approaches, by a battalion of the 95th; and Papelotte,
La Haye, and the first houses of Smohain, by detachments of
the Prince of Saxe-Weimar.
Wellington had confidence only in his English troops.
This is why the troops of his nationality alternated along the,
line of battle with the different allied contingents. He desired
the latter to be everywhere solidly encircled.
After deducting the losses suffered on June 16th and 17th,
the Duke had in line 67,700 men and 184 pieces of artillery.
He would have been able to concentrate at Mont Saint-Jean a
greater number of combatants; but, still uneasy for his lines
of communication with the sea, and fearing that a French corps
would turn his right, he had left inactive between Hal and
Enghien - four leagues, as the crow flies, from Mont Saint-
Jean - nearly 17,000 men and 30 guns, under Prince Frederick
of the Low Countries. What a capital fault was this
detachment on the eve of a battle, to guard against a chimerical
danger' As General Brialmont has very aptly said, "One has
never been able to explain how Wellington could have
attributed to his adversary a plan of operations which must
The Battle of Waterloo. 163
hasten the junction of the allied armies, when, from the
beginning of The Campaign. Napoleon had evidently manoeuvred
to prevent this junction."
Whilst the troops were taking up their positions,
Wellington, accompanied by Muffling and a few officers, traversed
the line of battle. He examined carefully all the positions
and descended as far as Hougoumont. Often he levelled
his glass upon the heights occupied by the French. He was
mounted upon his favourite horse, "Copenhagen," a superb
pure-blooded bay, that had been trained at Vittoria and
Toulouse. Wellington wore his ordinary field uniform - pantaloons
of white buckskin, boots with tassels, dark blue coat, and short
cloak of the same colour, white cravat, small hat without plumes,
ornamented with the black cockade of England and three
others, of smaller size, of the colours of Portugal, Spain, and the
Low Countries. He was very calm. His face reflected the
confidence inspired by the assured cooperation of the Prussian
Army.
III.
The orders of the Emperor prescribed that all the army
corps should be by nine o'clock sharp upon their positions of
battle, ready to attack. But the troops who had passed the
night at Genappe, Glabais, and in the scattered farms of the
neighbourhood were a long time in rallying, cleaning their arms
and making soup. Besides, they had only the great highway
of Brussels by which to debouch. The corps of Reille did not
arrive on a line with Caillou until nine o'clock. The Foot
Guard, the cuirassiers of Kellermann, the corps of Lobau, and
the division of Durutte were far in the rear. To begin the
action, the Emperor wished rightly or wrongly to have all his
force under his hand, and besides, it does not appear that the
condition of the ground yet permitted of the manoeuvring
of the artillery. At least, this was the opinion of Napoleon
and Drouot.
About eight o'clock the Emperor had breakfasted at the
farm of Caillou with Soult, the Duke of Bassano, Drouot, and
many general officers. After the repast, which had been served
in vessels of silver bearing the imperial arms, the maps of
Ferrari and Capitaine had been unfolded upon the table. The
Emperor said: "The enemy's army is superior to ours by
more than a quarter. We have, none the less, ninety chances
164 WATERLOO.
out of a hundred in our favour." Ney, who entered at this
moment, heard these words. He had just come from the
advance posts, and had taken some movement of the English for
the beginning of a retreat; he exclaimed: "No doubt, sire, if
Wellington were simple enough to wait for you. But I come
to announce to you that his retreat is pronounced, and that,
if you do not hasten to attack, the enemy will escape you."
"You have seen wrong," replied the Emperor; "the time is
gone for that. Wellington would expose himself to certain
destruction. He has thrown the dice, and they are for us."
Soult was anxious. He apprehended the arrival of the
Prussians upon the battle-field no more than did the Emperor -
he judged that the French were rid of them for many days.
But he regretted that Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men had
been detached to pursue Blücher, when a single corps of
infantry and a few thousand cavalry would have sufficed. Half
of the troops of the right wing, he thought, would be far more
useful in the great battle which was to be fought with the
English Army, so firm, so stubborn, and so formidable. As
Lefebvre's chief of staff, Soult had carried by assault, July 9,
1794, this same plateau of Mont Saint-Jean, and had thrown
back from the Forest of Soignes the Imperialists into Brussels.
But he knew that the English infantry was far more tenacious
than the Austrian; so, on the previous evening, he had advised
the Emperor to recall a part of the troops put under the orders
of Grouchy. During the morning he had reiterated his advice.
Napoleon, impatient, brutally replied; "Because you have
been beaten by Wellington you regard him as a great general.
I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are
bad troops, and that this will be a very small affair." "I hope
it may," said Soult.
Soon after, Reille and Jérôme entered. The Emperor
asked Reille his opinion of the English Army, which this
general must well know, from having so often fought it in Spain.
Reille replied: "Well posted, as Wellington knows how to do,
and attacked in front, I regard the English infantry as
invincible on account of its calm tenacity and the superiority of its
fire. Before attacking it with the bayonet, it may be expected
that half of the assailants will be struck down. But the
English Army is less agile, less supple, and less skilful than our army.
If it cannot be defeated by a frontal attack, it may be done
by manoeuvring." For Napoleon, who had never fought al
The Battle of Waterloo. 165
pitched battle with the English, the advice of a veteran of the
Spanish wars was worthy of consideration. But, irritated
perhaps, because Reille had spoken so frankly, at the risk of
discouraging the generals who listened, he appeared to attach
no importance to it. He broke off the interview by an
exclamation of incredulity.
The weather had cleared up and the sun shone; a rather
stiff wind - a drying wind, as one says in venery - began to
blow. Some of the artillery officers reported that they had
gone over the ground, and that the guns would be able to
manoeuvre. Napoleon called for his horses. Before starting
he received with kindness the farmer Boucqueau, who with his
family had returned from Plancenoit on learning that the
Emperor was at Caillou. The old man complained of having been
pillaged the day before by the enemy's stragglers. Napoleon,
who appeared to be deeply absorbed, seemed to be thinking
of something more important than these grievances. He
finished by saying : "Be tranquil; you shall have a safe-guard."
This did not appear superfluous, for the imperial quarters were
to quit Caillou during the day. It was said that the Army
would sleep in Brussels.
The Emperor, skirting at a rapid trot the flank of the
columns which were still debouching from Genappe, advanced in
front of La Belle Alliance, upon the very line of sharpshooters,
to observe the enemy's positions. A Fleming named Decoster
was his guide. This man kept a small inn on the side of the road
between Rossomme and La Belle Alliance; he had been taken
from his house at five in the morning and brought to the
Emperor, who had called for someone who knew the country.
As the maps which Napoleon used in his campaigns only
indicated in a general and summary manner the undulations of the
ground, he nearly always took a guide. Decoster had been
watched closely, for he seemed anxious to escape; and on
leaving Caillou he had been lifted and bound upon a troop-
horse whose saddle was attached by a halter to the saddle-bow
of a chasseur of the escort. During the battle he cut, naturally,
a poor figure amidst the bullets and cannon-balls. He twisted
in his saddle, turned his head, and leaned over the shoulders of
his horse. At one time the Emperor said to him : "My friend,
do not fidget so. A bullet can kill you as well from behind as
in front and will make an uglier wound." According to local
traditions, Decoster,' either through imbecility or ill-will, gave
166 WATERLOO.
during the entire day false information. Another guide had
been brought to the Emperor - a certain Joseph Bourgeois -
from the hamlet of Odeghien. He stammered from fear and
kept his eyes fixed obstinately upon the ground. Napoleon
dismissed him. When asked how the Emperor looked, he
said : "Had his face been the dial of a watch, one would not
have dared to look for the hour."
The Emperor remained for some time in front of La Belle
Alliance. After having ordered General Haxo to ascertain
whether the English had constructed any entrenchments, he
went to post himself, at nearly 1,500 yards in the rear, upon a
hillock, which rises near the farm of Rossomme. There were
brought from the farm-house a chair and a small table, upon
which were unfolded his maps. About two o'clock, when the
action was seriously engaged, the Emperor established
himself upon another eminence, nearer the line of battle, at some
distance from the inn of Decoster. General Foy, who had
recognized him from a distance by his grey great-coat, saw
him walking to and fro, his hands crossed behind his back,
halting, leaning over the table, and then resuming his walk.
At Caillou, Jérôme had acquainted his brother with the
words heard the day before at Genappe in the inn of the Roi
d'Espagne. The waiter who had served him with supper,
after having served Wellington with dinner, related that an
aide-de-camp of the Duke had spoken of a junction concerted
between the English and Prussian armies in front of the Forest
of Soignes. This Belgian, who appeared to be well informed,
had even added that the Prussians would arrive by way of
Wavre. The Emperor treated these words with incredulity.
"After a battle like that of Fleurus," said he, " the junction of
the English and Prussians is impossible before two days;
besides, the Prussians have Grouchy on their traces." Grouchy's
always Grouchy! The Emperor had too much confidence in
the information as well as the promise of his lieutenant.
According to the letter of the Marshal, written from Gembloux
at ten in the evening, and which had arrived at Caillou about
two in the morning, the Prussian Army, reduced to nearly
30,000 men, had divided itself into two columns, one of which
seemed to be directing itself towards Liege and the other on
Wavre, perhaps to join Wellington. Grouchy had added that
if the reports of his cavalry apprised him that the main body
of the Prussians was withdrawing on Wavre, he would follow it,
The Battle of Waterloo. 167
"in order to separate it from Wellington." All this was well
calculated to reassure the Emperor. But had the Prussians
but 30,000 men? had they not divided themselves to march?
and would they not concentrate to fight? Would Grouchy, of
whom they were greatly in advance, overtake them in time?
Either Napoleon did not ask himself all these questions or he
answered them in the manner most conformable with his
desires. Blinded like Grouchy, he believed that the Prussians
would halt at Wavre, or that, at all events, they would advance
on Brussels, and not on Mont Saint-Jean. From Rossomme
the Emperor contented himself with writing to Grouchy to
inform him that a Prussian column had passed through Saint-
Géry, directing itself on Wavre, and to order him to march as
swiftly as possible on that point, pushing the enemy in front
of him.
A few minutes later the Emperor ordered Colonel Marbot
to take position behind Frichermont with the 7th Hussars and
to send detachments to Lasne, Couture, and the bridges of
Mousty and Ottignies. Should we infer from this that
Napoleon had suddenly an intuition of the movement that was
about to be proposed to Grouchy by Gérard, and that he
thought that before receiving his despatch the Marshal, instead
of following the Prussians to Wavre, would pass the Dyle at
Mousty to advance on their left flank? Or should we believe
that, in the mind of the Emperor, these detachments were
merely intended to reconnoitre the right of the Army and to
connect the communications with Grouchy's corps by assuring
the passage of the couriers?
IV.
The troops began to take their positions for battle.
Napoleon, on horseback, passed them in review as they formed
on the ground. The entire plateau was furrowed with troops
on the march. The corps of d'Erlon closed up on its right, in
order to permit that of Reille to establish itself on its left.
On the flanks and in the rear of these first lines of infantry -
infantry of the Line, with blue coats, white pantaloons, and
gaiters, light infantry clothed entirely in blue and gaitered in
black - eight divisions of cavalry began to deploy, sabres and
cuirasses glittering in the sun, and lance pennons fluttering, in
the wind. It was a chatoyment of bright colours and metallic
168 WATERLOO.
flashes. The chasseurs, wearing a dark green jacket with
purple, gold-coloured, and scarlet trimmings, were succeeded
by the hussars, whose dolmans, pelisses, Hungarian pantaloons,
and plumes varied in colour in each regiment - maroon and blue,
red and sky-blue, grey and blue, green and scarlet. Then
passed the dragoons, wearing copper helmets and tiger-skin
turbans, white straps crossing over a green coat with red
or yellow trimmings, and musketoon at saddle-bow striking
against the rigid boot; the lancers, green like the chasseurs
and having like them the sheep-skin schabrack, but
distinguished from them by the crested helmet, the cut and colour of
the plastron; the cuirassiers, who wore the short imperial blue
coat with collar, facings, and sleeve-trimmings of red or yellow,
according to the regiment, white pantaloons, tall boots, cuirass
and helmet of steel, with copper crest and floating crinière;
the carabiniers, giants of six feet, clothed in white, wearing
golden cuirasses and coifed, like antique heroes, with great
helmets with red crests. The Horse Guard deployed in the
second line : dragoons with green coats with white facings and
helmets with red plumes; grenadiers with blue coats and
scarlet trimmings, leather pantaloons, orange-coloured epaulets and
shoulder-knots, and great bear-skin caps with plume and four-
ragère; lancers, who wore a red kurtka with blue plastron,
white and yellow epaulets and shoulder-knots, red pantaloons
with a blue stripe, red shapska ornaments with; copper plate
with the crowned N and surmounted by a snow-white plume
eighteen inches high; finally, the chasseurs with green dolmans
trimmed in orange-coloured braid, red pelisses edged with fur,
kolpachs with scarlet pendant and a great green and red plume.
The epaulets, braid, stripes, and brandenburgs of the officers
scintillated with gold and silver.
Other troops debouched by the Brussels route. There
arrived men and horses and cannon as far as the eye could reach;
the numerous battalions of Lobau, the chasseurs of Domon, the
lancers of Subervie; the foot artillery, in its simple dark blue
uniform relieved by red; the horse artillery, the front of the
dolman covered with scarlet brandenburgs; the Young Guard,
tirailleurs with red epaulets, voltigeurs with green ones; the
foot cannoneers of the Guard, wearing great bear-skin caps
and marching near those redoubtable 12-pounders, which the
Emperor called his "most beautiful daughters." Far in the
rear advanced the sombre columns of the Old Guard.
The Battle of Waterloo. 169
Chasseurs and grenadiers wore their campaign uniform - blue
pantaloons, long blue coat with a row of buttons down the front,
and bear-skin caps without plume or cordon. Their parade
uniform for the triumphal entrance into Brussels was in their
haversacks, which made for them, with their equipment and
their fifty cartridges, a load of sixty-five pounds. The
grenadiers were distinguished from the chasseurs only by their
greater stature, the copper plate upon their bear-skin caps,
and their epaulets, which were blood-red, while those of their
comrades were green with red fringes. The one and the other
wore their hair done up in a queue and powdered, and massive
gold rings in their ears.
The drums beat, the trumpets sounded, and the bands
played "Let us watch over the safety of the empire." In
passing before the Emperor, the standard-bearers inclined the
flag - the flags of the Champ du Mai, the new flags, but
baptized already at Ligny in fire and blood - the horsemen
brandished their sabres, and the infantry waved their shakos on the
point of their bayonets. The acclamations dominated and
drowned the roll of the drums and the blare of the trumpets.
Cheers of "Long live the Emperor!" followed one another with
such vehemence and such rapidity that they prevented the
commands from being heard. "Never," says an officer of the
1st Corps, "had one cried 'Long live the Emperor!' with more
enthusiasm; it bordered on frenzy. And that which rendered
this scene more solemn and impressive was that in front of us,
at a thousand steps, perhaps, the sombre red line of the English
Army was seen."
The infantry of d'Erlon and Reille deployed in the first
line, abreast of La Belle Alliance - the four divisions of d'Erlon,
in two ranks, the right facing Papelotte and the left supported
on the route of Brussels; the three divisions of Reille, in the
same formation, the right resting on this route and the left not
far from that of Nivelles. The light cavalry of Jacquinot and
Piré, in line of battle in three ranks, flanked the right of d'Erlon
and the left of Reille. In the second line, the infantry of Lobau
established itself in double columns of divisions on the left of
the route of Brussels, and the cavalry of Domon and Subervie
placed itself in serried columns of squadrons along and to the
right of this highway. Prolonging the second line, the
cuirassiers of Milhaud and Kellermann were in line of battle in
two ranks, the former on the right, the latter on the left. The
-12-
170 WATERLOO
Imperial Guard remained in reserve near Rossomme - the
infantry (Young Guard, Middle Guard, and Old Guard), in six
lines, each of four battalions, deployed on both sides of the
route of Brussels; the light cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes
(lancers and chasseurs), in two lines, a hundred paces behind
the cuirassiers of Milhaud; the reserve cavalry of Guyot
(dragoons and grenadiers), likewise in two lines, the same
distance behind the cuirassiers of Kellermann.
The artillery of d'Erlon was in the intervals between the
brigades, that of Reille in front of his line of battle, and that of
Lobau on the left flank. Each division of cavalry had near it
its horse battery. The batteries of the Guard were entirely
in the rear, between Rossomme and the Maison du Roi. The
route of Brussels and the roads which cross it, left free
intentionally, permitted the reinforcements of artillery to move
rapidly on all points.
There were in position nearly 74,000 men and 246 guns.
On the other side of the valley, at 1,300 yards, as the crow
flies, were massed 67,000 Anglo-Dutch. Never in the wars of
the Revolution and Empire had so great a number of
combatants occupied so restricted a field. The distance from the farm
of Mont Saint-Jean, position occupied by the last reserves of
Wellington, to the farm of Caillou, where were the imperial
treasure and the baggage under the protection of a battalion
of chasseurs of the Old Guard, is 4,500 yards, and the front of
each of the two armies was hardly more than three-quarters of
a league in extent. On account of the serrated ridges of the
plateau, the two armies, although in parallel order, were not
square. The English right wing overlapped the centre and
the left was refused. The French Army, having the right in
advance, the left centre in the rear; and the extremity of the
left wing en flèche, formed a concave and enveloping line.
It was nearly eleven o'clock, and all the troops had not
yet reached the positions assigned them. The Emperor even
thought that he would not be able to begin the attack before
one in the afternoon. He returned to his observatory at
Rossomme, where he dictated to Soult the following order: " As soon
as all the Army will have formed in line of battle, probably by
one in the afternoon, the Emperor will give the order to Marshal
Ney, and the attack will begin in order to obtain possession
of the village of Mont Saint-Jean, at the intersection of the
routes. For this purpose, the batteries of l2-pounders of the
The Battle of Waterloo. 171
2nd and 6th Corps will unite with those of the 1st. These
twenty-four pieces of ordnance will fire on the troops at Mont
Saint-Jean, and Count d'Erlon will begin the attack with his
left division supporting it, according to circumstances, with
the other divisions of the 1st Corps. The 2nd Corps will advance
in such a manner as to keep abreast of Count d'Erlon. The
companies of sappers belonging to the 1st Corps will hold
themselves in readiness to barricade themselves immediately in
Mont Saint-Jean."
This order leaves no doubt as to the intention of the
Emperor. His object was to pierce the centre of the English
Army and to throw it back beyond Mont Saint-Jean. Once
master of this position, which commands the plateau, he would
act according to circumstances against the broken enemy -
already he would have virtually gained the victory. Thus
Napoleon forgot or scorned the advice of Reille, that, by reason
of the precision of fire and of the solidity of the English
infantry, one could hope to conquer it only by manoeuvres. He
disdained to manoeuvre.
No doubt an attack against Wellington's right, very
numerous, covered by the village of Braine l'Alleud and the
farm of Hougoumont, and having the village of Merbe Braine
for réduit, would have exacted much time and great efforts;
but the extremity of the enemy's left wing was very weak,
entirely in the air, badly protected and easy to outflank. It
was by Papelotte and La Haye Sainte that one should have
operated at first. It appears that for a moment the Emperor
had an idea of doing so. But what a fine result, for Napoleon,
to inflict a half-defeat upon the English and to throw them
back on Hal and Enghien! He desired the battle to be
decisive. As at Ligny, he sought to pierce the enemy's army in
the centre in order to dislocate and exterminate it. He would
employ his usual tactics - the parallel order, the direct attack,
the assault by masses at the strongest point of the English
front, without other preparation than a deluge of cannon-balls.
The Emperor, it is true, could not well estimate the number
of the English nor the strength of their position. More than
half of the Allied Army was masked by the undulations of the
ground, and General Haxo, charged with ascertaining if there
were any entrenchments in front of the enemy's position, had
reported that he had discovered no trace of any fortifications.
Haxo's sight or judgment was at fault, for the sunken road of
172 WATERLOO.
Ohain, the sand-pit, the barricade across the route of Brussels,
the abatis closing the route of Nivelles, and the farms of
Hougoumont, La Haye Sainte, and Papelotte, could well be
classed as formidable entrenchments.
CHAPTER III.
The Battle of Waterloo.
From Half-past Eleven to Three o'clock.
I. - Attack of Hougoumont by Jérôme Bonaparte's division of Reille's
corps.
II. - Appearance of Bülow's corps upon the heights of Chapelle Saint-
Lambert. - New despatch of Napoleon to Grouchy.
III. - Attack of La Have Sainte and of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean
by the corps of Count d'Erlon.
IV. - Counter-attack of the English of Picton. - Charge of the Horse
Guards of Somerset. - Mishap of the cuirassiers in the hollow
road.
V. - Charge of the dragoons of Ponsonby. - Rout of d'Erlon's infantry
- Counter- charge of the lancers of Jacquinot and the cuirassiers
of Farine. - Burning of Hougoumont.
A few minutes after having dictated the order of attack,
the Emperor thought of preparing for the assault of Mont Saint-
Jean by a demonstration on the side of Hougoumont. By
threatening Wellington's right he might cause him to weaken
his centre. Appreciating, finally, the value of time. Napoleon
resolved to make this movement without waiting until all his
troops had reached their positions of battle. About a quarter-
past eleven o'clock Reille received the order to occupy the
approaches of Hougoumont.
Reille charged with this minor operation Prince Jérôme
whose four regiments formed his left. In order to protect the
movement, a division battery of the 2d Corps opened fire
against the positions of the enemy. Three English batteries,
established upon the edge of the plateau, to the east of the
route of Nivelles, replied. At the first cannon-shot some
English officers looked at their watches. It was thirty-five minutes
past eleven.
During this artillery duel, in which soon took part other
batteries of the English right, a part of Reille's artillery and
the horse batteries of Kellermann (the latter by command of
the Emperor), Bauduin's brigade of Jérôme's division, preceded
173
174 WATERLOO.
by its skirmishers, descended into the valley in columns of
echelons. At the same time the lancers of Piré made a
demonstration along the route of Nivelles. The 1st Light, having
at its head Jérôme and General Bauduin, the latter of whom
was killed at the beginning of the combat, attacked the wood
with the bayonet. In spite of the obstinate defence of the 1st
Nassau Battalion and of a company of Hanoverian carabiniers,
the French succeeded in establishing themselves on the
outskirts of the wood. There still remained three hundred yards
of very thick undergrowth to be conquered. The 3rd of the Line
entered the wood behind the 1st Light. The enemy retired
step by step, concealing himself behind each cluster of trees,
delivering his fire at almost point-blank range, and incessantly
resuming the offensive. One hour was required to clear the
wood of the Nassauers and the companies of English Guards
who had come to reinforce them.
On debouching from the wood, the French found
themselves at thirty steps from the Chateau of Hougoumont, a vast
stone building, and from the park wall, six feet in height. It
was simply a question of Jérôme "remaining in the valley
behind the wood and throwing out towards the front a strong
line of skirmishers." But, either because the order had been
badly understood or expressed, or because the brother of the
Emperor was unwilling to limit himself to this passive role, or
because the soldiers, who were very much animated, advanced
spontaneously, the French rushed to the assault. Wall and
ramparts were pierced with loopholes, through which the
English opened a sustained fire. Sheltered behind the walls, they
aimed carefully; fired at point-blank range, every bullet found
its billet. The soldiers of Jérôme wasted their shots at an
invisible enemy. Some attempted to break down the great gate
with the butt-ends of their muskets; but the gate being built
in a re-entering angle, they were exposed to a fire in front and
flank. Others, who endeavoured to scale the wall by climbing
upon each other's shoulders, were spitted on the bayonets of
the English. The dead and wounded accumulated in heaps
at the foot of Hougoumont. The assailants sought shelter
in the wood.
General Guilleminot, Jérôme's chief of staff, advised him
to confine himself to this first attack, to break off the combat,
and to simply occupy the wood. Reille, according to his
relation of the battle, sent analogous orders. But Jérôme
The Battle of Waterloo. 175
remained deaf to all entreaty. He was bent on carrying the
position. He summoned his second brigade (General Soye) to
relieve in the wood Bauduin's brigade, and with the survivors of
this brigade he turned Hougoumont by the west. His column,
which was no longer covered, marched under the fire of the
English batteries, firing at a range of six hundred yards. It
reached, however, the northern façade of Hougoumont and
delivered the assault.
Whilst Colonel de Cubières falls, severely wounded, from
his horse, a giant, surnamed The Crusher, Lieutenant Legros,
seizes the axe of a sapper and breaks a panel of the gate. A
handful of soldiers throw themselves with him into the court.
Surrounded on all sides by the English, they are all shot,
exterminated - not one escapes. At this moment the French
column is assailed by four companies of Coldstreams, sole
reinforcement which Wellington, who watches from a distance
the combat, but who is not deceived as to the importance of
the attack of Hougoumont, has judged necessary to send there.
Taken between two fires, the decimated battalions of Jérôme
withdraw, part into the wood and part towards the route of
Nivelles.
II.
During this combat the Emperor prepared for his great
attack. He reinforced with the 8-pounders of the 1st Corps
and three batteries of the Guard the twenty-four 12-pounders
which at first had been thought sufficient to cannonade the
centre of the enemy's position. Thus there was formed, in
front of and to the right of La Belle Alliance, a formidable
battery of eighty guns. It was nearly one o'clock. Ney sent
one of his aides-de-camp to Rossomme to inform the Emperor
that everything was ready and that he awaited the order to
attack. Before the smoke from all these guns had interposed
a screen between the hills, Napoleon wished to take a last look
at the field of battle.
At nearly two leagues to the northeast he saw, as it were, a
dark cloud which seemed to issue from the wood of Chapelle
Saint Lambert. Although his experienced eye left no doubt
in his mind, he at first hesitated to admit that it was troops.
He consulted his entourage. All the field-glasses of the staff
were directed upon that point. As often happens in such cases,
there was a difference of opinion. Some of the officers insisted
176 WATERLOO.
that it was not troops, but a cluster of trees, or the shadow of a
passing cloud; others saw a column on the march, and even
claimed to be able to distinguish French and Prussian uniforms.
Soult said that he recognized plainly a numerous corps stacking
arms.
One was not long in being fully informed. As a
detachment of cavalry started at a gallop to reconnoitre these troops,
a subaltern of the 1st Silesian Hussars, whom the hussars of
Colonel Marbot had just captured near Lasne, was brought to
the Emperor. He was the bearer of a letter from Bülow to
Wellington, announcing the arrival of the IV. Corps at Chapelle
Saint-Lambert. This hussar, who spoke French, showed no
hesitancy in telling all he knew. "The troops in the distance,"
said he, "are the advance guard of General Bülow. All our
army passed the night around Wavre. We have seen no
French troops, and supposed that they were on the march
towards Plancenoit."
The presence of a Prussian corps at Chapelle Saint-Lambert,
which would have perplexed the Emperor some minutes
earlier, at the time when he treated as "chimerical" the words
of Jérôme concerning the projected junction of the two Allied
Armies, now occasioned very little surprise, for he had received
in the meantime this letter from Grouchy, dated at Gembloux,
at six in the morning: "Sire, all my reports and information
confirm the supposition that the enemy is retiring towards
Brussels in order to concentrate there or to deliver battle
after having united with Wellington. The 1st and 2nd Corps of
Blücher's army appear to be directing themselves, the 1st on
Corbaix and the 2nd on Chaumont. These troops, no doubt,
started from Tourinnes yesterday at half-past eight in the
evening, and have marched all night; fortunately, the weather
has been so unfavourable that they can not have made much
progress. I am just starting for Sart-à-Walhain, from whence
I shall proceed to Corbaix and Wavre." This despatch was
less reassuring than that of the day before. Instead of the
two Prussian corps retreating in two columns, one on Wavre
and the other on Liege, Grouchy announced that these two
columns were marching concentrically towards Brussels, with
the probable design of uniting with Wellington. He no longer
spoke of preventing their junction; and, if it might be
conjectured that he would manoeuvre to this effect by advancing
on Wavre, he seemed to be in no hurry, since at six in the
The Battle of Waterloo. 177
morning he had not yet left Gembloux. Doubtless the Emperor
had a right to hope that the Prussians would march straight
on Brussels; but it was also very possible that they would
join the English by a flank march.
In order to ward off this possible danger, the Emperor
decided very late to send new instructions to Grouchy. It is
almost certain that Grouchy's letter had reached the imperial
headquarters between ten and eleven o'clock. It was only at
one, a few minutes before discovering the Prussian masses
upon the heights of Chapelle Saint-Lambert, that the Emperor
caused Soult to write to Grouchy: "Your movement on
Corbaix and Wavre is in conformity with the dispositions of
His Majesty. Nevertheless, the Emperor orders me to say to
you that you should continue to manoeuvre in our direction
and seek to draw near the Army (French), in order that you
may be able to join us before any hostile corps can interpose
itself between us. I do not indicate the direction for you to
follow. It is for you to see the point where we are, in order
that you may regulate your movements accordingly and
connect our communications, as well as be always in position to
fall upon any troops of the enemy who may seek to threaten
our right and crush them."
This despatch had not been forwarded when the Prussian
columns appeared in the distance. A few minutes after, the
Emperor, having interrogated the captive hussar, caused this
postscript to be added: "A letter which has just been
intercepted declares that General Bülow is to attack our right
flank. We believe that we see now this corps upon the heights
of Saint-Lambert. So you will not lose an instant in
approaching and joining us, in order that you may crush Bülow,
whom you will take in the very act."
The Emperor then was not greatly alarmed. Though
judging that the situation was seriously modified, he did not
regard it as compromised. The reinforcement on its way to
join Wellington consisted, after all, of only a single Prussian
corps, for the prisoner had not said that all the army was
following Bülow. This army was probably yet at Wavre.
Either Grouchy would overtake and attack it there and,
consequently, prevent it from joining Bülow; or, renouncing the
pursuit of Blücher, he was already on the march towards
Plancenoit by way of Mousty, as the hussar supposed, and was
bringing to the principal French Army a reinforcement of
178 WATERLOO.
33,000 bayonets. The Emperor, who deceived himself easily,
and who wished especially to deceive others, said to Soult:
"We had this morning ninety chances out of a hundred in our
favour. We still have sixty against forty. And if Grouchy
repairs the horrible fault which he has committed in amusing
himself at Gembloux and marches with rapidity, the victory
will be more decisive, for the corps of Bülow will be entirely
destroyed."
Nevertheless, as Grouchy might be late in arriving, and as
the advance guard of Bülow was in sight, the Emperor took
incontinently some measures to protect the flank of the army.
The light cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie were
detached upon the right, in order to observe the enemy,
occupy all the debouches, and connect with the heads of
columns of Marshal Grouchy as soon as they should appear.
Count Lobau received the order to establish the 6th Corps
behind this cavalry, in a good intermediate position, where it
could hold in check the Prussians.
III.
It was nearly half-past one. The Emperor sent to Ney
the order to attack. The battery of eighty guns opened with
the noise of thunder a rapid fire, to which the English artillery
replied. After a half-hour's cannonade the great battery
suspended for an instant its fire, in order to permit the infantry of
d'Erlon to pass. The four divisions marched in echelons, the
left in advance, with an interval of four hundred yards between
each echelon. The division of Allix formed the first echelon,
that of Donzelot the second, that of Marcognet the third, and
that of Durutte the fourth. Ney and d'Erlon conducted the
assault.
Instead of forming these troops in columns of attack -
that is to say, in columns of battalions, with regular intervals
between each battalion; a tactical formation favourable to
rapid deployments as well as formation in squares - each
echelon was made up of a succession of deployed battalions,
each following the other, at short intervals between. The
divisions of Allix, Donzelot, and Marcognet (Durutte had taken
it on himself not to conform to this disposition) thus presented
three compact phalanxes, with fronts varying from 160 to 200
files and a depth of 80 men. Who had prescribed such a
The Battle of Waterloo. 179
formation, perilous under all circumstances, and doubly so upon
this difficult ground? Ney, or rather d'Erlon, commanding
the army corps. At all events, it was not the Emperor, for in
his general order of eleven o'clock nothing similar had been
specified; nothing had even been said of an attack in echelons.
Upon the battle-field Napoleon rightly left all initiative
pertaining to the execution to his lieutenants.
Irritated at not having fought the day before, the soldiers
burned to grapple with the enemy. They rushed forward with
cries of "Long live the Emperor!" and descended into the
valley under the vault of iron formed by English and French
cannon-balls which passed over their heads. The French
batteries had recommenced firing as soon as the columns had
reached the dead angle. The advance of Allix's division
(Quiot's brigade) moved, by a slight conversion to the left,
against the orchard of La Haye Sainte, from whence came a
heavy fire. Bourgeois' brigade, forming alone, henceforth, the
left echelon, continued its march towards the plateau. The
soldiers of Quiot quickly dislodged from the orchard the
German companies and assailed the farm. But, no more than at
Hougoumont, no one had thought of making a breach in these
buildings with a few cannon-balls. The French vainly
attempted numerous assaults against the high and solid walls,
from behind which the Germans of Major Baring kept up a
murderous fire. One battalion turned the farm, escaladed the
garden wall, and dislodged the defenders, who re-entered the
buildings; but it could not demolish the walls with the butt-
ends of their muskets.
Wellington stood on foot under a great elm planted to
the west of the route of Brussels, at the intersection of this
route with the road of Ohain. During almost the entire battle
he remained on this spot with his staff and the Allied
commissioners, Pozo di Borgo, who received a slight contusion;
Baron de Vincent, who was wounded; Muffling, and Generals
Hugel and Alava. Seeing the French completely surrounding
La Haye Sainte, Wellington directed Ompteda to send to the
assistance of Baring a battalion of the German Legion. The
Germans descended to the west of the main highway, recaptured
the garden and, passing to the west of the farm, advanced
towards the orchard. At this moment they were charged by
the cuirassiers of General Travers, whom the Emperor had
detached from Milhaud's corps to second the attack of the
180 WATERLOO.
infantry. The cuirassiers rode them down and, with the same
élan, came to sabre on the edge of the plateau the skirmishers
of Kielmansegge's brigade.
To the east of the route the other columns of d'Erlon had
climbed the ascent under the fire of the batteries, the bullets
of the 95th English and the musketry of Bylandt's brigade,
deployed in front of the road of Ohain. The charge beat, and
the pace increased in spite of the tall wheat which impeded
the march, and of the drenched and slippery ground through
which the soldiers floundered. The cries of "Long live the
Emperor!" drowned at intervals the noise of the detonations.
Bourgeois' brigade (left echelon) repulsed the skirmishers,
assailed the sand-pit, dislodged from it the carabiniers of the 95th
and thrust them back upon the plateau, beyond the hedges,
which it attained in their pursuit. Donzelot's division (second
echelon) attacked the right of Bylandt, whilst Marcognet's
division (third echelon) advanced towards the left of this brigade.
The Dutch-Belgians fell back, repassed in disorder the hedges
of the road of Ohain, and in their flight, broke the ranks of the
28th English. On his side, Durutte, who commanded the
fourth echelon, dislodged from the farm of Papelotte the light
companies of Nassau; he was already half-way up the incline,
threatening the Hanoverians of Best.
In the Imperial Staff every one thought that "the affair
was getting on admirably." In fact, if the enemy was still in
possession of his advance posts of Hougoumont and La Haye
Sainte, these posts were outflanked, surrounded, and the left
centre of his line of battle was seriously threatened. The
cuirassiers of Travers and the skirmishers of d'Erlon seemed on
the point of crowning the plateau, followed closely by the
infantry. Let these troops make yet a few more steps, let them
maintain themselves upon these positions long enough to permit
the reserve cavalry "to deal the coup de massue," and factory
is certain.
IV.
The vicious formation of d'Erlon's columns, which had
already delayed their march and doubled their losses in the
ascension of the plateau, was about to lead to a disaster.
After the skirmishers had overthrown the Dutch of Bylandt,
Donzelot's division advanced within thirty steps of the road.
There Donzelot had halted his column to deploy it. During
The Battle of Waterloo. 181
the ascension of the hill the battalions had still further
contracted their intervals. They formed but one dense mass.
The deployment, or rather the attempt to deploy - for it does
not appear that the French succeeded in executing the
manoeuvre - consumed a great deal of time. Each command
increased the confusion. The enemy profited by this respite.
When the French batteries had opened fire, Picton's division
(brigades of Kempt and Pack)' had retrograded, by order of
Wellington, 150 yards from the road. The men were there,
in line, but lying on the ground in order to avoid the
projectiles. Picton saw the Dutch in rout and the French
skirmishers pushing through the hedges and advancing boldly
against a battery. He ordered his men to rise, and pushed
Kempt's brigade as far as the road. It drove back the
skirmishers, passed through the hedge, and then, discovering
Donzelot's column, occupied in deploying, saluted this column with
a file-fire at forty steps. Fired upon unexpectedly, and
surprised in the midst of their formation, the French made
instinctively, involuntarily, a slight retrograde movement.
Picton, seizing the moment, cried: "Charge! Charge!
Hurrah!" The English passed through the second hedge and
hurled themselves with fixed bayonets upon this disorderly
mass, which resisted from its very weight. Though repeatedly
repulsed, the English returned to the charge. The distance
was so slight that the discharges set fire to the clothing of the
combatants. During this hand-to-hand fight a French officer
was killed in the act of capturing the flag of the 32nd English,
and the intrepid Picton fell dead, struck by a ball in the temple.
The column of Marcognet (third echelon) had arrived
almost on a line with that of Donzelot at the moment of the flight
of the Dutch. Marcognet, not having believed it possible to
deploy his division, had continued his march and had passed
beyond Donzelot, who had halted. Already, with his leading
regiment, crying victory, he had passed through the double
hedge and was advancing against a Hanoverian battery, when,
to the shrill sounds of the pibroch, the Scotch brigade of Pack
advanced by battalions, deployed in four ranks. At less than
twenty yards, the 92nd Highlanders opened fire; soon after the
other Scotch fired. On account of their dense formation, the
French could only reply from the front of a single battalion.
They delivered one volley and rushed forward with the bayonet.
The two lines clashed together; the first ranks were mingled
182 WATERLOO.
in a furious mêlée. "I pushed a soldier in front of me," relates
an officer of the 45th Regiment. "I saw him fall at my feet
from a sabre-blow. I raised my head. It was the English
cavalry who were riding through our ranks and cutting us
to pieces."
As the French were on the point of crowning the plateau,
the cuirassiers of Travers on the west of the highway and the
columns of d'Erlon on the east, Lord Uxbridge had ordered
the élite of his cavalry to charge. Somerset's four regiments
of Horse Guards (1st and 2nd Life Guards, Blues, and Dragoons
of the King) started at a gallop in line. In a few strides of their
horses they arrived within pistol-shot of the cuirassiers,
separated from them by the road of Ohain. West of the route of
Brussels this road extended for the distance of 400 yards
between two steep banks, which disappeared farther on. The
left of Travers and the right of Somerset charged each other
at a gallop upon the level part of the road. But the right
companies of the cuirassiers encountered the trench. They
resolutely descended the outer slope and gave the spur to their
horses in order to mount the opposite bank when, thirty feet
above them, they beheld the glittering sabres of the 2nd Life
Guards, coming at full speed. In order to avoid being
completely crushed, for time and space were lacking to deliver the
charge, the cuirassiers threaded the hollow road in confusion,
regained the highway near Wellington's elm, and rallied in a
field near the sand-pit. The Life Guards, who had pursued
them in skirting the edge of the route, charged them before
they had re-formed; and, after a hand-to-hand combat in which,
said Lord Somerset, "the blows of the sabres on the cuirasses
sounded like braziers at work," they overthrew some of the
cuirassiers in the excavation of the sand-pit. The main body
of Travers' brigade was broken and forced back to the bottom
of the valley by the other regiments of Somerset, who, better
mounted than the cuirassiers, had also the superiority of
numbers and the advantage of position on their side.
V.
At the same time Ponsonby's brigade of dragoons (Royals,
Inniskillings, and Scots-Greys) had launched itself against the
columns of d'Erlon. The Royals debouched from the route of
Brussels, jostled Bourgeois' brigade, which was fighting with
The Battle or Waterloo. 183
the 95th, concealed behind the hedges, and repulsed it as far
as the sand-pit. The Inniskillings crossed the road through
the openings made in the double hedge to facilitate the artillery
fire, and assailed the column of Donzelot. The Scots-Greys,
thus named on account of the colour of their horses, arrived in
the rear of the battalions of Pack, which opened their ranks to
let them pass. Highlanders and Scots-Greys saluted each
other with the cry, "Scotland forever!" and the horsemen fell
with impetuosity upon the division of Marcognet. Smitten in
front by the fire of the infantry, charged on both flanks by the
cavalry, and paralysed by their dense formation, the unwieldy
French columns could offer but slight resistance. The men
recoiled one upon the other, and the press became so great that
they lacked the space necessary for firing at, and even for
striking with their side-arms, the horsemen who penetrated
their disorganized ranks. Muskets were discharged in the air,
and the bayonet thrusts, badly directed, missed the mark.
It was pitiful to behold the English cavalry overthrowing and
traversing these fine divisions like miserable flocks of sheep.
Drunk with carnage, encouraging each other to slay, the
enemy's horsemen pierced and hewed merrily in the throng.
The columns were broken, truncated, dispersed, and rolled to
the bottom of the valley under the sabres of the dragoons.
Bourgeois' brigade, which had rallied at the sand-pit, was
thrown in disorder and drawn along helter-skelter with the
fugitives and horsemen. Quiot's brigade abandoned the
attack of La Haye Sainte. Above Papelotte, the division of
Durutte suffered on its right flank the charges of Vandeleur's
dragoons (11th, 12th and 13th Regiments), seconded by the
Dutch dragoons and Belgian hussars of Ghigny. Though
broken at first, it withdrew without serious loss and repassed
the ravine, still surrounded by the cavalry. There no longer
remained a single Frenchman on the slopes of Mont Saint-Jean.
Carried away by their horses, from which, it is said, they
had received the order to remove the curb-chains, and excited
by the pace, noise, combat, and victory, the English traversed
the valley at a furious pace and began to mount the opposite
hill. In vain Lord Uxbridge sounded the retreat. His horse-
men heard or wished to hear nothing, and climbed at a rapid
gallop the French positions.
They were powerless to make any impression on them.
The Life Guards and dragoons were decimated by the fire of
184 WATERLOO.
Bachelu's division, established near the hillock to the west of
the highway. The Scots-Greys encountered half-way up the
slope two division batteries, sabred the gunners and drivers,
overturned the guns in a ravine, and then assailed the great
battery. The lancers of Colonel Martigue charged them in
flank and exterminated them, whilst those of Colonel Bro
disengaged the division of Durutte from the murderous clutches
of Vandeleur's dragoons. "Never," says Durutte, "had I
seen so well the superiority of the lance over the sabre." It
was in this melee that the valiant General Ponsonby met his
death. Unhorsed by a subaltern of the 4th Lancers, named
Urban, he had surrendered, when some of his Scots-Greys
returned to rescue him. Urban, fearing to lose his prisoner, had
the sad courage to plunge his lance through the body of the
General; after which he threw himself on the dragoons and
killed three.
The magnificent charge of the lancers was soon supported
by General Farine's brigade of cuirassiers. The Emperor,
seeing the Scots-Greys on the point of attacking the great
battery, had sent the order to General Delort, one of Milhaud's
generals of division, to launch against them two regiments.
Lancers and cuirassiers swept the acclivities of La Belle
Alliance, the entire valley, and pursued the Horse Guards and
dragoons as far as the first slopes of Mont Saint-Jean, beyond
La Haye Sainte. The light cavalry brigades of Vivian and
Van Merlen, which had followed the movement of Lord
Uxbridge at a distance, deemed it prudent to take no part in this
engagement.
There was a lull in the action. On both sides the soldiers
regained their positions. The hill-sides, an instant before
covered with combatants, were abandoned to the dead and
wounded. "The dead," says an English officer, "were in
many spots as thick as the overturned pawns on a chess-
board." The ground presented that desolate appearance of a
stricken field on the morrow of a battle, and the battle had
just begun!
During this lull in the combat a cuirassier detached himself
from his regiment, which was re-forming at La Belle Alliance,
and, at a gallop, descended the great route. He was seen to
traverse all that mortuary valley, in which he was the sole
living being. The Germans posted at La Haye Sainte
supposed that he was a deserter, and refrained from firing on him.
The Battle of Waterloo. 185
When he had arrived opposite the orchard, at the foot of the
hedge, he raised his gigantic body straight up in his stirrups,
waved his sabre, and cried, "Long live the Emperor!" Then,
under a hail of bullets, he returned into the French lines in a
few strides of his vigorous horse.
At Hougoumont the battle had continued more and more
ardent. Three companies of English Guards, a battalion of
Brunswick, one of the German Legion of Duplat, and two
regiments of Foy, had successively reinforced defenders and
assailants. The French, once more in possession of the wood
after having lost it, captured the orchard; but the English
Guards held fast to the garden, which was surrounded by a
slight wall with a natural banquette, and maintained
themselves in the farm. By order of the Emperor, a battery of
howitzers bombarded the buildings. A fire started in a granary
spread and devoured the chateau, the house of the farmer, the
cattle-sheds, and stables. The English withdrew into the
chapel, the granges, the house of the gardener, and the
adjacent hollow road, and recommenced their fusillade. The
conflagration itself was an obstacle to the French. In the
burning cattle-sheds, from which the ambulances established
by the English had not been removed, were heard vain appeals
for help and cries of despair.
-13-
CHAPTER IV
The Battle of Waterloo.
From Three o'clock until Seven.
I. - Second attack of La Haye Sainte. - The order from Ney to Milhaud.
II. - First and second charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud and of the
light cavalry of the Guard. - Order from the Emperor to the
cuirassiers of Kellermann and to the cavalry of Guyot.
III. - Entrance into line of Bülow's corps. - Lobau's defence. - Capture
and recapture of Plancenoit.
IV. - Third and fourth charges of the cuirassiers of Milhaud, supported
by those of Kellermann, the dragoons, and horse grenadiers of
the Guard.
V. - General attack of the plateau by the infantry of Reille and d'Erlon
and by the débris of the cavalry. - Capture of la Haye Sainte.
- The English line shaken. - New combats at Plancenoit.
I.
Wellington's sole object was to hold his positions until
the entrance into line of the Prussian Army. This movement,
was delayed longer than he expected. He had hoped that
Blücher would commence the attack at two o'clock; it was
now half-past three, and the Prussians seemed to be in no hurry
to unmask themselves. In the English Staff it was feared that
it would be impossible to resist a second assault.
Napoleon had his anxieties. Major La Fresnaye had just
delivered to him Grouchy's letter, written from Walhain, at
half-past eleven. In this very unsatisfactory despatch two
things especially struck the Emperor - one was that Grouchy
had marched very slowly, since at half-past nine o'clock he was
still three leagues from Wavre; the other, that the Marshal
seemed to pay very little attention to what was passing on his
left, and demanded orders to manoeuvre the next day in the
eccentric direction of La Chyse. It became evident that, unless
Grouchy had conceived the idea at noon of marching to the
sound of the cannon, he would be unable to attack in flank
the corps of Bülow, already in position at Chapelle Saint-
Lambert. At most the Marshal would be able to fall on the
rear of this corps or detain far from the field of battle, by an
186
The Battle of Waterloo. 187
attack pressed home, the other corps of the Prussian Army.
Should we be astonished that the Emperor did not immediately
send back La Fresnaye with new instructions for Grouchy?
These instructions, which would have been none other "than
to draw near the Army, in order to fall upon the ho; tile column
which should attempt to molest the right wing," had already
been sent by Napoleon to his lieutenant at a quarter-past one.
He could have only reiterated them, and very tardily at that!
The presence of Bülow at Chapelle Saint-Lambert, the
bloody check of Count d'Erlon, and the distance of Grouchy
were perhaps sufficient reasons to cause the Emperor to break
off the combat, as at Essling, and to take up a defensive position
upon the plateau of La Belle Alliance. It does not seem that
this expedient, which at most would have been good only for
the day, ever occurred to him. The next day the French
Army, even though reinforced by Grouchy, would have had
to deliver battle almost in the proportion of 1 to 2 to the
united armies of Wellington and Blücher. The Emperor
preferred to profit by the expectancy in which Bülow appeared
to remain, in order to overthrow the English before the entrance
into line of the Prussians.
As soon as d'Erlon had rallied some of his battalions, about
half-past three, the Emperor ordered Ney to attack La Have
Sainte again. He intended to use that position as a base for a
combined movement with the corps of d'Erlon, that of Reille,
which he thought would be soon in possession of
Hougoumont, all the cavalry, and finally the Foot Guard. Ney led
against La Haye Sainte Quiot's brigade, whilst one of
Donzelot's brigades, deployed as skirmishers, scaled the hill to the
east of the route of Brussels to attack in the rear the English
concealed behind the hedges of the road of Chain. The attack
failed. The skirmishers of Donzelot were repulsed; and the
soldiers of Quiot, decimated by the point-blank fire of the
Germans of Major Baring, who had just received a
reinforcement of two companies, withdrew into the orchard.
To second this assault, the great battery redoubled its fire
against the left centre of the enemy's position, whilst the
batteries of Reille, reinforced by a part of the 12-pounders of the
Guard, cannonaded incessantly the right centre. It was at
this period of the battle that the artillery fire was most intense.
"Never," says General Alten, "had the oldest soldiers heard
such a cannonade." Some battalions of the first English line
188 WATERLOO.
retrograded a hundred steps in order to shelter themselves be"
hind the crest of the plateau. At the same time groups of
wounded, convoys of prisoners, empty caissons, and crowds of
fugitives streamed towards the Forest of Soignes. Ney, who
saw with difficulty through the smoke, mistook these
movements for the beginning of a retreat, and thought of
establishing himself upon the plateau with the cavalry. He
summoned immediately a brigade of cuirassiers.
The aide-de-camp addressed himself to General Farine,
who put his two regiments on the march. But General Delort,
commanding the division, arrested the movement. "We take
orders only from Count Milhaud," said he. Ney, impatient,
hastened to Delort. The Marshal was greatly irritated at this
disobedience. He not only reiterated the orders concerning
Farine's brigade, but he ordered the other fix regiments of
Milhaud's corps to advance. Delort having again
remonstrated against the imprudence of this manoeuvre upon such
unfavourable ground, Ney invoked the instructions of the
Emperor. "Forward!" cried he; "it is a question of the safety
of France." Delort obeyed. The two divisions of cuirassiers
started at a rapid trot, and behind them moved the red lancers
and chasseurs of the Guard. Did these regiments follow the
movement by order of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, to whom Milhaud
had said when starting, "I am going to charge; support me,"
or did they advance spontaneously - seized, as it were, by an
irresistible desire to charge at sight of their comrades hastening
against the enemy, whose retreat had begun, and desirous of
having their share of the English to sabre?
Since the beginning of the battle Ney had thought of a
great cavalry action, of which he had spoken to the Emperor,
who had for this purpose placed under his command the corps
of cuirassiers and even the Horse Guard. The Prince of the
Moskowa promised himself immense results from this charge.
He who was classed, says Foy, among the first cavalry leaders
of the Army, was proud of having to lead it. He talked it over
with Drouot, assuring him that he was certain of success.
Ney at first, who was to engage the cavalry only after having
received the Emperor's order, had only wished to establish
himself upon the plateau with a brigade of cuirassiers. Then
the idea had occurred to him to hasten the retreat of the
English by launching against them all the cuirassiers of Milhaud.
This is why he had ordered these two divisions to advance.
The Battle of Waterloo. 189
Perhaps, however, he would have hesitated to engage them
without further orders from Napoleon; but when he saw
descending into the valley of La Haye Sainte, with this multitude
of mailed squadrons, the horse chasseurs and red lancers of the
Guard, he did not doubt that it was in accordance with the
instructions of the Emperor, who had judged the hour
propitious for the grand attack. Otherwise, would the cavalry
of the Guard have followed the cuirassiers? It appears almost
certain, however, that Napoleon had seen nothing of this
movement. From the low ground where the divisions of
Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes were in position, it was possible
for them to reach the route of Brussels, cross it close by La
Belle Alliance, and descend into the valley without being seen
by the Emperor, stationed near the Decoster house. But
Marshal Ney was none the less justified in supposing that this
glittering mass of 5,000 horsemen had not escaped the eye of
Napoleon. He formed in haste these magnificent squadrons
in the valley, to the left of the route of Brussels, and, placing
himself at their head, launched them against the English Army.
II.
Wellington thought so little of retreating that he had just
reinforced his front of battle with many brigades from his
second line and reserve. The Brunswickers advanced to the
support of the Guards of Maitland, and the brigades of Mitchell
and Adam crossed the route of Nivelles to establish themselves
above Hougoumont, in front of the road of Ohain. One was
not, however, without anxiety in the Allied Army. The staff
watched anxiously the French positions, seeking to discover
what movement was being prepared by Napoleon, when the
cavalry descended towards La Haye Sainte. The surprise of
the English was great and many of their fears were dissipated.
"We were astonished," says Kennedy, "that one should attack
with cavalry an infantry as yet unshaken and which, thanks
to the undulations of the ground behind which it was lying,
had suffered little from the cannonade." In an instant the
men were on their feet, formed in squares. The batteries
remained in front of the line of battle, on the very edge of the
plateau. The artillery horses were sent to the rear, and the
cannoneers received the order to fire until the last moment,
then to abandon their guns and seek refuge in the squares.
190 WATERLOO.
The French cavalry advanced in columns of squadrons in
echelons, the cuirassiers on the right and the chasseurs and
chevau-légers on the left. The direction was slightly oblique,
the first echelons manoeuvring to approach the level part of
the road of Ohain, and the left eschelons making a change of
front towards the acclivities that rise above Hougoumont. In
this movement they presented their flank to the fire of the
enemy's artillery. As soon as the cuirassiers began to debouch
from the low grounds where they had formed, the French
batteries ceased firing and those of the English accelerated their
fire. The guns were double-shotted with ball and canister,
or chain-shot - a whirlwind of iron. Passing through the miry
and rain-drenched bottoms, in which they sometimes sank up
to their knees, and impeded by the tall rye which swept their
chests, the horses mounted at a slow trot the steep slopes. By
accelerating their fire, the batteries were able to make many
discharges. A last salvo, at forty yards, from the batteries of
Lloyd and Cleeves, established on the spot where rises to-day
the Mound of the Lion, mowed down half of the leading
squadrons. The survivors halted for some seconds, appearing to
hesitate. The charge sounded more vibrant; and with cries of
"Long live the Emperor!" the cuirassiers hurled themselves
on the guns. One after the other, all the batteries were taken.
A superb feat of arms, but an illusory capture. There were no
teams to carry off the guns and no spikes to put them out of
service. It would have been possible to have overturned them
in the ravine and, in default of nails, to have forced into the
touch-holes of the cannon the ramrods of pistols. But nothing
of the kind was thought of; not an officer even thought of
causing the sponge-staffs to be broken.
The cannon are silenced, but the musketry rolls and
crepitates. Between the route of Nivelles and the highway of
Brussels twenty English, Hanoverian, Brunswick, and German
battalions form two lines of squares, arranged checker-wise. The
bullets strike and ricochet against the cuirasses with the noise
of hail upon a slate roof. Cuirassiers and lancers, their ranks
already, broken by the fire, the ascension of the hill, and even
the passage of this hedge of the cannon, burst on the squares..
But, from the edge of the plateau where they take the gallop
to the first line of infantry, the field is insufficient. The charge
lacks élan and consequently vigour. The English are in squares
in three ranks, the first rank kneeling, the butt-ends of the
The Battle of Waterloo. 191
muskets supported against the ground, and the inclined
bayonets forming chevaux-de-frise. In spite of their valour and rage,
the horsemen are unable to pierce these walls of men. They
oblique to the right and left and, under the cross-fires, charge
the squares in the second line. Squadron succeeds squadron,
like the waves of the sea. The sea of cavalry inundates all the
plateau. Cuirassiers, chasseurs, and red lancers circle round
the squares, assail them on their four faces, strike at the angles,
beat down the bayonets with their sabres, discharge their pistols
at close range, and in hand-to-hand combats open some partial
breaches, which are closed as soon as made.
Lord Uxbridge saw this mêlée. Two-thirds of his cavalry
had not been engaged. He launched against these
disorganized masses the dragoons of Dörnberg, the hussars of
Arenschild, the black lancers of Brunswick, the Dutch carabiniers of
Trip, and the two Dutch-Belgian brigades of Van Merlen and
Ghigny - in all, 5,000 fresh horses. The enemy had numbers
and cohesion in his favour. The French fell back under the
shock, repassed through the intervals between the squares,
and escaped the sabres only to fall under the bullets. They
abandoned the plateau. The gunners hastened to their pieces;
and, along all the crest of the plateau the English batteries
resumed their fire.
Hardly at the bottom of the valley, the valorous soldiers
of Milhaud and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes resume the charge. Again
they climb the miry slopes of Mont Saint-Jean under the iron
hail, take possession of the guns, crown the plateau, burst on
the infantry, and form a circle of glittering sabres around the
squares.
More than one Englishman believed the battle lost.
Many of the reserve batteries made ready to retreat at the first
order. Colonel Gould, of the artillery, said to Mercer: "I am
afraid that all is ended." From La Belle Alliance the Emperor
and his staff had seen these magnificent charges; they saw the
cannon abandoned, the horsemen galloping over the plateau,
the enemy's lines pierced, and the squares surrounded; already
the cry of victory was heard around Napoleon. Napoleon was
surprised and vexed that his cavalry had been engaged without
his order against infantry as yet unbroken. He said to Soult :
"This is a premature movement, the results of which may
prove disastrous." The Major-General inveighed against Ney,
"He is endangering us as at Jena!" The Emperor looked long
192 WATERLOO.
at the field of battle, reflected a moment, and then said: "It
is too soon by an hour; but it is necessary to follow up what
has already been done." He sent one of his aides-de-camp,
General Flahault, to carry to Kellermann the order to charge
with the four brigades of cuirassiers and carabiniers.
Like the Emperor, Kellermann thought the movement of
Milhaud premature; he also believed it imprudent to engage
his own cavalry. He was on the point of stating his reasons
to Flahault when General Lhéritier, who commanded his first
division (cuirassiers and dragoons), started at a rapid trot
without awaiting orders. Kellermann was forced to follow with his
second division, composed of the 2nd and 3rd Cuirassiers and the
1st and 2nd Carabiniers; but not far from Hougoumont he
halted the brigade of carabiniers in a hollow of the ground, and gave
positive instructions to General Blancard not to budge from
there unless he received an order from him. This was a wise
precaution, for these 800 carabiniers were henceforth the only
cavalry reserve left to the Army. Flahault, according to the
instructions of the Emperor, had transmitted the order to
charge not only to Kellermann, but also to General Guyot,
commanding the heavy cavalry of the Guard (dragoons and
horse grenadiers).
The Emperor has said that he had been forced to support
the divisions of Milhaud, as he feared that a check suffered by
the latter, in presence of the entire Army, would discourage
the soldiers and lead to panic and rout. Did he not also hope
to crush the English under a new mass of mailed cavalry?
It was necessary to press the action, to gain at one point, to
hold out at another, to conquer and impose by dint of audacity,
for affairs had become terribly critical. The Emperor was
fighting two battles at the same time, one parallel, the other
oblique: in front, he attacked the English; on his right flank,
he was attacked by the Prussian.
III.
Towards one o'clock Blücher had rejoined, at Chapelle
Saint-Lambert, the main body of Bülow's corps; but, though
he was very anxious to take part in the battle, he judged it
imprudent to engage himself in the defiles of the Lasne before
being assured that he would not be taken en flagrant delit of
march. Three-quarters of an hour later he learned from
The Battle of Waterloo. 193
reconnaissances that, the French being a long way off, he was in
no danger. He at once put his troops in motion in the direction
of Plancenoit. His object was to outflank the right of the
Imperial Army. The march was slow and laborious. When
one follows the rough road that descends from Chapelle Saint-
Lambert, crosses at Lasne the stream of this name, and ascends
the no less precipitous side of the other hill, one wonders how
the Prussian artillery ever managed to pass this defile. All
the energy of Blücher was necessary to accomplish the task.
He was everywhere, reanimating his soldiers exhausted from
fatigue and hunger (on the march since five in the morning, they
had not eaten since the day before), lavishing upon them
encouragements, appeals to duty, familiar and pleasant words.
"Come, comrades," said he to some cannoneers, who were
pushing at the wheels of a gun that had stuck fast in the mud,
"you would not have me miss my word!"
About four o'clock his heads of column attained the wood
of Paris (3,500 yards from Plancenoit) . The division of Losthin
and Hiller established themselves there without firing a shot;
for instead of occupying the avenues of he wood, the cavalry
of General Domon had confined itself to observing its debouches.
In this new position, the Prussians found themselves under
cover. Before unmasking himself, Blücher would have
preferred to await the other two divisions of Bülow, which were
still in the defiles of Lasne. But the messages from Wellington,
urging him to take part in the battle, became more and more
pressing; and he saw, it is said, the cuirassiers in motion upon
the heights of La Belle Alliance. He decided to act with the
force at hand. At half-past four the Prussians debouched:
the infantry of Losthin on the right of the road of Plancenoit,
the infantry of Hiller on the left, and the front covered by two
regiments of cavalry and three light batteries. Blücher
hastened to cannonade the squadrons of Domon; he wished, says
Muffling, to warn and encourage Wellington and at the same
time to prevent Napoleon from crushing the English.
Domon at first opposed offensive to offensive. He over-
threw the Prussian hussars and fell upon the batteries. Over-
whelmed by their fire and by the musketry of Losthin's entire
division, he fell back slowly; then passing in reserve, he
unmasked Lobau's infantry, which had taken position astride
of the road of Lasne, at nearly half a league to the east of
the route of Brussels. The divisions of Simmer and Jamin,
194 WATERLOO.
deployed one behind the other, were en potence, almost
perpendicular to the line of battle. In order to bring them in
line with the front, the Emperor had ordered the Foot Guard
to advance near La Belle Alliance, to the right of the route of
Brussels, save the 1st Regiment of Grenadiers, which remained
near Rossomme, and the 1st Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs,
posted at Caillou. He had at the same time given the order to
Durutte to assail Papelotte and La Haye Sainte, in order to
second the grand attack of Ney and to sever the
communications between Bülow's right and the English left.
Lobau, well knowing that all passive resistance is virtually
condemned, pushed straight against the Prussians, who fell
back. The divisions of Ryssel and Hacke debouched in turn
from the wood. The Prussians resumed the offensive - 30,000
against 10,000 Frenchmen. But Lobau's regiments were of
ancient formation and as solid as rocks. The 5th of the Line,
the first regiment to join Napoleon in the defile of Laffray, and
the 10th of the Line, the only one that had fought for the
Bourbons at the Bridge of Loriol, rivalled each other in enthusiasm
and tenacity. With these fine troops, Lobau presented so
bold a front that Blücher, instead of persisting in his parallel
attack, manoeuvred to outflank the right of the 6th Corps.
The cavalry of Prince William of Prussia and the infantry of
Hiller, supported by the division of Ryssel, advanced on
Plancenoit. Lobau, fearing to be turned, recoiled until abreast
of the village, which he caused to be occupied by a brigade.
Assailed on three points, this brigade was unable to maintain
its position. The enemy forced it out of Plancenoit, in which
he established and entrenched himself. On his front, Blücher
cannonaded the other three brigades of Lobau with eight
batteries, whose balls fell upon the route of Brussels, in the midst
of the battalions of the Guard and even in the Emperor's staff.
At the moment when his infantry attacked Plancenoit,
Blücher had received an aide-de-camp from Thielmann. The
commander of the III Corps announced that he was attacked
in Wavre by superior forces (they were the 30,000 men of
Grouchy), and that he doubted his ability to resist them.
"Let General Thielmann do the best he can," said Gneissenau.
"It matters little if he is crushed at Wavre if we are victorious
here."
With the enemy in possession of Plancenoit, Napoleon
was outflanked and his line of retreat threatened. He ordered
The Battle of Waterloo. 195
Duhesme, commanding the division of the Young Guard, to
retake the village. The eight battalions, four of voltigeurs
and four of tirailleurs, advanced at the charging step. The
Prussians were dislodged from the houses and from the cemetery
of which they had formed a réduit.
IV.
The English still held out. When the heavy cavalry of
Kellermann and Guyot debouched into the valley, between
five and half-past five o'clock, the cuirassiers of Milhaud had
again been forced from the plateau by the English dragoons.
Quickly re-formed, they followed to the charge these three
fresh divisions of Kellermann and Guyot. Cuirassiers of
Lhéritier, Delort, Wathier, and Roussel d'Hurbal, chasseurs
and lancers of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, dragoons and horse
grenadiers of Guyot - more than sixty squadrons - scaled the
plateau. The enemy was surprised to see 8,000 or 10,000
horsemen engaged upon a front where 1,000 at most would
have been able to deploy. They covered the entire space
between Hougoumont and la. Haye Sainte. Their files were so
contracted in the rush that many horses were raised off the
ground by the pressure. This mass of cuirasses, helmets, and
sabres rose and fell upon the rolling ground like billows on the
ocean. To the English it appeared as if a sea of steel were
mounting the plateau.
The enemy renewed the manoeuvre which twice already
had succeeded with him. After having scourged the cavalry
with grape, the gunners abandoned their guns and sought
refuge in the squares. The latter opened at thirty steps a
file-fire, which mowed down entire ranks "like the sweep of a
scythe," and then received the débris of the squadrons upon a
triple rank of bayonets. Charge succeeded charge without
intermission. Some squares suffered five, seven, ten, and even
as many as thirteen assaults. Many were shaken and partially
shattered, if not overthrown and broken. A quartermaster
of the 9th Cuirassiers took an English flag. Captain Klein de
Kleinenberg, of the chasseurs of the Guard, had his horse killed
while capturing the flag of a battalion of the German Legion.
But the greater part of the squares remained impervious to
assault. At moments they seemed submerged by the wave
of cavalry, then they reappeared through the smoke, bristling
196 WATERLOO.
with glittering bayonets, whilst the squadrons spread around
them like waves of the sea that break themselves against a dike.
The cuirassiers of Lhéritier burst through a labyrinth of
fire upon the squares of the second line, pass beyond them, and
are overwhelmed by the reserve batteries. An entire regiment
turns to the left, follows at a terrific pace the route of Nivelles,
sabres the sharpshooters of Mitchell along the road of Braine
l'Alleud, turns Hougoumont, and comes to re-form upon the
plateau of La Belle Alliance. The dragoons of the Guard
engage the light cavalry of Grant, which, occupied all the
afternoon in observing the lancers of Piré in front of Montplaisir
and finally recognizing in the movements of the latter mere
demonstrations, have turned back from the right wing on the
centre. Mercer's battery, the only one whose gunners have
remained at their guns, notwithstanding the order of
Wellington, is a little in the rear, its front sheltered by an
embankment of the road, and its flank protected by two squares of
Brunswick. The horse grenadiers - giants mounted on
enormous horses and their stature still further increased by their
tall bear-skin caps - advance at a trot in line. One would have
said that it was a wall on the march. Under the grape of
Mercer and the cross-fire of the squares of Brunswick this wall
crumbles, covering the ground with its blood stained débris.
At the second charge there is a new butchery. Colonel Jamin,
colonel of the grenadiers, falls mortally wounded across a gun-
carriage. In front of the battery there rises a wall of dead
men and disembowelled horses. "You have a nice lot here,"
laughingly said Colonel Wood to Mercer. The last companies
of grenadiers cross the hideous obstacle, pass between the guns,
and, sabring the gunners, go to mingle their charges with those
of the cuirassiers.
Too numerous for the extent of the ground, all these
squadrons mutually hinder one another. They clash together, cross
one another, break their charges, and mingle their ranks.
The charges, still as ardent as ever, become less and less rapid,
less and less vigorous, and less and less efficacious, in
consequence of this confusion and the exhaustion of the horses,
which, at each stride, sink into the heavy and rain-drenched
soil. The atmosphere is as hot as the blast from the mouth
of a furnace; and the combatants breathe only with the
greatest difficulty. Generals Donop, Delort, Lhéritier, Guyot, and
Roussel d'Hurbal are wounded. Edouard de Colbert charges
The Battle of Waterloo. 197
with his arm in a sling. Wounded also are Generals
Blancard, Dubois, Farino, Guiton, Picquet, Travers, and Wathier.
Marshal Ney, his third horse killed under him, stands alone
near an abandoned battery, wrathfully striking with the flat
of his sword the bronze muzzle of an English cannon. The
entire field of battle is encumbered with non-combatants,
dismounted cuirassiers staggering under the weight of their
armour in the direction of the valley, wounded men dragging
themselves out of the shambles, and riderless horses galloping
wildly under the lash of the bullets which whistle by their ears.
Wellington issues from the square of the 73rd, in which he had
sought refuge during the hottest part of the action, hastens to
his cavalry, and throws it upon these exhausted squadrons,
disunited and broken by their very charges. For the third
time, the French abandon the plateau.
For the fourth time they reascended it, crying, "Long live
the Emperor!" Ney led the charge at the head of the
carabiniers. He had seen at a distance their golden cuirasses, had
hastened to them, and, in spite of the observations of General
Blancard, who opposed the formal order of Kellermann, led
them with him in this race with death.
The persistency of Ney and his heroic horsemen, like him
drunk with rage, bordered on frenzy. This last charge with
squadrons reduced to half of their effectives, with exhausted
men and wind-broken horses, could only end in a new check.
The ascendancy of cavalry over infantry consists solely of
moral effect. What moral effect could one hope to produce
with cavalry upon an infantry which had just learned in
repulsing, with fire and bayonets, numerous charges, that the
tempest of horse was only a scare-crow, and which, in these
two rude hours, long as days, had become assured of its
invincibility? On the contrary, it was the horsemen who were
demoralized by the failure of their attacks, the vanity of their
efforts. They charged with the same intrepidity, but no longer
with the same confidence. They crossed again the line of
batteries; but, after having vainly pushed their harassed horses
on the squares - or, more correctly speaking, on the ramparts
of dead soldiers and slaughtered animals that protected the
face of each square - they fell back of their own accord,
discouraged, desperate, to the bottom of the valley, followed at a
distance, rather than driven by the English cavalry, itself at
the end of its strength.
198 WATERLOO.
V.
These great charges might have succeeded, but on
condition of being supported instantly by infantry. Whilst the
enemy's batteries, passed by the cuirassiers, remained silent,
the infantry could have climbed the slopes without danger of
loss, taken position on the edge of the plateau and attacked
the squares. The English would have been compelled either
to sustain in a vicious formation the fire and assaults of the
infantry, or to deploy, which would have placed them at the
mercy of the horsemen. Bachelu's division and Jamin's
brigade (Foy's division) had remained for many hours at 1,300
yards from the allied position, witnessing with grounded arms
this furious combat. They awaited but an order to go to the
assistance of the cavalry. Ney forgot them. It was only
after the repulse of the fourth charge that he thought of
utilizing these 6,000 bayonets. The six regiments marched by
echelons in columns of divisions. It was too late. The
batteries overwhelmed them, and the allied infantry, which had
extended its front in a circle towards Hougoumont, riddled
them with its convergent fire. "It was a very hail of death,"
says Foy. In a few minutes 1,500 men were killed, wounded,
or dispersed. In spite of all this, the French approached within
pistol-shot of the enemy, but the fresh brigades of Duplat and
William Halkett, having executed an offensive movement
(Duplat was killed at this moment), the columns, truncated
by the cannon-balls, retreated. It was in vain that Marshal
Ney caused them to be supported by a few skeleton squadrons,
notably the carabiniers. In these partial charges, which
succeeded one another until the end of the battle, the horsemen
pierced no more the line of English batteries.
During all the charges of the cavalry Ney, in the fire of
this tumultuous action, had lost sight of his first objective -
the capture of La Haye Sainte. There, as at Hougoumont,
but with less intensity, the fight had continued without result.
And yet the intrepid defenders, supplied with only sixty
cartridges per man, began to decrease their fire. Major Baring
had asked for more ammunition. Wellington gave him none;
but sent a new reinforcement of two companies.
About six o'clock, at the moment when the divisions of
Foy and Bachelu were advancing towards the plateau, the
Emperor traversed the line of battle under a rain of shells and
The Battle of Waterloo. 199
cannon-balls. General Desvaux de Saint-Maurice, commander
in-chief of the artillery of the Guard, General Lallemand,
commanding the foot batteries, and Bailly de Monthyon, chief of
the general staff, were struck down at his side. Napoleon sent
the order to Ney to take possession of La Haye Sainte,
regardless of the cost. It was a new prey pointed out to the Marshal,
a new occasion to meet death.
Ney hurried to the 13th Light (Donzelot's division) and
threw it, with a detachment from the 1st Regiment of
Engineers, against the farm. The bullets, fired at point-blank
range, thinned the ranks of the assailants. Some of the soldiers
sought to disarm the Germans by attempting to draw the
muskets through the loop-holes. In an instant seventy French
fell at the foot of the east wall. Their comrades mounted upon
their bodies to climb on top of the wall, from which they fired
upon the chasseurs of Baring in the court; others climbed upon
the roof of the grange. Lieutenant Vieux, of the engineers, who
fell later, with the rank of colonel, in the breach of Constantine,
struck with heavy blows of the axe upon the gate. He
received one ball in the wrist and another in the shoulder. The
axe passed from hand to hand, the gate finally yielded, and the
wave inundated the court. Driven back into the buildings,
and without ammunition, the Germans defended themselves
with their side-arms. Major Baring, with forty-two men - all
that remained of his nine companies - broke through the mass
of assailants, and regained Mont Saint-Jean.
Ney immediately established a horse battery on a hillock
near La Haye Saint, and pushed a regiment against the sand-
pit, which was abandoned by the 95th English. From these two
positions the cannoneers fired at a range of less than 300 yards,
and the sharpshooters at less than 80, upon the very centre of
the enemy's line. Supported by this fire, which opened a
breach, the débris of the divisions of Allix, Donzelot, and
Marcognet ascended from both sides of the farm as far as the road
of Ohain. French and Allies fired at each other through the
hedges, over the banks, and then rushed on each other with the
bayonet. Ompteda, with the 5th and 8th Battalions of the
German Legion, executed on the great route a counter-attack,
which was at first successful. A ball hurled him mortally
wounded from his horse. The 5th Battalion retired; the 8th,
which was further advanced, was exterminated by a squadron
of cuirassiers. Its flag was captured; its commander. Colonel
200 WATERLOO.
Schrader, was killed; and only thirty men escaped the sabres
of the cuirassiers.
The enemy's left centre (brigades of Kempt, Pack,
Lambert, Best, and Wincke) stood firm; but, on the extreme left,
the Nassauers of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar permitted
themselves, for the second time, to be dislodged from Papelotte
by the division of Durutte, and at the right centre the Allies
were shaken and incapable of further resistance. The
ammunition was exhausted, some of the guns dismounted, and others
without gunners. The Prince of Orange and General Alten,
both wounded, quitted the field of battle. Colonels Gordon
and De Lancey Evans, aides-de-camp of Wellington, were killed.
The cavalry brigades of Somerset and Ponsonby were reduced
to two squadrons between the two brigades; the brigade of
Ompteda had but a handful of men in line; that of
Kielmansegge withdrew behind the village of Mont Saint-Jean, and that
of Kruse recoiled. In the rear the fugitives multiplied. The
hussar regiment of Cumberland turned bridle and scampered
away in the direction of Brussels with its colonel at its head.
Everywhere the ranks grew thinner. The wounded were
numerous, and numerous also were the men who left the ranks
to carry them to the ambulances. There was some disorder
even in the intrepid brigade of Colin Halkett, in which a
battalion was commanded by a simple lieutenant. The flags of
the 30th and 73rd Regiments were prudently sent to the rear.
"The centre of the line was open," says an aide-de-camp
of General Alten. "We were in peril. At no moment was the
issue of the battle more doubtful." In spite of his accustomed
assurance, Wellington became anxious. He saw, indeed, the
black masses of Blücher outflanking the French Army, but he
himself remained without support. He was heard to murmur:
"Night or Blücher!" Already he had despatched towards
Ohain many aides-de-camp to hasten the march of Ziethen's
corps. But his resolution remained as firm as ever. Officers
arrived from all sides to inform him of their desperate situation
and to demand new orders. He coldly replied: "There is no
other order than to hold out to the last man."
The slight recoil of the enemy's line had not escaped the
eye of Marshal Ney. But his soldiers were as exhausted as
those of Wellington. He felt that a few fresh troops would
suffice to reanimate them and overcome the resistance of the
English. He sent Colonel Heymès to ask of the Emperor a
The Battle of Waterloo. 201
small force of infantry. "Troops!" cried Napoleon. "Where
do you think I can get them? Do you think I can make them? "
The Emperor had still eight battalions of the Old Guard
and six of the Middle Guard. If, at this moment, he had given
half of them to Marshal Ney, we may believe, even from the
avowal of the best informed and most judicious English
historian, that this reinforcement would have overthrown the
enemy's centre. But Napoleon, without a cavalry reserve,
did not believe that he had too many men, with all his bear-skin
caps, to maintain his own position. The moment was no less
critical for him than for Wellington. Under a third surge of
Bülow's entire corps, Lobau fell back, and the Young Guard,
after an obstinate resistance, yielded Plancenoit. Once more
the balls from the Prussian batteries laboured the ground near
La Belle Alliance. Napoleon, already outflanked, was
threatened by an irruption of the Prussians in the rear of his line of
battle. He formed eleven battalions of the Guard in as many
squares and stationed them in front of Plancenoit, along the
route of Brussels, from La Belle Alliance to Rossomme. The
1st Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs was maintained at Caillou.
Generals Morand and Pelet received the order to retake
Plancenoit with the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Grenadiers and the 1st of
the 2nd Chasseurs.
With drums beating, these old soldiers marched at the
double-quick, in serried columns of companies. They passed
the Young Guard, which was being rallied by Duhesme,
attacked Plancenoit at two points, penetrated into the village
without deigning to fire a shot, overturned, ground to pieces,
and drove out the Prussians. The attack was so impetuous
that in twenty minutes the village was cleared. The
grumblers, with their bayonets dripping blood, debouched at the
backs of the fugitives, pursued them 600 yards, and drove them
back upon the opposite hill, even behind the batteries of Hiller,
which were for an instant abandoned. The Young Guard
seconded this movement; it occupied Plancenoit once more,
and Lobau, fighting with the divisions of Losthin and Hacke,
recovered the ground that he had lost.
-14-
CHAPTER V.
The Battle of Waterloo.
From Seven to Nine o'Clock.
I. - Dispositions for the final attack. - Strengthening of the English
line. - Approach of Ziethen's corps.
II. - Assault of the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean by the Middle Guard.
III. - "The Guard recoils!" - General advance of the English Array. -
Irruption of the Prussians of Ziethen. - The panic.
IV. - The squares of Christiani, Roguet, and Cambronne.
V. - Arrival of Pirch's corps to the support of Bülow. - Butchery in
Plancenoit. - The melee on the plateau of La Belle Alliance. -
The last squares of the Old Guard.
I.
With a angle blow of his Old Guard, Napoleon had
arrested the Prussians. His right flank disengaged, he again
became free to act on the front of battle. It was more than seven
o'clock; but there still remained two hours of daylight; for
the sky was clear and the sun shone above Braine l'Alleud.
The cannonade of Grouchy increased in violence, drew nearer,
and roared in the direction of Limale. It was supposed that
the Marshal had finally overtaken the Prussian Army, was
fighting it, and, victorious or vanquished, would detain it long
enough to prevent its junction with the English. Blücher, it
seemed, had only been able to detach the single corps of Bülow,
which Lobau, Duhesme, and two battalions of the Old Guard
would suffice henceforth to hold in check. The Emperor
levelled his glass on the side of the English. The points from
which came the fire of artillery and musketry and the direction
of this fire served him as landmarks. On the extreme right
the division of Durutte, in possession of Papelotte and La Haye,
was climbing the plateau. On the left, the fight continued
around Hougoumont in flames; a brigade of Jérôme outflanked
this position, and the French sharpshooters, supported by the
lancers of Piré, had crossed the route of Nivelles. At the
centre, above La Haye Sainte, from whence the enemy had
finally been dislodged, the soldiers of Donzelot, Allix, and
Marcognet had crowned the crests, and were pressing the enemy
The Battle of Waterloo. 203
vigorously along the road of Ohain. In the valley, the
regiments of Bachelu and Foy, as well as the débris of the cavalry,
were rallying. The enemy's line appeared to be shaken. The
Emperor presumed that Wellington had engaged all his troops,
while he had still his Old Guard - his Invincibles. It was
the hour when victory decided in favour of the most
stubborn. He commanded Drouot to order to advance in the
formation in squares which they had previously taken nine
battalions of the Guard (of the other five, two were to remain in
Plancenoit and three upon the plateau as a last reserve). He
put himself at the head of the first square and descended
towards La Haye Sainte to the bottom of the furnace.
From the testimony of the enemy, this attack might have
succeeded a half-hour earlier, at the time when Ney had called
for a reinforcement. The moment had passed. Whilst Morand
had retaken Plancenoit, and even during the short time it had
taken the Guard to form and put itself in motion, Wellington
had strengthened his position. To reinforce his wavering and
almost broken centre he had recalled from his left the brigade
of Wincke and from his right four battalions of Brunswick, of
which he himself had taken the command. Seconded by these
fresh troops, the brigades of Kempt, Pack, and Best, on the
east side of the route of Brussels, and the brigades of Kruse and
Halkett, to the west of this route, had made a vigorous
counterattack, and had driven back the infantry of Donzelot, Allix,
and Marcognet. Whilst the soldiers were withdrawing to the
bottom of the hill, the Anglo-Germans reoccupied the brow of
the plateau, and their batteries, delivered from the fusillade at
short range, silenced the fire of the guns established at La Haye
Sainte. At the same time the Dutch-Belgian division of
Chasse arrived from Braine l'Alleud, and the six cavalry
regiments of Vandeleur and Vivian, which, informed of the
imminent arrival of the Prussian corps of Ziethen, had quitted
their post as flankers above Papelotte, hastened up at a rapid
trot.
The Prussian reinforcements, which had become so
necessary, and the first result of whose approach had been to
render available the 2,600 fresh cavalry of Vivian and
Vandeleur, had been on the point of failing Wellington. Starting
from Bierges at noon, constrained to halt for more than two
hours upon the heights northeast of the Dyle, in order to permit
the corps of Pirch I. to defile, then retarded in his march by the
204 WATERLOO.
scarped paths of the wood of Rixesart, through which the men
advanced sometimes in Indian file and forced to cut a passage
for the guns, Ziethen had arrived at Ohain about fix o'clock
with his advance guard. He was joined there by Colonel
Freemantle, Wellington's aide-de-camp, who explained to him
the critical situation of the English Army, and asked for a
reinforcement, "should it only consist of 3,000 men, but at once."
Ziethen was unwilling to run the risk of having his army corps
beaten in detail; he replied that he would hasten to the support
of the English as soon as the main body of his troops would
have closed up on the advance guard. Meanwhile he sent a
staff officer towards Mont Saint-Jean in order to see exactly
the state of affairs. The latter, deceived by the great number
of wounded and fugitives who were fleeing to the rear, returned
to report that the English were in full retreat. Fearing to be
drawn into a rout without any advantage for the Allied Army,
Ziethen immediately turned the head of his column to the left,
in order to rally Bülow between Frichermont and the wood
of Paris. Muffling, in observation above Papelotte, saw this
movement. He set his horse at a gallop, overtook Ziethen,
informed him more exactly, and entreated him to join the left
of the English. "The battle is lost," he cried vehemently,
"if. the I. Corps does not support the Duke!" After
hesitating a long time, Ziethen yielded to the reasons advanced by
Muffling, and resumed his first direction.
Ziethen's head of column debouched from Smohain when
the Guard descended towards La Haye Sainte. Already some
of the troops were falling back at sight of the Prussians. The
Emperor hastened to them and harangued them; they
resumed their advance. A new enemy's corps, making an
irruption upon the angle of the square formed by our two lines of
battle, was the coup de grace. But it is very doubtful if the
Emperor could have then broken off the combat. By reason
of the disorder in which the troops already found themselves,
of their extreme dissemination, and of the advanced position
of Bülow's corps upon their flank, a retreat would have been
terribly hazardous. Even if it had been effected without too
great loss or confusion, protected by a dike formed
incontinently at the summit of the plateau of La Belle Alliance with
all the battalions of the Guard, what to-morrows it would have
prepared for Napoleon I The Army reduced by half (for the
corps of Grouchy, left isolated, cut off from its line of retreat.
The Battle of Waterloo. 205
appeared devoted to certain destruction); the frontier open;
France discouraged; patriotism abased; the Chamber passing
from secret hostility to open war; and everywhere intrigue,
desertion, treason. Rather than to live again the agony of
1814, it were better to attempt a supreme and desperate effort
to violate rebellious Fortune.
II.
The approach of the I. Prussian Corps had no other effect
on the Emperor than to cause him to hasten his attack. Six
battalions of the Guard had alone arrived in the lowlands of La
Haye Sainte. The Emperor posted one of them (the 2nd of the
3rd Grenadiers) upon a little hillock, half-way between the farm
and Hougoumont; and, seeing Ney, who was always to be
found wherever death was to be affronted, gave him the
command of the others to deliver the assault against the enemy's
right centre. At the same time he ordered the batteries to
increase their fire, and d'Erlon, Reille, and the commanders of
the cavalry corps to second on their respective fronts the
movement of the Guard. It was possible that the report of the
arrival of the Prussians by way of Ohain might spread.
The Emperor wished to prevent this alarm. He directed La
Bédoyère and his orderly officers to traverse the line of battle,
and to announce everywhere the arrival of Marshal Grouchy.
Ney has said that he was indignant at this stratagem. As if
Napoleon had the choice of means! It is certain that, at this
false news, confidence returned and enthusiasm kindled up
again. The troops re-formed their ranks crying, "Long live
the Emperor!" Some of the wounded drew themselves up in
order to acclaim the passage of the columns on the march. One
soldier with three chevrons, a veteran of Marengo, seated, his
legs broken by a cannon-ball, against the side of the road,
repeated in a loud and firm voice: "It is nothing, comrades;
forward! and long live the Emperor!"
Had Wellington, in spite of the smoke which became more
and more thick, seen the preparatory movements for this final
assault? At all events, he was warned of them by a traitor.
At the moment when Drouot assembled the Guard, a captain
of carabiniers traversed the valley at full speed, defying the
cannon-balls and a hail of bullets, and approached, sabre in its
scabbard and right hand raised, the advanced skirmishers of the
206 WATERLOO.
52nd English. Conducted before the major of this regiment,
who was talking with Colonel Fraser, commanding the light
artillery, he cried, "Long live the King! Prepare yourself!
That rascal Napoleon will be on you with the Guard before
a half-hour." Colonel Fraser rejoined Wellington and
transmitted to him this information. The Duke traversed the line
of battle from the route of Brussels to that of Nivelles, giving
his last orders. The brigade of Adam and the Guards of
Maitland, which had retreated into a hollow in order to shelter
themselves from the balls, resumed their positions. The Hanoverian
brigade of William Halkett and the German brigade of Duplat
prolonged the right of Adam, towards Hougoumont. The
Dutch-Belgian division of Chasse established itself : the brigade
of d'Aubreme behind the Guards of Maitland, having behind
it the cavalry of Vivian; the brigade of Ditmer in the rear of
the three battalions of Brunswick, posted on the left of the
English brigade of Colin Halkett. The cavalry of Vandeleur
deployed to the west of the route of Brussels in support of the
decimated battalions of Ompteda and Kruse and another
battalion of Brunswick. The three batteries left until then in
reserve advanced to the front. The cannoneers were ordered
to reply no longer to the French artillery, but to concentrate
their fire on the assaulting columns. They were to fire until
they had exhausted the last cartridges.
It seems that Ney gave a bad formation as well as a bad
direction to the Guard. Instead of forming a single column,
powerful enough to pierce the enemy's line, the Marshal left
the battalions divided. And instead of ascending from the
lowlands of La Haye Sainte straight to the plateau by the route
of Brussels, by which the column would have had hardly 400
yards to traverse, and where the embankments of the road
would have protected it from the enfilading fire of the artillery,
it marched diagonally, by the unprotected slopes which had
been scaled by the cuirassiers in their first charge.
The five battalions of the Middle Guard, formed in as
many squares, advanced in echelons, the right in advance.
Between each echelon the horse cannoneers of the Guard
conducted two 8-pounders, a total of one battery, under the orders
of Colonel Duchand. In this oblique march, almost analogous
to the movement "towards the left, en avant en battaile," all
the echelons did not maintain their intervals. The fourth
approached the third. Soon the five battalions formed but
The Battle of Waterloo. 207
four: on the right, the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers; in
the centre, the sole battalion of the 4th Grenadiers; further to
the left, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs; and
on the extreme left, the 4th Chasseurs, reduced to a single
battalion.
All the troops had received the order to second this attack.
Already the divisions of Donzelot, Allix, and Marcognet had
begun to climb the plateau, the first along and to the left of the
route of Genappe, the other two to the right of this route.
But the infantry of Reille and the débris of the cavalry had
hardly begun to advance. Between La Haye Sainte and
Hougoumont the five battalions of the Guard advanced alone
against the English Army. They marched at a shoulder arms,
aligned as if for a review at the Tuileries, superb and impassive
All their officers were in front, the first in the midst of the balls.
Generals Friant and Porret de Morvan commanded the
battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers; General Harlet, the battalion of
the 4th Grenadiers; General Michel, the 1st Battalion of the
3rd Chasseurs; Colonel Mallet, a faithful of the Island of Elba,
the 2nd Battalion; and General Henrion, the battalion of the
4th Chasseurs. Ney rolled upon the ground with his horse,
the fifth one killed under him. He disengaged himself, arose,
and marched on foot, sword in hand, by the side of Friant.
The English artillery, disposed in a semi-circle from the route
of Brussels to the neighbouring heights of Hougoumont, for
from convex the front of the enemy's right had become
concave, fired double charges of grape at a range of 200 yards.
The Guard was battered in front and flank. Each volley made
a breach. The grenadiers closed up the files, contracted the
squares, and continued to ascend with the same step, crying,
"Long live the Emperor!"
The 1st Battalion of the 3rd Grenadiers (right echelon)
overthrew a corps of Brunswick, took possession of the
batteries of Cleeves and Lloyd, which were abandoned by the
cannoneers; and, by a slight conversion, directed itself
towards the left of the brigade of Halkett. The 30th and 73rd
English recoiled in disorder. Friant, wounded by a gunshot,
quitted the field of battle, believing the victory assured. But
the Belgian General Chassé, one of the heroes of Arcis sur
Aube (he served then in the French ranks!), caused to advance
on the right of the 30th and 73rd Regiments the battery of Van
der Smissen, whose fire enfiladed the assailants. Then he
208 WATERLOO.
deliberately sent to the left of the two English regiments the
brigade of Ditmer, 3,000 strong, launched it with fixed
bayonets against the feeble square, broke, dislocated, and crushed
it under the weight of numbers, and threw back the survivors
to the foot of the slopes.
During this time the battalion of the 4th Grenadiers
(second echelon) had engaged the right of Halkett's brigade.
Under the iron hail of the two guns of Duchand and the
fusillade of the grenadiers, the débris of the 33rd and 69th
Regiments gave ground. General Halkett seized the flag of the 33rd
and, by his example, succeeded in checking the disorder.
"See the General!" cried the men. "He is between two fires!
He can not escape!" In fact, he fell, severely wounded. But
the English had rallied and held their ground. An old
soldier said, in biting off his cartridge: "It is who will kill the
longest."
The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 3rd Chasseurs (third
echelon) almost attained the crest of the plateau without
meeting with any infantry. They marched towards the road
of Chain, distant from them hardly a pistol-shot. Suddenly, at
twenty steps, arose a red wall. It was the 2,000 Guards of
Maitland, drawn up in four lines. They had been waiting,
lying down in the rye. At the command of Wellington, "Up,
Guards, and be ready!" they had risen as if moved by springs.
They aimed, fired. Their first volley mowed down 300 men,
nearly half of the two battalions already decimated by the fire
of the artillery. General Michel fell, mortally wounded. The
French halted; their ranks broken, their march obstructed by
the dead. Instead of ordering them to advance instantaneously
with fixed bayonets, without disquieting themselves at
the disorder in which they found themselves, the officers
attempted to form them in line in order to reply to the fire of
the enemy. The confusion increased. The deployment was
effected with great difficulty and loss of time. For ten
minutes the chasseurs remained exposed to the fire of the Guards
of Maitland and the batteries of Bolton and Ramsay, which
enfiladed them. Wellington saw the Guard on the point of
giving way; he ordered the charge. "Forward, my lads!"
cried Colonel Saltoun; "now is the time!" The 2,000 English
rushed headlong upon this handful of soldiers, overthrew them,
and descended intermingled with them in a furious hand-to-
hand combat, even near the orchard of Hougoumont. "The
The Battle of Waterloo. 209
combatants were so mingled," says an officer of Bolton's
battery, "that we were compelled to cease firing."
At the sudden commands of their officers the English
halted abruptly. The battalion of the 4th Chasseurs (left
echelon) approached to disengage the survivors of the 3rd
Chasseurs, as well as those of the 4th Grenadiers, who had likewise
begun to retreat. Without awaiting the shock, the soldiers of
Maitland fell back in disorder and re-ascended to their positions
as swiftly as they had descended. Chasseurs and grenadiers
followed them up closely, scaling the hillside under the volleys
of grape. They crossed the road of Ohain, when the brigade
of Adam (52nd, 71st, and 95th Regiments), which had quickly
formed en potence on their left flank, raked them with a fire
from four ranks. The guards of Maitland faced about and,
re-forming as well as possible, recommenced to fire in concert
with the brigade of Colin Halkett, whilst the Hanoverians of
William Halkett debouched from the hedges of Hougoumont,
and opened fire upon the French from the rear. From all sides
the bullets arrived in clusters. Mallet was severely wounded.
One battalion deployed in front, of Maitland; and what
remained of the other two marched by the left against the brigade
of Adam. Colonel Colborn, whom the soldiers called in Spain
"the fire-eater," charged with the 52nd. All the brigade followed
with fixed bayonets. Considerably shaken already by the
formidable fire to which they had been exposed, chasseurs and
grenadiers yielded under the weight of numbers, and retired
in confusion.
III.
The cry, "The Guard recoils!" sounded the death-knell
of the Grand Army. Every one felt that all was ended. The
infantry of Reille, the cuirassiers, and the squadrons of the
Guard, who had finally put themselves on the march to second
Ney's attack, halted, paralysed. The soldiers of Donzelot and
Allix, fighting upon the crests above La Haye Sainte, with the
brigades of Kruse, Lambert, Kempt, and Pack, saw the Guard
falling back. They also yielded the conquered ground, and
again descended to the foot of the hill, drawing in their retreat
the division of Marcognet, which had attacked upon the
prolongation of their right the positions of the enemy. The
backward movement gained the entire line of battle, from left to
right. At the same time the infantry of Durutte was attacked
210 WATERLOO.
in Papelotte and La Haye by the Prussian heads of column,
debouching by the road of Ohain. The cry, "Sauve qui peut!
We are betrayed!" arose on all sides. This panic can be
readily explained, if one thinks of the state of mind of the
soldiers, troubled and possessed for three months by the fear
of treason. Everything appeared to justify their suspicions.
They had seen passing over to the enemy a general, a colonel,
and officers of every grade. Among their cartridges they had
found some filled with bran instead of powder. They were
astonished at so many disconnected movements; they were
disheartened by so many unsuccessful assaults. Finally, they
had expected the corps of Grouchy whose arrival had been
announced, and it was the corps of Ziethen that arrived to
crush them. Confusion set in, increased. The Prussians hurled
themselves to the assault, dislodged from the farms the few
handfuls of brave men who still held out in spite of the panic,
and threw them into the ravines. The débris of the four
divisions of d'Erlon ran foul of, jostled, and mutually broke
one another. East of the great highway, in the depths of the
valley over which crossed the English shrapnel and Prussian
cannon-balls, there was the most lamentable confusion.
Wellington wishes to finish this mortally wounded army.
He urges his horse to the brow of the plateau, uncovers, and
waves his hat in the air. His men understand this signal. All
the troops put themselves instantaneously on the march in the
order in which they find themselves. Without taking time to
re-form, the battalions, batteries, and squadrons of the different
divisions advance side by side, passing over the dead and
crushing the wounded under the feet of the horses and the
wheels of the cannon. There alone remain upon the positions
the brigades of Pack, Ompteda, and Kielmansegge, and two or
three batteries which are literally prevented from moving by
the carcasses of horses and the bodies accumulated along their
front. From right to left, English, Hanoverians, Belgians,
Brunswickers, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, forty thousand
men, descend in torrents to the sound of drums, bugles, and
pibrochs, in the first shadows of twilight. At this sight,
frightful even for brave men, the last echelons of infantry turn
and reascend precipitately, with most of the cavalry, the hills
to the west of La Belle Alliance; the leading battalions, more
immediately threatened with being overwhelmed by the
avalanche, disband and flee. La Haye Sainte, the orchard of
The Battle of Waterloo. 211
Hougoumont, and the wood are abandoned. The hussars of
Vivian and the dragoons of Vandeleur, who open the way for
the English masses, sabre the fugitives with the ferocious cry,
"No quarter! No quarter!"
IV.
Whilst the Middle Guard attacked the English positions,
the 2nd Battalions of the 1st Chasseurs, the 2nd Grenadiers,
and the 2nd Chasseurs, with Generals Cambronne, Roguet, and
Christiani, had arrived near the Emperor at the foot of La
Haye Sainte. Napoleon occupied himself with forming them
in column of attack, one battalion deployed and two upon the
flanks in serried column, to lead them himself upon the plateau,
where "all was going well," according to the words of Friant,
who returned from there wounded, when he saw the sudden
collapse of his line of battle. He also felt then that he was
irremediably defeated. But he preserved the hope of being able
to organize the retreat. Without losing any of his presence of
mind, he broke the column of the Old Guard and placed the
three battalions, in as many squares, at nearly a hundred yards
below La Haye Sainte, the right square on the route of
Brussels. Protected by this dike, he thought the Army would be
able to rally and retire in good order.
The hussars of Vivian, powerless to make any impression
on these squares, turned them and continued to trace red
furrows in the throng of fugitives. Drunk with blood, they were
intent on slaughter. A subaltern of the 18th said to Vivian:
"We will follow you to hell, if you will lead us." Behind the
hussars rushed other horsemen of the enemy. The Emperor
launched the four squadrons of his escort against this new wave
of cavalry, which submerged them.
Not far from the road, Ney, on foot, bare-headed,
unrecognizable, his face black with powder, his uniform in rags, one
epaulet cut in two by a sabre-stroke, and a broken sword in
his hand, cries with rage to Count d'Erlon, who is borne along
in an eddy of the rout: "D'Erlon, if we escape, we shall be
hung!" The Marshal "is less like a man than a furious Beast."
His efforts during this entire day have exceeded human energy
and strength. Never in any battle had any chief, any soldier,
exposed himself as much. Ney has surpassed Ney. He has
led twice to the attack the infantry of d'Erlon; he has charged
212 WATERLOO.
four times upon the plateau with the cuirassiers; he has led
the desperate assault of the grenadiers of the Guard. He
hastens now to Brue's brigade (Durutte's division), sole troops
of the Line retiring in good order, and which is reduced,
moreover, to the effective of two battalions. He stops the soldiers
and throws them once more against the enemy, crying : "Come
and see how a marshal of France can die!" The brigade
quickly broken and dispersed, Ney clings to this fatal field of
battle. Since he can not find death there, he wishes, at least,
to be the last to quit it. He enters into a square of the Guard
with Major Rullière, who has taken the eagle of the 95th from
the dying hands of Lieutenant Puthod. Durutte, his right
hand severed at the wrist, his forehead laid open by a sabre-
blow, and all covered with blood, is borne along by his horse
in a charge of the enemy's cavalry; he gallops in the midst of
the English as far as La Belle Alliance.
The three battalions of the Guard repulsed the cavalry
without difficulty. But their formation in squares, which,
however, they were forced to preserve in order to resist new
charges, put them in a state of tactical inferiority with the
English infantry, in line in four ranks. Its more extended and
denser fire battered the squares in front and flank. With the
musketry was mingled the grape from the batteries of Rogers,
Whyniates, and Gardiner, which fired at a range of sixty yards.
The masses of the enemy increased around the grenadiers:
the brigades of Adam and William Halkett, which were
especially persistent in their attack, and those of Kempt, Lambert,
Kruse, Wincke, and Colin Halkett. The Emperor gave the
order to quit this untenable position. As for himself, reflecting,
too late perhaps, that to check a rout one should not remain
upon the broken front of troops who are falling back, but
should betake himself to the rear, in order to rally them in a
new position, gained at a gallop, with a few chasseurs of his
escort, the heights of La Belle Alliance.
The three battalions - as well as that of the 3rd Grenadiers,
posted on their left and assailed in turn by the English dragoons,
the Black Lancers of Brunswick, the infantry of Maitland and
Mitchell - retrograded step by step. Reduced to too few men
to remain in squares in three ranks, they formed in two ranks,
in triangles and, with fixed bayonets, pierced slowly through
the crowd of fugitives and the English. At each step men
stumbled over the dead or dropped under the balls. Every
The Battle of Waterloo. 213
fifty yards it was necessary to halt to re-form the ranks and
to repulse a new charge of cavalry or a new attack of infantry.
In this heroic retreat, the Guard marched literally surrounded
by enemies, like a wild boar among a pack of dogs. The
distance separating the combatants was so slight that, in spite of
the multiple noises of the battle, one was within speaking
distance. In the midst of the musketry the English officers cried
to these old soldiers to surrender. Cambronne was on horse-
back in the square of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs.
Despair in his heart, choking with rage, and exasperated by
the incessant summons of the enemy, he cried wrathfully:
"M...!" A few instants after, as he was on the point of
attaining with his battalion the summits of La Belle Alliance,
a ball full in his face overturned him bloody and inanimate.
V.
During the last assault of Mont Saint-Jean half of the corps
of Pitch (divisions of Tippelskirch and Krafft and the cavalry
of Jurgass) had rejoined Bülow, who had just met with a bloody
repulse. Blücher immediately ordered a general attack against
all our right flank. In Plancenoit the Young Guard of
Duhesme and the two battalions of the Old Guard of Morand and
Pelet remained inexpugnable. But on the prolongation of
this village, the infantry of Lobau and the cavalry of Domon
and Subervie fell back before the 15,000 men of Hacke,
Losthin, and Prince William; they were overthrown when the
division of Steinmetz and the cavalry of Röder, debouching
from Smohain in pursuit of Durutte, attacked them in flank.
The French masses, stationed a quarter of an hour before from
the route of Nivelles to the ravines of Papelotte and
Plancenoit, inundated the plateau around La Belle Alliance. Behind
them, sabring, shooting, and cheering, hastened on one side the
English, on the other the Prussians. The two jaws of the vice
closed upon the panic-stricken and defenceless crowd that had
been the Imperial Army.
In this terror-stricken mob everyone pushed and scrambled
in order to flee more swiftly. There were cuirassiers who threw
aside their cuirasses, drivers who cut the traces of the teams,
and men who were trampled under foot. One stumbled among
the dead horses, the overturned caissons, the abandoned
cannon. The shadows of night, which began to grow thicker (it
214 WATERLOO.
was nearly nine o'clock), added to the fright and increased
the confusion. The 12th and 16th English Dragoons were
charged by the 1st Hussars of the German Legion. The brigade
of Adam received the fire of a Prussian battery. The
Highlanders of the 1st turned some French guns against the fleeing
columns. The four battalions of the Guard, which had just
regained the plateau, were the only infantry still in order.
English and Prussians enclosed each of these squares in a
circle of grape, sabres, and bayonets. Charged simultaneously
by the cavalry and infantry, they were broken, demolished,
crushed. Their débris were swallowed up in the débacle.
Five hundred yards in the rear, near the Decoster house,
await, formed in squares, on the left and right of the route,
the two battalions of the 1st Grenadiers, commanded by
General Petit. These men are the élite of the élite. Almost all of
them wear two chevrons, and four out of six are legionaries.
The Emperor is on horseback in the square of the 1st Battalion.
With these living redoubts, he still hopes to cover the
retreat. He orders to be established, upon the prolongation of
the squares, the battery of 12-pounders which had for a long
time cannonaded the Prussians above Plancenoit, and causes
the grenadièr to be beaten in order to rally all the detachments
of the Guard. A crowd of fugitives pass along the route on
both sides of the squares, followed closely by the enemy. The
battery, of the Guard has only one shot for each piece. Its last
discharge, at close range, overwhelms a column of cavalry.
The gunners, henceforth, without ammunition, remain
stoically by their guns, in order to impose still upon the
assailants. Other squadrons approach at a gallop. "Do not fire,"
cries a grenadier; "they are French hussars." They are
English hussars; they burst upon the battery and sabre the
disarmed cannoneers. But upon the squares these incessant
charges break and scatter like whirlwinds of sand upon blocks
of granite. Before each battalion of grenadiers rises a wall of
dead men and horses.
In Plancenoit, where the Prussian batteries had started a
conflagration, one fought by the light of the flames. The
Young Guard, recruited almost entirely from among the
volunteers of Paris and Lyons, and the 1st Battalions of the 2nd
Chasseurs and 2nd Grenadiers, fought one against five. The
combined attacks of the divisions of Hiller, Ryssel, and
Tippelskirch failed. Gneissenau reanimated his soldiers; they
The Battle of Waterloo. 215
rushed again to the assault and penetrated into the village.
There French and Prussians engaged in a murderous death-
grapple, in which they killed one another with thrusts of the
bayonet and blows of the butts of their muskets. Drum-
Major Stubert, of the 2nd Grenadiers, a giant, brained the
Prussians with the head of his baton. A battalion of the Young
Guard caused itself to be exterminated in the cemetery, which
served as a réduit. The Prussians captured the houses one
by one. The combatants massacred one another in the
chambers, in the attics; and during these fights, in which no mercy
was shown by either side, the thatched roofs, which the fire had
gained, crumbled over the heads of the combatants. "It was
necessary to annihilate the French," says Major Von Damitz,
"in order to obtain possession of Plancenoit." On the
outskirts of the village the remains of these heroic battalions were
charged and driven fighting as far as the plateau. There the
English cavalry finished them. General Pelet found himself for
an instant alone in the midst of the enemy, with a few men and
the eagle-bearer of the chasseurs of the Old Guard. "Help!
help! chasseurs!" he cried in a piercing voice. "Let us save
the eagle or die near it!" All those who heard this desperate
appeal turned back and cut their way through the mass of horse;
they rallied around the eagle and formed for it an impenetrable
rampart of bayonets.
From Plancenoit French and Prussians debouched upon
the route of Brussels, near the squares of the 1st Grenadiers.
The fugitives crowded around to seek a refuge within these
squares, but they were pitilessly repulsed by steel and fire.
The safety of the squares demanded it. General Roguet came
near being killed by a grenadier. "We fired," said General
Petit, "on all that which presented itself, friends as well as
enemies, for fear of permitting to enter the one with the other.
It was an evil for a good." The squares were outflanked on
the right and left; the English and Prussians became more
and more numerous, more and more compact. The grenadiers
repulsed every charge. Two battalions against two armies!
Finally, the Emperor ordered the position to be
abandoned. The grenadiers put themselves slowly in retreat, the
1st Battalion on the left of the route and the 2nd on the route
itself. Every few minutes they halted to dress the squares
and to delay the pursuit of the enemy by a rolling file-fire.
216 WATERLOO.
The Emperor marched at some distance in front of the
squares with Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, Lobau, and five or six
horse chasseurs of the Old Guard. At the farm of Caillou he
rejoined the 1st Battalion of the foot chasseurs of the Old
Guard. This battalion, charged with the safety of the
imperial treasure and baggage, was commanded by Major
Duuring, a Dutchman by birth. About seven in the evening,
two Prussian columns having advanced through the wood of
Chantelet with the manifest intention of intercepting the
retreat of the Army by occupying the main highway, Duuring
had at once ordered the wagons to retire on Genappe, in
accord with General Radet, provost-general of the Army, who
had succeeded in rallying two or three hundred dismounted
cavalry and infantry. He had then deployed his battalion in
front of the enemy. The Prussians (25th Regiment), received
with a heavy fire and then charged with the bayonet, retired
towards Maransart. The Emperor stopped for a few minutes
to question Duuring under the last cannon-balls from the
Prussian batteries of Plancenoit; he praised him for the firmness
and spirit of initiative of which he had given proof, and
ordered him to follow him. "I count upon you," said he. The
battalion having closed up in mass, the Emperor gave the reins
to his horse and marched at a walk upon the flank of the
column.
CHAPTER VI.
- The Rout.
I. - Meeting of Wellington and Blücher in front of La Belle Alliance
(quarter-past nine). - The rout of the French.
II.- Attempt at resistance in Genappe (eleven o'clock).
III. - Pursuit of the Prussian cavalry (night of June 18th-19th).
IV. - Halt of the Emperor at Quatre-Bras. - The Army passes the
Sambre at Charleroi (morning of June 20th).
V. - Retreat on Laon. - Departure of the Emperor for Paris (June 20th)
I.
About a quarter-past nine, at the time when the divisions
of Hiller, Ryssel, and Tippelskirch wrested Plancenoit from the
Young Guard, and the squares of the 1st Grenadiers still held
out near the Decoster house, Blücher and Wellington met in
front of the inn of La Belle Alliance. Blücher followed the
troops of Bülow, who had driven back Lobau, and Wellington
arrived from La Have Sainte with the last echelons of his army.
The two generals met and, according to the words of
Gneissenau, "they congratulated each other upon the victory."
The bands of the Prussian cavalry played in passing, "God
Save the King"; in the distance the noise of the firing
decreased. The infantry of Bülow, who had halted to re-form
their ranks, intoned the hymn of Luther: "Lord God, we
praise Thee! Lord God, we thank Thee!"
Blücher, impressed with the fact that his meeting with
Wellington had taken place precisely in front of La Belle
Alliance, wished to give this name to the battle, in which the
alliance of the English and Prussians had produced such great
results. But Wellington desired that the victory - his victory
- should bear the name of the village which had had the
honour the preceding night of serving him as headquarters.
It was decided that in spite of the night it was necessary
to pursue à outrance the wrecks of the Imperial Army. The
English were worn out with ten hours' fighting, "tired to
death," savs Wellington. The Prussians had made five leagues
on an average over the worst kind of roads, and they had
fought between Frischermont and Plancenoit with no less
217
-15-
218 WATERLOO.
obstinacy than had the soldiers of Wellington at Mont Saint-
Jean. Nevertheless, Blücher proposed to charge his troops
with the pursuit. The offer being accepted without shame,
he called together his corps commanders and ordered them
"to pursue the enemy as long as they would have a man and
horse in condition to stand up." Gneissenau put himself at
the head of the squadrons of Count Röder. All the Array
followed. Towards Rossomme they caught up with a part of
the Prussian divisions, which had debouched from Plancenoit,
and the furthest advanced of the columns of the English
cavalry and infantry.
The army of Wellington halted. The soldiers saluted with
a triple "Hip, hip, hurrah!" the Prussians who passed them,
and established themselves in bivouac in the midst of the
shambles. From the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean to the heights
of Rossomme, from Hougoumont to Plancenoit, and even
towards Smohain, the entire ground was covered with dead men
and horses. More than 25,000 French and 20,000 English,
Belgians, Germans, and Prussians lay upon the ground, here
scattered like uprooted trees, there in long lines like rows of
grain which had fallen under the reaper's scythe. The moon,
which h d risen, lighted up distinctly their livid and bloody
faces, their uniforms soiled with mud and spotted with blood;
the arms which had fallen from their hands scintillated in the
moonbeams. At times great sombre clouds, drifting across
the sky, concealed this vision, from which the least sensitive
among the oldest soldiers turned away their eyes; but it
soon reappeared under the glacial light of the moon. Amidst
the death-rattle of the dying and the groans of the wounded,
one heard at short intervals a raucous cry similar to that
uttered by someone being strangled by horror and fright. It was
some officer being finished by a robber of the dead, in order to
steal from him his purse or his cross of the Legion of Honour.
The Prussians conducted the pursuit with vigour. The
fugitives of the right wing (corps of Lobau and d'Erlon, Young
Guard, and cavalry of Domon, Subervie, and Jacquinot) who,
pursued too closely, or cut off from their line of retreat, had
not been able to overtake and pass the squares of the 1st
Grenadiers forming the rear guard, were sabred or made prisoners.
On the right wing a certain number of cuirassiers, whose
horses were still in condition to travel, and the lancers of Piré,
who had only skirmished during the battle, gained Quatre-
The Rout 219
Bras, without being molested, by way of Neuve-Court,
Malplaquet, and Vieux-Genappe. They passed the Sambre at
Marchienne. Five or six thousand infantry of Reille's corps,
rallied at nightfall, directed themselves on Genappe across the
fields, parallel with and at nearly a half-league from the
highway. A few Prussian squadrons were sufficient to
disperse them. Save three companies of the 93rd Regiment,
which turned at bay and repulsed the charges, all this mass
dispersed. Some of the soldiers threw away their haversacks
and guns in order to flee more rapidly, justifying only too well
the old adage: "Frenchmen are more than men in attack,
and less than women in retreat." They no longer listened
to their officers, and panic reigned supreme.
The Old Guard alone remained worthy of itself. The
chasseurs and lancers of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, who had quitted
the field at walk and with so bold a front that the English
cavalry had not dared to attack them, retired in good order on
the west of the highway, and reached Quatre-Bras without
suffering any new losses. On the highway itself the Prussians
were held in check by the two squares of the 1st Grenadiers,
which were preceded by the 1st Battalion of the 1st Chasseurs.
The grenadiers continued to march at the ordinary step,
defying all attacks. Not being able to bite, the Prussian pack
desisted from further attacks and confined itself to following
out of musket-range. Half a league from Genappe, General
Petit, no longer deeming it necessary to preserve the order of
combat, ordered the squares to break up and to march in
column by sections. It was at this moment that the Emperor
separated from the 1st Battalion of chasseurs to gain Genappe,
where he hoped to check the enemy and to rally the wrecks of
the Army.
II.
Genappe consisted of only one long street, steep and
winding, which abutted upon a bridge over the Dyle. It would
have been possible to have held for many hours this defile,
although it is commanded on the north by heights upon which
the Prussian batteries could have been established. But there
were in this village so much obstruction and confusion that one
could not think of organizing a methodical defence, especially
with soldiers who never ceased to cry, "We are betrayed! Let
us save ourselves!" Overturned wagons, carriages, limbers,
220 WATERLOO.
guns, and caissons abandoned by the auxiliary drivers
obstructed for a considerable distance the approaches to the
bridge, which was, in 1815, no more than seven feet wide.
Owing to the crowding of the fugitives into the street, from
which they could issue only three or four abreast, there arose
frightful disorder. Mad from fear, some of the men sought
to open a passage by striking everything in front. General
Radet, provost-general of the Army, was terribly beaten with
the butt-ends of muskets. Some of the cavalry used their
sabres, and the infantry replied with bayonet-thrusts,
sometimes even with gun-shots. They killed each other without
being able to advance, the living entangled with the dead.
The rear of the column accumulated at the entrance of
Genappe. The Prussians approached. The three battalions of
the Old Guard, threatened with being crushed between the
masses of the enemy and the crowd of fugitives, broke column
and gained Charleroi by turning the village on the east. The
Prussians did not pursue them, but turned upon the crowds of
unarmed men in front of Genappe. These unfortunates were
literally under the lances of the uhlans before they thought of
escaping by the right and left of the village and of passing the
Dyle by fording. This little river, which at this spot was not
thirty feet wide, and whose depth did not attain three, was an
obstacle only for the carriages, on account of the steepness of
its banks.
Genappe was still crowded with French. A handful of
men, who alone in this panic had preserved their resolution
and courage, attempted to arrest the enemy. They rapidly
erected with overturned wagons a barricade from behind which
they opened fire. A few cannon-balls gave only too quickly an
account of this feeble work and its defenders. The horsemen
of Röder descended the sloping street, crushing the inert
multitude, and striking with sabre and lance without more risk
than butchers in an abattoir. The Emperor, who had taken, it
is said, more than an hour to clear for himself a passage through
this long street, was still on the north side of the bridge. He
had just entered his carriage, which had been found by chance
in the midst of the abandoned train. The horses had not vet
been hitched to it. Hearing the hurrahs, he hastily
abandoned it, mounted his horse, and succeeded in escaping with a
few horsemen. The Prussians pillaged the carriage, which
contained a dressing case, a sword, an iron bed and a uniform.
The Rout. 221
in the lining of which were sewed some uncut diamonds, valued
at a million francs.
Blücher had pushed as far as Genappe with the corps of
Bülow. He halted to pass the night in the inn of the Roi
d'Espagne. Almost immediately there was brought to the
inn upon a stretcher General Duhesme. In the last hour of the
battle Duhesme had fallen grievously wounded between
Plancenoit and Rossomme; a few devoted soldiers had picked him up
and carried him till near Genappe, where he had been made
prisoner by the Prussians. The Field Marshal went to visit
him and recommended him to the surgeon of his staff. But
the wound was mortal, and Duhesme died during the following
night. Although worn out, Blücher did not wish to retire
before writing to his wife: "I have kept my promise," he wrote.
"On the 16th I was forced to recoil before numbers; but on
the 18th, in concert with my friend Wellington, I have
exterminated the Army of Napoleon." He sent also this letter
to his old comrade Knesebeck: "My friend, the finest battle
is fought, the most brilliant victory is won. The details mil
follow. I can write no more, for I tremble in all my members.
The effort has been too great."
III.
Beyond Genappe the pursuit became more rapid. As
there was no longer an organized body of troops forming the
rear guard, the Prussians sabred with impunity the panic-
stricken mob. "It was a regular chase," says Gneissenau; "a
chase by the light of the moon." The great highway, the
country roads, the lanes and fields, as far as the eye could see,
were covered with soldiers of every arm, dismounted
cuirassiers, lancers upon foundered horses, infantrymen who had
thrown away guns and haversacks, wounded men losing their
blood, and soldiers who had suffered amputation and had
escaped from the ambulances ten minutes after the operation.
Without authority over these men and, besides, no less
demoralized and thinking like them only of their own safety,
captains, colonels, and generals marched intermingled with
the mass of fugitives. Durutte on horseback, but blinded by
the blood that flowed from his open forehead, was guided by
a sergeant of cuirassiers. A corporal of the Old Guard
supported Ney by the arm until the moment when Major Schmidt,
of the red lancers, dismounted from his horse to give it to
222 WATERLOO.
the Marshal. Surgeon-in-Chief Larrey, wounded by two sabre-
blows, was struck again by the uhlans, robbed, stripped of his
clothing, and carried, almost naked, with his hands tied, to a
general, who ordered him to be shot. Just as this order was on
the point of being carried out, a Prussian surgeon recognized
him, threw himself in front of him, and saved him.
Each one marched, ran, dragged himself along as best he
could, went wherever he pleased, no one thinking to give orders,
which would not have been obeyed. And when the sound of
the Prussian trumpets, the galloping of the horses, and the
savage clamours of the pursuers drew nigh, from this terror-
stricken mob arose the cry: "Here they are! Here they are!
Let us save ourselves!" And, under the lash of fear,
cavalry and infantry, officers and soldiers, wounded and
unwounded, again found strength to run. Bands of fugitives,
who, falling from fatigue, halted in the woods, hollows of the
ground, farm-houses, and hamlets, were quickly set running
again by the cavalry. The Prussians broke up no less than
nine bivouacs. Some of the wounded killed themselves to
avoid falling alive into the hands of the enemy. An officer of
cuirassiers, seeing himself surrounded by uhlans, cried : "They
shall have neither my horse nor myself!" And coolly he
dropped his horse with a ball in the ear and then blew out his
own brains with a second pistol.
Most of Bülow's infantry having halted at Genappe and
Ziethen and Pirch's corps having gone no further than Caillou,
Gneissenau had with him only the dragoons and uhlans of
General Röder, one battalion of the 1st Pomeranian, and one
of the 15th Regiment. It is truly incredible that thirty or
forty thousand Frenchmen should have fled before four
thousand Prussians! If a few hundred soldiers had overcome their
terror and had re-formed to make a stand, their resistance
would have put an end to this lamentable pursuit. The
Prussians, who sabred especially the defenceless fugitives, allowed
themselves, as it seems, to be easily imposed upon, since a
handful of resolute men marching grouped around the eagle
of each regiment sufficed to defend the flags. The enemy
picked up on the battle-field and along the highway more than
two hundred abandoned cannon and more than a thousand
wagons; during the retreat, he did not capture one flag.
Hardened and insensible as is the soldier, by habit and the
very nature of his profession, to spectacles of death, the
The Rout. 223
fugitives in passing through Quatre-Bras were seized with horror.
The men killed in the battle of June 16th had not been
interred. Three to four thousand bodies, entirely naked, for the
peasants had even removed their shirts, covered all the ground
between the main road and the wood of Bossu. The scene
presented the aspect of an immense morgue. By turns lighted
up by the moon and drowned in shadow by the veil of clouds,
the dead, in the fleeting movements of the light, seemed to
move their stiffened bodies and to contract their livid faces.
"We thought," said a grenadier of the Guard, "to see some
spectres who demanded burial of us." Lower down the soldiers
quenched their thirst in the stream of Gemioncourt, which,
swollen by the storm of the day before, was filled with floating
bodies;
Less and less numerous, more and more fatigued, but as
ardent as ever, the Prussians continued the pursuit.
Gneissenau had knocked up en route half of his force. There alone
marched with him a few squadrons and a small detachment of
the 15th Infantry, whose drummer beat the charge, perched
upon a horse taken from the imperial carriages. They passed
Frasnes. Gneissenau judged that the fatigue of the men and
horses would not permit of the chase being pushed further.
He gave the order to halt in front of an inn, which, supreme
irony, bore the name "A l'Empereur."
IV.
From Genappe Napoleon had gained on horseback Quatre-
Bras, with Soult, Drouot, Bertrand, a few officers, and ten red
lancers and chasseurs of the Guard. He arrived there about
one. in the morning. He expected to find there the division of
Girard, left on June 17th at Fleurus, to protect the passage of
the convoys, and to which, during the evening of the 18th, had
been despatched the order to advance to Quatre-Bras and to
take position there. These instructions had not been carried
out. Colonel Matis, who commanded temporarily the remains
of this division, received, indeed, the order of Soult; but, either
because he judged, in view of the lateness of the hour, that the
prescribed movement could not be effected in time, or for some
other cause, he broke camp in the night and went to pass the
Sambre at Charleroi.
224 WATERLOO.
Meanwhile the Emperor awaited the arrival of these
troops at Quatre-Bras. He dismounted from his horse in a
clearing in the wood of Bossu, near a camp-fire which had been
started by some grenadiers of the Guard. A wounded officer,
who was fleeing along the highway, recognized the Emperor by
the light of the fire He stood, his arms crossed over his chest,
motionless as a statue, eyes fixed, turned towards Waterloo.
There was no news from Grouchy, who, it was thought,
was in great danger. The Emperor directed Soult to send him
a despatch to inform him of the retreat of the Army and to
direct him to withdraw upon the lower Sambre. Soldiers of
every arm passed, running along the route and through the
fields. Commandant Baudus, who marched on horseback in
the midst of the fugitives, discovered the little group composing
the Imperial Staff. He approached. The Emperor asked him
if he had not met with some corps that was not entirely
disorganized. Not far from Quatre-Bras, Baudus had passed the
5th Lancers, commanded by Colonel Jacquiminot, which still
marched in order. He informed the Emperor of the fact.
"Go quickly," said Napoleon, "and tell him to halt at Quatre-
Bras. It is already late, and the enemy, finding this point
occupied, will probably halt." Baudus set out at a gallop, but,
received with shots at the first houses of Quatre-Bras, he
returned and begged the Emperor to retire, "since he was no
longer covered by anyone." While uttering these words he
looked closely at the Emperor. Napoleon wept silently his
lost Army. The tears which trickled down his cheeks were the
only sign of life upon his mournful face, pallid as with the
look of death.
Amidst the confusion resulting from this great overthrow
the Emperor never lost his presence of mind. Seeing no signs
of Girard's corps, he concluded that it had not received the
order of the Major-General. Ignorant of the defeat, it was in
danger of being surprised in its bivouacs and enveloped by the
enemy. He commanded Baudus to hasten to Fleurus, to cause
the troops to take up arms, and to lead them upon the right
bank of the Sambre. Then, yielding to necessity, he
remounted his horse, and put himself en route for Charleroi by
way of Gosselies and Lodelinsart.
At Charleroi, where the Emperor arrived about five in
the morning, there was the same tumultuous mob, the same
disorder, as at Genappe. Since June 15th the ammunition
The Rout. 225
wagons, the bridge equipage, and the carriages containing food
and baggage encumbered the squares and avenues. On the
17th there had been evacuated on Charleroi the wounded of
Ligny, the prisoners, the twenty-seven pieces of artillery, and
the baggage captured from the Prussians. Doubtless, on the
evening of the 18th, at the moment when all the troops began
to give way, a commissary of war had been sent from
Rossomme with orders to cause all the wagons to pass the Sambre
immediately. But arrived at Charleroi, between one and two
in the morning, he had found the commandant of the place
sick, say some; dead drunk, say others; incapable, at any
rate, of being of any assistance to him. The commissary of
war had been compelled to seek one by one the different heads
of the departments. All employed themselves with the greatest
zeal, but much time had been lost. Already the first convoys
of wounded began to debouch by the route of Brussels, and
bands of fugitives traversed the town, spreading the alarm,
and saying that the enemy was in close pursuit.
The sole bridge of Charleroi was 125 feet long and 25 feet
wide. It formed a shelving ridge; the parapets were of wood.
Some cuirassiers, descending at full speed the sloping street
which abuts on the bridge, charged so violently against one
of the parapets that it broke and fell. Many horsemen were
drowned in the Sabre. The turret of the bridge was over-
thrown, a wagon overturned; the carriages, which were
immediately in the rear, started at a rapid trot down the slant
of the Rue de la Montagne, were unable to stop in time, and
upset over the first obstacle. Many soldiers were crushed to
death. Sacks of flour and rice, casks of wine and brandy, and
hundreds of loaves of bread, rolled upon the pavement. The
bridge thus obstructed, all the convoy halted,, whilst the
fugitives climbed over this barricade of overturned wagons
and fallen horses. Each soldier in passing stuck his bayonet
in a loaf of bread. The contents of the casks were still more
tempting; some of the soldiers pierced them with bullet-holes
and drank through the openings the wine and brandy. When
these casks were half emptied, they pierced in the same manner
those loaded on the wagons. All along the street red streams
flowed towards the Sambre. The wagon containing the
imperial treasure, which Provost-General Radet had caused to
set out from Caillou the day before at seven o'clock in the
evening, was caught with its six horses in the jam at some
226 WATERLOO.
hundred yards from the bridge. Despairing of being able to open
a passage, the paymaster, who was responsible for this precious
cargo, thought of opening the wagon and confiding to his
employees and the soldiers composing the escort as many sacks of
gold as each one could carry. All these men were ordered to
report at a certain point on the other side of the Sambre. The
paymaster entered in a note-book the names of the depositaries
and the number of sacks of 20,000 francs that were confided to
them. But, precisely at the moment when he was proceeding
with this operation, there resounded from the foot of the
street the shots fired into the casks of wine. An alarm followed
which degenerated into a panic, with cries of "The Prussians
are coming!" uttered designedly by the inhabitants and even
by some of the soldiers. These wretches hurled themselves on
the wagon. They ripped open the sacks of gold with sabres
and bayonets. Everything was pillaged. The stopping of the
head of the convoy arrested the carriages as far as the entrance
to the upper town. The berlin containing the Portfolio
remained stationary on the route in the midst of the artillery
train. The Duke of Bassano, hearing the fusillade in the
distance, caused the most important papers to be torn up and
scattered to the winds.
The evacuation of Charleroi, however, might have been
effected without disorder, for on June 19th the Prussians had
slackened their pursuit. With the exception of a few cavalry
reconnaissances, they did not approach the town before noon;
it was rather late in the day when they seized the bridges
of Marchienne, Charleroi, and Châtelet. During the evening,
whilst Pirch, who had been sent the preceding night
towards Gembloux with the II. Corps to intercept the retreat of
Grouchy, occupied Mellers', the corps of Ziethen and Bülow
bivouacked, their front covered by the Sambre. It was not
until the next day that the Prussian Army passed the river in
three columns, and directed itself on Beaumont and Avesnes.
The English, less ardent or not as good marchers, were still
between Nivelles and Binche.
V.
The Emperor had vainly attempted to organize resistance
in the bottoms of La Haye Sainte, at Rossomme, Genappe, and
Quatre-Bras. He understood that, with an army in
dissolution and yielding obedience only to fear, the best thing to do
The Rout. 227
was to retreat as quickly as possible. He traversed Charleroi
and halted in a meadow on the right bank of the Sambre. He
gave some orders, which were not obeyed, for rallying the
fugitives and reassembling the train. At the end of an hour he
remounted his horse and proceeded towards Philippeville,
where he arrived at nine in the morning. The gates of the
place being closed, he was forced to make himself known to
the officer of the guard. Napoleon had with him Bertrand,
Drouot, Dejean, Flahault, and Bussy. He was rejoined at
Philippeville by the Duke of Bassano, accompanied by Fleury
de Chaboulon, then by Marshal Soult. Of all his
preoccupations, the most pressing was the rallying of the Army.
Instructions were sent to the commandants of Givet, Avesnes,
Maubeuge, Beaumont, and Landrecies. They were to provide
for the wants of the detachments and isolated soldiers that
might present themselves before these places, and then to direct
them on the points of concentration : Laon for the 1st, 2nd, and
6th Infantry Corps; La Fere for the artillery; Marie, Saint-
Quentin, Réthel, Vervins, and Rheims for the cavalry; and
Soissons for the Guard. Of all the corps commanders, Reille
alone had rejoined the Emperor at Philippeville; he was
entrusted with the work of reorganizing the troops who might
arrive upon the glacis of that fortress. A new despatch,
directing Marshal Grouchy to retreat towards Philippeville or
Givet, had been forwarded by a spy named Cousin. The
commandants of the fortresses of the 2nd and 16th Military
Divisions were warned to be on the lookout for the enemy.
The Emperor had not only to think of his Army - there
was public opinion, the enemies in the interior, and, finally, the
Chamber. He wrote two letters to his brother Joseph. One,
destined to be read in the Council of Ministers, related only,
with certain reticences, the outcome of the battle; in the other,
entirely personal. Napoleon concealed nothing of the great
disaster, and announced his immediate return to Paris. Fleury
de Chaboulon, to whom these letters were dictated, assures us
that the second terminated as follows: ". . . All is not
lost. By uniting my forces, the dépôts, and the National
Guards, I shall have 300,000 men to oppose to the enemy.
But it is necessary that I be assisted and not interfered with.
. . . I believe the Deputies will realize the fact that their
duty is to unite with me in order to save France."
228 WATERLOO.
The Emperor then set about preparing the bulletin of the
battles of Ligny and Mont Saint-Jean, which was to appear in
the Moniteur. Then, leaving Soult at Philippeville to watch
over the rallying of the Army, he entered all alone, as it seems,
one of the calèches of the Major-General. Bassano, Bertrand,
Drouot, and the aides-de-camp followed in two other carriages.
From Philippeville to Paris, the most direct route was
by way of Barbancon, Avesnes, La Capelle, Marie, and Laon.
But the Emperor did not wish to run the risk of being captured
by some party of Prussian cavalry which might have passed
the Sambre at Marchienne; he took a longer route, which
passed through Marienbourg, Rocroi, Maubert-Fontaine, La
Capelle, Marie, and Laon. At sunset the party stopped for
some time in sight of Rocroi. The inhabitants knew nothing
of the great defeat; they flocked in crowds upon the ramparts
with the hope of seeing the Emperor. Their acclamations
awakened him from a deep sleep. Events had succeeded one
another with such rapidity that, for a moment, he imagined
that he had just awakened from a frightful dream.
As it was feared that it would be impossible to find relays
of horses at Maubert-Fontaine (a great number of horses had
been requisitioned eight days before for the auxiliary services
of Vandamme's corps), a detour was made as far as Meziéres.
There also horses were lacking. One was compelled to go the
distance of a league in search of them. From half-past ten
until midnight the calèches remained upon the Place des
Fontaines in front of the post-house. General Dumonceau,
Governor of Meziéres, Traulle, commandant of the place, and
the officers of their staffs surrounded the carriages. They
remained motionless, and conversed in a low tone, "as on a day
of mourning." None of the travellers dismounted save
Bertrand, whom Napoleon summoned to the door of his caliche
by a superior officer of hussars, who constituted the entire
imperial escort. Finally, the journey was resumed. As the
carriages approached the Porte de Pierre the soldiers of the
post cried, "Long live the Emperor!" and repeated this cry -
"very poignant under the circumstances," says Commandant
Traulle - until the last carriage had crossed the glacis.
The imperial party did not arrived until the next day, June
20th, between six and seven in the evening, at the foot of the
mountain of Laon, in the faubourg of Vaux. The Emperor
dismounted from the calèche in the court of the post-house.
The Rout. 229
Through the great gate, which remained open, he was seen from
the street walking to and fro, his head bowed and his arms
folded over his chest. There was a great deal of straw
scattered over the courtyard, upon which opened the granaries
and stables. One of the spectators said in a low voice : "It is
Job upon his dung-hill." Napoleon appeared so crushed and
so sad, the scene was so impressive, even for rustic souls, that
one dared not acclaim him. A few cries of "Long live the
Emperor!" very weak, timid, and suppressed, issued, however,
from the crowd. The Emperor stopped and raised his hat.
The Emperor's arrival had been reported in the town. A
detachment of the National Guard descended to form the guard
of honour. Soon after came General Langeron, commanding the
department, the prefect, and some of the municipal councillors.
General Radet, provost-general, and General Neigre conferred
also with the Emperor. He ordered the prefect, with whom he
associated his aide-de-camp Bussy, who was from that part of
the country, to collect great supplies of provisions, as the Army
was to concentrate under Laon. He sent Neigre to La Frere to
organize the field batteries, Dejean to Guise to examine the
condition of the fortifications, and Flahault to Avesnes to
gather information upon the march of the enemy. Night
came. The Emperor did not wait for Marshal Soult; besides,
he had given him his instructions at Philippeville. About ten
or eleven o'clock he started for Paris.
Since Philippeville, and doubtless even since the halt in
the meadows of the Sambre, Napoleon had resolved to hasten
to Paris. He remembered the grievous lesson of 1814 - that
vote of deposition, which had paralysed him at the head of his
Army. He felt that, unless he returned in haste to his capital
to impose on Fouché, the conspirators of all parties, and the
hostile or deluded Deputies, it was all over with his crown and
the last resistance of the country. From a military as well as
from a political standpoint, his true place, for some days at least,
was in Paris. Without soldiers and without cannon, he could
not think of stopping the enemy on the frontier. As to rallying
at Laon the wrecks of the Army, Soult and the generals could
do that as well as he. There was no need of genius for that!
During this time, in Paris, the Emperor would take, in
conjunction with Davout and Carnot, the measures necessary for
assuring the public safety. He would allay the political crisis;
would push forward the preparations in every branch of the
230 WATERLOO.
service; would direct on Laon all the available men in the
dépôts, the mobilized battalions, the field batteries, and the
convoys of arms and ammunition; would decree, in concert
with the Chambers, new levies of soldiers and National Guards,
and would go, after four or five days, to resume the command.
It has been said that Napoleon "deserted" his Army, as in
Egypt and Russia. Alas! Napoleon no longer had an army.
Of Grouchy he knew nothing; it was presumed that he was in
great peril with the corps of Vandamme and Gérard. Of the
74,000 combatants at Waterloo, 40,000 had perhaps retired
safe and sound and had re-passed the Sambre; but more than
three-fourths of these men were still dispersed from Cambrai to
Rocroi, marching along the roads singly or in small squads,
camping in the woods and stopping at the homes of the
peasants. On June 20th, at the hour when Napoleon quitted Laon
to go to Paris, there were 2,600 soldiers assembled at
Philippeville and nearly 6,000 at Avesnes. These soldiers constituted
the entire Army.
CHAPTER VII.
The Combats of Wavre; and the Retreat of Grouchy.
I. - March of Grouchy on Wavre. - Combat of La Baraque. - Attack
of Wavre (afternoon of June 18th).
II. - The second despatch of Soult. - New assaults against Wavre and
Bierges. - Passage of the Dyle at Limale and night combat.
III. - Renewal of the combat and defeat of Thielmann (morning of June
19th). - News of the disaster (half-past ten in the morning). -
Retreat of Grouchy (afternoon and evening of June 19th).
IV.- Combats of La Falise and Boquet (morning of June 20th) . - Defence
of Namur (from three to nine in the evening). - Rallying at
Givet of the army of Grouchy (June 21st).
We have seen that, on June 18th, about noon, Marshal
Grouchy, in the course of his discussion with Gérard at
Walhain, had received an aide-de-camp from Exelmans, who
informed him of the Prussian rear guard before Wavre.
Between nine and ten o'clock Exelmans' two divisions of
dragoons had arrived at La Baraque, at five kilometres from
that little town. Some scouts who had pushed beyond the
defile of La Huzelle reported a body of Prussian troops,
consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, in position upon the
heights of Wavre. It was the entire corps of Pirch, still on the
right bank of the Dyle, and two cavalry regiments of the
landwehr, composing the rear guard of Bülow. Although he
had orders to pursue the enemy closely, Exelmans feared to
engage these masses with only his cavalry in a region so wooded.
He knew, moreover, from new information or indications, that
the Prussian Army would manoeuvre to join the English. He
thought that Grouchy would interrupt the march on Wavre,
henceforth without object, in order to pass the Dyle at the
nearest point. With the design of preparing for this
movement, he directed towards that river the brigade of Vincent;
it took position at the farm of La Plaquerie, at the distance of
a cannon-shot from Ottignies. Exelmans sent towards Neuf
Sart the brigade of Berton to reconnoitre the right, left at La
Baraque an advance guard of two squadrons, and fell back
231
232 WATERLOO.
with the bulk of the division of Chastel nearly a league in the
rear, near Corbaix. It was during this halt that he sent an
aide-de-camp to Grouchy to inform him of the presence of the
Prussians before Wavre and of the dispositions that he had
made.
The corps of Vandamme was then halted at Nil Saint-Vincent,
in conformity with the orders of Grouchy of the day
before. On the evening of June 17th, the Marshal, in spite of
all his information concerning the march of the Prussians
towards Wavre, was still so undecided touching the direction to
take that he had directed Vandamme to advance only as far as
Walhain. A little later, about eleven or twelve at night, he
had written to him as follows: "I have forgotten to tell you
to push beyond Walhain, in order that General Gérard may
take position in the rear. I think we will go farther than
Walhain; it will then be rather a halt than a definite
position." On the morning of the 18th, on breaking camp,
Grouchy, fully decided from that time to march on Wavre, would
have had plenty of time to rectify these instructions and to
order Vandamme to follow as rapidly as possible the cavalry
of Exelmans. He did not think of this. Vandamme, after
having passed Walhain, halted at Nil Saint-Vincent, pending
new orders.
About one o'clock, Grouchy warned by Exelman's aide-de-
camp, Commandant d'Estourmel, that the Prussian rear guard
was in sight, arrived at Nil Saint-Vincent. He gave to
Vandamme and sent to Exelmans the order to put the troops on
the march. A little before two o'clock, as the advance of the
dragoons approached La Baraque, the two squadrons that had
been left there as an advance guard were attacked by the 10th
Prussian Hussars, debouching on their left flank. This regiment,
with two battalions and two guns, formed the detachment of
Colonel Ledebur, posted in observation at Mont Saint-Guilbert.
Until one o'clock Ledebur had not budged. Badly
informed by his patrols and videttes, he was completely ignorant
of the approach of the French Army, as well as the point
pushed in the morning to La Baraque by the two divisions of
Exelmans, and the occupation of the farm of La Plaquerie by
the brigade of Vincent. Although surrounded by enemies,
he did not know it. Warned, finally, of the presence of the
French at Nil Saint Vincent and on the route of Wavre, Ledebur
saw that his direct line of retreat was in danger of being
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 233
intercepted. He pushed rapidly his hussars through the fields to La
Baraque, whilst his two battalions gained at a run, by way of
Bruyères and Bloc-Ry, the wood of La Huzelle, which bordered
the road on both sides, to the north of La Baraque, and made
of it a kind of defile. The hussars drove back the two French
squadrons to the east of the road, kept up for some minutes the
combat, and then, on the approach of the bulk of the dragoons,
they withdrew through the defile, which had just been occupied
by the sharpshooters of Ledebur. Infantry was required to
dislodge the latter. The dragoons made way for the head of
Vandamme's column; it attacked without delay. Two
battalions of Brause's division, which were still with Langen's
division (both belonging to Pirch's corps), on the right bank of
the Dyle, had been sent to the support of Ledebur. The
defence was obstinate. Grouchy, unknown to Exelmans, had
recalled from the banks of the Dyle the brigade of Vincent.
All the dragoons were assembled. He ordered Exelmans to
turn the position towards Dion-le-Mont with these three
thousand horsemen. The manoeuvre, well conceived, but effected
too late or two slowly, did not give the expected results.
Before the French cavalry had finished its movement, the
Prussians had fallen back on Wavre. Vandamme passed the
defile. He had orders from Grouchy to pursue the enemy even
upon the heights which dominate this town, and to take
position there pending new instructions.
In spite of the assurance with which he had spoken to
Gérard, Grouchy was none the less troubled by the cannonade
heard on his left. He advanced at a gallop towards Limelette,
"in order," says he, "to form a better opinion as to the causes
of this cannonade." He finally acquired the conviction that a
great battle was being waged upon the edge of the Forest of
Soignes. On regaining the route of Wavre, between half-past
three and four o'clock, he received the Emperor's (or rather
Soult's) letter, written from Caillou, at ten in the
morning. It was addressed to "Marshal Grouchy, at Gembloux,
or somewhere in front of this town." The courier, Adjutant-
Commandant Zenowicz, had been forced to pass through
Genappe, Sombreffe, and Gembloux. This made a journey of ten
leagues. Zenowicz, however, might have effected it in less
time than it took him to do so. Besides, had this despatch,
which directed Grouchy to march on Wavre while connecting
the communications with the Imperial Army, reached him
-16-
234 WATERLOO.
sooner, it would have led to no change in his essential
dispositions. After having read it, he even remarked to his aide-de-
camp Bella "that he congratulated himself on having so well
carried out the Emperor's instructions in marching on Wavre,
instead of listening to the advice of General Gérard"; and he
replied to Berthezene, who had sent one of his aides-de-camp
to inform him of the march of the Prussian columns in the
direction of the fire: "Let the General be tranquil; we are on
the right road. I have just heard from the Emperor, and he
orders me to march on Wavre."
The Emperor also ordered him, as subsidiary, it is true,
to connect the communications with the main body of the
Army. Grouchy took some tardy measures to execute these
instructions. Pajol had just informed him, through an aide-
de-camp, that the right column, in its march from Grand Leez
to Tourinnes, had discovered no trace of the enemy. Grouchy
sent back the aide-de-camp with the order for Pajol to
advance immediately with the 2nd Cavalry Corps and the
division of Teste to Limale and to pass the Dyle by main force.
Grouchy was ignorant of the value of time, otherwise he would
have selected to capture the bridge of Limale, not Pajol, who,
at Tourinnes, was distant three leagues and a half from it;
but the cavalry of General Vallin, which was a league from the
Dyle, and the division of Hulot, of the corps of Gérard, which
had arrived at La Baraque.
The despatch sent to Pajol, Grouchy galloped towards
Wavre, against which he intended to direct the attack in
person. The impetuous Vandamme had not waited for him.
Despite the orders of the Marshal, without reconnoitring the
position, and without preparing the way with his artillery, he had
launched à la français the entire division of Habert against
the town in columns of assault.
The second echelon of the corps of Ziethen (divisions of
Brause and Langen and the cavalry of Sohr) had passed the
Dyle after the combat at the defile of La Huzelle and had
marched towards Chapelle Saint-Lambert. But there still
remained to defend Wavre and its approaches almost all of the
corps of Thielmann. Believing at first that the deployment of
the cavalry of Exelmans between Sainte-Anne and Dion-le-
Mont was only a demonstration, Thielmann had set his troops
in motion in the direction of Couture Saint-Germain; two
battalions alone were to remain to guard Wavre. Then, at sight
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 235
of Vandamme, who debouched in front of the town, he had
caused the positions which he had just evacuated to be
reoccupied. The divisions of Kempher and Luck, three battalions
of the division of Borcke and the cavalry of Hobe, established
themselves in Wavre, Basse-Wavre, and upon the heights of
the left bank of the Dyle. The division of Stülpnagel came to
occupy Bierges; the detachment from the corps of Ziethen
(three battalions and three squadrons, under Von Stengel),
detached to guard the bridge of Limale, was maintained
at that post.
The infantry of Habert quickly dislodged the Prussians
from the faubourg of Wavre; but their furious charge was
arrested at the Dyle, which separated the town from the
faubourg. The two bridges were strongly barricaded and
enfiladed by batteries established upon the different heights in
the inclined streets abutting on the river; finally, more than a
thousand sharpshooters were concealed in the houses of the
left bank. General Habert, Colonel Dubalen, of the 64th, and
600 men were put hors de combat in a few minutes. Powerless
to carry the bridge, the soldiers hesitated to retire, for fear of
being exposed to the terrible fire of the Prussian batteries,
which swept the approaches of the faubourg and the steep
acclivities of the right bank. They sheltered themselves in the
streets parallel with the Dyle. "They were engulfed," says
Grouchy, "in a kind of cul-de-sac."
II.
After having examined attentively the position. Grouchy
resolved to second the attack on Wavre by two other attacks
above and below the town. Some reinforcements entered the
faubourg; one of Lefol's battalions was detached to pass the
Dyle at the mill bridge of Bierges; and Exelmans advanced
with his dragoons in front of Basse-Wavre. As the Marshal
finished taking these dispositions, he received, about five
o'clock, the dispatch which Soult had sent him from the battle-
field at half past one, and which terminated as follows: "At
this moment the battle is engaged along the line of Waterloo
in front of the Forest of Soignes. So you will manoeuvre to
join our right. We believe that we see now the corps of Bülow
upon the heights of Saint-Lambert. So you will not lose an
236 WATERLOO.
instant in approaching and joining us, in order that you may
crush Bülow, whom you will take in the very act."
The despatch, written with a pencil, was partly effaced,
and almost illegible. Grouchy and many officers of his staff
read this letter as follows: "La battaile est gagnee" ("The
battle is gained"), instead of "La battaile est engagee" ("Battle
is engaged"). They wished to interrogate the courier. But
Grouchy pretends that this officer was too drunk to answer.
At any rate, the Marshal had only to reflect. It was evident
that a despatch written at one o'clock could not call gained
an action which the noise of the cannon, more and more
violent, indicated only too well still lasted at five.
However, whether the battle was engaged or gained, the
order of the Emperor existed none the less, formal and
imperative : it was necessary to march on Saint-Lambert in order
to crush Bülow. Grouchy understood it; but he displayed
neither resolution nor method in his dispositions. Two of
Vandamme's divisions were sufficient to occupy the Prussians
before Wavre. It seems then that the Marshal ought to have
directed immediately towards Limale Vandamme's third
division as well as Exelmans' eight regiments of dragoons, whose
diversion upon Basse-Wavre was no longer useful. But
Grouchy, by the strangest of strategical conceptions, wished at
the same time to capture Wavre with half of his army and
to direct the other half on Saint-Lambert by the bridge of
Limale. He left then before the Prussian positions all of the
3rd Corps and Exelmans' cavalry, and sent his aide-de-camp
Pont-Bellanger to carry the verbal order to Pajol, who had left
Tourinnes, to hasten his march on Limale. "Never has the
Emperor been so great!" said Pont-Bellanger, on approaching
Pajol. "The battle is gained, and only the cavalry is awaited
to finish the rout."
At the same time that he despatched this order to Pajol,
Grouchy came at a gallop with Gérard to La Baraque to direct
from thence on Limale the 4th Corps, whose leading division
(General Hulot) had alone arrived upon the heights of Wavre.
Is it true, as Grouchy says, that the other two divisions of the
4th Corps (Vichery and Pècheux) had not yet attained La
Baraque at six in the evening; that, tired of waiting for them,
the Marshal returned in front of Wavre, leaving the order for
these two divisions to march directly on Limale; finally, that,
this order having been badly interpreted, Vichery and Pècheux
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 237
continued their movement on Wavre? Or should we rather
believe that Grouchy found these divisions at La Baraque;-
that he gave them the order to march on Limale, but that the
head of column got lost en route for want of a guide, and resumed
its march towards Wavre? It appears impossible to get at
the truth in the midst of the contradictory testimonies of
Gérard, General Hulot, and of Grouchy himself, whose own
assertions do not agree with each other. It is certain,
however, that Grouchy went to La Baraque and then returned
to Wavre.
The combat continued to rage fiercely on both sides of
the Dyle. The attack on the bridge of Bierges by the battalion
of Lefol had been repulsed. Grouchy, bent on passing the
Dyle at this point, ordered Gérard to renew the attack with a
battalion of Hulot's division. Gérard having remarked to
him that it would be better to cause the detachment of Lefol
to be supported by other troops of the same corps, he received
badly this very apposite observation. Gérard then transmitted
the order to Hulot, who conducted in person to the assault a
battalion of the 9th Light. To reach the bridge, it had to
cross some very marshy ground intersected parallel with the
Dyle by ditches, very deep and wide. Hulot directed the men
to throw themselves into these ditches, if they could not leap
them. They found themselves in water from four to six feet
in depth, and the skirmishers were on the point of being
drowned; the assistance of their comrades was necessary to
extricate them from their dangerous position. During this
time the bullets fell as thick as hail. Rebuffed, the soldiers
fell back. Grouchy and Gérard, the latter at the head of
another battalion, arrived about this time on the edge of the
meadow. Gérard, little accustomed to spare himself, exposed
himself all the more, as he had reasons to be in a very bad
humour. He was shot through the body and carried to the
rear. Grouchy then ordered General Baltus, commanding
the artillery, to replace Gérard at the head of the
assaulting column. The latter having positively refused to do so,
Grouchy leaped from his horse, crying: "If one can no longer
command the obedience of his subordinates, he should at least
know how to die." This third assault failed, like the preceding
ones. Grouchy left the division of Hulot before Bierges, as
if he had wished, says Hulot, to make new dispositions for
attacking the mill; then, suddenly changing his mind, he
238 WATERLOO.
rejoined the other two divisions of Gérard and advanced with
them towards Limale.
During these vain assaults, one continued to skirmish in
front of Basse-Wavre, and at Wavre the fight was pursued
with terrible ferocity. Vandamme made as many as thirteen
attacks without being able to wrest from the Prussians this
little town, which had been transformed into a veritable
fortress. At eleven in the evening the combat still raged.
When Marshal Grouchy arrived at Limale, at nightfall,
the bridge over the Dyle was free. Renewing the audacious
manoeuvre of the preceding year at Montereau, Pajol had
launched at full speed the hussars of General Vallin upon this
bridge, which, however, was accessible to only four horses
arriving abreast, and which was defended by an entire battalion.
The Prussians overthrown and sabred, the infantry of Teste
and the rest of the cavalry passed the bridge behind the
hussars and took position on the left bank. Von Stengel yielded
Limale after a combat of some duration, and took up a position
on the height which dominates this village. In spite of the
gathering darkness, the assault was vigorously conducted by
Teste, when Grouchy debouched by the bridge of Limale with
the divisions of Vichery and Pecheux. These reinforcements
were necessary, for Thielmann, hearing the cannonade, had
sent to the support of Stengel, by the left bank of the Dyle,
the division of Stülpnagel and the cavalry of Hobe. The
combat continued until eleven in the evening for the possession
of the crest of the plateau, which, finally, remained in
possession of the French. The road to Mont Saint-Jean was open;
but for a long time the cannon of the Emperor had been
silent.
III.
The French bivouacked in squares, almost intermingled
with the enemy, who occupied the wood of Rixensart. The
advance posts were so close to each other that the bullets
exchanged throughout the night fell in the rear of the first lines.
At half-past eleven in the evening Grouchy wrote to Vandamme
to rejoin him at once at Limale with the 3rd Corps. He
intended to recommence the combat early in the morning, in
order to join the Imperial Army at Brussels, for the report
was circulated - we know not upon what grounds - that the
Emperor had defeated the English.
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 239
The Prussian Staff was better informed. An officer of
Marwitz's cavalry, sent on a reconnaissance, had reported that
the French Army was in flight. Thenceforth reassured,
Thielmann directed most of his troops upon the plateau of Limale,
in order to resume the offensive at dawn. At three in the
morning the cavalry of Hobe debouched from the wood of
Rixensart with two horse batteries, which, in a few minutes,
riddled with balls the French bivouacs. Grouchy, hastening
upon the firing-line, ordered his batteries to reply; then,
having formed all his force in line of battle, the cavalry of
Pajol on the extreme left, the divisions of Pecheux and Vichery
in the centre and in reserve, and the division of Teste on the
right, he marched against the enemy. After a stubborn
defence, the Prussians yielded the wood of Rixensart. It was
nearly eight o'clock. Thielmann received from Pirch positive
information of the defeat of the French. The despatch added
that the II. Corps was about to manoeuvre to intercept the
retreat of Marshal Grouchy. The news of this great victory,
which was immediately announced to the troops, reanimated
them. Thielmann, pivoting upon his left wing, which still
occupied the wood of Bierges, executed a change of front. By
this movement the Prussian right found itself deployed
parallel with the route from Wavre to Brussels.
The combat was resumed, not without advantage for the
Prussians, till the division of Teste had carried the village and
the mill of Bierges. In this assault General Penne, one of
Teste's brigadiers, who was wounded himself, had his head
carried away by a cannon-ball. Berthezene, posted on the
right bank of the Dyle, had seconded the attack of Teste; the
two divisions united. Thielmann, seeing his left outflanked
and his right on the point of being turned by the cavalry of
Pajol, which was manoeuvring towards Rosieren in order to get
possession of the route of Brussels, put himself in retreat in the
direction of Louvain. The four battalions left in Wavre
evacuated that position, and proceeded at first to La Bavette,
from whence they were quickly dislodged by the advance guard
of Vandamme. Notwithstanding the order of Grouchy to
come to rejoin him at Limale with the 3rd Corps, Vandamme
had remained all the morning before Wavre. He had only
sent to the Marshal the dragoons of Exelmans and the division
of Hulot, which he had caused to be relieved in front of Bierges
by the division of Berthezene.
240 WATERLOO.
Master of the field of battle, upon which the Prussians had
abandoned five pieces of artillery and numerous wounded,
Grouchy had his right at La Bavette and his left beyond
Rosieren. He was making his preparations to march on
Brussels when, about half-past ten, an officer of the Major-General
arrived. His haggard face, his eyes big with fright, and his
enfeebled body appearing, like his horse, broken by fatigue, he
seemed the living image of defeat. Hardly able to collect his
ideas and to find his speech, he related in so incoherent a
manner the disaster of Mont Saint-Jean that the Marshal
thought at first that he had an affair with a fool or a drunken
man. To the questions asked him by Grouchy - if he was
the bearer of an order; upon what point the retreat was to
be effected; and if the Army had repassed the Sambre - the
officer, instead of replying, recommenced the confused
recital of the battle. Some precise details, seized in the midst
of divagations, finally convinced Grouchy. It was not the
moment to yield to grief; it was necessary to save what
remained of the Army.
Grouchy united his general officers in a sort of council
of war. He announced to them the terrible news. While
speaking he had, it has been said, tears in his eyes. The officers
knew of the discussion that he had had the day before with
Gérard at Walhain. The Marshal thought that the
circumstances made it necessary for him to justify himself for not
having listened to the counsel of his lieutenant. "My honour,"
said he, "demands that I explain my dispositions of yesterday.
The instructions which I had received from the Emperor
forbade me to manoeuvre in any other direction than Wavre. I
have been forced to reject the advice that Count Gérard
believed he had a right to give me. I render justice to the talents
and the brilliant valour of General Gérard; but, no doubt, you
were as much astonished as myself that a general officer,
ignorant of the Emperor's orders and of the information upon
which the Marshal of France under whom he was placed
acted, should permit himself to trace publicly for him his
conduct. The advanced hour of the day, the distance at which
we were from the point where the cannon was heard, and the
state of the roads, rendered it impossible to arrive in time to
take part in the action that was being fought. Besides,
whatever may be the events that have taken place, the orders of the
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 241
Emperor, of which I have just communicated to you the
contents, did not permit of my acting otherwise than I have done."
After having pronounced these words, which were merely
an apology for his conduct, the Marshal unfolded his plan of
retreat. He had at first thought of advancing upon the rear
of the Anglo-Prussians, in order to delay by this diversion their
pursuit of the Imperial Army; but he quickly renounced this
idea, whose sole result would have been the total destruction
of his 30,000 men submerged, crushed by 150,000. For the
same reason he wisely rejected the bold project of Vandamme,
which consisted in marching on Brussels, where they would
set free numerous prisoners, and in regaining the frontier
towards Valenciennes or Lille by way of Enghien and Ath.
Vandamme supposed that on this side only a few detachments
of the Allied Army would be encountered. Grouchy rightly
preferred to take his line of retreat on Namur, Dinant, and
Givet. It was necessary to make haste, for it was not only to
be feared that the Army would be harassed by Thielmann,
who, no doubt, would resume the offensive at the first
retrograde movement of the French, but that it would be attacked
in flank by one of Blücher's army corps. Perhaps this
detachment would even arrive in time to take position at Gembloux
and bar the retreat. This was, in fact, the object of the
Prussians; and at eleven o'clock, when Grouchy still had his army
beyond the Dyle, its front between Rosieren and La Bavette,
Pirch, who had been detached from Rossomme in the night
with the II. Corps, already occupied Mellery. He had nearly
two hours the start of Grouchy, for the distance from Mellery
to Gembloux is ten kilometres, as the crow flies, and from La
Bavette to Gembloux, twenty.
The retreat began between eleven o'clock and noon.
The dragoons of Exelmans, with the exception of the 20th
Regiment placed under the orders of Vandamme, advanced
very rapidly on Namur to seize the bridges over the Sambre;
their advance guard reached there about four o'clock. The
4th Corps and the cavalry of Vallin repassed the Dyle at Limale
and took the direct route to Gembloux; they bivouacked at
night at two leagues beyond that village on the road leading
from Nivelles to Namur, between Le Mazy and Temploux.
Grouchy, who marched with this echelon of the army,
established his headquarters in Temploux. From La Bavette the
corps of Vandamme withdrew to Wavre, remained in position
242 WATERLOO.
there until late, and then marched by way of Dion-le-Mont,
Tourinnes, and Grand Leez. It halted about eleven in the
evening on the road from Gembloux to Namur, on a line
with Temploux. Pajol, charged with forming the rear guard
with the cavalry of General Soult and the indefatigable
division of Teste, imposed on Thielmann by following him even
near Saint-Achtenrode, where the latter took position. Then,
when the entire corps of Vandamme had repassed the bridges
of Wavre, Pajol put himself in retreat, gained Gembloux by
way of Sauvenierre, and there established himself in bivouac
in the night.
This hazardous retreat was not effected without some
disorder; but not a shot was fired. Thielmann, whose corps
was reduced to 12,500 men by the losses of the day before and
of the morning, did not learn until very late of the retreat
of the French. As to the II. Prussian Corps, though it had
reached Mellery at noon, it had arrived there in the worst state
of fatigue, for it had, so to speak, been on the march for twenty-
four hours without intermission. Besides, it seems that Pirch
did not feel strong enough to act alone. He was without news
of Thielmann, whose cooperation he expected. He was
unwilling or did not think it possible to lead further on this day
his harassed soldiers.
IV.
The next day, June 20th, Pajol and Teste quitted
Gembloux early in the morning, in accordance with the orders of
Grouchy, and marched by way of Saint-Denis and Saint-Marc
on Namur. About nine o'clock Grouchy likewise directed on
Namur the 4th Corps, which convoyed all the wounded and
the reserve park. The Marshal intended to traverse the town
with this army corps, whilst that of Vandamme remained in
position across the route of Gembloux until past noon to cover
the movement. But things did not pass exactly as the Marshal
had planned. At the moment when the advance of the 4th
Corps quitted Temploux a brisk cannonade was heard in front
towards the left. Instead of bivouacking in the midst of his
troops, Vandamme had gone to pass the night in Namur.
He had not received the order, sent by Grouchy, to hold the
position; and in the morning Generals Lefol, Berthezène, and
Habert, left without instructions, had put themselves on the
march for Namur and, by this movement, uncovered the
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 243
flank of the 4th Corps. They were attacked near La Falise by
more than thirty squadrons of Hobe, which Thielmann had
caused to set out from Saint-Achtenrode at five in the morning
with a horse battery, and which had made ten leagues in
pursuit of the French. At the same time Grouchy was informed
that a considerable body of the enemy was debouching from
Mazy. It was the advance guard of Pirch on the march from
Mellery.
Grouchy found himself in grave peril, for if the infantry
of Vandamme should withdraw too quickly beyond the
Sambre, Hobe would bar to him the route of Namur while he
was fighting Pirch. The troops, also understanding the danger,
showed some uneasiness; the numerous wounded who had
been brought from Limale and Wavre expressed by murmurs,
groans, and cries of rage their fear of falling alive into the
hands of the Prussians. Grouchy rode among the wagons
with General Vichery. He said in a loud voice : "Be tranquil!
We swear not to abandon you. But I am confident that our
dispositions will save us." Then, with the cavalry of General
Vallin, he charged the Prussian squadrons which, having
turned the divisions of Vandamme, flanked his line of retreat,
and drove them back on the left. Continuing his march, he
went to the support of Vandamme. In the meantime the 4th
Corps, which thenceforth found the road free, gained Namur
with the wounded and the park; the rear guard, commanded
by Vichery in person, arrested for some time at Boquet the
Prussians of Pirch; it then withdrew, disputing the ground
foot by foot.
Surprised by the sudden attack of the Prussian cavalry,
the 3rd Corps found itself in a critical situation. A square of
Lefol was broken; the men escaped the lances of the uhlans
only by seeking refuge in the woods. Two pieces of artillery
were lost. The arrival of Grouchy arrested the enemy. The
cavalry of Vallin charged at a gallop. Colonel Briqueville,
who charged at the head of the 20th Dragoons, overthrew the
furthest advanced of the Prussian squadrons, retook the two
guns, and even captured a cannon. All of Hobe's cavalry fell
back upon Pirch's corps, which debouched from Temploux.
On hearing the noise of the combat, Vandamme had
hastened from Namur. Grouchy reiterated to him the order
to cover the retreat of the 4th Corps. Vandamme re-formed
his battalions, took position in front of the faubourgs, and
244 WATERLOO.
succeeded in checking the Prussians. The cavalry, the 4th
Corps, and the convoys entered Namur, where the Prussians
were detested. The French brought with them the terrible
hazards of war. They were none the less received as friends.
The municipality distributed 100,000 rations of bread and the
same number of brandy. The brave Namurois loaned their
boats for the transportation of the wounded by the Meuse,
and themselves aided in embarking them. The women brought,
even under the cannon-balls of the enemy, food to the soldiers
and assistance to the wounded.
The Army passed through Namur without halting. First
Grouchy, with the 4th Corps, and then Vandamme, wounded
slightly, with the 3rd, passed the Sambre and plunged into the
long defile formed by the Meuse and the Forest of Morlagne.
The division of Teste was ordered to hold the town until night.
To defend Namur, whose dilapidated fortifications were not
proof against an escalade. Teste had eight field-pieces and 2,000
men at most. He distributed them upon the ramparts and at
the three eastern gates - Louvain, Iron, and Saint-Nicholas.
Hardly were his men in position when Pirch launched his
columns to the assault. Received by a discharge of grape and a
rolling fire of musketry, the Prussians retreated, leaving upon
the glacis a pile of dead and wounded. A second attack, in
which Colonels Zastrow and Bismarck were mortally wounded,
failed like the preceding. On account of the scarcity of
cartridges, each Frenchman aimed carefully and brought down
his Prussian. It was eight in the evening. Pirch, having lost
1,500 men, and despairing of capturing the place by main
force, broke off the combat. But General Teste, almost out of
ammunition, had already begun his retreat. The Prussians,
having discovered this, penetrated into the town through the
windows and door of the custom-house, and pushed rapidly
as far as the bridge of the Sambre. There, a detachment of
engineers, posted in some houses which the sappers had had
time to pierce with loopholes, checked them a long time by a
sustained and well-aimed fire. This rear guard then withdrew
by the gate of France, where a great quantity of fascines,
bundles of straw, and pieces of wood soaked in tar had been
accumulated. The sappers set fire to the pile. The gate and
neighbouring houses burst into flames, closing the street to the
Prussians.
COMBATS OF WAVRE AND RETREAT OF GROUCHY. 245
During this combat the bulk of Grouchy's army had
attained Dinant. On the next day, June 21st, all the army was
assembled under the cannon of Givet.
If this march from Wavre to the frontier is not "one of the
most astonishing retreats of modern military history, "for the
carelessness of Thielmann and the timidity of Pirch singularly
facilitated it, it, nevertheless, does great honour to Grouchy.
He did not despair when all hope seemed lost. He knew how
to act with precision and rapidity. By the direction which he
chose and by the dispositions which he took, he saved his army.
We may ask ourselves. What would have happened if the
unfortunate Marshal had shown on June 17th and 18th as much
resolution, activity, military talent, and the same
understanding of the exigencies of the situation?
CHAPTER VII.
The Campaign of 1815.
I. - The operations of June 15th. - The battles of Ligny and Quatre-
Bras.
II. - The error of Napoleon.
III. - Marshal Grouchy.
IV. - Waterloo.
I.
The initial plan of The Campaign of 1815, and even the
movements requisite for its development, are among the finest
strategical conceptions of Napoleon. All failed from errors of
execution, of which some are attributable to the Emperor, a
great number to his lieutenants.
On the first day Drouet d'Erlon put himself on the march
an hour and a half too late; Gérard interpreted for his
greater convenience the instructions of the Emperor; Vandamme
broke camp three hours after the time specified, halted his
troops before the end of the combat, and refused to second
Grouchy; and Ney, become suddenly circumspect even to
timidity, dared not execute the manoeuvre with which he was
charged. The service of the staff was poor; the transmission
of orders was slow and uncertain. The chiefs were irresolute,
apathetic, without zeal, initiative, or enthusiasm. It seemed
that they no longer had faith in the Napoleonic Fortune; that
they wished to advance very slowly beyond the frontier; and
that they felt already the inevitable embrace of the two great
Allied Armies. The powerful machine of war constructed by
Napoleon appeared to be worn out or out of gear.
Thus the day of June 15th did not give the results that
Napoleon had a right to expect. Had the orders of the
Emperor been carried out, before noon all the Army would have
been across the Sambre; at three o'clock the Prussians of Pirch
II. would have been driven from Gilly; and in the evening
Grouchy would have occupied Sombreffe and Ney Quatre-Bras.
The next day Blücher and Wellington, separated by this double
manoeuvre, and neither the one nor the other wishing to risk
alone a combat against the entire French Army, would have
246
The Campaign of 1815. 247
fallen back upon their respective base of operations, the first
to the northeast of Sombreffe and the second to the west of
Brussels. This divergent retreat would have separated the
English from the Prussians twenty leagues, as the crow flies.
Many days would have been required for them to concert
together and effect a new junction. In the meantime Napoleon
would have occupied Brussels without firing a shot, and
combined some overwhelming movement against one or the other
of the two Allied Armies.
On the morning of June 16th, however, in spite of the fault
of Ney and the delays at the right wing, nothing was yet
compromised. The Emperor even thought that the English and
the Prussians were in full retreat, and that he would be able
to reach Brussels without meeting with any resistance. The
probabilities led him to reason thus; for, according to the
remark of Kennedy, Blücher and Wellington committed a grave
fault, in view of the dispersion of their troops and the
separation of their armies, in delivering battle on June 16th. The
Emperor then gave his orders for a march on Brussels, and at
nine o'clock left Charleroi. The criticism, that he lost time in
the morning, does not appear to be justified. The Emperor
not expecting a battle on this day, which, in fact, was very
improbable, he thought this day would be sufficient for his
diversion on Gembloux and the night march on Brussels. At
six in the morning he dictated his orders, in view of a
concentration of all the right wing at Fleurus. He can not be held
responsible for the delay of Gérard, who did not arrive until
after one o'clock. If the Emperor did not reiterate early in the
morning to Ney the order to take position at Quatre-Bras, it
was because, deceived by the report of the latter, he believed
this post feebly occupied, or even evacuated, and judged that
the left wing would be able to establish itself there without
difficulty. In fact, the Prince of Orange having received
reinforcements only at three o'clock, it would have been as easy
for Ney to have dislodged from Quatre-Bras the division of
Perponcher at eleven - the moment when the instructions of
the Emperor reached him - as in the first hours of the morning.
In the meantime Fortune intervenes in favour of Napoleon.
Blücher knows that the French number 120,000 men; he has,
on account of Bülow's delay, but 80,000 soldiers. But faithful
to his promise to protect the English left, impatient to fight,
and confiding, moreover, in the very uncertain support of
248 WATERLOO.
Wellington, be rashly offers battle to Napoleon in the position of
Ligny. When the Emperor sees the deployment of the
Prussian Army, he congratulates himself that it places itself within
reach of his sword. This battle which he has not foreseen
gives him the opportunity to close in a single day with a
thunderbolt The Campaign commenced the day before. He is
on the point of exterminating the Prussian Army. He at once
decides upon his plan, marshals his troops, and sends some
orders to Ney. While he will attack, the Marshal will advance
upon the rear of the Prussians, and at the end of the battle,
when the final assault is delivered, the army of Blücher, over-
thrown at the centre, outflanked on the right, and assailed in
reverse, will be caught almost entirely in a net of steel and fire.
Muffling, Rogniat, and others pretend that Napoleon
ought to have confined himself to mere demonstrations
towards Ligny and directed all his efforts against Saint-Amand,
where the Prussian right, which was in an exposed position,
would have made only a feeble resistance. This is ignoring
one of the finest tactical inspirations of Napoleon. Most
assuredly the attack by Saint-Amand would have brought about
in less time and with less loss the retreat of the Prussians.
But, on June 16th, the Emperor had in view a more decisive
object than that of separating Blücher from Wellington by
throwing back the former towards the Meuse - he aimed at the
destruction of the Prussian Army. For this it was necessary
to pierce its centre and envelop its right wing. Only the left
wing would escape a disaster.
We have seen by what concatenation of faults and
mistakes this well-conceived plan miscarried, and how each
contributed to this result. Flahault, the bearer of the first
instructions of the Emperor, took two hours to go four leagues.
Reille delayed a movement which he had been ordered to
make, under pretence that a little lost time would be of no
importance; he judged, according to the strange explanation
of Jomini, that it was better "to obey the laws of la grande
tactique" than the orders of the General-in-chief. Forbin-Janson
did not understand a word of the despatch entrusted to him;
he was unable to explain it, and, after having transmitted
it to General d'Erlon, he omitted to communicate it to Marshal
Ney. D'Erlon engaged himself in a false direction; he had no
inspiration to rectify it; he determined, after having made
three-fourths of the way, to retrace his steps in obedience to
The Campaign of 1815. 249
the injunction of Ney, who recalled him, notwithstanding the
formal order of Napoleon; and he did not stop to think that,
by this counter-march, he would deprive the Emperor of a very
efficacious support, and would not reach Ney in time to take
part in the action. In short, during this entire afternoon
d'Erlon neutralized his troops, promenading them with
shouldered arms from the left wing to the right and then back again,
without seconding either the one or the other. Vandamme,
who first discovered the corps of d'Erlon, caused it to be
imperfectly reconnoitred and reported it to the Emperor as being
an enemy. Napoleon, perplexed by the information of
Vandamme and the direction of this column, lost his presence of
mind. He did not think nor could he admit that the column
which threatened his flank might be the 1st Corps, which,
however, he had himself called upon the field of battle; he
neglected to prescribe eventually to the officer whom he had
sent to reconnoitre again the supposed hostile column to
direct it on Brye if, contrary to his expectations, it proved to
be the corps of d'Erlon.
Marshal Ney, finally, must bear the principal
responsibility for the incomplete results of the day. In recalling
d'Erlon in spite of the formal order of the Emperor, he
committed an act of disobedience which rendered him liable to a
council of war, and which can be explained only by the spirit
of indiscipline that existed at that time throughout' the entire
Army. But this act of desperation had no influence on the
results of the day; for already Count d'Erlon, by taking Saint-
Amand instead of Brye for his objective, had compromised the
fine manoeuvre conceived and ordered by the Emperor. That
for which Ney should be especially held accountable is the
initial fault that led to all the delays, all the mistakes, all the
false movements, and all the contretemps of this double action
Had he acted as both the circumstances and the principles of
war dictated, by eight or nine o'clock he would have had the
2nd Corps massed at Frasnes and the 1st concentrated at
Gosselies. Thus, at eleven o'clock, on receipt of the order borne
by Flahault, he would have attacked Quatre-Bras with the four
divisions of Reille and the cavalry of Lefebvre-Desnoëttes,
and he would have summoned to Frasnes the four divisions of
d'Erlon and the four brigades of cuirassiers of Kellermann.
Long before two o'clock he would have wrested the position
from the 7,500 Dutch, who alone occupied it at that time. At
-17-
250 WATERLOO.
three, with his 43,000 men, he would have driven back without
difficulty upon the route of Brussels - admitting that
Wellington would have dared to take the offensive - the 7,500
English of Picton and the 6,000 Brunswickers of Duke
Frederick William. At four - at the moment when the despatch
of the Emperor directing him to turn back on Brye arrived -
he would have been able to detach, by the Roman way more
than half of his forces upon the rear of the Prussian Army to
change into disaster the defeat of Blücher.
Jomini admits that the battle of Ligny would have
produced decisive results if Ney had sent to Brye a part of his
troops. But he objects that the Marshal would not have been
able to effect this movement, even if he had had in hand the
corps of Reille and that of d'Erlon, for he would have found
himself engaged with the 40,000 Anglo-Dutch of Wellington.
This reasoning is based upon a material error. At four o'clock
Wellington had as yet only the division of Perponcher, the
cavalry of Van Merlen, the corps of Brunswick, and the
division of Picton, or 21,000 men. Furthermore, upon the
hypothesis of the capture of Quatre-Bras by Ney, between noon
and two o'clock, the 7,500 soldiers of Perponcher, who would
have been crushed, would have been almost incapable of
further resistance on the arrival of the English reinforcements.
The division of Alten (4,000 muskets) did not debouch until
half-past five, and the divisions of Cooke and Kruse (7,000
men) until seven. Now, either Wellington would have
attacked at three with Perponcher, Picton, and Van Merlen, in
which case these 15,000 men fighting against 43,000 would
have been exterminated; or rather, not wishing to expose his
divisions to being destroyed in detail, he would have awaited,
to take the offensive, not only Brunswick, but Alten, and
consequently he would have engaged battle only about six o'clock.
At this hour half of Ney's troops would have been already in
the rear of the Prussians, and there would have remained
20,000 men with the Marshal to resist until night, in a good
position, first 28,000 and then 30,000 assailants. Had he even
been forced to withdraw to Frasnes, this retreat, in the
gathering darkness, would have been without strategical
importance. It is very probable, however, that if Wellington, on
his return from the mill of Bussy, about three o'clock, had
found Quatre-Bras occupied in force by the French, he would
have prudently concentrated his troops at Genappe, pending
The Campaign of 1815. 251
the issue of the battle then being fought in front of Ligny.
At least this is what may be inferred from his customary
prudence and his Britannic egotism.
Clausewitz, after having argued long and confusedly,
concludes that "10,000 men in the rear of the Prussian Army
would have only rendered the battle more doubtful by
obliging Blücher to withdraw sooner." The proof of the
weakness of his case is that he wittingly gives us false figures.
Clausewitz knew very well that it would not have been 10,000,
but 20,000, horse and foot, that would have attacked the
Prussians in reverse. Now, if this attack could have no other effect
than to hasten the retreat of Blücher, by what miracle, two
days later at Waterloo, had the attack of Bülow been able to
produce an entirely different result? According to Clausewitz,
one would believe in truth that an army is free to quit a battle-
field like a field of manoeuvres, and that a sudden retreat in
the midst of an action can be effected without disorder and
without peril. Charras has a wholly personal way of looking
at things. "The generals," he cries, "were admirable. They
did not fail the General-in-chief; the General-in-chief failed
them." He extols the conduct of Ney, "who accomplished
the impossible in arresting Wellington with 20,000 men."
Charras seems to ignore the fact that Wellington, until the
arrival of the divisions of Cooke and Kruse (at half-past six)
had scarcely 26,000 men to oppose to the French, who
numbered more than 23,000. And he voluntarily forgets to say
that if Ney had but one army corps to oppose to the English,
it was because he had neglected in the morning to concentrate
the 2nd and 1st Corps between Gosselies and Frasnes. This
was - we can not too often repeat it - the initial fault from
which all the others proceeded - those of Ney, those of Reille,
those of d'Erlon, and those of the Emperor.
The facts and written orders, the hours and figures,
contradict the conclusions of Clausewitz and Charras. There is
also the testimony of Kellermann: "Napoleon did not attain
his object through the fault of Marshal Ney;" of Reille: "A
far greater success would have been obtained by taking in
reverse the right of the Prussian Army;" of General Delort:
"Ney could have, with 44,000 men, contained the English
and turned the army of Blücher." There is the judgment of
Ropes: "If Ney had executed the orders of the Emperor,
the issue of The Campaign would have been modified." There
252 WATERLOO.
is the judgment of Marshal Wolseley: "If everything had
passed as Napoleon had planned, we are justified in faying that
the corps of Ziethen and Pirch would have been annihilated,
and that, according to all probabilities, Blücher and Gneissenau
would have been made prisoners." There is finally - and it is
worth all the rest - the admission of Gneissenau, chief of staff
of the Prussian Army, who wrote, June 12, 1817, to the King of
Prussia: "If General Perponcher had not made so vigorous a
resistance, Marshal Ney, arriving at Quatre-Bras, would have
been able to turn to the right and fall upon the rear of the
army that was fighting at Ligny and cause its total destruction."
II.
The battle to be gained - to be gained even to the crushing
and annihilation of the enemy - was the battle of Ligny. A
complete victory gained on June 16th over the Prussian Army
could have closed at a single blow The Campaign of the Low
Countries. Through the fault of Ney, the battle was
indecisive. On the next day another occasion of terminating the
campaign by destroying the English Army presented itself.
This occasion was allowed to escape through the fault of
Napoleon.
The Emperor had separated Blücher from Wellington, and,
in spite of the lull in the action and the beginning of a panic
caused by the approach of d'Erlon's corps, he had beaten in
six hours 87,000 Prussians with 65,000 Frenchmen, thus
demonstrating, as he had so often done, the inanity of his axiom,
that victory is always on the side of the heaviest battalions.
There remained the English Army in position at Quatre-Bras,
where it had resisted with advantage Marshal Ney. On June
17th the Emperor was free to exterminate it. This battle,
decisive and gained in advance, and of which he had the
intuition in useful time, he, unfortunately, did not prepare to
deliver till after having lost four long hours in inaction and
irresolution. This was leaving too much respite to the enemy.
Wellington decamped.
Doubtless at daybreak the Emperor was ignorant of the
Prussian line of retreat and the result of the battle of Quatre-
Bras. But, between seven and eight o'clock, he was informed
by a despatch from Pajol that Blücher's army was retiring
towards the Meuse, and by the verbal report of Flahault that
the English were still at Quatre-Bras. If he had taken at that
The Campaign of 1815. 253
time the course upon which he resolved only between eleven
o'clock and noon - that is to say, if he had marched towards
Quatre-Bras with Lobau's corps, the Guard, and Milhaud's
cuirassiers, these troops would have debouched between ten
and half-past ten on the flank of the English Army, precisely
at the moment when it was preparing to break camp.
Wellington's forces, after deducting the losses of the day before,
and adding the five brigades of Uxbridge's cavalry, which had
arrived during the night and in the morning, amounted at
most to 35,000 muskets and sabres. Caught in the act of
marching, and attacked at the same time on its left by the
30,000 soldiers of Napoleon and in front by the 40,000 soldiers
of Ney, the English Army, which would have either made head
against this attack, or would have attempted a very
hazardous retreat on Genappe or Nivelles, would have been unable
to avoid a disaster.
Instead of this. Napoleon purposed at first to leave his
Army in bivouac during this entire day. Then he changed
his mind, matured a new plan, despatched his orders, and put
himself on the march. It was too late. The Emperor did not
reach Quatre-Bras till two o'clock. The Anglo-Dutch divisions
had repassed the Dyle at Genappe. He could only give chase
to the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge. When he overtook the
English Army in position at Mont Saint-Jean, night approached.
"Would that I had the power of Joshua," said he, "to retard
the course of the sun!" But for fourteen hours the sun had
lighted up the earth and Napoleon had not profited by it.
We may add that the information received by Napoleon
at seven in the morning did not appear to be either precise or
definite enough to determine him to act immediately. Was it,
indeed, towards the Meuse that the Prussians were retiring,
and could he engage himself in their pursuit without being
assured of the direction that they had taken? On the other
hand, could he, in this uncertainty, march with his army
towards Brussels without exposing himself to an offensive
return of Blücher, either against his right flank, or upon his
lines of communication? As for Wellington, was it possible
that, informed of the defeat of the Prussians, he had not
already evacuated his position at Quatre-Bras? In that which
regarded the retreat of the Prussians and the march on
Brussels, the hesitation of the Emperor is perfectly explicable.
But he had not as good reasons for deferring the movement
254 WATERLOO.
against Wellington This movement was pregnant with such
immense results that it was necessary to undertake it at the
earliest possible moment with the corps of Lobau and the
Guard, even at the risk of a useless march. Either Wellington
would have still been at Quatre-Bras, and Napoleon would
have attacked him, in concert with Ney, under the most
favourable conditions; or the English would have already
decamped, in which event the Guard and the 6th Corps would
have effected their junction with the corps of Reille and
d'Erlon. At any rate, the march on Quatre-Bras, which might
have led to the extermination of the English Army, would
have compromised nothing, for, in view of the short distance
from that point to Brye, it would have caused the Emperor
no more inconvenience to have concentrated his reserve on
his left wing than to have left it with his right.
One has further alleged the necessity of giving repose to
the troops and of re-supplying them in munitions. Repose?
The horsemen of Exelmans and Pajol, who had combated the
day before until nightfall, marched none the less at sunrise.
With greater reason, the Guard, which had been engaged only a
short time, and the 6th Corps, which had fired hardly a shot,
would have been able to set out at seven in the morning.
Munitions? The corps of Gérard and Vandamme alone had
need of being re-supplied, and this operation was certainly
completed before noon. As for the 30,000 men of the Guard
and the 6th Corps who would have marched on Quatre-Bras,
their cartridge-boxes and ammunition-chests were still well
supplied.
There were then other reasons for the inaction of the
Emperor on the morning of June 17th. Charras, General
Berthaut. Ropes, and Marshal Wolseley attribute it to the state of
his health. (Neither Wolseley nor Ropes state the malady
from which he suffered; Charras assures us that he was afflicted
with all the ills that flesh is heir to.) It is possible, in fact,
that Napoleon did suffer, in the night following the battle of
Ligny, one of those attacks of ischury to which be had been
subject for three years, and which had become rather
frequent in April and May, 1815. Grouchy relates incidentally
that the Emperor was fatigued on quitting the Chateau of
Fleurus on the morning of the 17th. According to General Le
Senecal and Colonel de Blocqueville, chief of staff and first
aide-de-camp, respectively, of Grouchy, Napoleon had been ill
The Campaign of 1815. 255
during the night. We repeat, it is possible. But, as Thiers
has said, "Whatever may have been the state of Napoleon's
health in 1815, his activity was not affected by it."
Let us review these memorable days during which, if
Marshal Wolseley is to be believed, Napoleon was "under a
veil of lethargy." On June 15th the Emperor rises at three
o'clock, goes as far as Jamignon, remounts his horse, captures
Charleroi, prescribes the movement of the left wing, directs at
the right wing the combat of Gilly, and returns to Charleroi
at ten in the evening. On the 16th we find him busy sending
off aides-de-camp and writing orders at four in the morning.
At nine he goes on horseback to the mill of Fleurus, delivers
the battle of Ligny, and, in the final assault at twilight, he
advances in person with the Guard beyond the first Prussian
lines. If he is ill during the night, we find him none the less
the next day, at ten in the morning, at Brye, passing his troops
in review and superintending the removal of the wounded.
Then he marches on Quatre-Bras at the head of the troops,
whom he outstrips in his impatience. He attacks the English
cavalry and pursues it with the advance guard for three leagues
at the pace of a steeple-chase and under a torrential rain. At
Caillou, where, all streaming with water and as wet as if he had
just issued from a bath, he takes his quarters for the night
after sunset, dictates some orders for the Army, and becomes
absorbed in the reading of letters from Paris. He throws
himself upon his bed for a few minutes; then, at one in the morning,
he rises again, and makes on foot, under the rain which
continues to fall, the entire round of his advance posts. Returned
about three, he listens to the reports of the reconnaissances
and spies, and dictates new orders. From nine he is upon the
battle-field; he quits it only after dark, with the last squares
of the Guard; and, still on horseback, he goes to pass the
Sambre at Charleroi, at eight leagues from La Belle Alliance.
Out of ninety-six hours, this man, who is represented as being
prostrated and depressed by sickness, without energy, without
resistance to sleep, and incapable of remaining on horseback,
takes scarcely twenty hours' rest; and, supposing that he
remains on the ground three-fourths of the time of the two great
battles, he is in the saddle thirty-seven hours.
In 1815 Napoleon's health was still such as to support the
fatigues of war, and his brain had lost nothing of its puissance.
But in him his moral nature no longer equalled his genius.
256 WATERLOO.
While in his dictations at Saint Helena he attempts to
demonstrate that he had committed no fault in the course of his last
campaign, in his familiar conversations he permits the secret
of these faults to escape him: "I no longer had in me the
sentiment of final success. It was no longer my first
confidence. . . I felt Fortune abandoning me. I no longer
obtained an advantage that was not followed by a reverse.
None of these blows surprised me, for I had a
presentiment that the result would be unfavourable." This state
of mind explains the hours lost by the Emperor during the
campaign, his sometimes troubled views, the respite left the
enemy. He no longer believes in success; and his boldness
declines with his confidence. He no longer dares to seize, to
seek the occasion. While his faith in his destiny lasted, he
had always been an audacious player. Now that he feels
Fortune deserting him, he becomes a timid one. He hesitates
to begin the game, no longer yields to inspiration, temporizes,
weighs the chances, sees the pros and cons, and wishes to take
no risks.
III.
In order to be able to act freely against the English, it was
necessary that the Emperor should be protected against an
offensive return of Blücher. Where were the Prussians? in
retreat towards the Meuse, or on the march to unite with
Wellington to the south of Brussels? The Emperor ordered
Grouchy to discover their traces and to pursue them. It has
been said that, in the uncertainty in which he found himself
concerning the direction taken by the Prussians in their retreat,
Napoleon ought, by all means, at ten or eleven o'clock on June
17th, to have ordered Grouchy to march laterally by the left
bank of the Dyle. The Emperor himself has refuted this
criticism: "If Grouchy," says he, "had marched at noon on
the 17th by the left bank of the Dyle, without knowing in what
direction the Prussians were retiring, he would have assuredly
covered the flank of the principal column, but he would have
also left without protection our lines of communication." In
fact, the Prussians, if they had retired on Namur, would have
been able to return towards Charleroi to cut the Imperial Army
from its base of operations.
It has also been said that in detaching upon his right only
two corps of cavalry, a few guns, and a division of infantry -
The Campaign of 1815. 257
forces sufficient to observe the Prussians - the Emperor would
have kept with him 20,000 men more, who would have
been very useful to him at Waterloo. Doubtless, in 1814,
after Arcis-sur-Aube, Winzingerode, with 10,000 horse, had
imposed for two days upon the French Army. There are,
however, some objections to this criticism. In spite of the
absence of the corps of Vandamme and Gérard, and the cavalry
of Pajol and Exelmans, the French at Waterloo were superior
in numbers to the English; and, if a part of the Army had not
been paralysed by the approach of the Prussians, it is very
probable that the plateau of Mont Saint-Jean would have been
carried towards five o'clock. Now Napoleon had detached
35,000 men with Grouchy precisely to contain the Prussians.
It was far more important to keep Blücher from the field of
battle than to have there 20,000 men more.
This division of the Army into two masses, so much
blamed by the historians of the Campaign of 1815, was the
usual tactics of Napoleon. It was thus he manoeuvred at
Marengo, Jena, Friedland, and in all The Campaign of France,
which has been so justly admired. When one has to fight two
armies, it is necessary to contain one whilst one directs all his
effort upon the other.
But was it possible for Grouchy to oppose the movements
of the Prussians, and, at first, were the orders of the Emperor
precise and explicit enough in order that he might make no
mistake and know that the principal thing was to guard against
an offensive return of Blücher upon the flank or the rear of the
Army? It is presumable that in his verbal instructions
Napoleon had explained them to the Marshal; but upon the words
of the Emperor the testimony is so interested and contradictory
that it is necessary, as a good critic, to confine oneself solely to
the written order. I have given this order integrally. I will
recall only its essential dispositions: "Go to Gembloux;
reconnoitre in the direction of Namur and Maëstricht; pursue
the enemy. It is important to find out if Blücher wishes to
unite with Wellington in order to deliver battle in front of
Brussels."
If, indeed, the Emperor, in this letter does not explicitly
direct Grouchy to cover the Army, it appears to me that he
implicitly does so. "To find out if Blücher wishes to unite
with Wellington" - this is the important thing Now, as
Grouchy had with him not a few squadrons sufficient to
258 WATERLOO.
reconnoitre the enemy, but an army capable of serious resistance,
his manifest duty was not only to keep the Emperor posted,
but also to protect him against an offensive return by
manoeuvring so as to interpose himself between the Prussians and
the Imperial Army. A man who had made war for twenty
years could not mistake the object of the operation with which
he was charged. And, in fact, these words of Grouchy's letter,
written on the evening of June 17th, ". . I shall follow
the Prussians in the direction of Wavre, in order to separate
them from Wellington," prove that he thoroughly understood
the implicit instructions of the Emperor.
Unfortunately, Grouchy did not know how to manoeuvre
with sufficient rapidity, intelligence, or resolution. On June
17th his troops marched with incredible slowness. At the time
when Napoleon reached La Belle Alliance at seven in the
evening, after having made nearly six leagues fighting. Grouchy
only arrived at the same hour at Gembloux, fourteen kilometres
from Saint-Amand. And, though in these long days it was
still possible to march two hours longer, he ordered his army
to bivouac. On the next day it was yet possible for him to
regain the time lost. Informed as he was, there was no doubt
for him - the Prussians were marching to join Wellington.
Though the Emperor, being ignorant of the direction of
Blücher's retreat, had not prescribed the march by the left
bank of the Dyle, Grouchy, who was henceforth acquainted
with this direction, ought not to have hesitated to undertake it.
He risked nothing at all events in doing so; for either the
Prussians would still be at Wavre and he would turn them by the
left bank - a more advantageous manoeuvre than to attack
them by the right bank; or they would be already on the march
either for Brussels or for Mont Saint-Jean, in which event he
would make a flank pursuit, or would come to prolong the
right of the Emperor. Grouchy ought then, on June 18th, to
have marched on Wavre, not at seven in the morning, in a
single column and by way of Walhain and Corbaix. as he did,
but at sunrise, in two columns, and by way of Vilroux, Mont
Saint-Guibert, and Ottignies. En route at four in the morning,
the two columns would have arrived upon the banks of the
Dyle, at the bridges of Mousty and Ottignies (seventeen and
eighteen kilometres, respectively, from Gembloux), between
nine and ten. o'clock. Allowing an hour and a half for the
The Campaign of 1815. 259
passage of the two bridges, Grouchy would have found himself
at eleven upon the left bank of the Dyle with all! his army.
Doubtless before this time (about eight o'clock) Colonel
Ledebur, in observation at Mont Saint-Guibert with the 10th
Hussars and two battalions, would have discovered Grouchy's
heads of columns. His detachment being too weak to offer
any resistance, he would have first sent a courier to Gneissenau
to inform him of the approach of the French. The despatch
would have arrived at Wavre about nine o'clock, at the time
when the single corps of Bülow was on the march. It is
presumable that Blücher, or rather Gneisseneau, who was
invested with all the authority, would not have modified the
orders directing Bülow and Pirch I. to march on Chapelle Saint-
Lambert, but that he would have taken some measures to
defend the approach to Wavre with the corps of Ziethen and
Thielmann. Pending the development of the manoeuvre of
the French, would he have confined himself to leaving these
two corps in position at Bierges and Wavre? or, informed that
Grouchy had passed the left bank of the Dyle, would he have
ordered Ziethen and Thielmann to advance to encounter the
French Army by way of Bierges and Limelette? Upon the
first hypothesis, it would have been easy for Grouchy, hearing
the cannon of the Emperor, to march by his left on Ayviers
or Maransart, a movement which would have brought him near
the battle-field at half-past two, or two long hours before
Blücher took the offensive. Upon the second hypothesis -
the most probable, I admit - Grouchy, in a good position upon
the plateau of Mousty-Ceroux, would have resisted without
difficulty with 33,000 men the 40,000 Prussians of Ziethen and
Thielmann. But would he have been able, between eleven
and four o'clock, to inflict upon them a defeat sufficiently
decisive to put them out of action and to become free again to
march on Maransart? It is doubtful.
By this battle Grouchy would have at any rate detained
far from Mont Saint-Jean the corps of Ziethen and Thielmann,
which would not have been without importance. First, it
would have prevented the panic which took place at the end
of the battle of Waterloo, when Ziethen debouched on
Papelotte. It would have done more. We have seen that at half-
past six, at the moment when, according to the avowal of
Colonel Kennedy, Alten's aide-de-camp, "the centre of the
English line was open," the approach of Ziethen's corps
260 WATERLOO.
permitted Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to move from the
extreme left to the centre with their 2,600 fresh horsemen and to
reaffirm the confidence of Wellington. If this support -
support effective and moral - had failed him, it is probable that he
would have been unable to re-establish his position before the
assault of the Middle Guard, and that, under this supreme
push, the English line would have yielded. Wellington has
admitted that on June 18th he was in dire peril. "Twice," said
he, "did I save the day by my obstinacy; but I hope that I
shall never have to fight another such battle." We may also
believe that if Blücher had heard at noon, at two leagues on his
left flank, the cannonade of a great battle, and that if couriers
had come from hour to hour to announce to him the successive
checks of his lieutenants, he would have attacked Plancenoit
with less resolution. We should not forget, finally, that if the
Emperor had been informed between eight and nine o'clock,
by a despatch from Gembloux, that Grouchy was on the point
of passing the Dyle at Ottignies, he would have been able, long
before noon, to send him new orders and to remain all day in
close communication with him. What consequences!
Grouchy would have been able to repair the grave
strategical fault which he had committed in the morning by servilely
following the traces of the Prussians, by marching at half-past
eleven towards the sound of the cannon, according to the
counsel of Gérard. At that hour Exelmans had three brigades
of dragoons between Corbaix and La Baraque and one brigade
at the farm of La Plaquerie (1,500 yards from Ottignies); the
corps of Vandamme was halted at Nil Saint-Vincent; that of
Gérard had. arrived at Walhain; and Pajol with his cavalry
and the division of Teste was on the march from Grand Leez
to Tourinnes. It was only necessary to push Exelmans as
far as the wood of La Huzelle - or further towards Wavre, if it
could be done without compromising him - so as to disquiet
the enemy and to mask from him the movement of the French
Army; to direct Vandamme on Ottignies by way of Mont
Saint-Guibert, and Gérard on Mousty by way of Cour Saint-
Etienne; and, finally, to recall Pajol, who would come to form
the rear guard. Put en route at noon, the head of Vandamme's
column would have attained the bridge at Ottignies (ten
kilometres from Nil Saint-Vincent) towards a quarter-past three,
whilst that of Gérard, starting a quarter of an hour earlier,
would have arrived at the bridge of Mousty (thirteen kilometres
The Campaign of 1815 261
from Walhain) about four. After having passed the Dyle,
the troops having to march henceforth upon a single route,
Vandamme would have taken the lead and his first division
would have reached Maransart (two leagues from Ottignies,
by way of Ceroux) towards six o'clock. For this, doubtless,
it would have been necessary to march, during this journey of
eighteen kilometres, at the rate of three kilometres per hour.
Notwithstanding the bad roads, all of which, moreover, as far
as the Dyle shelved downwards towards this river, and in spite
of the time required for crossing the bridges, this pace was
possible, especially if we remember that at each step the soldiers
would have heard the cannon thundering nearer and more
intense. What a moral factor for soldiers of 1815 to go to the
support of the Emperor and to combat under his eye!
Let us now see if, as Charras and others have pretended,
the Prussians would have been able to interfere with this
movement. At noon Bülow was at Chapelle Saint-Lambert with
his cavalry and two divisions; his other two were on the march
to rejoin him at this point. The corps of Pirch I., which had
bivouacked at Aisemont, had hardly commenced to pass the
bridge of Wavre; and the corps of Ziethen, which had camped
at Bierges, was just taking up its line of march for Ohain by
way of Fremont. The corps of Thielmann, destined to remain
last in position on the banks of the Dyle, was massed between
Wavre and La Bavette. Finally, Ledebur with his detachment
occupied Mont Saint-Guibert, where he remained tranquilly,
little suspecting that he was outflanked on his left.
If Grouchy had marched on Ottignies and Maransart
instead of Wavre, things on the side of the Prussians would have
passed, at least until three o'clock, exactly as they did.
Between one and two Ledebur would have cut his way through
the cavalry of Exelmans; at two the divisions of Brause and
Langen (corps of Pirch), hearing the combat in the wood
of La Huzelle between the skirmishers of Ledebur and the
dragoons of Exelmans, who had two batteries, would have
marched in the direction of this wood, and Thielmann would
have deferred his departure until the end of the combat.
About three, it is true, the enemy would have discovered that
the attack of Exelmans, unsupported by infantry, was only a
feint. The Prussians would have then resumed the prescribed
movement. The second echelon of Pirch (divisions of Brause
and Langen) would have passed the bridge of Wavre and would
262 WATERLOO.
have proceeded towards Chapelle Saint-Lambert. Thielmann
would have left only a few battalions in Wavre, and would have
prepared to march on Couture with the bulk of his troops.
But in order to advance from La Bavette in the direction of
Couture he would have been forced to await the defile of the
divisions of Brause and Langen and the cavalry of Sohr (of
Pirch's corps), which, as we have seen, were compelled to await
the passage of the entire corps of Ziethen, which itself had been
forced to permit the rear of Bülow's corps and the leading
divisions of Pirch to precede it. The Prussian Staff had so
badly conceived the disposition of the march that the crossing
of the different columns was inevitable. The principal column
(Bülow and Pirch I.), on the march from Dion-le-Mont and
Aisemont by way of Wavre to Chapelle Saint-Lambert, was
bound to cross the route of Ziethen's corps advancing from
Bierges to Ohain by way of Fromont, and Thielmann's corps,
which had orders to direct itself from La Bavette on Couture.
Under these conditions, Thielmann would not have set
himself in motion until four o'clock at the earliest. The
distance from La Bavette to Maransart by way of Couture is
nearly nine miles. The III. Prussian Corps would have then
been unable to reach Maransart before a quarter to nine, much
too late, consequently, to arrest Grouchy. At that moment,
Bülow, attacked in flank by the troops of Grouchy, whilst he
was fighting against Lobau and the Young Guard, would have
been for more than an hour driven back beyond the wood of
Paris, if not perhaps exterminated in the valley of the Lasne.
Grouchy acted like a blind man, but Napoleon did nothing
to enlighten him. Though informed on the evening of June
17th, by Milhaud, of the retreat of a hostile column towards the
Dyle; though advised in the night, by a despatch from Grouchy,
of the march of at least one Prussian corps towards Wavre; and
though warned on the morning of June 18th, by Prince Jérôme,
against a possible junction of the two hostile armies in front of
the Forest of Soignes, it was only at one in the afternoon, when
the battle was engaged, that the Emperor despatched to
Grouchy the formal and precise order to cover his right.
Doubtless he had believed until then - he even yet believed
that the Marshal would manoeuvre to fulfil this great object;
and doubtless the letter of Grouchy in which he had said: "I
shall follow the Prussians, in order to separate them from
Wellington," had strengthened this opinion. But ought he to
The Campaign of 1815. 263
have put so much confidence in Grouchy? Was it not very
hazardous to rely, for the safety of his right flank, with an
adversary as bold as Blücher, upon the strategical intelligence,
the initiative, and resolution of a commander who had never
exercised so important a command? The Emperor, at any
rate, ought to have renewed his instructions much sooner,
and should have explained them more fully than he had at
first done.
IV.
At Waterloo, Napoleon wished to begin the action early in
the morning - his orders show it. If the battle had begun
about six or seven o'clock, the great strategical fault of Grouchy
and the negligence of the Emperor in reiterating to him his
orders would have had no consequences, for the English Army
would have been overthrown before the arrival of the Prussians.
The corps of Lobau, the Young Guard, the cavalry of Domon
and Subervie, which the Emperor employed against Bülow,
and the Old Guard itself, which, being uneasy for his right, he
had held in reserve until the last moment, would have certainly,
by supporting the other troops, determined towards noon or
one o'clock - perhaps earlier - the retreat of Wellington.
The condition of the ground, or, if one wishes to quibble,
the false appreciation of the condition of the ground, by
Drouot and the artillery officers, obliged the Emperor to
modify his orders. The attack was put off from six or seven
o'clock until nine and then again delayed, as the troops had
not yet reached their positions. This delay saved the English
Army.
It is certain that an attack against the left of the enemy,
very weak and in the air, or even against his right, which would
have permitted of a vast deployment, would have been more
easy and less murderous than the assault against the centre.
But Napoleon, manoeuvring between two armies, found himself
between the chops of a vice. It was not sufficient to get rid
of one of the Allied Armies for a day or two, as he had done
at Ligny; it was necessary to crush it. For this, the Emperor
must pierce the centre of the English Army and crush the
broken wings. "Napoleon," said Wellington, "attacked me
in the old manner, and I repulsed him in the old manner."
Under the circumstances, and in spite of the compact position
264 WATERLOO.
of the enemy, "the old manner" was for the Emperor the
best to employ.
But how many mistakes, how much negligence, and how
many faults in the execution! We have seen that the
demonstration against Hougoumont, ordered by the Emperor, had
developed through the ardour of Jérôme, the impetuosity of the
soldiers, the lack of vigilance and firmness of Reille, into a real
attack, in which half of the 2nd Corps had been uselessly
sacrificed. We have also seen that the heavy formation of the
four divisions of General d'Erlon was the virtual cause of the
confusion in which they found themselves on attaining the
crest of the plateau and of the lamentable rout in which they
were thrown by the English cavalry.
Why was it that Reille, who, according to the order of the
Emperor, was "to advance so as to keep abreast of the corps
of Count d'Erlon," did not operate this movement? One of
his divisions (that of Jérôme) was, it is true, engaged at
Hougoumont, but Bachelu and Foy remained available for marching
against the right centre of the enemy.
Why was it that Ney, who had under his immediate
command all the first line, consisting of the corps of d'Erlon and
Reille - more than 30,000 bayonets - delivered vainly two
assaults against La Haye Sainte, defended by five companies?
Why did he not demolish its walls with cannon-balls? Why,
having failed twice in the attack of this farm, did he not renew
the assaults? Why did he not obey the orders of the Emperor?
Why did he not understand that the possession of La Haye
Sainte - "the key to the English position," says the aide-de-
camp of Alten, Kennedy - was his first objective?
Ney found it shorter to begin at the end. Too
circumspect at Quatre-Bras, he was too audacious at Mont Saint-
Jean. He risked before the hour, without orders, without
preparation, and without support, the great cavalry movement
planned by the Emperor. He thought to overthrow with
cavalry an infantry as yet unshaken and occupying a
commanding position. He launched rashly to the assault the two
corps of cuirassiers, the Horse Guard, and even the brigade of
carabiniers - the last cavalry reserve of the Army - which
Kellermann had halted with the formal order not to budge. In spite
of their temerity, these heroic charges would have succeeded,
however, if they had been supported by infantry. There was
near La Belle Alliance, within short cannon-range of the English
The Campaign of 1815. 265
position, half of Reille's corps. These twelve battalions had not
yet been engaged; they waited with grounded arms the order
to take part in the action. Ney, who, according to the words
of Napoleon, "forgot in the heat of the action the troops who
were not under his eye," did not think to summon them upon
the plateau. It was only when the last charges had been
repulsed, and when the intervention of the infantry was no
longer opportune, that he launched these 6,000 men against the
slope of Mont Saint-Jean, where they were decimated without
advantage.
It was nearly six o'clock. La Haye Sainte, of which Ney
had attempted to take possession at two, then at four, was still
held by the enemy. It was necessary, however, for the
Emperor to renew the order to capture it at any price. This time
Ney carried the position, and it was only then that Wellington
deemed himself in peril. Unfortunately, it was too late to
profit by this point of support. Men and horses were
harassed. Napoleon gave to the Marshal the Middle Guard for a
supreme effort; but instead of making a breach in the English
line with these five battalions of heroes formed in a single
column, Ney arranged them in echelons, so that each one
found itself outnumbered by the enemy at every point.
It would seem that on the right there were also some
negligence and faults. The cavalry of Domon and Subervie
advanced upon the skirts of the wood of Paris when it ought
to have watched its approaches. The defence of Lobau was
valorous, but badly conceived and prepared. It was not at
1,200 yards to the east of La Belle Alliance and upon open
ground that he should have established himself to arrest the
Prussians. At half past one, when the corps of Bülow was
inactive at Chapelle Saint-Lambert, Lobau had received from the
Emperor the order to move in that direction "and to choose
a good intermediate position in which he could, with 10,000
men, arrest 30,000." This "good intermediate position"
Lobau did not seek. It was the rugged heights which
command the valley of the Lasne in front of the only bridge over
this river. There, his communications with the main body of
the Army being assured by the numerous squadrons of Domon
and Subervie, Lobau would have been able to make a longer
and more efficacious resistance than in front of Plancenoit.
Perhaps this position would have even been impregnable.
Clausewitz admits that Blücher would have been obliged to
-18-
266 WATERLOO.
turn it by way of Couture. This would have been much time
gained for the Emperor! Even in case Lobau had felt some
hesitancy in advancing so far en flèche (a league from La Belle
Alliance), he at least ought to have occupied the wood of Paris.
In the different phases of the battle one can follow the
development of the Emperor's plan such as he had explained it
in the morning to Prince Jérôme - preparation by the artillery;
attack of d'Erlon and Reille's corps; charges of the cavalry;
and the final assault by Lobau's corps and the Foot Guard.
But the presence of the Prussians on his right made it necessary
for the Emperor to employ, in order to hold them in check, the
6th Corps and the Young Guard and to hold the Old Guard
too long in reserve. On the other hand, instead of operating
against the English with method and ensemble, one acted by
fits and starts, at first awkwardly, then at an unseasonable
time, and, finally, desperately.
In order to judge with equity the Commander-in-chief,
who was the greatest of captains, it is necessary to bear in
mind the manner in which his orders were understood and
executed, when they were not obeyed. Marshal de Saxe has
said in his "Reveries upon the Art of War": "The
disposition of the commander-in-chief should be correct and simple,
as: Such a corps will attack and such an one will support.
The generals under him would need to be very ignorant
indeed, if they did not know how to execute this order and to
manoeuvre as the circumstances required. Thus the
commander-in-chief should not occupy and embarrass himself with
the details. He will be able to see everything better and
maintain a sounder judgment, and will be in a better position to
profit by circumstances. He should not be everywhere and
attempt to perform the duties of a sergent de bataille."
From the many faults committed at Waterloo, Charras,
York von Wartenbourg, and Marshal Wolseley conclude that
the Emperor, prostrated by sickness, lost all hope, remained
inert and blind far from the field of battle, and left the
combat without direction. Regarding the physical and moral
condition of Napoleon on June 18th, the testimonies are
contradictory. Colonel Baudus relates that the Emperor "was
plunged into a sort of apathy." According to oral traditions
mentioned by Marshal Canrobert and General du Barail,
Napoleon slept during the battle of Waterloo. (He slept also
at Jena and Wagram, and directed no less victoriously the
The Campaign of 1815. 267
combat.) But Marshal Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angély, who
made The Campaign of 1815 in the Imperial Staff, related
that, far from sleeping, the Emperor was nervous and
impatient, and lashed his boot incessantly with his riding-whip.
(It is thus Coignet pictures Bonaparte at Marengo before the
arrival of Desaix's division.) In his manuscript Journal,
General Foy writes that he saw the Emperor walking to and fro,
with his hands behind his back. I have read nowhere that
the guide Decoster, so loquacious and lavish of details, has
ever spoken of the prostration of Napoleon. Walter Scott, who
had questioned the inn-keeper some months after the battle,
learned from him that the Emperor remained all the afternoon
not far from La Belle Alliance, most of the time on horseback,
and very attentive to all the phases of the battle. According
to the words of Ney, spoken at Meziéres, where he passed the
day of the 19th of June, the Emperor had shown himself very
brave. In addition to all this testimony, there are the facts,
which testify more surely than all words. At eleven o'clock
the Emperor dictated his disposition for the attack. At a
quarter-past eleven he ordered the demonstration against
Hougoumont. At one he wrote to Grouchy. At half-past
one he ordered Lobau to take position to arrest the Prussians,
and enjoined Ney to begin the attack of Mont Saint-Jean. In
the meantime he had caused Hougoumont to be bombarded
by a battery of howitzers. At three he launched a brigade of
cuirassiers against the cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, which had
attacked the great battery. At half-past three he ordered Ney
to take possession of La Haye Sainte. At half-past four he
caused the Guard to advance near La Belle Alliance. At five
he sent the Young Guard to the assistance of Lobau. At half-
past five he ordered Kellermann to second the charges of
Milhaud. At six he renewed the order to take La Haye Sainte.
Soon after he detached two battalions of the Old Guard to
drive the Prussians from Plancenoit. At seven he led his
Guard into the bottoms of La Haye Sainte for the final assault.
On the way he harangued the soldiers of Durutte, who were
beginning to give way, and sent them back into the fire, and
directed all his officers to traverse the line of battle and
announce the arrival of Marshal Grouchy. In the evening he
formed in squares in the valley the second echelon of the Guard,
hastened to Rossomme, still resisted there with the grenadiers
268 WATERLOO.
of Petit, and fired the last volley of grape at the English
cavalry.
Never did Napoleon exercise more effectively the
command, and never was his action more direct. But, obliged
precisely to play that role of "sergent de bataille" which is
condemned by Maurice de Saxe, he employed himself entirely
in repairing the mistakes, the forgetfulness, and the faults of
his lieutenants. And, seeing all his combinations miscarrying,
all the attacks proving unsuccessful, his generals wasting his
finest troops, his last Army melting away in their hands, and
the enemy laying down the law to him, he lost resolution with
confidence, hesitated, confined himself to providing for the
most imminent perils, awaited the hour, allowed it to pass,
and dared not risk all in time to save all.
