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He had a dream. He planned to take the forts, sparkling like a chain of diamond necklace on the map, along the Rio Grande. He could establish a base in New Mexico and occupied the goldmines of Colorado, Nevada and California for the Confederacy. He met President Davis in Richmond and secured a commission to organize this expedition. With weapons left over by Gen. D. Twiggs' surrender, plus the anticipated captured arms from the Union troops, he could have scrapped enough fire-arms to proceed as planned. He was Brig. Gen. Henry Hopkins Sibley, an ambitious Louisianan.
He knew his army were small, scattered and in turmoil from the mass resignations of many officers. He knew not whom to trust. Washington, D.C. was too far and too pre-occupied to be helpful. He doubted the loyalty of his boss, Indiana born, Col. William W. Loring, who passed secret information to the South, and who eventually resigned. By default, he inherited his command. He had to rely on his wit and act fast. And he was not absolutely certain whom to trust, for the person he entrusted might turned around and pass the information to the Confederacy. He asked for reinforcement from William Gilpin, Governor of the nearby State, Colorado. He was then, a mere Lient. Colonel of the Regular Army, and shortly after, Colonel, Edward R. S. Canby from Kentucky.
Sibley knew the land and the people. In fact, before Secession he was stationed in New Mexico and lived in Taos. The Union soldiers were chaotic and leaderless. The political scene unfurled like this: the people of the western portion of the New Mexico Territories (today's Arizona) were almost unanimous to the confederacy; one third of the people in Denver, CO were secretly gathering arms, and intended to take over the State at the right opportunity; substantial numbers of miners in Nevada and in southern California moved there from the south; in the northwestern Oregon Territory, the independent homesteaders would not want any part of being controlled by the Federal government; and certainly the Mormons at Salt Lake had enough Federal military interventions and of course won't join the Union. The time was ripe. The Union force was very weak. With one little push, he believed, the Blue Coats would fall like dominos. Before Sibley was coming back to Texas from Richmond, his subordinate, Lieut. Col. Baylor and a small force of 350 men, marched from Fort Bliss and El Paso, Texas, went north and took Fort Fillmore and occupied the town Mesilla, on 7/24/1861, and made himself Governor of the Confederate Territory of Arizona.
Union Major Isaac Lynde of Vermont, a veteran of 34 years, was surprised by this unexpected attack, got scared and surrendered Ft. Fillmore with his 700 men without a fight. (After the war, Lynde escaped punishment because some of his relative was related to Grant. He retired and kept his Army pension.) Canby was devastated at the news but he did not panic. He adopted the Fabian strategy, trading space (land) with time. He wanted to gain time for the Colorado Volunteers, who had to cross the 12,000 feet high snow-capped Rocky, in the midst of a freezing winter, to reinforce Fort Union. At the same time, he had to persuade the Spanish-speaking citizens to join the newly organized volunteer force, defending their home-land against the invading Texans. He withdrew the troops from the isolated Ft. Stanton and Ft. Thorn to Ft. Craig.
Sibley arrived with his main force totaling 3,500 veteran fighters. Realizing Canby had concentrated his numerically larger force at Fort Craig, Sibley ordered his men to bypass the fort, and marched north to Valverde.
Canby realized his supply lines were about to be cut, he decided to come out and fight the southerners at Valverde, in 2/21/62, on grounds of the Texans' choosing. Intense fighting broke out. Canby had 3,800 men: 1,200 Regulars and 2,600 ill-trained volunteers. Lieut. Robert Hall commanded the artillery. In the turmoil of the day's fighting, the Federal suffered 263 casualties and the Confederate, 187, but clearly Canby lost the battle with the flight of the New Mexican Volunteers. Sibley won a victory. However, Sibley's army was depleted and a substantial of his wagons burnt and that led to his ultimate defeat a month later.
Sibley still dared not attack Fort Craig and decided to re-supply his army in Albuquerque, leaving Canby and Fort Craig in his rear. Canby determined to hold the fort, interposing himself between Sibley and Confederate communication, supplies, and reinforcements from the Mesilla area, and hoping that he could eventually trap Sibley between himself and the reinforced Federal troops from Fort Union. The Confederate moved slowly to collect supplies. It was a tactical error, for (without Sibley's knowledge) it gave time for the Coloradans to reach Ft. Union and also the Federal in Albuquerque to load all available wagons with supplies via Santa Fe to Ft. Union, setting fire to the stores that they couldn't move, in obedience to Canby's order. Sibley occupied Albuquerque and Santa Fe, and sent his vanguards via Santa Fe Trail to capture Ft. Union, the last outpost, 60 miles east of Santa Fe. He was so close to accomplish phase one of his operation.
Meanwhile, Union Colonel John Slough and Major John Chivington organized the Colorado miners and pioneers, the Pike's Peakers, from the Denver City gold mines, 1340 strong, on a rapid march across the blustery high plains and over the Raton Mountains in snow and freezing weather. It is an epic trek. Learning the Union defeat at Valverde, they stepped up their pace to forty miles a day, laboring at times through several inches of snow. They met an ambulance from the south with the startling news that Sibley had already occupied Albuquerque and Santa Fe and was advancing to Fort Union. Leaving everything but their arms and blankets, they added wings to their speed through a night march. Fighting hurricane-force winds and bitter cold, they tramped into Fort Union on the night of 3/11/1862. Colonel Gabriel Paul was in charge of Fort Union, but Slough was appointed Colonel of the Volunteer Army a few months ahead of Gabriel Paul, who served in the Regular Army, where promotion was slow during peace time. No one would blame Paul getting mad at the injustice he got. But for the sake of the country, he swallowed his personal ambition and yielded command to the inexperienced Slough. That courage act saved the Union in the Far West. It avoided the internal struggle for power and restored harmony and unity of the defending force. It was also good the Slough, as an outsider, could think out of the box, instead of following conventional wisdom. Slough, free from traditional army thinking, dared to to the unexpected and would soon surprise and stun the Confederates. Slough at once marched the combined force against the Confederates leaving only a small detachment to guard the post, against the order of Canby to stay in the fort. Canby's order was a week old and the change of circumstances demanded a different action to counteract the Confederate's assault.
In Santa Fe, Confederate Major Charles Pyron learning from spies on (the old news) the Federal troop guarding Ft. Union, and thought he could surprise and defeat what he assumed was the fort's original numerically weak garrison on the narrow mountain stretch of the Santa Fe Trail, without any knowledge of the Colorado reinforcement. On 3/26/1862 with about 600 men, he started east to surprise the Federal which had 1,340 men. Instead, Pyron himself was surprised. The two forces met at Apache Canyon, the western gate of Glorieta Pass, a high, constricted passage of the rugged Sangre de Cristo Mountains.
Chivington led the 420 advance guard from Kozlowski's Ranch and attacked Pyron from the front and the wooded slope. Pyron copied Chivington's tactic, but the later ordered his men to climb higher and poured slugs into the Confederates. In addition, he ordered his horsemen to charge Pyron with ferocity with swords drawn, rushing like devils. The day was March 26, 1862.
The Southerners were stunned and fled (70 surrendered, 145 died and 385 escaped.) Chivington abandoned the pursuits and returned through Glorieta Pass and rested at Pigeon's Ranch. The Coloradan lost only 20 lives. It was the first Union victory in the Territory. Pyron, realizing he was fighting the Coloradans and garrison troops from Ft. Union, sent a message for reinforcement to his superior Lient. Col. William Scurry, who camped at Galisteo, 16 miles south. Scurry hurried to Johnson's Ranch near the western entrance of the Apache Canyon and took command of the combined force of 1,000 men.
Chivington withdrew to Kozlowski's Ranch where there had ample water supply for his men. Slough, coming from Bernal Spring, devised a daring plan to trap the Texans in Glorieta. He divided the force into two groups: Chivington would take 500 men with orders to climb the mountains and head directly west on secret trail across the high wilderness south of Glorieta Pass, while Slough would lead the remaining 850 men, minus one detachment to guard the supplies, to meet Scurry head on towards La Glorieta. It was March 28, 1862. About 11 a.m. and both sides collided in a valley of rocky hills and thick stands of pine on Glorieta Pass. On both sides of the road, the valley sloped up to higher elevations covered with timber and rugged masses of rock.
Scurry, Pyron, Raguet and Shropshire moved forward to Slough's force, facing the Companies of Downing, Robbins, Sopris and Kerber. They left their trains and animals at Apache Canyon, assuming the trains were safe, since they would move forward with maximum force on the only Santa Fe trail, while behind them there were Confederate occupying Santa Fe. So the trains were placed in between 2 Southern forces and should be safe. They fought 6 hours fierce hand-to-hand combat, with rifles, pistols, artillery, cavalry, knives and swords. Both sides were exhausted. The numerical inferior Federal retreated and the Confederate held the field. It looked like another Southern victory.
Meanwhile, guided by Lieut. Col. Chaves, Major Chivington had secretly crossed sixteen miles through mountain wilderness south of Glorieta Pass to a 200 feet high bluff directly above Johnson's Ranch, at Canoncito, the western end of Apache Canyon, where Scurry and Pyron had left their trains and animals. They intended to get to the Confederate's rear and attcked them from both front and rear. Lowering themselves down the steep hill with ropes and leather straps, they had surprised and driven away the small guards, and destroyed all 80 Confederate wagons, burning everything, ammunition, food, water bottles, saddles, forage, tents, clothing and medical supplies, everything the Rebels would need to continue their campaign. They also bayoneted the 600 horses and mules located north of the Canyon. Without food and supplies, the Confederate army was doomed. The result was a smashing victory for the Union. A local priest, a father from the Mission, advised Chivington to returned Kozlowski's range by the same short cut, instead of hitting Scurry's rear at La Glorieta through Santa Fe trail. A courier rode back to Pigeon's Ranch at La Glorieta and reported the bad news to Scurry. Chivington and his men ended Sibley's hopes of conquering the Southwest. Scurry quickly retreated to Santa Fe, where they joined Sibley's six companies marching from Albuquerque. On 4/1/62, Canby left Col. Kit Carson and ten companies in Ft. Craig, and took 1,200 Regulars and volunteers and 4 cannons up north. Sibley gathered his men and withdrew. Confederate Col. Green's 5th encamped at Peralta, where most of his men were asleep or drunk, unaware Canby was waiting for them. Canby deployed his troops along the eastern and northern sides on Green's camp but decided not to attack and that frustrated the Coloradans, who joined Canby by a quick march. The objective of the war was to protect the Southwest and drove the Rebels back to Texas. The object was not slaughter and certainly not wasting his men's lives unnecessarily. "The best strategy is to secure victory without using force" quoting Sun Tzu in his Art of War, written 2,000+ years age. If the Rebel surrendered upon his attack, Canby had to feed and water them, which he could not spare. Food and water were scarce in the desert. Let the desert do his battle. Let hunger and thirst do his battle.
In 4/15/62, realizing they were followed, the Texans fired first at the federal in Peralta and tried to escape from the trap, west of the Rio Grande. Canby followed on the eastern bank of the river, but held his fire. He also knew the land. He knew the Rebels were facing a desert when they tumbled back to San Antonio. Sibley's men would starve and drop down from exhaustion. Most of them would die with thirst. Canby stopped the chase at an appropriate distance, so that his men would not subject themselves to the same torturous weather of the desert. Let the desert take care of Sibley's routed men. Let the desert bury them. He knew Union Col. James Carleton was leading his southern Californian volunteers and a company of Regulars of the 3rd U.S. Artillery from Los Angeles through the original Butterfield route, through Ft. Yuma, Tucson, Apache pass towards Las Cruces, planning to intercept Sibley.
Sibley and his men were doomed. He had no guide, no road, no trail through the barren desert. Across the 700 miles trek, from water hole to water hole, under the scorching heat of summer, his remaining men threw away everything, including their guns, trying to reach home alive. Many of his men were left to die or to be captured. They also abandoned Ft. Bliss and El Paso. The grand dream of the Confederacy in the Far West abruptly ended in this complete defeat.
Postscript: Sibley (graduated 1838) and Canby (graduated 1839) both were classmates at West Point. They both served in the New Mexico Territories before the Civil War. When Sibley got married, Canby was his bestman. Canby's wife and Sibley's wife were cousins. Sibley was court-martialed for insubordination and drunkenness in the battles of Irish Bend & Fort Bisland, in defense of the Red River Campaign launched by Union Gen. Banks. He was acquitted but was relieved from command. After the war, he went to Egypt and served as a General there. Canby got promoted to Brig. Gen. and transferred to Washington, D.C. He suppressed the N.Y. City draft riot. Again promoted to Major Gen., he replaced Gen. Banks to head the Military Division of Western Mississippi, attacked and captured Mobile, AL. He had the honor to receive the surrenders of not one but two Confederate Armies: Gen. Richard Taylor, Dept. of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana, and Gen. Simon B. Buckner representing Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, Dept. of Trans-Mississippi. After the war, Canby was assigned to the West, where he was murdered by the Modoc Indian at a Peace Conference.
Notes: The Webmaster have an opportunity to study the topography of the area. An old adobe structure still stands on Johnson's Ranch there at Apache Canyon. The narrow pass of La Glorieta meanders through the two steep slopes of the canyon. I could see that without ropes and straps, no soldiers could safely descend the cliff. I visited the Glorieta Convention Hall, privately owned by the Baptists and I also notice the Glorieta Baptist Church nearby. I found the site of Pigeon's Ranch, and the adjacent Sharpshooter's Ridge. With limited time of my visit, I couldn't locate Kozlowski's Ranch, nor the water Spring in the Bank of the Creek Back nearby the property. Today the area and town is called Pecos. However, I could find the neighboring Ruins of the old Mission, which is now part of the Pecos Pueblo National Monument. Kozlowski's ranch is south of the Pecos Pueblo. Because of time limitation, I had to skip Ft. Union. I did pass through Peralta, where Rio Grande bisected Los Luna. Valverde today is a marshy, tamarisk infested river. Major floods inundated the area, changing the vegetation pattern. It is difficult to find the exact location of the battlefield today, but we could still use the adjacent monolithic Mesa del Contadero as a landmark to locate the battlefield. At the center of the Park in Santa Fe, adjacent to the old Governor's House, stood a Civil War Memorial, shaped like a smaller version of our Bunker Hill Monument. I visited the old town section of Albuquerque where the Confederate occupied as headquarters. Today it is a restaurant catering tourists.
(Notes were taken at Glorieta Pass, New Mexico, June 1997. Final Write up: July 1997.)
Introduction (a separate article written first in 1999 on the first 4 books and later added the fifth book review in 2001.)
Do you know which army had marched one thousand miles in an arid land, with little or no expectation of reinforcement or re-supply from their base? Do you know which army had marched through the highest mountain (Rocky Mountain range) of North America, enduring thin oxygen, cold weather, deep snow and blowing wind in a blizzard?
Yes, those were the epic records established in the Civil War. I am speaking of a very important Campaign in the Far West, where the outcome would determine once and for all, which side would control the vast Far Western territories. The stake was high. If the Confederate won, ultimately they would take over the gold mine of Colorado and Nevada, and could finance the war with unlimited resource. In addition, they could use their bases to attack and occupy California, to expand their territories to Sonora & Chihuahua and captured their coastlines, breaking the Union's blockading efforts. The strategic picture would drastically change to favor the Confederacy. The Confederate army marched North from Texas and took Mesilla. They defeated the Union at Valverde, and planned to take Ft. Union, where the Federal arsenal and supplies were stored. If they were successful, one-third of the United States would be theirs.
But in between Santa Fe and Ft. Union lies Glorieta Pass. And in Glorieta Pass laid the Pike's Peakers, waiting for the Confederates. (Years later, Katherine Lee Bates of Falmouth, MA, inspired by the purple mountains she saw from the same Pike's Peak in Colorado, wrote the famous "America the Beautiful")
Let's look at this 1991 book written by Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., The Civil War in the American West. The first 3 chapters described the New Mexico Campaign, providing a detail summary of the battle of Glorieta Pass. For readers who are not familiar of the history on this section, it is an excellent book to introduce the highlight of the struggle. Josephy presented detail background information on the history of the conflicts between the Texans and the Mexicans. It was Josephy who described Brig. Gen. James Carlton's reinforcement, taking the Butterfield Overland Mail Route from San Francisco through the San Joaquin Valley to Los Angeles, and continued to Ft. Yuma towards the land of Gadsden Purchase, through Tucson, Apache Pass to Las Cruces. There are two points that the other 3 authors never mentioned. (1) Don't confuse Henry Hopkins Sibley (Confederate) with his cousin Henry Hastings Sibley (Union). Both were Brig. Generals and both signed their names as Henry H. Sibley. A few researchers have confused the two. The Union Sibley only fought in Minnesota in suppressing the Sioux's uprising in the Civil War. (2) The hero of the battle of Glorieta Pass, Major John Chivington, was not so heroic in the Sand Creek massacre on the Cheyennes in 1864.
Civil War student, who is familiar to the names of the participants in the Eastern and Western theaters, may not be familiar with the participants in the Far West Theater. Names like John Slough, Gabriel Paul, Manuel Chaves, Samuel Tappan, Richard Sopris, Jacob Downing, William Wilder, Charles Kerber, Samuel Robbins, Robert Hall and Richard Lord filled the Union ranks and names like John Baylor, Tom Green, William Scurry, Charles Pyron, John Shropshire and Henry Raquet would lead the Confederate's roster. This is a very good primer on the New Mexico campaign.
Two books on Glorieta Pass appeared in 1998. The earlier one is called The Battle of Glorieta Pass, written by Thomas S. Edrington and John Taylor, printed by the New Mexico University Press, 1998. The most striking impression of the book was that the authors are neither historians nor professional writers. They are Scientists working in the Sandia Laboratory. John Taylor is a nuclear engineer who also wrote another book called The Battle of Velverde. Thomas Edrington is a manager/scientist. Both of them did research for the love of history. Their works are very detail and their documentation are in good order, including sources from the National Archives, Manuscripts from the Colorado, New Mexico and Texas libraries, Government Documents, diaries and Journals, Newspapers and books. The most impressive feature is the compiling of the Union and Confederate Order of Battle, Unit Strengths, and Casualties documentation of the battle in the Appendix. It is a nice work.
Weakness? A little. The domain of the book started from bloody Velverde to the end of the battle of Glorieta Pass. True to the title, the book is a straight description of the event, right to the point, but the book lacked explanation on the deep background of the causes, and the consequences after the battle. A reader may miss some of the historical significance if he is only relying on this book for information. For example, they did not describe in detail how difficult the Pike's Peakers faced when they force-marched through snow and sleet, through the eye of a novelist. They only used one sentence to describe the episode, "---- to encounter yet more misery on the form of a bitterly cold wind that one diarist described as a gale, and another, a hurricane." I think a more descriptive passage would reveal what an epic march the heroic Colorado miners had endured. The authors also did not mention the California reinforcement led by Brig. Gen. James Carlton and only used an indirect reference on him. In 1987, 31 skeletons were found during excavation for the foundation of a new house. The remains were re-buried in the Santa Fe National Cemetery in 1993. Tom Edrington took a picture on the ceremony. This book depicts a very detail account of the battle.
The second 1998 book is called The Battle of Glorieta, Union Victory in the West, written by a former history professor Don E. Alberts, University of Texas Press. Mr. Alberts is an old hand on Civil War history of the southwestern region. As early as 1984, he edited "Rebels on the Rio Grande: The Civil war Journal of A. B. Peticolas." Sgt. Alfred B. Peticolas, a young lawyer from Victoria, Texas, served on Company C, Fourth Texas Mounted Volunteers. As a consulting historian, Don Alberts was involved in the archeological dig of the Confederate mass grave in 1987. His work produced a harvest of many Civil War artifacts: buckshot, shrapnel, minie balls, artillery projectiles and unfired carbine rounds. Don Alberts also once served as President and member of the Glorieta Battlefield Preservation Society. He did a thorough job in describing the background of the conflict, the fight in Apache Canyon in 3/26/1862, the fierce battle at Pigeon's Ranch and the stealth rear attack at Canoncito (Johnson's Ranch) in 3/28/1862 and the postscript on several major players. Alberts explained the anger of Col. Gabriel Paul, who was a professional soldier for many years. The slow promotion system only made him Major in the old Regular Army. He was appointed Colonel in December 1861. Then came this green non-professionally trained soldier, John Slough, with only 6 months experience, was appointed Colonel of the Volunteer Colorado army, dated August 1861, and suddenly ranked him, and took away his command to defend Ft. Union. His anger is understandable. He protested to Col. Canby and to Washington. The issue would not be resolved before the battles. He knew that Slough would "steal" all his glory. Fortunately Paul played by the rule and put the interest of the country ahead of his personal interest. He submitted under protest, but cooperated with Slough. Fortunately their unity helped the Union win the New Mexico War, even though technically the Confederate won the battle of Glorieta Pass in 3/28/1862 by holding the field of Pigeon's Ranch. The author added critical thinking to his work. For example, he doubted the cavalry could jump over the 150 feet gap of a burned bridge, as stated in Chivington's recollection. The narrative includes background, main feature and postscript ----- presenting a complete story!
The last but not the least, is the classic 1906 book: The battle of Glorieta Pass, the First Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War, by William C. Whitford, reprinted by the Rio Grande Press, Inc. in 1994. In the late 1880s, Dr. Whitford, D.D., taking an AT&SF railway car, passed through the Glorieta Pass battlefield. Sitting next to him was an ex-soldier who fought that war. After hearing the story, he went back and interviewed as many ex-veterans as he could find to record this historic deed. Because Whitford got his history from the direct source, the participant eyewitnesses, his book had no bibliography. He re-visited and examined the battlefield numerous times in order to understand the significance of the topology of the land and strategy used.
This pioneer work precedes all other works. Whitford deserved all the credit for bringing this little known history out to the later generation. Without his work, the story may never be told so thoroughly.
The book had a detail description on Governor William Gilpin who had the insight to organize the Colorado Volunteers with no help from the Federal Government. He used I.O.U. to buy weapons, food and supplies. But the inflexible Fed. Gov. won't rectify his action to honor the I.O.U., causing him to resign.
The 1994 edition also included a factual analysis of the military strategy of both sides, illustrated with explanatory maps compiled and drawn by Burt Schmitz of Cupertino, California. Burt studied the battles for 30 years, and used the scaled U.S. geological topographic maps to draw his battlefields. His map, the most detail and the most accurate, is the best of all the 4 books. The book is pro-Union and not quite balanced (to the Confederates). It also gave most of the credit to the Coloradans and not quite enough to the New Mexicans. But overall, this is a great book. I believe this is a very important historical record on Civil War of the Far West.
Of the 4 books, no one book has all the complete facts. No one book is perfect. Each one missed a little fact or interpretation. Each one contributed some findings that the others didn't have. Only by combining all 4 books and superimposing all the facts, could you gather all the information to form a comprehensive picture of the history.
A footnote from the author: The movie "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" starring Clint Eastwood, used Sibley's retreat from New Mexico to Texas as its background. You could see the images of the wounded and thirsty Confederates, abandoned to die in the desert. (Webmaster. Written in 1998-99)
Glorieta Pass, a historical novel written by P.G. Nagle, put the historical figures in the background while she developed her fictional characters and unfurled them in the story. Using this approach, she is free to create characters and story line without restriction and constraint. Whereas, novelist Jeff Shaara used his historical characters in the fore ground and that made his historical novel predictable. Using this format, Ms. Nagle was able to intrigue the readers in every step of the way.
The main character Miss Laura Howland from Massachusetts is a composite of historical facts. A Union private named Howland did exist, and Confederate General Henry Hopkins Sibley's wife, Charlotte Kendall Sibley was from Massachusetts. Federal Colonel Edward Canby's wife, Louisa Hawkins Canby, did nurse the injured Confederate soldiers in Santa Fe for humanitarian reason, in true life as well as in the novel. And she was widely respected by the Confederates. The character Lieutenant Charles Franklin is totally believable. I have come across in my study in the Civil War that there are quite a number of "Deborah Sampsons" in both armies. Deborah Sampson was the famous woman who dressed as a man and fought in the Revolutionary War. Most women followed their husbands or boy friends to the army as soldiers. It is less likely, but possible, for a sister to follow a brother, like in this novel.
She also created characters on the Confederate side, though she spent more pages writing on her Union characters. Not too many descriptions on the military struggle were inked. Perhaps the primary focus by Ms. Nagle is on human interaction, on culture and on the spirit of the time rather military actions and fighting.
The author also had the advantage of knowing the country, for she had lived in Los Alamos, about a half-hour drive to Glorieta Pass. Knowing the area and the local American / Spanish culture and history presented a big plus in presenting the realism of the people and the era. (Webmaster. Written in 2001)
Book 1: 1991 book - The Civil War in the American West (Total 11 chapters)- Chapter 1,2 & 3 on
the New Mexican campaign, including the Glorieta Pass - by Alvin M. Josephy, Jr.
Book 2: 1998 book - The Battle of Glorieta Pass - by Thomas S. Edrington & John Taylor
Book 3: 1998 book - The Battle of Glorieta - by Don E. Alberts
Book 4: 1906 book (1971 expanded edition, reprinted 1994) - The Battle of Glorieta Pass, the First Colorado Volunteers in the Civil War - by William C. Whitford
Book 5: 1999 book -- Glorieta Pass (a Novel) -- by P.G. Nagle
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